Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
U.H.A., on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated,
Petitioner-Plaintiff,
and
K.A., M. DOE, H.D., D. DOE, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated;
and THE ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the
United States;
KRISTI NOEM, 	Secretary, 	United States
Department of Homeland Security;
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, United
States 	Immigration 	and 	Customs
Enforcement;
DAVID EASTERWOOD, Acting Director, St.
Paul Field Office, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement;
JOSEPH 	B. 	EDLOW, 	Director, 	U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Defendants-Respondents.
Civil No. 26-417 (JRT/DLM)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 1 of 66

2
Ariana Kiener, Bryan Plaster, E. Michelle Drake, Hans W. Lodge, John G.
Albanese, Jordan C. Hughes, Joseph Hashmall, Katherine Raths, Marika K.
O’Connor Grant, and Soledad Slowing Romero, BERGER MONTAGUE PC,
1229 Tyler Street Northeast, Suite 205, Minneapolis, MN 55413; Kimberly
Robin Grano, Megan McLaughlin Hauptman, Ghita Schwarz, Mevlude
Amina Akay Alp, and Pedro Sepulveda, Jr., INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
ASSISTANCE PROJECT, 650 Massachusetts Avenue, Suite 600, Washington,
DC 20009; and Sarah Kahn and Bardis Vakili, CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
& CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1505 East Seventeenth Street, Suite 117, Santa
Ana, CA 92705, for Petitioner-Plaintiff and Plaintiffs.
Brantley Mayers, U.S.DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue
Northwest, Washington, DC 20530, for Defendants-Respondents.
When the clock strikes 12:00 a.m. on the 366 th day after a refugee was lawfully
admitted to the United States, according to the Government, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) gives
Department of Homeland Security officials the power to arrest and detain that refugee
with no limits on the length of detention. Because § 1159(a) provides no such power, the
Court will issue a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from arresting or detaining
refugees in Minnesota on the basis that have not yet been adjusted to lawful permanent
resident status—which, by law, cannot occur until one year has passed. The Court will
not allow federal authorities to use a new and erroneous statutory interpretation to
terrorize refugees who immigrated to this country under the promise that they would be
welcomed and allowed to live in peace, far from the persecution they fled.
The 	Government 	contends 	that 	§ 1159(a) 	provides 	them 	with 	arrest-and-
detention power and that such power is necessary to prevent refugees from skipping
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 2 of 66

3
town before they have been adjusted to lawful permanent resident status. 	The
Government’s position flatly contradicts the plain meaning of § 1159(a) and contravenes
forty-five years of agency practice. 	Section 1159(a) did not give the Government this
authority when Congress passed this provision in 1980, and it does not give the
Government the authority to do so now.
Decades ago, as a nation, we made a solemn promise to refugees fleeing
persecution: that after rigorous vetting, they would be welcomed to the United States
and given the opportunity to rebuild their lives. We assured them that they could care
for their families, earn a living, contribute to their communities, and live in peace here in
the United States. 	We promised them the hope that one day they could achieve the
American Dream.
The 	Government’s 	new 	policy 	breaks 	that 	promise—without 	congressional
authorization—and raises serious constitutional concerns. 	The new policy turns the
refugees’ American Dream into a dystopian nightmare. Until the Court can resolve those
issues on the merits, it will not allow federal authorities to cast aside the commitment
made to those who were vetted, admitted, and came to this country in reliance on our
word.
Because the Dataphase factors all weigh in favor of granting preliminary injunctive
relief, the Court will issue a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from arresting or
detaining any member of the putative class in Minnesota on the basis that they are a
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 3 of 66

4
refugee who has not yet adjusted to lawful permanent resident status and postpone the
effective date of Defendants’ detention policy pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705. Because the
putative detained subclass members have been released, the Court will deny for now
preliminary injunctive relief as to that subclass.
BACKGROUND
Before addressing whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate, the Court will
outline the relevant factual background, provide an overview of the statutory and
regulatory framework governing refugees, and summarize the relevant procedural
history.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 9, 2026, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the United
States 	Citizenship 	and 	Immigration 	Services 	(USCIS) 	announced 	Operation 	Post-
Admission Refugee Reverification and Integrity Strengthening (“Operation PARRIS”).
(Class Action Compl. & Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Am. Pet.”) ¶ 1, Jan. 24, 2026,
Docket No. 12.) 	According to USCIS’s press release announcing the program, it is a
“sweeping initiative” intended to “reexamin[e] thousands of refugee cases through new
background checks and intensive verification of refugee claims.”1 	(Decl. of E. Michelle
Drake (“Drake Decl.”) ¶ 17, Ex. 15, Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No. 16-19.) The press release
1 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., DHS Launches Landmark USCIS Fraud Investigation
in Minnesota (Jan. 9, 2026), https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/dhs-launches-
landmark-uscis-fraud-investigation-in-minnesota. (Filed at Docket No. 16-19.)
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 4 of 66

5
emphasizes that the “initial focus [of Operation PARRIS] is on Minnesota’s 5,600 refugees
who have not yet been given lawful permanent resident status (Green Cards).” (Id.)
Petitioner-Plaintiff U.H.A. and Plaintiffs K.A., H.D., D. Doe, and M. Doe (collectively,
the “Named Plaintiffs”) are refugees who were lawfully admitted to the United States
through the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) after completing a
rigorous vetting process. (Am. Pet. ¶ 9.) The Named Plaintiffs are originally from Africa,
Asia, or Latin America and reside in Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 11.) The Named Plaintiffs have not
yet been adjusted to lawful permanent resident status (sometimes referred to as “green
card” status). (Id. ¶¶ 3, 11.) None of the Named Plaintiffs have been charged with any
ground for removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), nor have they
been declared a danger to the public or a flight risk. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.)
The Named Plaintiffs’ accounts illustrate the impact of Defendants’ new program.
Petitioner-Plaintiff U.H.A. is a refugee, admitted into the United States in 2024, who was
arrested by ICE while driving to work on January 18, 2026. (Id. ¶ 15.) He was pulled over,
ordered out of his car, handcuffed, and detained, without a warrant or apparent
justification. (Id.) U.H.A., who lives with his parents and siblings, has no criminal history
and has never been placed in removal proceedings. (Id.) Plaintiff K.A., U.H.A.’s younger
brother, is also a refugee. (Id. ¶ 16.) K.A. was driving behind U.H.A. on their way to work
on January 18 and witnessed his brother’s arrest on the highway. 	(Id.) 	K.A. now fears
that he, too, will be arrested by ICE. (Id.) He has not returned home since that day, “[n]or
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 5 of 66

6
has he ventured out to attend his college classes or to buy groceries.” (Id.) K.A., like his
brother, has no criminal history. (Id. ¶ 111.) At the time Plaintiffs filed their Amended
Petition, U.H.A. was in detention.2 (Id. ¶ 110.)
Plaintiff H.D. is a refugee who applied to become a lawful resident in 2025, and she
fears leaving her home as a result of Operation PARRIS. (Id. ¶ 17.) ICE officers “came to
[H.D.’s] family home twice within a week and attempted to get her family to open the
door; fearful, they did not.” (Id. ¶ 112.) H.D. received a letter “instructing her to report
to an appointment at an ICE office for a case review interview”—but H.D. has a friend,
also a refugee, who “had applied for a green card,” and was arrested by ICE at a case
review appointment. (Id. ¶ 112.) Fearful for her own liberty, H.D. did not attend. (Id.)
“She secured a lawyer who attended on her behalf, but the ICE officer refused to
communicate with her lawyer.” (Id.) H.D.’s “experience has caused her to relive similar
experiences of armed men knocking on her door in the country she fled.” (Id.)
D. Doe, a refugee, was at home with his family on January 11, 2026, when a man
in plain clothes knocked on the door. (Id. ¶ 18.) D. Doe answered the door, and the man
told him that he had hit D. Doe’s car—but his description did not match D. Doe’s car. (Id.)
The man left, and returned a few minutes later, this time describing the correct car. (Id.)
When D. Doe went outside to check the damage, he was surrounded by armed men and
2 It is the Court’s understanding that Petitioner-Plaintiff U.H.A. was released following the
Court’s January 28, 2026 TRO order.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 6 of 66

7
arrested. (Id.) After being taken to a detention center in Minnesota, he was immediately
flown to Texas, where he was interrogated about his refugee status. (Id.) He was kept in
“shackles and handcuffs” for sixteen hours. (Id. ¶ 113.) D. Doe was ultimately released
on the streets of Texas, left to find his way back to Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 18.) After seeing
her spouse, D. Doe, arrested, Plaintiff M. Doe fears that she may be arrested and detained
by ICE, and that both parents may be separated from their three-year-old son. (Id. ¶¶ 19,
114.)
Plaintiff the Advocates for Human Rights is a 501(c)(3) legal services nonprofit
organization. 	(Id. ¶ 115.) 	They allege that their “core business activities have been
significantly impacted” by Defendants’ new policy, and that they have “been unable to
assist clients that it would have ordinarily served” due to the need to “divert significant
resources to representing refugees in habeas proceedings.” (Id. ¶¶ 116–17.)
Plaintiffs also submitted declarations concerning Operation PARRIS’s effect on
other refugees in Minnesota. 	For instance, one refugee—a junior in high school—was
arrested and detained after she was pulled over on her way to school. (Drake Decl. ¶ 9,
Ex. 7.) She told the ICE agents that she was a minor and provided them with her driver’s
license, which showed that she was a minor. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) ICE agents handcuffed her and
forced her to leave the vehicle on the road. (Id. ¶ 9.) ICE agents told her that she was
going to be sent to Texas or Chicago. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11.) ICE then learned that a judge had
ordered them not to transport her outside of Minnesota, and an ICE agent had her call
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 7 of 66

8
her parents to come get her. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) The ICE agent told her to tell her family that
if they came to get her, ICE would send them all to Texas. (Id.) Her family decided not to
pick her up. 	(Id.) 	At that point, ICE took her to a hotel where she spent the night in
same room with two ICE agents. (Id. ¶¶ 14–16.) Although she had her own bed, she did
not have her own room. (Id. ¶ 17.) The next day, she was released and allowed to leave
with her lawyer. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Another refugee, a father of a four-year-old girl, submitted green card applications
for his family in 2025. (Drake Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 8 ¶ 3.) While at work, he received a call from
his wife that ICE agents had shown up to their house and told her that they had not
completed their green card applications. (Id. ¶ 4.) That same day, ICE made three return
visits to the home. 	(Id. ¶¶ 5–6.) 	On the first return visit, ICE agents took his wife and
daughter’s passports and told them that the documents could be picked up the next day.
(Id. ¶ 5.) On the third return visit, an ICE agent took his wife and daughter into custody.
(Id. ¶ 6.) 	After being taken into custody, an ICE officer called him, using his wife’s cell
phone, and told him that they had arrested his wife and daughter and would be sending
them to Texas. (Id. ¶ 7.) ICE gave him the option to go with his family. (Id.) When he
reached the ICE office near the airport, ICE agents directed him to his wife and daughter,
closed the door, and told him to give them his phone and belongings. (Id. ¶ 9.) He was
fingerprinted and handcuffed in front of his family. (Id.) ICE agents told him that they
could not tell him why he was being detained. (Id. ¶ 10.) The refugee and his family were
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 8 of 66

9
flown to a detention facility in Houston, Texas and for nearly ten hours, they were held in
a small room, which had bright lights, a dirty toilet, and a tiny metal bench next to the
toilet. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) The family noted a camera that made them feel unsafe to use the
toilet. (Id. ¶ 13.) The family was taken to a hotel at around 3:00 a.m.; three ICE officers
stayed in the room with them overnight. (Id. ¶ 15.) In the morning, the refugee and his
family were transported back to the detention facility where they were interviewed about
their refugee applications for more than three hours. 	(Id. ¶¶ 16–20.) 	After the
interviews, they were transported from Houston to San Antonio. 	(Id. ¶ 21.) 	ICE
eventually released the refugee and his family on January 16, 2026, at an airport in Texas,
where they were left to return to their home in Minnesota at their own expense.
(Id. ¶ 22.)
II. 	STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Decades ago, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by
enacting the Refugee Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). The Act was
passed to create a clear, consistent, and humane system for admitting and resettling
refugees in the United States. Id. The Act emphasized “that it is the historic policy of the
United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their
homelands,” which includes providing resettlement opportunities as well as humanitarian
and transitional assistance to those who qualify as a refugee. Id. § 101.
To qualify for resettlement in the United States, the noncitizen must meet the
definition of a refugee. A refugee is an individual “who is unable or unwilling to return
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 9 of 66

10
to . . . [their country of origin] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
To be admitted into the United States as a refugee, a prospective refugee must
complete many steps. 	First, the prospective refugee must be referred to the United
States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), an interagency initiative involving multiple
governmental and nongovernmental entities, including the Department of State, the
Department of Homeland Security, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement,
Resettlement Support Centers, and the International Organization for Migration.3 	To
obtain such a referral, the prospective refugee must typically must register with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the country where they have
sought refuge.4 UNCHR then determines whether resettlement in a third country is the
3 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., The United States Refugee Admissions Program
(USRAP) 	Consultation 	and 	Worldwide 	Processing 	Priorities,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/usrap 	[https://perma.cc/G3WN-
NYD2] (last visited Feb. 23, 2026).
4 	U.S. 	Dep’t 	of 	State, 	Refugee 	Admissions, 	https://2021-2025.state.gov/refugee-
admissions/ [https://perma.cc/4SA8-PYD6] (last visited Feb. 23, 2026).
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 10 of 66

11
best option.5 But because so many people are displaced worldwide, typically only about
one percent of registrants are referred for resettlement in a third country.6
After a refugee applicant is referred, they must undergo extensive security
screening 	conducted 	by 	multiple 	federal 	agencies, 	including 	the 	National
Counterterrorism Center, the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center, the Drug Enforcement
Agency, the Department of Defense, and others.7 An applicant’s biometric and biographic
information is screened against numerous databases, including the Consular Lookout and
Support System and other intelligence community systems.8
After completing the biometric and biographic checks, USCIS conducts an interview
to determine whether the individual qualifies for refugee status.9 During this interview,
USCIS verifies the applicant’s biographic information, confirms that the applicant properly
accessed the USRAP, and assesses whether the applicant meets the legal definition of a
refugee.10 USCIS also evaluates whether the applicant is admissible to the United States,
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Refugee Processing and Security Screening,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/refugees/refugee-processing-and-
security-screening [https://perma.cc/PZJ4-RDUT] (last visited Feb. 23, 2026).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 11 of 66

12
whether the applicant has participated in the persecution of others, and whether the
applicant has already been firmly resettled in another country.11
Once an applicant is conditionally approved, applicants must complete a medical
examination as well as a cultural orientation program.12 Applicants are assigned to a local
resettlement agency in the United States.13 	Before traveling to the United States,
applicants are subject to additional security screening.14 	Upon arrival, applicants are
inspected by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and if eligible, admitted into the United
States.15
Once 	admitted, 	refugees 	are 	automatically 	authorized 	to 	work. 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 274a.12(a)(3). 	They are also eligible for resettlement assistance, which provides
refugees access to housing, food, clothing, orientation programs, English-language
instruction, employment training, and medical and social services.16 The stated purpose
11 Id.
12 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., United States Refugee Admissions Program
(USRAP), 	https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/charts/USRAP_FlowChart.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4MA-2ELM] (last visited Feb. 23, 2026).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., United States Refugee Admissions Program
(USRAP), 	https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/charts/USRAP_FlowChart.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4MA-2ELM] (last visited Feb. 23, 2026); 8 U.S.C. § 1522.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 12 of 66

13
of providing this assistance is to help refugees “become effectively resettled as quickly as
possible.” 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a).
An 	individual 	with 	conditional 	refugee 	status 	is 	considered 	to 	have 	been
“admitted.” 	Matter of D-K-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 761, 769 (B.I.A. 2012) (concluding that “an
alien admitted to the United States as a refugee has been ‘admitted’ for the purposes of
[8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)]”). 	However, under the relevant statutory framework, a
refugee’s conditional admission may ultimately result in two “admissions.” 	Id. at 768.
The first is the initial conditional admission; the second occurs when the refugee is
adjusted to lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status. 	Id. (noting “that a refugee who
ultimately becomes a lawful permanent resident will have been ‘admitted’ twice—first,
upon conditional admission [under 8 U.S.C. § 1157] and second, upon reinspection and
adjustment to permanent resident status under [8 U.S.C. § 1159.]”).
After 	either 	of 	these 	admissions, 	Congress has 	imposed 	restraints on 	the
Government’s authority to commence removal proceedings. That is, a refugee may only
be removed based on the grounds of deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 but may not be
removed under grounds of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Matter of D-K-, 25 I. &
N. Dec. at 768 (acknowledging that, once conditionally admitted or adjusted to LPR status,
the individual is “subject to charges under only the deportability grounds, and not the
grounds of inadmissibility”). An individual designated as a refugee may also be subject to
removal if the individual is later found not to meet the definition of a “refugee” under 8
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 13 of 66

14
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4). If USCIS subsequently determines that the
noncitizen was not a “refugee,” regulations require USCIS to provide the noncitizen
written notice of its intent to terminate the noncitizen’s refugee status. 8 C.F.R. § 207.9.
The noncitizen then has 30 days to respond. Id.
Once an individual has been admitted as a refugee under § 1157 and has been
physically present in the United States for over a year, but has not been adjusted to LPR
status, they must “at the end of such year period, return or be returned to the custody of
the Department of Homeland Security for inspection and examination for admission to
the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the provisions of sections 1225,
1229a, and 1231 of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1).
Three aspects of § 1159 warrant emphasis. 	First, the statute requires refugees
who have resided in the United States for more than one year to submit to DHS for
inspection and examination. However, § 1159 “permits custody for a specific and limited
function: to allow DHS to conduct the inspection necessary to adjudicate adjustment of
status under § 1159(a)(2).” E.E. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-314, slip. op. at 7 (D. Minn. Jan. 17,
2026) (vacated on other grounds). 	Federal regulations require refugees to apply for
adjustment to LPR status one year after entry and to submit biometric information; such
regulations further provide that USCIS will decide “on a case-by-case basis” whether an
interview with an immigration officer is required to determine eligibility for LPR status. 8
C.F.R § 209.1(b), (d).
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 14 of 66

15
Second, detention of a refugee after “inspection and examination” is subject to 8
U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1229a, and 1231. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1). 	Section 1225 provides for
mandatory detention for certain inadmissible noncitizens “arriving in the United States,”
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and noncitizens deemed “applicant[s] for admission” that are
“seeking 	admission,” 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Section 	1229a 	governs 	removal
proceedings. 	Under § 1231, a noncitizen subject to a final order of removal must be
detained during a 90-day removal period, which generally starts when the order becomes
administratively final. 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)–(B), (a)(2)(A). After the 90-day removal
period ends, the noncitizen may be detained if determined “to be a risk to the community
or unlikely to comply with the order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
Third, refugees who meet the statutory requirements to obtain lawful permanent
resident status are entitled to that status. 	See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(2) (“Any [noncitizen]
who is found upon inspection and examination by an immigration officer . . . to be
admissible . . . shall, notwithstanding any numerical limitation . . . be regarded as lawfully
admitted to the United States for permanent residence[.]”).
ICE’s longstanding agency guidance has been that failure to obtain LPR status, by
itself, is not grounds for removal nor is it a “proper basis for detaining them.” U.S. Immigr.
& Customs Enf’t, Detention of Refugees Admitted Under INA § 207 Who Have Failed to
Adjust to Lawful Permanent Resident Status at 2 (May 10, 2010) (“2010 ICE Guidance”)17;
17 (Drake Decl. ¶ 18, Ex. 16.)
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 15 of 66

16
see also Liban G. v. Noem, Civ. No. 26-301, 2026 WL 125689, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2026).
Indeed, this guidance provided that if “an unadjusted refugee [is arrested] upon
reasonable belief of removability,” the Government must decide within 48 hours of the
arrest, whether to release the refugee or to commence removal proceedings by issuing a
Notice to Appear.18 (2010 Ice Guidance at 2.) But “[i]f it becomes apparent earlier that
no removability ground applies, the individual must be released promptly.” (Id.)
ICE, however, recently rescinded its 2010 ICE Guidance on December 18, 2025.
U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Rescission ICE Policy No. 11039.1: Detention of Refugees
Admitted Under INA § 207 Who Have Failed to Adjust to Lawful Permanent Resident
Status at 1 (Dec. 18, 2025) (“December Rescission Memo”).19 The seven-line rescission
memorandum stated the rescission was necessary “to protect its citizens from terrorist
attacks and other national security and public safety threats.”20
On February 18, 2026—the day before the preliminary injunction hearing in this
case—ICE issued a seven-page memorandum stating that although “ICE believes the
December rescission is valid, DHS has undertaken a fresh look at the past policies and
18 See also 2010 ICE Guidance at 3 (“If a determination to place an unadjusted refugee in
removal proceedings has not been made within the initial 48-hour period . . . the [Detention and
Removal Operations] Field Office should release the alien with a reminder that the INA imposes
an obligation upon him or her to apply for adjustment of status under section 209(a) and to
provide DHS with updated address information[.]”).
19 (Defs.’ Mem. Regarding Document Prod., Ex. A, Feb. 12, 2026, Docket No. 112-1.)
20 Id.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 16 of 66

17
rescinds them anew.” 	U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Detention of Refugees Who Have
Failed to Adjust to Lawful Permanent Resident Status at 1 (Feb. 18, 2026) (“February Re-
Rescission Memo”).21 The memorandum established that if a refugee does not voluntarily
submit themselves to DHS for inspection and examination under § 1159 one year after
admission, “DHS will return the individual to custody (i.e., arrest and detain) for this
purpose,” and “DHS may maintain custody for the duration of the inspection and
examination process.” Id. at 2.
III. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 18, 2026, Petitioner-Plaintiff U.H.A. filed a Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus following his arrest and detention under Operation PARRIS. (Docket No.
1.) On January 24, 2026, U.H.A, K.A., H.D., D. Doe., M. Doe., and The Advocates for Human
Rights (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Class Action Complaint and Amended Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging that Defendants’ policy of arresting and detaining
unadjusted refugees through the implementation of Operation PARRIS violates the
Administrative 	Procedure 	Act, 	the 	Accardi 	Doctrine, 	and 	the 	Fourth 	and 	Fifth
Amendments of United States Constitution. (Am. Pet. ¶¶ 118–69.)
Plaintiffs filed several other motions at the same time as the Amended Petition,
including a motion for a temporary restraining order and a motion for class certification.22
21 (Defs.’ Mem. Regarding Document Prod., Ex. A at 2, Feb. 18, 2026, Docket No. 122-1.)
22 (1) Motion for Entry of Preliminary Protective Order (Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No. 13); (2)
Motion for Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonyms and to Seal (Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No. 14); (3)
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 17 of 66

18
Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO), asking the Court to (1) postpone
the effective date of the “Refugee Detention Policy” Defendants have employed in
furtherance of Operation PARRIS;23 (2) enjoin Defendants from arresting or detaining any
member of the putative Class on the basis that they are an unadjusted refugee; and (3)
order that a subgroup of putative class plaintiffs who were detained under the Refugee
Detention Policy be immediately released from custody. (Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. for TRO
at 50, Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No. 16-2.)
Plaintiffs also filed a motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs requested certification of a “Class” of “[a]ll individuals
with refugee status who are residing in the state of Minnesota, who have not yet adjusted
to lawful permanent resident status and have not been charged with any ground for
removal under the [Immigration and Nationality Act].” (Pls.’ Mot. for Rule 23(b)(2) Class
Cert. at 2, Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No. 15.) 	Plaintiffs also requested certification of a
“Detained Subclass,” consisting of “[a]ll members of the Class who are or will be detained
by DHS pursuant to the Refugee Detention Policy.” (Id.)
Motion for Rule 23(b)(2) Class Certification (Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No. 15); and (4) Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Immediate Postponement of Agency Action (Jan. 24, 2026,
Docket No. 16).
23 Plaintiffs define the “Refugee Detention Policy” as Defendants’ policy “that would
subject all lawfully present refugees who have not yet obtained lawful permanent resident
(“LPR”) status to arrest and mandatory detention after being present in the United States for one
year—even though refugees cannot adjust to LPR status until the one-year mark[.]” (Pls.’ Mem.
Supp. Mot. for TRO at 10, Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No. 16-2.) For ease and consistency, the Court
will refer to DHS’s new policy, as defined by Plaintiffs, as the “Refugee Detention Policy.”
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 18 of 66

19
On January 28, 2026, the Court granted temporary relief to a putative “Class”
defined as “[a]ll individuals with refugee status who are residing in the state of Minnesota,
who have not yet adjusted to lawful permanent resident status, and have not been
charged with any ground for removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act” and
enjoined Defendants from arresting and detaining any member of the Class on the basis
that they are a refugee who has not been adjusted to LPR status. U.H.A. v. Bondi, Civ. No.
26-417, 2026 WL 222226, at *13 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2026). 	The Court also granted
temporary relief to a putative “Detained Subclass” defined as “[a]ll members of the Class
who are or will be detained by DHS pursuant to the Refugee Detention Policy” and
ordered their release. (Id.)
On January 29, 2026, the Court issued an order concluding that good cause existed
to extend the TRO under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2) to allow the parties the
requested amount of time to respond.24 	U.H.A. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-417, 2026 WL
242879, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2026). 	The Court ordered that the TRO entered on
24 As previously noted by the Court, Defendants arguably consented to an extension under
Rule 65(b)(2). At a status conference on January 26, 2026—two days before the Court entered
the TRO—Defendants requested that they be given two weeks to respond to Plaintiffs’ motion
for a preliminary injunction. (Hr’g Tr. at 14, Jan. 29, 2026, Docket No. 42 (The Court: “So if we
are looking at a hearing on a preliminary injunction, regardless of what happens with the TRO,
you want two weeks to respond to this in writing?” Defendants’ counsel: “Yes, sir.”).) Therefore,
if the Court had granted Defendants two weeks to respond and the Court had not extended the
14-day time limit, Plaintiffs would have had little or no time to respond and the Court would have
had at most two days to issue a further order before the TRO expired. Such a restricted time
limitation would be unfair, considering the important issues to consider in this case.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 19 of 66

20
January 28, 2026, would remain in effect until February 25, 2026, or until the Court ruled
on the preliminary injunction, whichever occurred first. Id.
On January 31, 2026, Defendants moved to dissolve the TRO, and requested, in the
alternative, that the TRO be stayed pending appeal. (Docket No. 55.) On February 3, the
Court denied Defendants’ motion to dissolve the TRO, concluding that Defendants had
failed to show that the conditions that warranted the TRO were no longer present and
that the Dataphase factors continued to weigh in favor of granting temporary relief.
U.H.A. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-417, 2026 WL 357636, at *8 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2026). The Court
also denied Defendants’ alternative request to stay the TRO pending appeal. Id.
The Court heard oral argument on whether to issue a preliminary injunction on
February 19, 2026.
DISCUSSION
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction is to
maintain the status quo. 	Tumey v. Mycroft AI, Inc., 27 F.4th 657, 664 (8 th Cir. 2022).
Courts evaluating a motion for a TRO or preliminary injunctive relief weigh four factors,
commonly referred to in the Eighth Circuit as the Dataphase factors: (1) the movant’s
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant in
the absence of relief; (3) the balance between that harm and the harm injunctive relief
would cause to the other litigants; and (4) the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 20 of 66

21
Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8 th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 	The movant has the burden of
proving all the Dataphase factors. Watkins Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8 th Cir. 2003).
When applying these factors, “a court should flexibly weigh the case’s particular
circumstances to determine whether the balance of equities so favors the movant that
justice requires the court to intervene.” Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement,
Inc., 182 F.3d 598, 601 (8 th Cir. 1999) (quoting United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d
1175, 1179 (8 th Cir. 1998)). That said, injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, and the
movant has the burden of establishing the propriety of an injunction. Watkins Inc., 346
F.3d at 845. The Court will address each of the Dataphase factors in turn.
II. 	LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must show that they are likely
to succeed on the merits of any one of their claims. Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth.
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 826 F.3d 1030, 1040 (8 th Cir. 2016). However, the question
is not whether the movant has “prove[d] a greater than fifty per cent likelihood that [they]
will prevail,” PCTV Gold, Inc. v. SpeedNet, LLC, 508 F.3d 1137, 1143 (8 th Cir. 2007), but
whether any of their claims provide a “fair ground for litigation,” Watkins, 346 F.3d at
844. “In considering the likelihood of the movant prevailing on the merits, a court does
not decide whether the movant will ultimately win.” PCTV Gold, 508 F.3d at 1143. Rather,
the movant must show that they have a “fair chance of prevailing” on their claims, “with
a ‘fair chance’ meaning something less than fifty percent.” 	Planned Parenthood Minn.,
N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732 (8 th Cir. 2008). 	While no single factor is
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 21 of 66

22
determinative, likelihood of success on the merits is often considered the most significant
of the Dataphase factors. Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 497 (8 th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy (1) violates 8 U.S.C.
§ 1159(a); (2) violates their procedural due process rights; (3) infringes their substantive
due process rights; (4) violates the Fourth Amendment; and (5) is arbitrary and capricious
and must be set aside under the APA.25 To obtain preliminary relief, Plaintiffs must
demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on at least one of these claims. Although the
Court will address each argument in turn, it finds that the Plaintiffs have shown that they
have a fair chance of prevailing on each of their claims.
A. 	Statutory Authority
Section 1159(a)(1) provides that once an individual has been admitted as a refugee
under 8 U.S.C. § 1157 and has been physically present in the United States for over a year
but has not been adjusted to LPR status, they must “at the end of such year period, return
or be returned to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security for inspection
and examination for admission to the United States as an immigrant in accordance with
25 Plaintiffs request that the Court stay the Refugee Detention Policy under 5 U.S.C. § 705
of the APA. (See, e.g., Pls.’ Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 32.) The Court has the authority
to “issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of” the agency
action “or to preserve status or rights.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. To determine whether a stay under § 705
is appropriate, the Court must apply the same factors used to decide whether to issue a
preliminary injunction. See Baggett Transp. Co. v. Hughes Transp., Inc., 393 F.2d 710, 716–717
(8 th Cir. 1968); Labnet Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 197 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1167 n.3 (D. Minn. 2016).
The Court will therefore apply the Dataphase factors to determine whether a stay under § 705
should be issued.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 22 of 66

23
the provisions of sections 1225, 1229a, and 1231 of this title.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)
(emphasis added).
1. 	Meaning of “Custody” Under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)
Defendants now argue that the phrase “be returned to the custody” in § 1159(a)(1)
authorizes (and even mandates) DHS to arrest and detain refugees who have been
present in the United States for more than one year for “inspection and examination” as
lawful permanent residents. 	Alternatively, Defendants argue that § 1159(a)’s cross-
reference to § 1225 provides an independent basis for detention.
As 	the 	Court 	explained 	previously, § 1159(a)(1) provides 	that 	refugees 	shall
“return or be returned to custody” for the purpose of “inspection and examination.” See
U.H.A., 2026 WL 222226, at *8. Within the context of § 1159(a)’s specific purpose, the
Court concludes for numerous reasons that the phrase “return or be returned to custody”
does not permit the arrest and detention of unadjusted refugees that have not been
charged with any ground of removability.
First, Defendants’ interpretation of § 1159(a)(1) impermissibly renders the word
“return” superfluous. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“[A] statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant[.]”). 	Section 1159(a)(1) provides that
refugees shall “return or be returned to the custody” of DHS for inspection and
examination. 	8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1) (emphasis added). 	If Defendants are authorized to
arrest and detain refugees 366 days after they are admitted, it would be impossible for
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 23 of 66

24
such refugees to submit themselves to DHS voluntarily because they cannot apply for LPR
status until they have been present in the United States for one year. 	See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1159(a)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a)(1) (noting that to be eligible for LPR status, the refugee
“is required to apply to USCIS one year after entry in order for USCIS to” make an LPR
adjustment determination); id. § 209.1(b) (providing that “every refugee entrant will be
notified of the requirement to submit an application for permanent residence one year
after entry”). 	Although the phrase “be returned” connotes a form of government
coercion, the word “return” does not—especially when placed next to and contrasted
with the phrase “be returned.” If Defendants’ interpretation is correct, the word “return”
would be meaningless.
Second, § 1159(a)(1) states that refugees shall “return or be returned” to DHS’s
custody. 	If “custody” is read to mean arrest and detention, then “returned” would
suggest that refugees were arrested and detained when they first entered the country.
But they were not: they were inspected and admitted into the country without being
detained. See Jerson A.D.G. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-516, 2026 WL 207352, at *2 (D. Minn.
Jan. 27, 2026) (“Refugees are not detained upon arrival, therefore, they could not be
‘returned’ to detention.”); Matter of D-K-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 769 (noting “that a refugee
who ultimately becomes a lawful permanent resident will have been ‘admitted’ twice—
first, upon conditional admission . . . and second, upon reinspection and adjustment to
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 24 of 66

25
permanent resident status” (emphasis added)). 	Because refugees were not detained
upon arrival, they cannot “be returned” to detention.
Third, the Government’s previous interpretations of § 1159(a)(1) reinforce the
conclusion that the term “custody” does not translate to arrest and detention of
unadjusted refugees. Contemporaneous constructions of a statute “constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024); see also Kisor v.
Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 594 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that
“the government’s early, longstanding, and consistent interpretation of a statute” may
be “powerful evidence” of the statute’s original meaning). In the wake of the Refugee
Act of 1980, the implementing regulations contemplated only that a “[n]otice [would] be
sent to all refugees after one year to report for an interview.” 	Aliens and Nationality;
Refugee and Asylum Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 45116-01, 45117 (Sept. 10, 1981) (Final
Rules); see also Aliens and Nationality; Refugee and Asylum Procedures, 45 Fed. Reg.
37392, 37392 (June 2, 1980) (Interim Regulations) (“Notice will be sent to all refugees and
asylees after one year to report for an interview.”). 	These early regulations made no
mention of 	arrest or 	detention of 	refugees who 	had not 	yet acquired permanent
resident status—much less arrest or detention without a warrant or prior notice.
That understanding endured for decades. 	And as recently as 2010, ICE’s own
guidance expressly recognized that § 1159 is “not a proper basis for detaining” refugees
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 25 of 66

26
who fail to apply for adjustment after one year. 	2010 ICE Guidance at 2. 	Although
Defendants declared they rescinded the 2010 ICE Guidance on December 18, 2025, and
then “re-rescinded” it on February 18, 2026, the agency’s consistent historical practice is
strong evidence that the plain text of § 1159(a)(1) does not authorize or require DHS to
arrest and detain unadjusted refugees, absent any ground of removability. 	Moreover,
current federal regulations do not contemplate the arrest or detention of unadjusted
refugees, as the regulation governing the adjustment of status does not refer to arrest or
detention. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(b), (d) (describing the adjustment-of-status process as
involving an application and an interview). Yet, Defendants have argued that § 1159(a)
“mandates temporary detention.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dissolve TRO at 8, Jan. 31,
2026, Docket No. 56 (emphasis added).) 	If the Court were to accept that argument, it
would have to conclude that the executive branch has been violating § 1159(a)’s
supposed detention mandate for the past forty-five years, because it has never arrested
or detained unadjusted refugees in the years since the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted.
The Court declines to make such a finding and concludes that Defendants’ “early,
longstanding, and consistent interpretation of a statute” is, indeed, “powerful evidence”
that § 1159(a) does not permit arrest and detention of unadjusted refugees. See Kisor,
588 U.S. at 594 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
Fourth, the Supreme Court has concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)—which
contains nearly identical “be returned to custody” language—does not authorize
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 26 of 66

27
detention. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (interpreting the phrase “be
returned to the custody” under § 1182(d)(5)(A) and concluding that “nothing in this
text . . . affirmatively authorizes detention, much less indefinite detention”). 	“[W]hen
Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes . . . it is
appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in
both statutes.” Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).
Fifth, Defendants’ broad interpretation of § 1159(a) would likely render the statute
unconstitutional. Courts must avoid construing statutes in ways that would make them
unconstitutional when a reasonable alternative interpretation is available. 	Edmond v.
United States, 520 U.S. 651, 658 (1997). 	If the Court were to accept Defendants’
interpretation of § 1159(a)(1)—that DHS may (or even must) arrest and detain refugees
after the one-year mark—the statute would effectively permit DHS to detain refugees
indefinitely. Neither § 1159(a)(1) nor the relevant regulations set any deadline for when
the required inspection and examination must occur. 	A statute that permits indefinite
detention would present serious constitutional concerns. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 699–701 (2001) (holding that although 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)—which applied to
noncitizens subject to a final removal order—imposed no express time limit on the length
of detention, a limitation on length of detention should be read into § 1231(a)(6) to avoid
constitutional concerns).
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 27 of 66

28
Sixth, reading § 1159(a)’s “be returned to custody” language to require or
authorize arrest and detention leads to an absurd outcome. 	Since § 1159(a) bars
adjustment before the one-year mark, Defendants’ interpretation would subject all
refugees to detention unless USCIS conducted the inspection and examination precisely
at the one-year mark. That outcome makes little sense and undermines the claim that
§ 1159(a) mandates or authorizes detention.26
Seventh, in light of § 1159(a)’s limited purpose—ensuring that refugees undergo
inspection 	and 	examination—the 	term 	“custody” 	is 	better 	understood 	to 	mean
“responsibility” or “control,” not arrest and detention. Custody, Black’s Law Dictionary
(12 th ed. 2024) (defining custody as, among other things, “responsibility for taking care
of” and “[t]he care and control of a thing”); see also Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 245
(2010) (noting that when a word that has “many dictionary definitions . . . [a court] must
draw its meaning from its context”). In context, § 1159 simply envisions that a refugee
26 Tacitly recognizing the absurdity of subjecting all unadjusted refugees to arrest and
detention at the one-year mark, Defendants shifted course in their opposition memorandum.
According to Defendants’ January press release announcing Operation PARRIS, the initiative
targeted all of Minnesota’s roughly 5,600 unadjusted refugees. (Drake Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. 15.) Yet in
their opposition brief, Defendants advance a different position, asserting that “[u]nder § 1159,
an alien may voluntarily ‘return’ for inspection and examination . . . [b]ut if an alien fails to
voluntarily return, § 1159 requires” arrest and detention. (Defs.’ Opp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 7, Feb.
11, 2026, Docket No. 107.) 	At least one difficulty with this revised position is that the record
reflects implementation of the sweeping policy described in the January press release, not the
narrower approach now presented in Defendants’ opposition. 	Additionally, counsel for
Defendants indicated that even if a refugee voluntarily returned, they could still be arrested and
detained. (See Tr. of Jan. 19, 2026 Hr’g at 51, Jan. 22, 2026, Docket No. 129.)
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 28 of 66

29
be returned temporarily to DHS’s control (i.e., being summoned to appear for an
interview) 	so 	that 	the 	agency 	can 	carry 	out 	its 	inspection 	and 	examination
responsibilities—functions that do not require, and have never required, arrest and
detention.
Having the concluded that § 1159(a) does not provide an independent basis for
detention, the Court must decide whether unadjusted refugees may be detained under
§§ 1225, 1229a, or 1231. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1). As the Court previously concluded in
its order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, none of these
provisions justify detention of refugees who have not yet secured LPR status and have not
been charged with any ground of removability. 	See U.H.A., 2026 WL 222226, at *7.
Section 1225 is inapplicable to individuals admitted as refugees. See Matter of D-K-, 25 I.
& N. Dec. at 769. Thus, they cannot be considered “arriving aliens” under § 1225(b)(1) or
“applicant[s] for admission” under § 1225(b)(2) because they were admitted into the
country when they were granted permission to resettle in the United States. 	Section
1229a only applies to noncitizens who have been placed in removal proceedings.
Similarly, Section 1231 only applies to noncitizens that are subject to removal orders.27
27 In addition to the detention grounds referenced in 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (i.e., §§ 1225,
1229a, 1231), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) imposes mandatory detention on a defined group of noncitizens
who fall within “enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and terrorist activities.”
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). Defendants have offered no evidence that any
of the Named Plaintiffs have committed any of the enumerated crimes. Mandatory detention
under § 1226(c) therefore does not apply to the Named Plaintiffs. And by definition, members
of the putative Class and Detained Subclass have not been charged with any ground of
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 29 of 66

30
Accordingly, after considering the text, history, and purpose of § 1159(a), the Court
concludes that § 1159(a) does not give DHS the power to arrest or detain refugees who
have not yet obtained LPR status. Rather, § 1159(a)(1) grants DHS the responsibility to
inspect and examine refugees for the purpose of adjusting their status to LPR status under
§ 1159(a)(2).28 If DHS wishes to detain unadjusted refugees, it may only do so under §§
1225, 1229a, or 1231. 	Because Defendants have not demonstrated that any of these
provisions apply to Plaintiffs, and § 1159(a) provides no independent detention authority,
Defendants lack statutory authority to detain refugees solely on the basis that they have
not yet secured LPR status and they have not be charged with any grounds of
removability.
2. 	8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)’s Cross Reference to § 1225
As 	previously 	explained, 	§ 	1159(a)(1) 	provides 	that 	any 	“inspection 	and
examination for admission to the United States as an immigrant” must be done “in
accordance with the provisions of sections 1225, 1229a, and 1231 of this title.” 8 U.S.C.
removability; therefore, § 1226(c) does not apply to the putative Class or the putative Detained
Subclass.
28 To the extent § 1159(a) envisions a refugee’s involuntary encounter with federal
authorities, its plain language limits any return to custody (i.e., a DHS interview) to a single,
specific purpose: “inspection and examination for admission.” 	This statutory purpose places
clear boundaries on DHS’s authority. 	See Aleksander B. v. Trump, Civ. No. 26-170, 2026 WL
172435, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2026). DHS may not exercise control over a refugee under § 1159
once the “inspection and examination for admission” is complete, or for any purpose unrelated
to that inspection. 	The temporary and limited nature of § 1159(a)’s custody requirement is
reinforced by the fact that any detention must justified under §§ 1225, 1229a, or 1231—
provisions that, as the Court has already explained, are inapplicable here.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 30 of 66

31
§ 1159(a)(1). Defendants argue, in the alternative to their arguments addressed above,
that § 1159(a)’s cross-reference to § 1225 permits detention of unadjusted refugees. The
Court also rejects this argument.
Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission”—noncitizens who are either
“present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted” or “who arrive[] in the
United States.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). 	Applicants for admission fall under either
§ 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). “Section
1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud,
misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” as well as “certain other aliens
designated by the Attorney General in his discretion.” 	Id. (citations omitted). 	Section
1225(b)(2) serves as a “catchall provision that applies to” almost all other applicants for
admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1). Id.
Defendants’ claim that § 1225(b) allows detention of the putative class is flawed
because refugees are not “applicants for admission” under § 1225(a)(1). 	See, e.g.,
Mohamednoor A. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-525, 2026 WL 221926, at*3 (D. Minn. Jan. 28,
2026); Jama A.O. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-420, 2026 WL 185767, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 23,
2026). 	After undergoing robust screening, refugees are conditionally admitted upon
arrival, so they cannot be considered applicants for admission. See Matter of D-K-, 25 I.
& N. Dec. at 769. ICE’s own July 2025 guidance confirms this interpretation, specifying
that § 1226 (discretionary detention)—not § 1225 (mandatory detention)—applies to
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 31 of 66

32
“[noncitizens] admitted to the United States.” Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957,
963 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority
for Applicants for Admission to all ICE Employees, July 8, 2025).
Consequently, § 1159(a)’s cross-reference to § 1225 does not change the analysis.
DHS does not possess authority under § 1159(a), either independently or in conjunction
with § 1225, to detain members of the putative Class or the Detained Subclass.
* 	* 	*
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed in showing that
§ 1159(a) authorizes arrest and detention of refugees who have not yet adjusted to LPR
status and have not been charged with any grounds of removability.
B. 	Procedural Due Process
Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	Defendants’ 	Refugee 	Detention 	Policy 	violates 	their
procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution because Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy does not provide any notice
or opportunity to be heard prior to arrest. Defendants counter that the Policy presents
no procedural due process concerns because Plaintiffs do not explain how more process
(e.g., an evidentiary hearing) “would produce a fact ‘material to’ § 1159(a).” (Defs.’ Opp.
Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 22, Feb. 11, 2026, Docket No. 107.)
The Fifth Amendment bars the government from depriving a noncitizen of his
liberty without due process of law. Sanchez-Velasco v. Holder, 593 F.3d 733, 737 (8 th Cir.
2010). “Due process is a flexible concept, requiring only ‘such procedural protections as
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 32 of 66

33
the particular situation demands.’” Clark v. Kan. City. Mo. Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 698, 702
(8 th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)). 	To determine
whether a procedural due process violation occurred, the Court must consider three
factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation through the procedures used, as well as the value of additional safeguards, if
any; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the burdens that additional safeguards
would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The Court will address each factor in turn.
1. 	Private Interest
A person’s interest in freedom from physical detention is “the most elemental of
liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690 (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or
other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process] Clause protects.”). 	When considering the private interest,
courts consider the detainee’s conditions of confinement, namely, “whether a detainee
is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” Günaydin v. Trump,
784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025).
This factor favors Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have a strong interest in remaining free from
detention, and the record shows that refugees have been held in facilities in Texas and
Minnesota that are indistinguishable from, or closely resemble, traditional incarceration.
In fact, the facilities may be worse than traditional incarceration. (See, e.g., Drake Decl.
¶ 10, Ex. 8 ¶ 13); Advocs. for Hum. Rts. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Civ. No. 26-749,
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 33 of 66

34
2026 WL 404457, at *2–8 (D. Minn. Feb. 12, 2026); Pedro Eduardo R.P. v. Bondi, Civ. No.
26-1323, 2026 WL 473140 (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2026). 	As a result, Plaintiffs have either
already experienced or face a substantial risk of “experiencing all the deprivations of
incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning,
interruptions to [their] education, lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of
freedom of movement.” See id. The first Mathews factor therefore favors Plaintiffs.
2. 	Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second step in determining what process is due is analyzing the risk of
erroneous deprivation. 	See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. 	The risk of erroneous
deprivation appears to be high for three reasons.
First, for the reasons stated above, Defendants lack statutory authority to arrest
and detain Plaintiffs, and therefore, the risk of erroneous deprivation is high. See Jerson
A.D.G., 2026 WL 207352, at *1 (concluding that a refugee’s due process rights were
violated when respondents detained him under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1) because they did
not have the authority to detain him).
Second, Defendants’ reading of § 1159(a)(1) would effectively permit indefinite
detention, even though Defendants now describe the statute as authorizing merely
“temporary” detention. (Defs.’ Opp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 8.) Defendants’ interpretation
creates a serious risk that refugees could be subject to DHS control for reasons beyond
the statute’s limited authorization. Section 1159(a)(1) permits “custody” for one defined
purpose: “inspection and examination for admission.” The record shows that adjustment
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 34 of 66

35
interviews occur during regular business hours and typically last between three and four
hours, and ICE does not need to seize personal property or use handcuffs or shackles to
complete these interviews. (Suppl. Decl. of Allegra Drobnick ¶ 9, Feb. 15, 2026, Docket
No. 119; Decl. of Samantha M. Rollins Murphy ¶¶ 4–5, Feb. 2, 2026, Docket No. 120; Decl.
of Mary Ghandour ¶¶ 7–10, Feb. 15, 2026, Docket No. 121.) Thus, if DHS exercises control
over a refugee for a period longer than three to four hours, the risk that the refugee is
being held for a purpose other than inspection and examination increases significantly.
To be sure, the limited record before the Court demonstrates the probability and
magnitude of the risk of erroneous deprivation. For instance, Petitioner-Plaintiff U.H.A.
was pulled over on his way to work, ordered out of his car, handcuffed, and detained on
January 18, 2026, without a warrant or apparent justification. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) U.H.A.
was released after being detained for weeks, and only after the Court ordered that he be
released since he was part of the Detained Subclass.29 See U.H.A., 2026 WL 242879, at
*3. Plaintiff D. Doe was arrested on January 11, 2026, without a warrant, transported to
a detention center in Minnesota, then flown in shackles to Texas, where he was
questioned about his refugee status. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) He was kept in “shackles and
handcuffs” for sixteen hours. (Id. ¶ 113.) He was ultimately released several days later,
29 U.H.A. was still detained at 6:11 p.m. on January 30, 2026 (see Docket No. 53) but was
released before February 4, 2026 (see Docket No. 80).
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 35 of 66

36
on January 17, on the streets in Houston, Texas, outside the detention center without his
identifying documents. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Third, as demonstrated by the Named Plaintiffs’ accounts, Defendants’ Refugee
Detention Policy has been carried out without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard
in a pre-deprivation hearing. 	Absence of these elements means that that a detained
refugee will not have any particularized or individualized consideration of their case
before being deprived of their liberty interest. 	See Günaydin, 784 F. Supp.3d at 1188
(finding that imposition of the automatic stay in bond cases deprived detainees of
procedural due process since it does not consider “any individualized or particularized
facts”).
Under the second Mathews factor, the Court must also “consider the degree to
which additional or substitute procedural safeguards could ameliorate the risks of
erroneous deprivation.” Maldonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1153 (D. Minn. 2025)
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). Here, an obvious alternative to arrest and detention
exists: Defendants could simply notify refugees of their adjustment interview and afford
them the chance to attend voluntarily—summoning them only after the interview is
scheduled. 	Indeed, this approach is consistent with forty-five years of agency practice
and federal regulations that establish the process for adjusting refugees’ status to LPR.
See 8 C.F.R. § 209. 	There is no indication in the record that this practice has been
ineffective in achieving the statute’s purpose.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 36 of 66

37
In sum, Defendants’ sweeping interpretation of § 1159(a)(1) creates a substantial
risk of erroneously depriving Plaintiffs of their private interests, even though a simpler
and less burdensome alternative would allow Defendants to achieve their stated policy
objectives while adequately protecting Plaintiffs’ rights. The Court therefore concludes
that the second Mathews factor weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.
3. 	Government’s Interest
Under the third Mathews factor, the Court must consider the Government’s
interest, including the “fiscal and administrative burdens” that an “additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335.
This factor also tips in favor of Plaintiffs. 	The Government has no interest in
carrying out “unlawful agency action,” and as established above, Defendants lack
statutory authority to arrest and detain unadjusted refugees who are not subject to any
grounds for removal. See Missouri v. Trump, 128 F.4th 979, 997 (8 th Cir. 2025) (quoting
League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). However, even
assuming that § 1159(a)(1) permits arrest and detention after the one-year mark and that
Defendants fear that a refugee might skip their adjustment interview, a far simpler and
less burdensome alternative exists: notify refugees of their interview, let them appear
voluntarily, and call them in only after the interview is scheduled. The Court sees little
justification for rounding up vetted, non-removable refugees only to interrogate, detain,
and fly them across the country. In addition to interfering with refugees’ liberty interests,
such a policy results in a clear waste of time and resources.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 37 of 66

38
Accordingly, the Court finds that all three Mathews factors weigh in favor of
Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy violates their due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs therefore have demonstrated that they are
likely to succeed on the merits of their Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim.
C. 	Substantive Due Process
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy violates their
substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 	To prevail on a substantive 	due process claim, 	the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the action (1) infringes on “‘fundamental’ liberty interests, without
narrowly tailoring that interference to serve a compelling state interest”; or (2) is so
outrageous that it shocks the conscience or otherwise offends our judicial notions of
fairness. Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8 th Cir. 1998) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993)).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ interpretation of § 1159(a) infringes Plaintiffs’
liberty interests in being free from detention and that Defendants’ attempt to arrest and
detain unadjusted refugees under § 1159(a) is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. In response, Defendants argue that their interpretation of § 1159(a) does
not violate Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights because Policy “bear[s] some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is [detained],” and the
detentions under Operation PARRIS are limited to the time reasonably necessary for DHS
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 38 of 66

39
to fulfill its statutory obligations. (Defs.’ Opp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 22 (alteration in original)
(quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).)
The Court begins by identifying the parties’ respective interests. 	Plaintiffs—
unadjusted refugees with no grounds of removability—undoubtedly possess a significant
liberty interest in remaining free from detention. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 	The
Government, for its part, has a strong interest in enforcing the Nation’s immigration laws.
See Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 911–12 (2024) (“[T]he through line of history
is recognition of the Government’s sovereign authority to set the terms governing the
admission and exclusion of noncitizens.”). The Government also has a strong interest in
promoting national security. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
After careful consideration, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed
on the merits of their substantive due process claim for at least two independent reasons.
First, as previously explained, Defendants lack statutory authority under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1159 to arrest and detain Plaintiffs. 	Absent such authority, the Refugee Detention
Policy likely violates substantive due process. See Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp.
3d 1149, 1158 (D. Minn. 2025) (“At its foundation, due process prohibits detaining an
individual without justification.”).
Second, Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy is not narrowly tailored. Although
Defendants claim that “detentions under Operation PARRIS are limited to the amount of
time reasonably necessary for DHS to comply with its statutory obligations” (Defs.’ Opp.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 39 of 66

40
Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 22), neither their sweeping interpretation of § 1159(a) nor the record
before the Court supports that claim. Defendants’ reading of § 1159(a)(1) would give DHS
the authority to detain unadjusted refugees indefinitely—a result the Supreme Court
rejected in the context of noncitizens who have already been ordered removed. 	See
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (holding that § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize the government
to detain an alien indefinitely and “limit[ing] an alien’s post-removal-period detention to
a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United
States”). 	Defendants’ proposed boundless construction underscores the absence of
narrow tailoring. 	Moreover, the record at this stage reflects that refugees subject to
Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy have been—or face a substantial likelihood of
being—arrested, handcuffed and shackled, detained, and transported out-of-state away
from family and counsel. The Court therefore concludes that Defendants’ sweeping and
severe deprivations of liberty are not narrowly tailored to the interests they assert.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to
succeed on the merits of their substantive due process claim.
D. 	Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s “basic purpose . . . is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”
Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 	After
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 40 of 66

41
experiencing firsthand a government that policed its subjects without due respect for
their individual liberties, “[t]he Founding generation crafted the Fourth Amendment as a
response to the reviled general warrants and writs of assistance of the colonial era, which
allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for
evidence of criminal activity.” 	Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
The protections of the Fourth Amendment apply to arrests of noncitizens. 	See United
States v. Quintana, 623 F.3d 1237, 1239 (8 th Cir. 2010); cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (“For the same reasons that the Fourth Amendment forbids
stopping vehicles at random to inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the
country, it also forbids stopping or detaining persons for questioning about their
citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens.”).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ arrest and detention of refugees in reliance on
§ 1159—specifically, without a warrant or probable cause tied to a specific offense—
violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures. 	Plaintiffs are
likely to prevail on their Fourth Amendment claim for two key reasons.
First, for many of the same reasons outlined above, the Court concludes that the
plain text of § 1159 creates no offense which unadjusted refugees have committed such
that 	their 	arrest 	could 	be 	reasonable 	under 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment. 	Plaintiffs
persuasively argue that the vague language of § 1159 stands in contrast with other
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 41 of 66

42
statutes through which Congress has granted immigration officials the power to make
warrantless arrests. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 expressly states that noncitizens can be
arrested without a warrant if the immigration official has “reason to believe” that the
noncitizen is “in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation [regulating
the admission, exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens],” if they are also “likely to
escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” See also Quintana, 623 F.3d at
1239 (“The Attorney General’s regulations implementing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) carefully
distinguish between warrantless arrests for the purpose of commencing civil deportation
proceedings, and warrantless arrests for criminal violations of the immigration laws[.]”).
Section 1159, on the other hand, does not establish or reference any misconduct or
offense which unadjusted refugees have committed that could give rise to any reasonable
exercise of the Executive’s arrest power. Importantly, refugees—who have been vetted
and admitted to the country—commit no crime or removable offense in failing to obtain
a green card one day after they become eligible to do so; nor do they lose their status as
lawfully admitted to the United States.
“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891)). Because § 1159 itself does not create any independent offense, criminal
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 42 of 66

43
or civil, justifying Plaintiffs’ arrest, and does not reference any other statute that does so,
the arrest of a refugee under § 1159 based solely on the fact that they have not yet been
adjusted to LPR status is inconsistent with not only the statute itself, but with the
refugee’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
Second, even if the Court were to construe § 1159 to permit arrest and detention
of some kind, the record before the Court provides no evidence that Defendants’
warrantless arrests of refugees in furtherance of Operation PARRIS have been based upon
individualized probable cause inquiries. The “Fourth Amendment’s ultimate touchstone
is ‘reasonableness,’” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006), and generally,
this requires an arrest to be supported by either a warrant or probable cause. See Terry,
392 U.S. at 20 (“[W]henever practicable,” the government must “obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.”); Borgman v. Kedley,
646 F.3d 518, 522–23 (8 th Cir. 2011) (“A warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment if it is supported by probable cause . . . .”). 	Indeed, where Congress has
established federal authority to make warrantless immigration-related arrests, the Eighth
Circuit has read the requirements of the Fourth Amendment into the statute and required
that such arrests be supported by probable cause. Quintana, 623 F.3d at 1239 (“Because
the Fourth Amendment applies to arrests of illegal aliens, the term ‘reason to believe’ in
§ 1357(a)(2) means constitutionally required probable cause.”). 	However, under
Operation PARRIS, refugees in Minnesota have been arrested and flown across the
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 43 of 66

44
country: (1) without the warrants presumptively required under the Fourth Amendment,
and (2) seemingly without probable cause that the refugees have committed any offense,
even under § 1159. 	Instead, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that arrests under
Operation PARRIS may simply have been based on the fact that those detained were not
citizens.30
Because the warrantless arrest of a refugee premised solely on their failure to
adjust to LPR status violates that refugee’s right to be free from unreasonable seizures
and 	because 	Defendants have 	failed 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	arrests 	carried 	out 	in
furtherance of Operation PARRIS have been supported by probable cause, the Court
concludes that the Fourth Amendment provides an additional basis to support Plaintiffs’
request for a preliminary injunction of the Refugee Detention Policy.
E. 	APA
Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	Defendants’ 	Refugee 	Detention 	Policy 	violates 	the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 	Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ Policy is
arbitrary and capricious and that, because it violates their constitutional rights, it must be
set aside. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their APA claim
because DHS’s enforcement decision is an agency action that is “committed to agency
30 (See, e.g., Drake Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1 (Decl. of U.H.A.) ¶¶ 9–12 (“The officer knocked on the
window and told me to roll down the window. He demanded to see my ID. He asked me if I was
a US Citizen. I said no and he pulled me out of my car and put me in handcuffs behind my back.
. . . He then repeated the same sentence telling me ‘don’t worry sir, you’re going to go home
soon. . . . you’re going back to your country Ethiopia.’”).)
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 44 of 66

45
discretion” by law, and therefore not reviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). (Defs.’ Opp.
Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 19.) 	Defendants further argue that its recission of the 2010 ICE
Guidance is reasonable and was reasonably explained in the December Recission Memo,
which expressed that the policy change was “motivated by national security and public
safety concerns.” (Id. at 20.)
The APA provides that an agency acts unlawfully if the action is (1) “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” (2) “contrary
to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity,” or (3) “in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(C).
An agency action is arbitrary and capricious when:
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their APA
claim for at least two reasons. 	First, neither the December Rescission Memo nor the
February Re-Rescission Memo addresses—or even reflects—the Policy that has actually
been implemented in Minnesota. 	Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ “Refugee Detention
Policy,” a policy “that would subject all lawfully present refugees who have not yet
obtained lawful permanent resident (‘LPR’) status to arrest and mandatory detention
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 45 of 66

46
after being present in the United States for one year—even though refugees cannot
adjust to LPR status until the one-year mark.” (Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. for TRO at 10.) The
record shows that this is the policy Defendants actually enacted and carried out.
Although Defendants acknowledge that the December Rescission Memo merely
“rescind[s] the flat ban on detention for purposes of enforcing 8 U.S.C. § 1159” (Defs.’
Opp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 21), neither memorandum explains why all refugees who have
not adjusted status are (or even should be) subject to detention. (See Drake Decl. ¶ 17,
Ex. 15 (providing ICE’s January 9, 2026 press release, which emphasizes that the “initial
focus [of Operation PARRIS] is on Minnesota’s 5,600 refugees who have not yet been
given lawful permanent resident status (Green Cards)”).)
Second, 	as 	previously 	explained, 	the 	Refugee 	Detention 	Policy 	exceeds
Defendants’ authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1159 and infringes on Plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ APA claim is unreviewable under 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2) is unavailing. “The APA establishes a basic presumption of judicial review” for
agency action. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 16 (2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted). This presumption can be rebutted by a showing that
the relevant statute precludes review or that the “agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law[.]” Id. at 17 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)). Nothing in § 1159 precludes
judicial review. And the exception in § 701(a)(2), that the “agency action is committed to
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 46 of 66

47
agency discretion by law,” is to be construed “quite narrowly” and applied only in
“those rare circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn so that a court would have
no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”
Weyerhaeuser Co v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586 U.S. 9, 22 (2018) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court concludes that this is not a situation where it has
“no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” See
Id.
Although the “limited category of unreviewable actions” can include “an agency’s
decision not to institute enforcement proceedings,” Regents, 591 U.S. at 17 (citing Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985)), Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy can be
distinguished from such a decision because 8 U.S.C. § 1159 does not grant DHS the
amount or kind of discretion required for the agency’s action to be unreviewable.
Section 1159 permits refugees who have not yet had their status adjusted to that
of a lawful permanent resident to present themselves voluntarily for inspection before
any arrest or detention occurs. The statute also limits the purpose of custody: DHS may
exercise custody over a refugee only to conduct inspection and examination in connection
with adjustment of status.
In Chaney, the Supreme Court held “that an agency’s decision not to take
enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2).”
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 47 of 66

48
470 U.S. at 832.31 But this exception set forth in Chaney does not apply because the 2010
ICE Guidance was not a non-enforcement policy. It merely prohibited ICE from detaining
refugees solely because they failed to apply for adjustment of status. 	See 2010 ICE
Guidance at 3. 	Even under its prior policy, ICE continued its enforcement efforts by
performing its inspection and examination duties under § 1159.
Moreover, DHS’s subsequent decision to rescind the 2010 ICE Guidance and to
interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1159 as authorizing the arrest and detention of refugees who have
not adjusted to LPR status represents an affirmative act to enforce § 1159 differently than
before. That is a decision to act, not to refrain from action. Further, even if the 2010 ICE
Guidance were characterized as a non-enforcement policy, Regents declined to extend
31 In Chaney, the Court outlined several reasons why agency non-enforcement decisions
are generally not suitable for judicial review:
First, an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of
a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency
must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency
resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely
to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits
the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough
resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against
each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is
far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in
the proper ordering of its priorities.
Id. at 831–32. 	The Court then went on to explain that the agency’s decision to not bring
enforcement proceedings is similar to “the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not
to indict.” Id. at 832. To the extent 8 U.S.C. § 1159 gives DHS the power to arrest and detain
unadjusted refugees, the concerns outlined in Chaney that would make the enforcement
decisions unsuitable for judicial review are largely absent in this case.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 48 of 66

49
the Chaney exception to decisions rescinding such policies. See Regents, 591 U.S. at 18
(declining to “test [the Government’s] chain of reasoning” when they argued that the
rescission of a non-enforcement policy was unreviewable under Chaney).
For these reasons, the Court concludes, on the record currently before the Court,
that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their
APA claim.32
* 	* 	*
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the
merits of at least one of their claims. Indeed, Plaintiffs have demonstrated they are likely
to succeed on all of their claims. 	Plaintiffs have shown that Defendants lack lawful
authority to detain them under § 1159(a). 	They have also shown that Defendants’
Refugee Detention Policy violates procedural due process, substantive due process, the
Fourth Amendment, and the APA. 	Therefore, the Court finds that the first Dataphase
factor weighs in favor of Plaintiffs.
32 On February 18, 2026—the day before the preliminary injunction hearing—ICE issued
a seven-page memorandum that appeared to re-rescind the 2010 ICE Guidance, which had
already been rescinded by a one-sentence memorandum in December 2025. The February Re-
Recission Memo appears to be an impermissible post hoc rationalization, which cannot cure an
APA violation. See Mohammed H., 786 F. Supp. 3d at 1159 (“Post-hoc rationalizations will not
suffice; agency action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.”).
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 49 of 66

50
Bearing in mind that likelihood of success on the merits is often considered the
most significant of the Dataphase factors, Home Instead, 721 F.3d at 497, the Court will
turn to the consideration of the other Dataphase factors.
III. 	THREAT OF IRREPARABLE HARM
The Court will next consider the threat of irreparable harm. 	“Irreparable harm
occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because its injuries cannot
be fully compensated through an award of damages.” 	Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry
Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8 th Cir. 2009). “To succeed in demonstrating a threat of
irreparable harm, a party must show that the harm is certain and great and of such
imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” Roudachevski v.
All-Am. Care Ctrs., Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 706 (8 th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
The Court previously concluded that Plaintiffs demonstrated a threat of irreparable
harm, noting that Plaintiffs have suffered or face an imminent threat of being (1) arrested
and detained without a warrant, (2) handcuffed and shackled for extended periods, (3)
hurriedly transported across the country, and (4) separated from and prevented from
communicating with family, counsel, or their community. 	U.H.A., 2026 WL 222226, at
*8–9.
The Court likewise concludes that the threat of irreparable harm favors relief in
the form of a preliminary injunction. The loss of liberty is “perhaps the best example of
irreparable harm.” See Matacua v. Frank, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1025 (D. Minn. 2018).
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 50 of 66

51
The Court does not have to look far to see the grave and immediate threat of
irreparable harm facing Plaintiffs. To name a few, Petitioner-Plaintiff U.H.A., a refugee,
was seized by armed, masked ICE officers without warning or explanation. (Am. Compl.
¶ 110.) He was handcuffed, placed in leg shackles, and given no basis for his arrest. (Id.)
Agents transported him to a detention facility in Texas, where he was forced to sleep on
the floor and share a single toilet with more than forty detainees. (Id.)
Plaintiff D. Doe was similarly targeted. 	ICE officers lured him outside by falsely
claiming to have hit D. Doe’s car. (Id. ¶ 113.) When he and his wife attempted to present
proof of status, agents ignored the documentation, took him into custody, shackled him,
and flew him to Texas. 	(Id.) 	He remained in shackles for sixteen hours. 	(Id.) 	He was
ultimately released outside a detention center and left to make his own way back to
Minnesota. (Id.)
DHS’s actions did not stop there. Agents also arrested a high school junior while
she was on her way to school and took her into custody. (Drake Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 7, Docket
No. 16-11.) She was compelled to spend the night in a hotel room with two ICE agents—
without even being provided with a room of her own. (Id.)
As for unadjusted refugees who have not yet been arrested under Defendants’
Refugee Detention Policy, they too face a threat of irreparable harm. Operation PARRIS
was expressly designed to target “Minnesota’s 5,600 refugees who have not yet been
given lawful permanent resident status (Green Cards).” (Drake Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. 15 (ICE’s
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 51 of 66

52
January 9, 2026 press release).) Refugees who have already been detained and released,
as well as those who fall within the putative Class but have not yet been arrested, face a
concrete and ongoing risk of arrest or re-arrest absent preliminary relief. 	This fear is
neither exaggerated nor speculative; it is a logical and entirely legitimate response to
what has occurred. Because Plaintiffs have shown a threat of irreparable harm, the Court
concludes that the second 	Dataphase 	factor weighs heavily in favor of granting
preliminary relief.
IV. 	BALANCE OF HARMS AND PUBLIC INTEREST
The third and fourth Dataphase factors—balance of the harms and the public
interest—"merge 	when 	the 	Government 	is 	the 	party 	opposing 	the 	preliminary
injunction.” Morehouse Enters., LLC v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives,
78 F.4th 1011, 1019 (8 th Cir. 2023) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). For
these factors, “the key question is whether the movant’s likely harm without a
preliminary injunction exceeds the nonmovant’s likely harm with a preliminary injunction
in place.” Cigna Corp. v. Bricker, 103 F.4th 1336, 1347 (8 th Cir. 2024).
These factors also weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendants argue—as they did in
their motion to dissolve the TRO—that the balance-of-the-harm and the public interest
factors favors weigh in favor of Defendants because a preliminary injunction itself would
inflict irreparable injury on Defendants. 	The Court rejected that argument then, see
U.H.A., 2026 WL 357636, at *6, and rejects it again here.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 52 of 66

53
It is true that “[a]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes
enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.” Trump v.
CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But it is also
true that the Government has “no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency
action.” Missouri, 128 F.4th at 997 (quoting Newby, 838 F.3d at 12); Schmitt v. Rebertus,
148 F.4th 958, 970 (8 th Cir. 2025) (“[I]t is always in the public interest to protect
constitutional rights.” (citation omitted)).
Given the unlawfulness of DHS’s Refugee Detention Policy, the public interest is
not served by allowing Defendants to carry out such policy. 	To the extent the
Government has an interest in carrying out Operation PARRIS, these interests clearly do
not outweigh Plaintiffs’ interest in being free from unlawful detention. See Francisco T.
v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 776 (D. Minn. 2025) (“[P]reventing unlawful detention is a
compelling issue of public importance.”); cf. Advocs. for Hum. Rts. v. U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., Civ. No. 26-749, 2026 WL 404457, at *14 (D. Minn. Feb. 12, 2026) (“The
Constitution does not permit the government to arrest thousands of individuals and then
disregard their constitutional rights because it would be too challenging to honor those
rights.”). 	Indeed, Defendants’ enforcement of an expensive and expansive Refugee
Detention 	Policy likely hinders 	Defendants’ lawful pursuit 	of 	serious immigration
violations.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 53 of 66

54
The Court therefore concludes that both the balance-of-harm and the public
interest factors weigh in favor of granting preliminary relief. 	The public’s interest in
protecting refugee rights will be advanced by preserving the status quo.
* 	* 	*
Accordingly, 	the 	Dataphase 	factors 	weigh 	in 	favor 	of 	granting 	preliminary
injunctive relief.33 Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on their claim that
Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy is unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)), the Constitution, and the APA; Plaintiffs have
shown a significant threat of irreparable harm; and Plaintiffs have shown that the balance
of harms as between the Plaintiffs and Defendants favors Plaintiffs. 	The Court will
therefore grant preliminary injunctive relief and postpone the effective date of the
Refugee Detention Policy under 5 U.S.C. § 705.34
33 The Court waived the bond requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) in
its January 28, 2026 TRO order. See U.H.A., 2026 WL 222226, at *13. The Court will, out of an
abundance of caution, waive the bond requirement for the purpose of this preliminary injunction
because the preliminary injunction seeks to prevent constitutional violations and because
Defendants would not incur monetary damages due to a wrongfully issued preliminary
injunction. See Liban G. v. Noem, Civ. No. 26-301, 2026 WL 125689, at *3 n.1 (D. Minn. Jan. 16,
2026). This matter also implicates significant public interests. See, e.g., Richland/Wilken Joint
Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 826 F.3d 1030, 1043 (8 th Cir. 2016).
34 On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order, titled “Realigning the
United States Refugee Admission Program.” See Exec. Order No. 14163, 90 Fed. Reg. 8459 (Jan.
20, 2025). The order indefinitely suspended both “entry into the United States of refugees under
the USRAP” and “decisions on applications for refugee status.” 	Id. at 8459. 	The Court’s
conclusions regarding the lawfulness of Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy in Minnesota have
no bearing whatsoever on the question of the lawfulness of President Trump’s refugee
suspension.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 54 of 66

55
V. 	SCOPE OF RELIEF
The Named Plaintiffs bring claims on behalf of themselves as individuals and also
on behalf of a putative class (and subclass) of similarly situated individuals under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs seek to certify a “Class” defined as “[a]ll
individuals with refugee status who are residing in the state of Minnesota, who have not
yet adjusted to lawful permanent resident status and have not been charged with any
ground for removal under the INA.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Rule 23(b)(2) Class Cert. at 2.) And
Plaintiffs move to certify a “Detained Subclass,” which consists of “[a]ll members of the
Class who are or will be detained by DHS pursuant to the Refugee Detention Policy.” (Id.)
On January 28, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary
restraining order, which, among other things, (1) required Defendants to immediately
release all members of the putative Detained Subclass, and (2) prohibited Defendants
from arresting or detaining any member of the putative Class solely because they are a
refugee who has not yet obtained lawful permanent resident status. 	U.H.A., 2026 WL
222226, at *13. The Court deferred ruling on Plaintiffs’ class certification motion until the
motion could be fully briefed and heard. Id. at *10. Although the Court deferred ruling
on Plaintiffs’ class certification motion, the Court evaluated whether temporary relief on
a putative class-wide basis was appropriate using the framework set forth in Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Consistent with its TRO order, the Court will defer ruling on the class certification
motion until that motion been fully briefed and argued. The Court will, however, again
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 55 of 66

56
assess the propriety of class-wide preliminary injunctive relief by applying the framework
set forth in Rule 23.
A. 	Standard of Review
“[C]ourts may issue temporary relief to a putative class.” 	Tincher v. Noem, 164
F.4th 1097, 1099 (8 th Cir. 2026) (quoting A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 98 (2025)). 	In
other words, the Court need not certify a class before issuing temporary injunctive relief
that applies beyond the named parties to the present case. A.A.R.P., 605 U.S. at 98 (“[W]e
need not decide whether a class should be certified as to the detainees’ due process
claims in order to temporarily enjoin the Government from removing putative class
members while the question of what notice is due is adjudicated.”). 	The Court will
nevertheless address why preliminary injunctive relief for the putative class is justified,
applying the criteria of Rule 23.
To certify a class, Plaintiffs must demonstrate compliance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.35 Rule 23 sets forth more than “a mere pleading standard.” Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013). Rather, Plaintiffs must provide evidentiary proof of
each Rule 23 element. Id. A court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” before certifying a
class, which necessarily requires that the Court consider some issues that bear on the
merits of a claim. Id. at 33–34. But courts considering class certification are not expected
35 Class actions in habeas cases are permitted in the Eighth Circuit. 	See Williams v.
Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8 th Cir. 1973).
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 56 of 66

57
to resolve questions regarding the merits. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Tr. Funds,
568 U.S. 455, 459–60 (2013). First, Plaintiffs must show that they meet the requirements
of Rule 23(a). See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Then, they must satisfy one of the three
23(b) categories. Id.
B. 	Rule 23(a)
A court considering whether to certify a class first assesses whether the class
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a). In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1119 (8 th
Cir. 2005). 	These requirements are: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impractical (“numerosity”); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class (“commonality”); (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class (“typicality”); and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (“adequacy”). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a). The Court will address each prong in turn.
First, Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be “so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). A putative class size of forty or more will
generally support a finding of numerosity, but the Eighth Circuit has occasionally certified
classes with less than forty members. Portz v. St. Cloud State Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d 929,
944 (D. Minn. 2018) (citing cases). The numerosity prong is easily satisfied as Operation
PARRIS targets thousands of unadjusted refugees in Minnesota.
Second, Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be questions of law or fact that are
common to the class. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 	To establish commonality under Rule
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 57 of 66

58
23(a)(2), class claims “must depend upon a common contention” that is “capable of
classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve
an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). The “commonality” element is clearly met
here because the question of whether Defendants’ policy of arresting and detaining
refugees who have not yet obtained lawful permanent resident status is unlawful is a
narrow, clear, common question of law or fact that applies equally to the Named Plaintiffs
and the putative Class. Therefore, the legal issues presented are especially suited to class-
wide resolution.
Third, Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement requires the Court to consider if the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 	To establish typicality, the Court must determine
“whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the
interests of 	the 	class members will 	be 	fairly 	and 	adequately protected 	in 	their
absence.” Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). Here, the same
Refugee Detention Policy that likely infringes on the Named Plaintiffs’ rights is equally
poised to violate the rights of other class members, simply because the Refugee
Detention Policy targets all lawfully present refugees in Minnesota who have not secured
LPR status and subjects them to arrest and mandatory detention after being present in
the United States for one year.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 58 of 66

59
Fourth, the Court must decide whether the proposed representatives and counsel
will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The
adequacy inquiry “serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the
class they seek to represent.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).
After considering the limited record at this stage, the Court finds that this element is met
as the Court is unaware of any conflicts of interest.
Accordingly, on the limited record before the Court, it seems probable that
Plaintiffs will satisfy the criteria set forth in Rule 23(a).
C. 	Rule 23(b)
The Court must also decide whether the putative Class falls within one of the three
categories of Rule 23(b). 	Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied if a party shows that “the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class,
so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single
injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the
class.” Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 360. The rule is particularly appropriate in civil rights
actions seeking declaratory relief. See Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364, 1378 (8 th Cir. 1980).
Here, Plaintiffs convincingly allege that Defendants have acted on grounds that apply
generally to the putative Class by adopting a policy of targeting Minnesota’s 5,600
unadjusted refugees for arrest and detention. 	E.g., Mercado v. Noem, 800 F. Supp. 3d
526, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (provisionally certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class of immigrants
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 59 of 66

60
detained by ICE, explaining that “defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable
to the class—subjecting them to the same set of policies governing their confinement and
access to attorneys—thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to
the class as a whole”).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Class is likely to be certified and that this
matter is suitable for preliminary class-wide relief.
D. 	Defendants’ Other Arguments
Defendants claim that class-wide preliminary injunctive relief is inappropriate. The
Court is unpersuaded but will briefly address each of Defendants’ arguments in turn.
First, Defendants argue that Court should not issue class-wide relief because there
are too many factual issues. The Court disagrees. As discussed above, Plaintiffs seek to
challenge a single policy—Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy—which applies equally
to those who satisfy the putative Class definition. 	Because an injunction enjoining
Defendants from enforcing the Refugee Detention Policy will provide relief to each
putative class member, preliminary class-wide relief is appropriate. See Wal-Mart Stores,
564 U.S at 360 (“Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory
judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.”).
Second, Defendants argue that the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Tincher v.
Noem, 164 F.4th 1097 (8 th Cir. 2026), forecloses temporary class-wide relief when the
Court is not at risk of losing jurisdiction. This argument is unavailing. In Tincher, the Eighth
Circuit stayed the District Court’s preliminary injunction that barred federal officials from
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 60 of 66

61
retaliating against protesters opposing the government’s immigration-enforcement
initiative, Operation Metro Surge. Id. at 1098. The Eighth Circuit concluded that a stay
was warranted because the putative class had “no chance of getting certified” and
because the injunction was impermissibly vague. Id. at 1099. The Court finds Tincher to
be readily distinguishable. Here, the putative class is far more likely to be certified for the
reasons set forth above as well as those in the TRO Order. See U.H.A., 2026 WL 222226,
at *10–12 (analyzing the propriety of temporary class-wide relief under Rule 23). Indeed,
Tincher itself acknowledged that “[c]ourts may issue temporary relief to a putative class.”
Tincher, 164 F.4th at 1099 (quoting A.A.R.P., 605 U.S. at 98). Accordingly, the Court does
not read Tincher to foreclose the putative class-wide relief the Court will grant here.
Third, Defendants argue that a preliminary injunction runs afoul of 8 U.S.C
§ 1252(f)(1), which places limitations on the Court’s authority to issue injunctive relief. 8
U.S.C § 1252(f)(1) provides that “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have
jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of
this subchapter [8 U.S.C §§ 1221–1232] . . . .” Defendants acknowledge that § 1159(a) is
not among the statutes listed in § 1252(f)(1), but they argue that the preliminary
injunctive relief is barred because § 1159(a) cross-references § 1225, which is included in
part IV. 	The Court rejects Defendants’ argument. 	Defendants’ proposition contradicts
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 61 of 66

62
the plain text of § 1252(f)(1). Moreover, as previously discussed, § 1225 does not apply
to Plaintiffs.36
In 	short, 	the 	Court 	is 	unpersuaded 	by 	Defendants’ 	claims 	that 	class-wide
preliminary injunctive relief is inappropriate.
* 	* 	*
Under A.A.R.P., formal certification is not required to grant preliminary relief to a
putative class. 605 U.S. at 98. But the Court’s Rule 23 analysis above simply demonstrates
that preliminary relief on a class-wide basis is appropriate. Unlike the putative class in
Tincher, the putative class in this case is likely to be certified. Based on the Court’s review
of the Dataphase factors and its brief assessment of Rule 23’s requirements, the Court
will incorporate Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition37 and grant their motion for a
preliminary injunction. 	Because the putative Detained Subclass has been released
pursuant to the Court’s TRO order (see U.H.A., 2026 WL 222226, at *13), the Court will
not issue a preliminary injunction at this time as to the putative Detained Subclass. The
36 Additionally, § 1252(f)(1) in no way prohibits courts from setting aside unlawful agency
actions under APA, which forms the basis of some of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Garland v. Aleman
Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543, 571 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part) (“[T]he Court does not
purport to hold that § 1252(f)(1) affects courts’ ability to ‘hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions’ under the Administrative Procedure Act.” (citing 5 U.S.C
§ 706(2))).
37 All individuals with refugee status who are residing in the state of Minnesota, who have
not yet adjusted to lawful permanent resident status and have not been charged with any ground
for removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 62 of 66

63
Court will therefore grant preliminary injunctive relief only for the putative Class, as
detailed in the Order section, below.
VI. 	STAY PENDING APPEAL
Finally, Defendants’ request that the preliminary injunction be stayed pending
appeal if the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion. Courts consider four factors when assessing
whether to issue a stay pending appeal:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely
to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the
public interest lies.
Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (cleaned up). 	In light of the “substantial overlap” with the
Dataphase factors and the Court’s conclusions that the Dataphase factors weigh in favor
of granting preliminary injunctive relief, a stay is not warranted. 	See id. 	Defendants’
request for a stay pending appeal will therefore be denied.
CONCLUSION
The Government’s actions in this case beg the question: Why? 	Why would our
Government adopt a policy under which refugees—who have been thoroughly vetted,
lawfully admitted to the United States, and resettled in communities with Government
support—are subject to arrest and detention the moment that one year has passed since
their lawful arrival? Why subject them to warrantless arrests, place them in shackles, and
transport them to distant detention facilities—facilities whose conditions likely resemble
the refugee camps they once lived in—simply to conduct the required one-year interview
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 63 of 66

64
that precedes adjustment to lawful permanent resident status? Why? The Government
suggests that they are looking for terrorists, but there is not a shred of evidence in the
record that the Named Plaintiffs or the putative Class they seek to represent pose serious
national security risks. The Government suggests that prior Administrations did not vet
refugees thoroughly enough. But again, there is no evidence in the record or elsewhere
that suggests that prior Administrations were deficient in evaluating refugees for
admission.
Refugees are not illegal immigrants who have crossed our borders without
permission. Refugees are thoroughly vetted before being offered conditional admission
to the United States. The refugees covered by this injunction have not been charged with
any ground of removability, nor is there reason to believe that they would evade the
interview and inspection required to obtain lawful permanent resident status. 	The
Government has offered no legitimate rationale or legal authority to justify their
indefinite detention.
The Court holds that 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1) does not authorize federal authorities to
arrest and detain refugees who have lived in the United States for more than a year, have
not yet adjusted to lawful permanent resident status, and have not been charged with
any ground of removability. The Government’s startling theory—that the statute silently
grants DHS the power to seize a refugee the moment the clock strikes midnight on the
366 th day after admission—is wrong. This theory finds no support in the text, the history,
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 64 of 66

65
or the purpose of § 1159(a)(1) and marks a sharp break from more than four decades of
agency practice. Section 1159(a)(1) did not confer such authority in 1980, and it does not
confer it now.
In the Refugee Act, this Nation extended a helping hand to those escaping
persecution. We made a simple promise: pass the vetting, follow the law, and you will be
given a chance at a new beginning in safety. 	That promise was not symbolic. 	It was
concrete. It meant the opportunity to work, to worship, to raise children without fear,
and to build a future under the protection of American law. Stability—not more fear—
was the commitment.
The Government’s proposed new interpretation upends that commitment without
clear authorization from Congress and rests on constitutionally precarious grounds.
Defendants seek to transform a system built on promised opportunities and freedom into
one of uncertainty and indefinite confinement. Until the legality of this dramatic shift is
addressed at trial, the Court will not allow those who relied on this Nation’s promise of
safety to be met instead with handcuffs. The Constitution requires steadiness, fidelity to
statute, and respect for promises made. The rule of law demands no less.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. [16]) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 65 of 66

66
1. 	For the purposes of this Order, preliminary relief is GRANTED to a putative “Class”
which encompasses: “All individuals with refugee status who are residing in the
state of Minnesota, who have not yet adjusted to lawful permanent resident
status, and have not been charged with any ground for removal under the
Immigration and Nationality Act.”
2. 	Defendants are ENJOINED from arresting or detaining any member of the Class on
the basis that they are a refugee who has not been adjusted to lawful permanent
resident status.
3. 	For the purposes of this Order, preliminary relief is DENIED without prejudice as
to the putative “Detained Subclass” which encompasses: “All members of the
Class who are or will be detained by DHS pursuant to the Refugee Detention
Policy.”
4. 	The effective date of the Refugee Detention Policy in Minnesota is postponed
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705.
5. 	Plaintiffs are not required to provide security under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(c).
6. 	This Order is effective upon the date recited below and shall remain in effect until
this action is terminated or until otherwise ordered by the Court.
DATED: February 27, 2026 	_____ 	_____
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
CASE 0:26-cv-00417-JRT-DLM Doc. 133 Filed 02/27/26 Page 66 of 66