Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Guillermo N.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Daren K.
Margolin, Director for Executive Office
for Immigration Review; Executive Office
for Immigration Review; and David
Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
Civ. No. 26-258 (PAM/DLM)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Guillermo N.’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. (“Pet.” (Docket No. 1).) For the following reasons, the Court denies the
petition.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Guillermo N. is a citizen of Ecuador. 	(Id. ¶ 37.) 	He claims to have
entered the United States on July 17, 2022, (id. ¶ 38.), at which time agents from the United
States Department of Homeland Security encountered him, processed him, and released
him under an Order of Release Under his own Recognizance. (Decl. of Gabriela Anderson
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(“Anderson Decl.”) (Docket No. 2) Ex. A.) 	On January 13, 2026, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner, and he remains in Respondents’
custody. (Pet. ¶¶ 21, 42, 45.)
DISCUSSION
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asking
the Court to order his immediate release or grant him an individualized bond hearing under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents contend that his detention is mandatory pending removal
proceedings under § 1225(b)(2). The Court must therefore decide whether § 1225(b)(2) or
§ 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention.
Relevant here, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) creates a framework
that controls the regulation of aliens, including their civil detention pending removal.
Before 1996, the INA focused on the alien’s physical entry into the country. 	In 1996,
Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act
(“IIRIRA”), which amended the INA’s framework to center on whether an alien has been
lawfully admitted. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 223 (BIA 2025).
Thus, under the new framework, “applicants for admission” defines both aliens at the
border and any alien “present in the United States” without lawful authorization. 	See 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a). 	“Now, in removal proceedings, the relevant distinction for procedural
purposes is whether the immigrant has been lawfully admitted, regardless of actual physical
presence.” Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020). Put differently, the IIRIRA
undid the backwards requirement that aliens who presented at a port of entry had to be
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detained, while those who entered illegally without trying to prove their basis for admission
to the country were not detained.
“When interpreting a statute, [courts] begin with the statute’s plain language, giving
words the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them. 	If the intent of
Congress can be clearly discerned from the statute’s language, the judicial inquiry must
end.” 	United States v. Lester, 92 F.4th 740, 742 (8th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). 	Section
1225(a)(1) dictates that “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted
or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . ) shall
be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 	There is no dispute
that Petitioner is an alien present in the United States. See id. And the facts are clear that
he did not lawfully enter the United States, i.e., an immigration officer did not inspect him
and authorize his entry. 	Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (“The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’
mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) instructs that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” The plain reading of the text is that detention
is mandatory. 	Other courts disagree with this reading, making distinctions based on the
length of an alien’s presence in the United States, an alien’s efforts to secure lawful status
here, or where an alien was apprehended. 	Such limitations are not found in the statute.
“What governs this case is the text of the statute, not what other district courts have
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concluded.” Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025).
Petitioner argues that § 1225 applies only to aliens “seeking admission” at the
United States’ border, and because he has lived in the United States for some time, he is
not “seeking admission.” 	Indeed, many courts agree with Petitioner’s interpretation of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). However, the Court determines that the growing minority of district
courts to reject Petitioner’s argument are correct. See, e.g., Chavez v. Noem, 801 F. Supp.
3d 1133, 1140 (S.D. Cal. 2025); Lopez v. Ladwig, No. 6:25-CV-01884, 2026 WL 19095,
at *4–6 (W.D. La. Jan. 2, 2026); Alberto Rodriguez v. Jeffreys, No. 8:25CV714, 2025 WL
3754411, at *11–14 (D. Neb. Dec. 29, 2025); Melgar v. Bondi, No. 8:25CV555, 2025 WL
3496721, *10–14 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 2025); Chen v. Almodovar, No. 1:25-CV-8350-MKV,
2025 WL 3484855, *3–6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025); Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, *3–
4. The text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is clear that a noncitizen who is an “applicant for admission”
is necessarily “seeking admission.” Indeed, the law dictates that an alien’s mere presence
in the United States without lawful admission means that he or she is seeking admission
“by operation of law.” Matter of Lemus-Losa, 25 I & N. Dec. 734, 743 n.6 (BIA 2012).
Petitioner’s attempt to distinguish an “applicant for admission” from an alien
“seeking admission” lacks merit. See Vargas Lopez v. Trump, No. 8:25CV526, 2025 WL
2780351, (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025), at *9 (explaining that “just because Vargas Lopez
illegally remained in this country for years does not mean that he is suddenly not an
‘applicant for admission’ under § 1225(b)(2)”). Petitioner fails to provide evidence that he
has been lawfully admitted to the United States. “Admission” means lawful entry into the
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United States, not merely any presence here. 	8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). 	The statute’s
plain meaning prevails: Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” because he is present in
this country and has not been admitted. Respondents may lawfully detain Petitioner under
§ 1225(b)(2), which requires detention. Thus, as a matter of law, Petitioner is not entitled
to a bond hearing.
To the extent that Petitioner argues that he cannot be detained under § 1225 he was
previously 	released 	under 	an 	Order 	of 	Release 	on 	Recognizance 	indicating 	that
Respondents derived their authority under § 1226, that argument fails. The statute contains
no such restriction. Section 1226(a) authorizes the Attorney General to arrest or detain any
alien pending removal proceedings but provides that the Attorney General also “may
release the alien” on bond or conditional parole. 	Nowhere does § 1226 mandate that an
alien released under § 1226 must be re-arrested pursuant to § 1226. Rather, “[s]ection 1226
provides that if the government exercises discretion to release an alien, pursuant to
§ 1226(a), the government ‘at any time may’ decide to ‘rearrest the alien under the original
warrant.’” Chen, 2025 WL 3484855, at *8. Moreover, Petitioner does not claim to have
been arrested “on a warrant issued by the Attorney General.” Indeed, Petitioner contends,
in part, that his detention is improper because Respondents did not have a warrant for his
arrest, but “Section 1225(b) does not include a warrant or an arrest requirement.” Melgar,
2025 WL 3496721, at *8. Petitioner’s argument fails.
Petitioner argues that Respondents’ previous interpretation of the INA is the better
course for the Court to follow. 	But past practice does not eclipse statutory language. 	In
July 2025, DHS issued a memorandum requiring that all “applicants for admission” be
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detained under § 1225(b)(2) during removal proceedings, a position that the Board of
Immigration Appeals later adopted in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA
2025). 	See Memorandum from Rodney S. Scott, U.S. Customs & Border Protection,
Detention of Applicants for Admission (July 10, 2025). Petitioner claims that supports his
view, because the Court need not afford weight to the agency’s decision given that Loper
Bright significantly curtailed judicial deference to administrative actions. See Loper Bright
Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412–13 (2024). 	However, Petitioner provides no
authority or history to support his argument that the agency’s previous pattern was superior,
and “[i]f there was a documented prior rationale, the Court has not seen it.” Rojas v. Olson,
No. 25-CV-1437-BHL, 2025 WL 3033967, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025). Moreover, “it
is well established that the Executive Branch has broad discretion to make enforcement
decisions in ‘the immigration context.’” Chen, 2025 WL 3484855, at *7 (quoting United
States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 679 (2023)).
Although Petitioner contends that Jennings supports his view, the better reading of
Jennings supports Respondents’ argument. The Court determines that Jennings cannot be
read so broadly as to mean that aliens who have been in the country for an extended length
of time must necessarily fall under § 1226(a). 	See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
297 (2018). Jennings explains that § 1225(b)(2) is a “catchall provision,” applying to all
“applicants for admission,” including those who unlawfully entered the country and are
therefore “deemed” applicants for admission under § 1225(a)(1)’s definition. 	Id. at 287.
As 	established, 	Petitioner 	is 	an 	applicant 	for 	admission. 	Neither 	Petitioner 	nor
Respondents argue that he qualifies for expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1). “So if the
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Supreme Court’s reference to ‘all applicants … not covered by § 1225(b)(1)’ in fact means
what it says, then [Petitioner] necessarily falls under the ‘catchall provision.’” Coronado
v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-CV-831, 2025 WL 3628229, at *9 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 15, 2025) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287). 	Indeed, “[r]ead most naturally,
§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) . . . mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain
proceedings have concluded.” Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *2 (quoting Jennings,
583 U.S. at 297).
Petitioner further argues that Respondents’ interpretation would create superfluity,
because applying § 1225(b)(2) to aliens in his position would render the 2025 amendment
to § 1226, the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, Sec. 2, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), redundant.
“As the Supreme Court has explained, when confronted with a choice between an
interpretation that honors a statute’s plain meaning but produces surplusage, and an
interpretation that ignores the plain meaning but avoids surplusage, there is no choice at
all—the plain meaning must control.” 	Artola v. Garland, 996 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir.
2021). 	Decades after the IIRIRA was enacted, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act to
empower the Attorney General to detain certain criminal aliens, “remov[ing] the Attorney
General’s detention discretion for aliens charged with specific—but not all—crimes.”
Chavez, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1141. Thus, it is reasonable that § 1226(c) would cover a large
category of aliens, including those also covered under § 1225(b)(2). 	Fear of redundancy
does not carry the day. The statute’s plain meaning prevails.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	The Petition (Docket No. 1) is DENIED; and
2. 	This action is DISMISSED without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 2, 2026 	s/ Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge
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