Braun v. Vierzba

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Nathan C. Braun,
Plaintiff,
v.
Christopher Vierzba,
Defendant.
Civil No. 26-401 (DWF/ECW)
AMENDED ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Nathan C. Braun’s objections (Doc.
No. 6) to the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge Elizabeth
Cowan Wright dated February 9, 2026 (Doc. No. 3). The Court previously adopted the
R&R. (Doc. No. 4.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules the objections
and amends its prior order to dismiss the claims with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The factual background for the above-entitled matter is clearly and precisely set
forth in the R&R and is incorporated by reference. In short, this case involves (1) an
alleged contract between Braun and Defendant Christopher Vierzba, an agent for
Minnesota’s intensive supervised release program, regarding Braun’s conviction in state
court for third-degree criminal sexual conduct, and (2) Braun’s subsequent arrest for
violation of his conditional release. Braun alleged that he and Vierzba entered into an
oral contract that upon Braun’s completion of a polygraph examination proving his
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innocence, Vierzba would help Braun overturn the conviction. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Braun
alleged that he completed and passed the polygraph, but instead of helping Braun,
Vierzba arrested him. (Id.) Braun alleged that the search pursuant to the arrest was
impermissibly broad and that the arrest was retaliatory in nature. (Id. at 1-2.) Braun
brings a breach of contract claim for the oral contract and constitutional claims related to
the arrest and searches. (Id.)
The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the complaint in its entirety
without prejudice and denying the application to proceed in district court without
prepaying fees or costs as moot. (Doc. No. 3 at 13-14.) The deadline to file objections
set forth in Local Rule 72.2(b)(1) passed on February 23, 2026, and no objections to the
R&R had been filed. Upon a finding of no clear error, the Court adopted the R&R on
March 6, 2026. (Doc. No. 4.) On March 9, 2026, judgment was entered. (Doc. No. 5.)
The Court then received Braun’s objections on March 30, 2026. (Doc. No. 6.) Braun
claims he did not receive the R&R until March 25, 2026, and he wrote his objections that
same day. (Id. at 1, 4.) Although the objections were not received by the deadline, the
Court will consider the arguments because Braun raised the issues promptly upon
receiving the R&R and because the arguments make clear that Braun’s claims fail. 1
1 	In the objections, Braun points the Court to arguments in a similar case filed
against Vierzba, Civil No. 26-511. That case was dismissed as duplicative of this case.
Braun v. Vierzba, No. 26-cv-511, 2026 WL 529674 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2026), report and
recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 526660 (D. Minn. Feb. 25, 2026). Braun
acknowledges that the cases were similar claims, but asks the Court to consider the
arguments in both because his filing was presented more clearly in the second case.
(Doc. No. 6 at 3.) In the interests of justice, the Court will consider the complaint from
Civil No. 26-511 (the “Second Complaint”) in addition to the objections and complaint
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DISCUSSION
Because this is a dispositive matter and Braun filed objections, the Court conducts
a de novo review. D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(b). An action may be dismissed when an applicant
to proceed in district court without prepaying fees or costs has filed a complaint that fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);
Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). In reviewing whether
a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true
all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). Although a
complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain facts with
enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally,
but they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced. E.g., Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
I. 	Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Search Claim
Braun claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police
searched his workplace, his locked vehicle, and two locked cellphones. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.)
He alleged that he was arrested for not maintaining residence at the house listed on his
conditional release, and he reasoned that his workplace, vehicle, and phones were
filed in this case. The Court notes consideration of the Second Complaint where
applicable.
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irrelevant to that arrest. (Id. at 1-2.) He also alleged that Minnesota Department of
Corrections (“MNDOC”) policies allow only for a search of the person and explicitly
prohibit searches of locked phones, locked vehicles, and the workplace in such
circumstances. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing this claim because
(1) alleged violations of MNDOC policy are insufficient to establish a constitutional
violation and (2) the searches were not unreasonable. (Doc. No. 3 at 6-7.)
Braun first objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion regarding MNDOC
policy. (Doc. No. 6 at 1-2.) He argues that his references to MNDOC policies were to
establish violations of the state laws the policies were intended to enforce. (Id.)
MNDOC policies do not create federally enforceable rights. See Edwards v. Baer, 863
F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1989). A violation of a MNDOC policy is not sufficient to state a
claim under § 1983; the policy violation must have been an independent violation of law.
See, e.g., Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1999). The Magistrate
Judge correctly explained that and then went on to analyze the state laws underlying
those policies. (Doc. No. 3 at 6-7.) The Magistrate Judge has already done what Braun
requests.
Braun next objects to the conclusion that the searches were not clearly
unreasonable due to lack of evidence. (Doc. No. 6 at 2.) The Magistrate Judge explained
that Minnesota law allows officers to impose conditions on supervised release, including
unannounced searches of a person’s vehicle and electronic devices, and concluded that
Braun did not plausibly state a claim because he did not provide or explain the arrest
warrant or his conditions of release. (Doc. No. 3 at 7.) Braun argues that the lack of
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evidence is because the state of Minnesota is withholding evidence and points the Court
to a pending state court case in which he says he requested the evidence, Case
No. 13-cv-26-148. (Doc. No. 6 at 2.) Upon review of that case, there is no request for
the evidence relevant here. Additionally, it was not necessary for Braun to submit the
documents. He simply could have described the warrant and the conditions of his release
more fully. The Magistrate Judge’s reasoning stands.
Moreover, the reasonableness inquiry is based on the totality of the circumstances.
E.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006). While on conditional release,
Braun had a lesser expectation of privacy. See id. at 849. Additionally, Braun does not
challenge the basis for the arrest warrant: that he violated his supervision conditions by
failing to maintain residency at the correct housing. The search of the phones,
workplace, and vehicle is not unreasonable given that Braun violated his supervision
conditions. Cf. United States v. Hamilton, 591 F.3d 1017, 1021-24 (8th Cir. 2010)
(finding that a search of the home and electronics was reasonable after one parole
violation, drinking alcohol, was confirmed). Braun cannot state a claim for unreasonable
search.
II. 	Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Seizure Claim
Reading the complaint liberally, the Magistrate Judge addressed a second Fourth
Amendment theory, unreasonable seizure. The R&R recommended dismissing that
theory because Braun did not identify any false statement on which the warrant was
based. (Doc. No. 3 at 8.) In his objections, Braun does not appear to argue that the arrest
in question was based on any false statement. (See Doc. No. 6.) Both the complaint and
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the objections state that the challenged arrest warrant was based solely on failing to
maintain residence at the sponsored housing. (Doc. No. 1 at 1-2; Doc. No. 6 at 3.) Braun
does not challenge that residency violation. He alleges two other false statements: one
regarding sexually explicit photos of a minor found on his phones (which he specifically
connects to his felony sentence), and one regarding a false report to Benton County
Family & Child Services. (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) But neither allegedly false statement was a
basis for his arrest for the residency violation. Braun fails to state a claim for
unreasonable seizure based on a false statement.
In his objections, Braun also clarifies that his unreasonable seizure claim was
based on Braun’s retaliatory conduct. (Doc. No. 6 at 2-3.) Specifically, he alleges that
Vierzba waited to seek an arrest warrant on the residency issue until the primary agent on
Braun’s case went on vacation and that the arrest warrant was retaliation for Braun
raising the breach of contract issue. (Id.) As the Magistrate Judge explained, such a
claim is properly considered under the First Amendment. (See Doc. No. 3 at 4-5.) The
Court turns to that next.
III. 	First Amendment Retaliation Claim
In his complaint, Braun briefly mentions “retaliatory actions” by Vierzba that
occurred after Vierzba allegedly failed to uphold his end of the contract. (Doc. No. 1
at 2.) With little to go on, the Magistrate Judge interpreted the claim to allege that
Braun’s polygraph results were used against him in the arrest warrant. (Doc. No. 3
at 12.) The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal because the complaint did not
describe any protected activity or plausibly allege retaliatory motive. (Id.)
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Braun now clarifies that the allegedly retaliatory arrest warrant was in response to
Braun filing grievances about Vierzba’s breach of contract. (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) Such a
claim is not clearly articulated in the complaint. The complaint did not mention the
grievances filed, nor explain how those could be the basis for retaliation.2 Consequently,
the Magistrate Judge did not consider the grievances in her R&R. Even for pro se
litigants, the Court need not consider completely new arguments at the objection stage.
E.g., Ridenour v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 679 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir.
2012); see also Jidoefor v. City of Minneapolis Police Dep’t, No. 22-cv-1686, 2023 WL
2823159, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 7, 2023) (explaining that even liberally construed
objections from a pro se litigant must direct the court to specific errors in the R&R).
Moreover, even if the Court did consider the retaliatory arrest theory, Braun has
failed to state a claim. A First Amendment retaliation claim has three elements: (1) the
plaintiff engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the defendant “took an
adverse action that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in that
protected activity,” and (3) the injury would not have occurred but for the alleged animus.
Nieters v. Holtan, 83 F.4th 1099, 1110 (8th Cir. 2023). Additionally, for a retaliatory
arrest claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant lacked probable cause to arrest.
Id.; see also Danielson v. Huether, 355 F. Supp. 3d 849, 864-65 (D.S.D. 2018)
(discussing the requirement in the context of an allegedly retaliatory warrant). Braun
accepts that he did violate the residency condition of his release, which was the basis for
2 	The same is true for the Second Complaint. Indeed, Braun does not mention nor
allude to retaliation in the Second Complaint. (See Civ. No. 26-511, Doc. No. 1.)
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the warrant. Braun therefore cannot establish that the arrest lacked a lawful basis and that
he would not have been arrested if not for retaliatory reasons. See, e.g., Danielson, 355
F. Supp. 3d at 864-65 (dismissing retaliation claim because plaintiff did not allege any
facts indicating that he did not commit the violation which was the basis of the warrant).
Put differently, Braun’s violation of his conditional release is a proper basis for his arrest,
regardless of the motivation behind it. The retaliation claim fails and was properly
dismissed.
As a separate retaliation issue, Braun claimed that Vierzba made a false statement
to Benton County Family & Child Services.3 (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Braun said Vierzba
made a report that Braun had unauthorized conduct with his daughter, but the report was
false because Braun did have authorization. (Id.) Again, there is insufficient factual
basis to find causation. Braun does not connect any injury to this false report
specifically. He lists damages, including the loss of employment and loss of ability to see
3 	It is unclear if Braun raises this issue as a First Amendment retaliation claim, as
some sort of negligent misrepresentation or fraud claim, or as a violation of MNDOC
policy. If Braun intended to raise these other claims, they too would fail.
First, claims of negligent misrepresentation and fraud require that Braun himself
be misled. See Nelson v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 899 F.3d 475, 481 (8th Cir. 2018)
(listing the elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim, including that the defendant
supply false information to the plaintiff); Stinson v. U.S. Bank, NA, No. 12-cv-68, 2012
WL 2529354, at *3-4 (D. Minn. June 13, 2012) (listing the elements of a common law
fraud claim and explaining that plaintiffs had not identified a false statement made to
them), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 2529411 (D. Minn. July 2, 2012).
The allegedly false statement was made to Benton County, not Braun.
Second, as discussed above, a violation of MNDOC policy is not a standalone
cause of action. For the reasons discussed throughout, Braun has failed to show an
independent violation of law.
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his children, but those injuries seem to be connected to his reinstated incarceration, not
any action by Benton County. Additionally, there is no information suggesting that the
Benton County report was an impetus for the arrest or that Benton County took any
action in response to the report.4 Further, as discussed, the arrest would have happened
anyway due to the residency violation. Braun does not have a viable retaliation claim.
IV. 	Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Claim
Braun next objects to the dismissal of his Fifth Amendment claim, arguing that the
illegal seizure of his phones being used against him amounts to a violation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause. (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) The complaint did not explain the intricacies of
the self-incrimination claim, so the Magistrate Judge was forced to guess what Braun’s
claim meant. (See Doc. No. 3 at 8-9.) But Braun’s claim would still fail on his illegal
phone seizure theory.
The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled testimonial communication.
E.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004). Braun did not make
any testimonial communication. Cf. State v. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870, 876 (Minn.
2018) (finding that the compelled use of fingerprint to access defendant’s phone did not
4 	The Second Complaint explains that Benton County made a maltreatment
determination, which prevented Braun from seeing his daughter and attending the birth of
his twins. (Civ. No. 26-511, Doc. No. 1 at 2.) However, the Second Complaint specifies
that the maltreatment determination was “due to [his] requirement to register—and that
alone.” (Id.) The requirement to register as a sex offender was part of Braun’s sentence
for the state court conviction. Sentencing Order, State v. Braun, No. 05-cr-16-1323
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Sep. 6, 2017). The inability to see his children therefore stemmed from
the prior conviction, not from Vierzba’s report to Benton County. Again, there is nothing
connecting the allegedly false report to the injury claimed by Braun, so any retaliation
claim fails.
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violate the Self-Incrimination Clause because defendant did not have to reveal his
internal thought processes). Such allegations are better raised as a Fourth Amendment
claim, and the Court has already explained that the allegations are insufficient to make a
Fourth Amendment claim. Braun does not have a viable Fifth Amendment claim and the
Magistrate Judge was correct to recommend dismissal. 5
V. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
Braun also objects to the dismissal of his due process claim. The Magistrate Judge
considered both substantive and procedural theories of due process and concluded that
Braun could not state a claim under either theory. (Doc. No. 3 at 9-11.) For a substantive
due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that their fundamental right was violated
in a manner that shocks the conscience. Torgerson v. Roberts County, 139 F.4th 638, 644
(8th Cir. 2025). For a procedural process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
state deprived them of a protected interest without sufficient process. Id.
Braun points to the two allegedly false statements as evidence that his due process
rights were violated. (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) First, Vierzba allegedly committed perjury by
reporting that there were sexually explicit images of a minor on Braun’s phone. (Id.)
This claim is relevant to the state court case in which Braun was convicted of third-
degree criminal sexual conduct. That case, and the evidence relevant to it, was
extensively litigated and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. See Braun v. State,
5 	Braun’s mention of the Second Complaint appears in the paragraph about the Fifth
Amendment claim. (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) The Second Complaint does not raise a self-
incrimination claim. (See Civ. No. 26-511, Doc. No. 1.)
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No. A19-924, 2020 WL 994759 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2020) (detailing the case’s
procedural history and affirming denial of post-conviction relief). Braun cannot show a
procedural due process violation because he had process available to him—he could have
raised evidentiary issues in state court. See Anderson v. Douglas County, 4 F.3d 574, 578
(8th Cir. 1993) (“[Plaintiff] cannot complain of a violation of procedural due process
when he has not availed himself of existing procedures.”). Braun likewise cannot show a
substantive due process violation because the facts as alleged do not establish conduct
that shocks the conscience—there is no allegation or indication that Vierzba threatened or
coerced Braun, purposely ignored exculpatory evidence, or systematically targeted
Braun. Cf. Akins v. Epperly, 588 F.3d 1178, 1183-84 (8th Cir. 2009) (describing conduct
that would be shocking to the conscience).
Second, Vierzba allegedly made a false claim to Benton County that Braun had
unauthorized contact with his daughter. (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) As discussed above, there is
no indication that the report to Benton County had negative consequences for Braun; any
consequence stemmed from the state court conviction, not Vierzba’s report. Braun has
failed to allege deprivation of any interest and therefore has neither a substantive nor
procedural due process claim for this allegedly false claim. E.g., Winslow v. Smith, 696
F.3d 716, 735 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing need for deprivation of interest). Braun’s
Fourteenth Amendment claims were properly dismissed.
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VI. 	State Law Breach of Contract
Finally, reading the complaint liberally, Braun alleged breach of contract.6 (Doc.
No. 1 at 1.) As the Magistrate Judge correctly explained, a federal court has discretion to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction over state-law claims when all federal-law claims are
eliminated. (See Doc. No. 3 at 12-13.) Because all of Braun’s federal claims fail, the
Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, the Court overrules Braun’s objections. While
Braun is entitled to leniency as a pro se litigant, he must still plead viable claims.7 He
fails to do so. Additionally, the Court previously dismissed Braun’s claims without
prejudice. (Doc. No. 4.) Now that Braun has added new arguments and details about the
case to his objections and has pointed to a second case filing on the same subject, it is
clear that further amendment of his claims would be futile. It is therefore appropriate to
dismiss his claims with prejudice. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s
R&R insofar as it recommends dismissal and modifies it insofar as it recommends
dismissal without prejudice.
6 	Braun did not defend the breach-of-contract claim in his objections (see Doc.
No. 6), but he did raise a similar claim in the Second Complaint (see Civ. No. 26-511,
Doc. No. 1 at 1).
7 	In his request for leniency, Braun claims he requested counsel for assistance with
these claims. (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) The Court found no such request. Nonetheless, there is
no right to counsel in civil cases, and the Court does not find it appropriate to appoint
counsel here. See Phillips v. Jasper Cnty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the factors a court considers when determining whether counsel should be
appointed).
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ORDER
Based on the Court’s careful review of the R&R and the record in this case, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Plaintiff Nathan C. Braun’s objections (Doc. No. [6]) to Magistrate Judge
Elizabeth Cowan Wright’s Report and Recommendation dated February 9, 2026, (Doc.
No. [3]) are OVERRULED.
2. 	The Court’s prior order (Doc. No. [4]) adopting Magistrate Judge Elizabeth
Cowan Wright’s Report and Recommendation dated February 9, 2026, (Doc. No. [3]) is
AMENDED as follows:
a. 	Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright’s Report and
Recommendation dated February 9, 2026, (Doc. No. [3]) is ADOPTED IN PART
AND MODIFIED IN PART.
b. 	Plaintiff Nathan C. Braun’s claims (Doc. No. [1]) are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
c. 	Plaintiff Nathan C. Braun’s application to proceed in district court
without prepaying fees or costs (Doc. No. [2]) is DENIED AS MOOT.
3. 	The Clerk’s Office is directed to issue an amended judgment dismissing the
case with prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: April 21, 2026 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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