Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Mahad S.,
Petitioner,
v.
Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Department of
Homeland Security, in her official capacity;
Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in
his official capacity; Peter Berg, Director,
St. Paul Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, in his official
capacity; Samuel J. Olson, Field Office
Director of Enforcement and Removal
Operations, Chicago Field Office,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in
his official capacity; James Tadman, Sheriff
of Polk County, Minnesota, custodian of
detainees of the Northwest Regional
Corrections Center;
Respondents.
File No. 26-CV-476 (JMB/JFD)
ORDER
Karen Venice Bryan, KB Law PLLC, St. Louis Park, MN, for Mahad S.
Trevor Brown, Friedrich A.P. Siekert, and Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office,
Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, Peter Berg, and Samuel
J. Olson.
Trevor Brown and Friedrich A.P. Siekert, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis,
MN, for James Tadman.
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This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Mahad S.’s1 Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Petition) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 2 [hereinafter, “Pet.”].) Respondents
Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, Peter Berg, Samuel J. Olson, and James Tadman (together,
Respondents) oppose the Petition. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the
Petition in part and orders Mahad S.’s immediate release.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	Mahad S. is a native and citizen of Somalia who entered the United States
around September 30, 2022. (Pet. ¶¶ 1, 20.)
2. 	On November 19, 2022, Respondents released Mahad S. on his own
recognizance under 8 U.S.C. 1226. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 20.)
3. 	Mahad S. was issued a Notice to Appear and placed in full removal
proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (Id.)
4. 	Mahad S. timely filed an I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal on March 2, 2023. 	(Id. ¶ 3.) 	He has never missed a court hearing, he has no
criminal history, and he possesses a valid work permit. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 21.) He is awaiting an
individual merits hearing on his asylum claims. (Id. ¶ 3.)
5. 	Mahad S. was detained on December 6, 2025. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 22.) He is currently
being 	detained 	by 	Respondents 	at 	the 	Northwest 	Regional 	Corrections 	Center 	in
Crookston, Minnesota. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 23)
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in immigration cases.
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6. 	On January 20, 2026, Mahad S. filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet.) Mahad S. seeks immediate release or a bond hearing
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 	(Id. at 16.) 	Mahad S. also seeks a variety of additional
relief 	from 	the 	Court, 	including 	a 	declaration 	that 	his 	current 	detention 	without
individualized determination is unlawful, as well as an award of attorney fees and costs
pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. 	(Id. at 15–16.) 	Mahad S. argues that his
December 6, 2025, redetention violates his due process rights because Respondents
revoked Mahad S.’s order of release on his own recognizance without consideration of any
individualized facts and circumstances applicable to him. (Id. ¶¶ 49–52, 57–61.)
DISCUSSION
Respondents argue that Mahad S.’s detention is mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b). 	Respondents, however, do not address whether they violated Mahad S.’s due
process rights when they redetained him on December 6, 2025. 	Because Respondents
continue to rely on an incorrect interpretation of sections 1225 and 1226, and because the
portion of the Petition challenging Mahad S.’s arrest is not directly opposed, the Court
grants the Petition in part and orders immediate release.
A. 	Constitutional Guarantee of Habeas Review and Due Process
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted
to any person who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to
every individual detained within the United States” (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2));
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Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025). For most of the nation’s
history, habeas review “has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it
does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” 	Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525
(quotation omitted). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “extends to . . . immigration-related detention.” Deng
Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (citation omitted). 	The
petitioner bears the burden of proving that his detention is illegal by a preponderance of
evidence. 	Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 2025 WL 2466670, at *5
(D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H., 782 F. Supp. 3d at 703).
The Constitution also guarantees every person in the United States due process of
law, including persons who are not United States citizens. E.g., Lopez v. Heinauer, 332
F.3d 507, 512 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court has long recognized that deportable
aliens are entitled to constitutional protections of due process.” (citing Yamataya v. Fisher,
189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903))); see also, e.g., Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U. S. 670, 673 (2025)
(per curiam) (“‘It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process
of law’ in the context of removal proceedings.” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306
(1993))); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies
to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”).
B. 	Interpretation of Section 1225
Respondents generally oppose Mahad S.’s Petition, explaining that the Petition
“raises legal and factual issues similar to those in prior habeas petitions this Court has
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decided” and that Respondents have appealed one such petition (see Avila v. Bondi, No.
25-3248 (8th Cir.)). (Doc. No. 10.) Respondents then incorporate by reference all of the
arguments raised in the Avila appeal and request denial of the petition. (Id.) In this way,
Respondents reiterate their argument that the detention of petitioners similarly situated to
Mahad S. is mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). 	As this Court has previously
concluded, however, Respondents’ interpretation lacks merit.
Courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ interpretation that section
1225(b)(2) requires the mandatory detention of all noncitizens living in the country who
are “inadmissible” because they entered the United States without inspection. 	See, e.g.,
Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 & n.22
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that this interpretation had been rejected in 350 cases
“decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across
the United States” and collecting cases in an Appendix A); Jose Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No.
25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025)
(collecting cases); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL
2802947, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 	This Court also finds
Respondents’ interpretation unpersuasive.
When interpreting a statute, “every clause and word of a statute should have
meaning.” 	United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432
(2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883)). 	Noncitizens who have been residing in the United States but who entered
without inspection have not, historically, been considered to still be “arriving” under
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section 1225(b). 	This is because the statute itself states that, in order to apply, several
conditions must be met; specifically, an immigration officer must determine that the
noncitizen “is an applicant for admission . . . seeking admission . . . [and] not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Determining the plain
meaning of the statute requires consideration of the tense of the verb “is” and the present
participle “seeking.” 	Here, section 1225(b)(2) applies to persons who presently are
applicants for admission and who presently are seeking admission at the time of their
detention. 	To be seeking admission means to be seeking entry, which “by its own force
implies a coming from outside.” United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401
(1929). In this case, Mahad S. has been residing in the United States and is, therefore, not
currently “seeking admission” into the United States.
In addition, Respondents’ interpretation of 1225(b)(2) renders superfluous other
immigration laws. Specifically, interpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens
who have already entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the
country, as Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section
1226 by the Laken Riley Act (LRA). The LRA added new categories of noncitizens subject
to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), and one such category was for noncitizens
lacking valid documentation and who have been charged with or convicted of certain
crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). But if Respondents’ interpretation of section
1225 were correct, then there would have been no need for the LRA to create these
additional categories because all noncitizens who are present in the United States and have
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not 	been 	admitted 	would 	have 	already 	been 	ineligible 	for 	bond 	under 	section
1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court also agrees with those courts that have found that Respondents’
interpretation of section 1225(b) is “at odds with both the relevant legislative history and
longstanding agency practice.” Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *7; see, e.g., Maldonado
v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150 (D. Minn. 2025) (discussing the longstanding practice
of treating noncitizens who resided in the United States, but who had entered without
inspection, as being subject to section 1226(a)).
The fact that Mahad S. has applied for asylum does not change the conclusion. The
definition of “admission” in this context means “the lawful entry of the noncitizen into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 	Barco
Mercado, 2025 WL 3295903 at *5 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis altered)).
Even by applying for asylum, a “noncitizen who already has entered the United States
illegally and is living here cannot be said to be actively seeking lawful entry into the United
States,” because the “entry, whether lawful or unlawful, occurred years ago.” Id. (emphasis
in original). 	Other courts have reached this same conclusion under similar facts. 	E.g.,
Quishpe-Guaman v. Noem, No. 4:25-CV-00211-TWP-KMB, 2025 WL 3201072, at *4
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2025) (finding it was “strong evidence” that the federal government
earlier released a noncitizen on her own recognizance under section 1226 and rejecting
Respondents’ argument that her asylum application shows that she “is plainly seeking
admission to the United States”); Mayamu K. v. Bondi, File No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025
WL 3641819, at *4, 8 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025) (concluding that despite a pending asylum
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application, the petitioner’s previous Order of Release on Recognizance under section 1226
precludes detention under section 1225).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Mahad S.’s detention is governed by
section 1226(a), and he is not subject to section 1225(b)’s mandatory detention.
C. 	Independent Grounds for Relief
Separate and independent from the applicability of section 1226, Mahad S. also
contends that the Due Process Clause compels immediate release. (Pet. ¶¶ 10, 49–52, 57–
61; id. at 16.) Respondents made no argument to the contrary, and the Court considers this
portion of Mahad S.’s request unopposed. 	Therefore, the Court alternatively grants the
petition on this basis.
In addition, the Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the Barco Mercado court on
the issue of whether the redetention of a person previously ordered released under section
1226—without Respondents first formally revoking that order of release or following any
procedures prior to making a decision that conflicts with an order of release—violates due
process. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)-(9) & (d)).
Here, it is undisputed that Mahad S. was ordered released pursuant to section 1226
and had been residing in the United States pursuant to that decision until his December 6,
2025 arrest. The record also shows that no official made any individualized, discretionary
decision to revoke Mahad S.’s section 1226 release. 	As in the Barco Mercado case, the
Court grants the Petition in part because the redetention of Mahad S. violated his due
process rights. See Barco Mercado, 2025 WL 3295903, at *12.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, as follows:
1. 	Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner Mahad S. from custody
immediately, and in any event no later than 4:00 p.m. CST on January 23,
2026.
2. 	On or before 11:00 a.m. CT on January 26, 2026, counsel for Respondents
shall file a letter affirming that Petitioner was released from custody in
accordance with this Order.
3. 	Mahad S. may move separately within 30 days of final judgment in this
action to recover attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
4. 	To the extent Petitioner seeks relief beyond an order requiring release or an
order requiring a bond hearing, the Petition is DENIED.
5. 	Petitioner’s Motion for Order to Show Cause (Doc. No. 3) and Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 4) are DENIED AS MOOT.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 22, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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