Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Jerson A.D.G.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, in their official capacity as
Attorney General of the United States;
Kristi Noem, in her capacity as Secretary
of the United States Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, in his
official capacity as Acting Director of the
United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and David Easterwood, in
his official capacity as Acting Director, St.
Paul Field Office, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
Civil No. 26-516 (DWF/SGE)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jerson A.D.G.’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution and laws of
the United States (“the Petition”). (Doc. No. 1.) Respondents oppose, arguing that
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1). (Doc. No. 5.)
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Petition and orders Respondents to
release Petitioner from custody immediately.
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a refugee from Venezuela who was lawfully admitted to the United
States on September 23, 2024. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 3.) He resides in Brooklyn Park,
Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 5.) Since admission, he has followed all required processes and
procedures to remain in good standing. (Id. ¶ 3.) Petitioner has not been charged with or
convicted of any crimes. (Id. ¶ 44.) The Government has not initiated removal
proceedings against Petitioner, and Petitioner has never been subject to a removal order.
(Id. ¶¶ 50-51.) Petitioner has a pending I-485 application to adjust his status to that of a
lawful permanent resident (“LPR”). (Id. ¶ 47.)
Petitioner received a letter from Respondents requesting a meeting regarding his
refugee status. (Id. ¶ 3.) When Petitioner arrived at the meeting on January 21, 2026, he
was arrested and detained. (Id.) He was first detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) at Fort Snelling. (Id. ¶ 5.) He was then moved to an ICE facility in
Texas but returned to Minnesota pursuant to court order. (See Doc. No. 5 at 1-2.)
Respondents claim authority for continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)(C).
(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 12; Doc. No. 5 at 2.)
Petitioner filed the Petition on January 21, 2026. (Doc. No. 1 at 19.) He asserts
that his detention violates his procedural and substantive due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment, his Fourth Amendment rights to protection from unreasonable search
and seizure, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative Procedure
Act, and the Accardi doctrine. (Id. ¶¶ 48-74.) He requests an order declaring that his
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detention violates the law, immediate release from detention, and an award of attorneys’
fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Id. at 19.)
DISCUSSION
A district court may provide habeas relief to a person who is being detained in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). That
authority includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration-related detention.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896,
900-01 (D. Minn. 2020). The burden is on the petitioner to prove illegal detention by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149,
1154 (D. Minn. 2025).
The Court starts and ends with Petitioner’s claim that his detention violates his
procedural due process rights. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
U.S. Const. amend. V. Freedom from physical detention by the government is “the most
elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). Civil
detention violates the Due Process Clause unless there is a “special justification” that
“outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation modified). It is clear that Respondents’
detention of Petitioner violates the Due Process Clause because they do not have
authority to detain him.
Petitioner entered the United States as a refugee. Under the INA, a “refugee” is
any person who is outside their country of nationality, or where they last habitually
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resided, and “is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country because of persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Following
extensive screening and vetting procedures, refugees may be lawfully admitted into the
United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157. A person who has obtained conditional status as a
refugee is deemed to have been “admitted.” D-K-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 761, 769 (B.I.A.
2012).
After residing in the United States for one year, refugees are required to apply for
adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a). The statute
provides that a refugee who has been admitted under § 1157, and whose admission has
not been terminated, but who has not yet attained LPR status, “shall, at the end of such
year period, return or be returned to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security
for inspection and examination for admission to the United States as an immigrant in
accordance with the provisions of sections 1225, 1229a, and 1231 of this title.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1159(a)(1).
This case hinges on the meaning of “custody” under § 1159(a). Respondents
argue that this language gives DHS the authority to detain Petitioner. (Doc. No. 5 at 2-3.)
Petitioner argues that the language merely gives DHS the authority to interview a
refugee, not detain. (Doc. No. 6 at 12-13.) The Court agrees with Petitioner.
The “custody” contemplated by § 1159 is “for a limited time to serve a specified
purpose—inspection and examination.” Serhii L. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-463, 2026 WL
184736, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 24, 2026). Such authority is not equivalent to authority to
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detain. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385-86 (2005) (finding that “custody” did
not authorize “detention, much less indefinite detention” under a different provision of
the INA). Put differently, § 1159 authorizes legal custody, not physical custody. E.g.,
Darvin M. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-437, 2026 WL 184843, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 24, 2026)
(“As Petitioner correctly observes, ‘custody’ contemplates the exercise of control absent
physical detention . . . .”). This reading is bolstered by the directive that a refugee “return
or be returned.” “Return” implies something which has happened previously. Refugees
are not detained upon arrival, therefore, they could not be “returned” to detention. See id.
Even DHS’s own guidance says that detention under § 1159 is not proper. U.S. Immigr.
& Customs Enf’t, Memorandum on Detention of Refugees Admitted Under INA § 207
Who Have Failed to Adjust to Lawful Permanent Resident Status 2 (May 10, 2010),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/policy/directive11039.1.pdf. (“[A]djustment of status
under [§ 1159] is not a sufficient ground to place [refugees] in removal proceedings, and
therefore not a proper basis for detaining them.”).
Further, Respondents made no argument that detention was justified under one of
the sections cited in § 1159—§§ 1225, 1229a, and 1231. Even if they had, none of those
apply to Petitioner. He is not an “arriving alien” and there is no evidence that he has
been placed in removal proceedings or that he is subject to a removal order. See Jama
A.O. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-420, 2026 WL 185767, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2026) (ordering
the immediate release of a similarly situated refugee). “Respondents cannot justify
Petitioner’s continued detention through an open-ended assurance that they will get
around to conducting the inspection and examination required by § 1159(a), which
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presents their only identified basis for continued detention.” Aleksander B. v. Trump,
No. 26-cv-170, 2026 WL 172435, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2026).
Petitioner cannot be detained pursuant to § 1159 as he awaits determination on his
LPR application. Accordingly, there is no lawful basis for Petitioner’s detention, and the
Court orders his immediate release.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1. 	Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. [1]) is
GRANTED.
2. 	The Court DECLARES that Petitioner’s current detention is unlawful
under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
3. 	Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner from custody
immediately.
4. 	Within three (3) days of the date of this Order, Respondents shall provide
the Court with a status update confirming Petitioner’s release.
5. 	Within thirty (30) days of final judgment in this action, Petitioner may
move to recover attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 27, 2026 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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