Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Aleksander B.,
Petitioner,
v.
Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as
President of the United States; Kristi
Noem, in her capacity as Secretary of the
United States Department of Homeland
Security; Todd M. Lyons, in his official
capacity as Acting Director of the United
States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Pamela Bondi, in her official
capacity as Attorney General of the United
States; David Easterwood, in his official
capacity as Acting Director, St. Paul Field
Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
No. 26-cv-170 (KMM/DJF)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Aleksander B.’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus (Dkt. 1) and Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss or Transfer (Dkt. 7). For the
following reasons, Respondents’ Motion is denied and the Petition is granted.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Aleksander B. is a native of Russia. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 3.) He was lawfully
admitted to the United States as a refugee on August 21, 2024. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 49.) Petitioner
has lived in the United States since then. (Id. ¶ 5.) On August 27, 2025, Petitioner filed an
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I-485 Application for Adjustment of Status with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services. (Id. ¶ 50.) Petitioner “has not been arrested by the police or charged with any
crime.” (Id. ¶ 52; id. ¶ 3 (“He has neither violated the immigration statutes, nor any
criminal statute.”). There is no allegation or evidence in the record that Petitioner has
been charged with removability under the laws of the United States. Nor is there any
indication that the government has terminated his refugee status.
On January 9, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) at Fort Snelling in Minnesota.1 (Dkt. 1 ¶ 53.) At that point,
Petitioner “essentially disappeared,” leaving his family with “no idea [of] what happened
to him.” (Dkt. 12 at 5; see Dkt. 14 ¶¶ 2–4 (listing ways Petitioner’s wife, Ksennia
Blizniukova, attempted to locate Petitioner, including calling hospitals and calling 911 to
obtain information on how to file a missing persons report, and, upon finding Petitioner’s
car with the keys left inside, stating Blizniukova concluded that “something very bad
happened to him, like being kidnapped.”).
The following morning, January 10, Petitioner called his father and stated that he
had been arrested the previous day and was being detained in St. Paul. (Dkt. 14 ¶ 3.) At
around noon, Petitioner’s family contacted Attorney Viorel Ureke to serve as Petitioner’s
counsel, who then checked the ICE Detainee Locator which indicated that Petitioner was
1 The parties dispute what day Petitioner was arrested by ICE, with Petitioner
alleging it was January 9 and Respondents averring that it was January 10. As this matter
comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts Petitioner’s allegations
as true for purposes of this Motion. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
But even should Defendant be correct, the difference does not alter the Court’s analysis
or conclusion.
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still in St. Paul. (Dkt. 13 ¶ 2.) That same afternoon, Ureke filed a Notice of Appearance
with ICE online and emailed its St. Paul Office with additional details and noting the
inability to identify Petitioner’s current location. (Dkt. 13 ¶ 3; Dkt. 13-2 at 1.) The instant
Petition was then in this Court on January 11, 2026. (See Dkt. 1.) At the time of this its
filing, Petitioner’s “last known whereabouts” were Fort Snelling. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 5.)
Unbeknownst to Petitioner’s family and counsel, Respondents had transferred
Petitioner on January 10, 2026 to the Mongomery Processing Center in Conroe, Texas.
(Dkt. 8 at 1.) “As of January 11, 2026, [Petitioner] was housed in Conroe, Texas.” (Dkt.
11 ¶ 9.) Petitioner was again transferred on January 13 to El Paso, Texas, where, at the
time of Respondents’ last filings, Petitioner was being detained. (Dkt. 11 ¶ 10.) It was not
until that day that Petitioner’s counsel and family learned through the ICE Detainee
Locator that Petitioner was being held outside of Minnesota. (See Dkt. 13 ¶ 4; Dkt. 14 ¶
4.) ICE never responded to Ureke’s email. (Dkt. 13 ¶ 3.) When Ureke was able to reach
an ICE officer in El Paso by phone on January 20, the officer told Ureke that Petitioner
had been transferred back to Houston, Texas on January 18, despite the ICE Detainee
Locator showing no such update. (Dkt. 13 ¶ 6.) As of January 20, Petitioner’s counsel nor
family have had any communication with Petitioner. (Dkt. 13 ¶¶ 4–6; Dkt. 14 ¶ 4.)
On January 17, Respondents filed both their Response to the Petition (Dkt. 10), the
instant Motion (Dkt. 7), and a declaration from Xiong Lee (Dkt. 11). Petitioner filed his
Response to the Motion and additional declarations on January 20. (Dkts. 12–16.)
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DISCUSSION
A. 	Motion to Dismiss
Respondents move to dismiss this Petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
(Dkt. 8 at 1–2.) Respondents contend that this Court lacks such jurisdiction because the
Petition was filed in this District after Petitioner had been transferred to Texas. (Id.
(quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004).) In the alternative to dismissal,
Respondents seek an order transferring this matter to the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas. (Id. at 3.)
District courts may grant writs of habeas corpus “within their respective
jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). That power “includes jurisdiction to hear habeas
challenges to immigration-related detention.” Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957,
965 (D. Minn. 2025). The Supreme Court has stated that “the general rule” for habeas
petitions is that “jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement.”
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443. But the high court has also recognized that when “a prisoner is
held in an undisclosed location by an unknown custodian, it is impossible to apply the . . .
district of confinement rules.” Id. at 450 n.18. In those instances, Justice Kennedy, joined
by Justice O’Connor, “acknowledge[d] an exception” to the district of confinement rule:
“if there is an indication that the Government’s purpose in removing a prisoner were to
make it difficult for his lawyer to know where the habeas petition should be filed, or
where the Government was not forthcoming with respect to the identity of the custodian
and the place of detention . . . habeas jurisdiction would be in the district court from
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whose territory the petitioner had been removed.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 454 (Kennedy, J.
concurring).2
While a Supreme Court majority has not formally accepted such an exception,
courts nationwide have recognized its existence. See Ozturk v. Trump, 777 F. Supp. 3d
26, 37–38 (D. Mass. 2025) (collecting cases); Suri v. Trump, 785 F. Supp. 3d 128, 144–
45 (E.D. Va. 2025) (recognizing and applying the exception), aff’d, No. 25-1560, 2025
WL 1806692, at *4 (4th Cir. July 1, 2025) (same) (noting the Fourth Circuit’s previous
application of the exception in United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004));
Tacuri ex rel. Guanoluisa v. Francis, No. 25-CV-07012 (JAV), 2025 WL 3459377, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2025) (recognizing and applying the exception); Munoz-Saucedo v.
Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 392 (D.N.J. 2025) (same). Courts in this District have as
well. See E.E. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-00314 (JWB/DTS), Dkt. 7 at 3–5 (D. Minn. Jan. 17,
2026); Ermatov v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-313 (JWB/DTS), Dkt. 7 at 3-5 (D. Minn. Jan. 17,
2026); Ermatov v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-312 (JWB/DTS), Dkt. 8 at 3–5 (D. Minn. Jan. 17,
2026); Palma v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-196 (NEB/DTS), Dkt. 8 at 2 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026)
(granting motion to transfer because Petitioner did not respond but recognizing the
exception); Lah v. Trump, No. 26-cv-00171 (MJD/SGE), Dkt. 11 at 6–11 (report and
recommendation); Xia v. King, No. 24-cv-2000 (JRT/DLM), 2025 WL 240792, at *2 (D.
2 This exception rhymes with another, formally adopted exception that states
“when the Government moves a habeas petitioner after [he] properly files a petition
naming [he] immediate custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction[.]” Padilla, 542
U.S. at 441 (citing Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944)). But since Petitioner did not file
his Petition in this Court before his transfer to Texas, this exception does not apply here.
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Minn. Jan. 17, 2025). In applying this carve out, at least one court has articulated that
“[a]n exception to the district of confinement rule must apply when, after reasonably
diligent effort, the district in which the petitioner was confined could not have been
determined.” Suri, 785 F. Supp. 3d at 143–44, aff’d, 2025 WL 1806692, at *5 (“Under
those circumstances, no “diligent attorney could have known that [the petitioner] was
[moved out of the district] at the time [his attorney] filed the petition.”); see Francis,
2025 WL 3459377, at *4 (applying the standard from Suri).
Here, Petitioner’s case falls within the exception envisioned by Justice Kennedy
and applied by our sister courts. Petitioner was arrested by ICE without notice on January
9 at Fort Snelling and, because no communication was made that day on his behalf, left
his family to conclude that he had gone missing altogether. When Petitioner was able to
communicate with his father the following day, he relayed that he was being detained by
ICE in St. Paul. Then, for three days, Petitioner’s family and counsel heard nothing
whatsoever about Petitioner’s whereabouts, despite Ureke’s attempts to communicate
with ICE. During that time, the instant Petition was filed on January 11. Only on January
13 were Ureke and Petitioner’s family made aware of Petitioner’s new location when the
ICE Detainee Locator was updated. In their filings here, Respondents make no attempt to
rebut these allegations or assert that information on Petitioner’s location was otherwise
available. (Dkt. 10 at 1 (“Respondents do not dispute the salient facts alleged in the
Petition.”).) In total, this record is clear that Respondents were “not forthcoming with
respect to . . . [Petitioner’s] place of detention,” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 454 (Kennedy, J.
concurring), and despite a “reasonably diligent effort” to find such information on
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Petitioner’s behalf, no such discovery was made. Suri, 785 F. Supp. 3d at 143–44. An
exception to the district of confinement rule applies here and leaves the Court with
jurisdiction to hear the Petition.
The Court finds support for this conclusion from the other courts who have
recently applied this exception in strikingly similar circumstances. See Suri, 785 F. Supp.
at 144 (concluding that the case “demand[ed] an exception to the district of confinement
rule” where “Petitioner reside[d] in this District, he was arrested in this District, and he
was originally detained in this District,” “[t]he last time Petitioner was permitted to speak
to his wife, the only information he had was that he would be detained in this District,”
“Petitioner’s counsel worked diligently in less than twenty hours and filed the petition in
this District based on the only information that was available to him—that his client was
detained in this District,” the petitioner’s notice to appear “did not reference [another
district], nor did the ICE Online Detainee Locator provide information about Petitioner’s
whereabouts until after the petition was filed,” and “[a]t no point after entering his
appearance did Petitioner’s counsel receive any notification that Petitioner had been
transferred”), aff’d, 2025 WL 1806692, at *5 (“This case is a prime example for why the
[district of confinement] exception exists.”); Francis, 2025 WL 3459377, at *4
(concluding that the district of confinement exception applied where “ICE officials
arrested Petitioner in New York on August 21, 2025, and flew him to Texas on August
22, 2025,” the petition “was filed within one day of Petitioner’s arrest [and] represent[ed]
that Petitioner continues to be detained [in New York],” “neither Petitioner’s next friend
nor anyone else seeking to act on Petitioner’s behalf could have known that [the
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petitioner was not in New York] at the time of filing,” and the respondents did not
“represent that the information about where ICE officials were planning to transport
Petitioner had been made available through ICE’s online detainee locator or otherwise”)
(cleaned up); see also Munoz-Saucedo, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 392–93; E.E. v. Bondi, Dkt. 7
at 3–5; Ermatov v. Bondi, Dkt. 7 at 3-5; Ermatov v. Bondi, Dkt. 8 at 3–5; Lah v. Trump,
Dkt. 11 at 6–11.
Because an exception to the district of confinement rule applies, the Court retains
subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition. And because this District is the proper place
to hear the Petition, Respondents’ alternative request to transfer it to the Western District
of Texas is denied.
B. 	Petition
In the Petition itself, Aleksander B. requests an order declaring his detention
unlawful and requiring his immediate release from custody. (Dkt. 1 at 14.) Respondents
argue that the Petition should be denied and the Court should find that he is lawfully
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)(C). The Court has recently granted a similar habeas
petition in Abdi F. W. v. Trump, No. 26-cv-208 (KMM/SGE), Dkt. 7 (D. Minn. Jan. 21,
2026) (Order). Just as the Court found in Abdi F. W., here, Petitioner has shown that he is
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
A court can issue a writ of habeas corpus if a person “is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “The
burden is on the petitioner to prove illegal detention by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Jose J.O.E., 797 F. Supp. 3d at 965. This case concerns the government’s power to detain
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a person who has been admitted into the United States as a “refugee,”3 which requires the
Court to consider the unique status of refugees within our complex network of
immigration laws. “Admission as a refugee is a distinct lawful immigration status.” Liban
G. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-0301 (SRN/ECW), 2026 WL 125689, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 16,
2026). Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), refugees may be admitted to
the United States following certain procedures. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157; Liban G., 2026 WL
125689, at *2 (citing USCIS, Refugees, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-
and-asylum/refugees). Refugees may be conditionally admitted to the United States
without presenting a visa upon arrival. See Azarmanesh v. Bondi, No. 23-cv-05210-LJC,
2025 WL 965955, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2025).
Those who have obtained conditional status as refugees are deemed to have been
“admitted.” In re D-K-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 761, 769 (B.I.A. 2012) (“[W]e conclude that
under the language of the [INA] and regulations, and also in view of the context and
structure of the provisions at issue, an alien admitted to the United States as a refugee has
been ‘admitted’ for purposes of section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act.”). This means that a
refugee’s conditional admission can result in two “admissions” to the United States—the
original conditional admission, and a later, longer-lasting admission if the refugee is
adjusted to LPR status. Id. at 768 (stating that “a refugee who ultimately becomes a
lawful permanent resident will have been ‘admitted’ twice—first, upon conditional
3 The Immigration and Nationality Act sets forth a specific definition of “refugee.”
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
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admission under section 207 of the Act, and second, upon reinspection and adjustment to
permanent resident status under section 209(a) of the Act[.]”).
Moreover, admission as a refugee places limitations on the government’s ability to
initiate removal proceedings. See id. at 765, 769 (holding that, although removal
proceedings may be initiated against a refugee whose refugee status has not been
terminated, any charges of removability against such a refugee “must be based on the
grounds of deportability under section 237 of the [INA]”). Under the law, a refugee’s
failure to obtain adjustment to LPR status by itself is not grounds for removal.
With these background principles in mind, the Court turns to the statute that
Respondents argue gives them the authority to detain Petitioner—8 U.S.C. § 1159.
However, Respondents point to no case law that supports their interpretation of § 1159 as
authorizing continued detention of Petitioner.4 That provision establishes a procedure for
refugees to seek adjustment to LPR status after having been physically present in the
United States for one year. Under § 1159, a refugee who has been admitted under § 1157,
and whose admission has not been terminated, but who has not yet been adjusted to LPR
status, “shall, at the end of such year period, return or be returned to the custody of the
[DHS] for inspection and examination for admission to the United States as an immigrant
in accordance with the provisions of sections 1225, 1229a, and 1231 of this title.” 8
4 Respondents cite only Omanovic v. Crawford, No. CV 06-0208-PHX, 2006 WL
2256630 (D. Ariz. Aug. 7, 2006). But Omanovic involved a petitioner whose application
for adjustment of status had been denied due to the petitioner’s criminal convictions, and
the government had initiated removal proceedings against the petitioner charging him
with removability due to the denial and his prior felonies. Id. at *3–4. Neither of those
circumstances are present in Petitioner’s case.
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U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a)(1). Thus, while § 1159(a) provides for a
refugee’s return to the custody of DHS, it does so only (1) to allow the government to
inspect and examine the refugee for admission; and (2) subject to §§ 1225, 1229a, and
1231.
The statute’s plain text and the applicable regulations contemplate a refugee’s
“return” to the “custody” of DHS for a limited time to serve a specified purpose—
inspection and examination. E.E. v. Bondi, Dkt. 7 at 7 (“The statute . . . permits custody
for a specific and limited function: to allow DHS to conduct the inspection necessary to
adjudicate adjustment of status under § 1159(a)(2).”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(a)(1)
(requiring every refugee to apply “one year after entry in order for USCIS to determine
his or her admissibility under [8 U.S.C. § 1182]”). On review, if there are any applicable
grounds for removal, “ICE . . . may charge a refugee with removability . . . even if the
individual’s refugee status has not been terminated,” and “USCIS may place the
individual in removal proceedings charging applicable grounds of inadmissibility[.]”
Policy Memorandum, U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement, Requests for
Evidence and Notices of Intent to Deny, PM-11039.1, at 2 (May 10, 2010) (“2010 DHS
Guidance”). “Accordingly, upon taking an unadjusted refugee into custody based upon a
reasonable belief that he or she is removable, the [ICE Office of Detention and Removal
Operations (“DRO”)] first must finalize its determination whether to place the individual
in removal proceedings . . . and, if so, whether to continue detention.” Id.
The text of § 1159(a) further makes apparent that continued detention of a refugee
following “inspection and examination for admission” under § 1159(a) must flow from
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§§ 1225, 1229a, and 1231. The Court finds that the record does not support Petitioner’s
continued detention under any of these provisions, and Respondents do not point to any
of them to justify such continued detention. First, the mandatory-detention provisions of
§ 1225 only apply to certain arriving aliens who are inadmissible, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1),
or who are deemed “applicant[s] for admission,” id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See also Belsai D.S.
v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 1,
2025) (distinguishing between detention under §§ 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a)). Section 1225
cannot justify Petitioner’s detention because Petitioner was conditionally admitted to the
United States as a refugee in August 2024, and, therefore, his entry into the country is
deemed an “admission” under the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A); In re D-K-, 25 I.
& N. at 769. Nothing before the Court suggests that Petitioner falls into either category
that is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) or 1225(b)(2).
Likewise, § 1231 cannot justify Petitioner’s continued detention because the
government has not shown that he is subject to a final removal order. Section 1231
mandates detention of an alien who has been ordered removed from the United States
during the 90-day “removal period,” which usually begins on the date that a removal
order becomes administratively final. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)–(B), (a)(2)(A). It also
authorizes detention beyond the 90-day removal period when DHS determines that the
person is “a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)). Here, § 1231
is entirely inapplicable because, according to the record, Petitioner has not been ordered
removed from the United States.
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Lastly, § 1229a, which governs removal proceedings, cannot justify Petitioner’s
continued detention because there is nothing before the Court suggesting that the
government has initiated removal proceedings against him. Section 1229a authorizes
immigration judges presiding over removal proceedings to decide whether an alien is
inadmissible or deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1). To initiate such proceedings, the alien
must be provided written notice of, among other things, the nature of the proceeding and
the alleged basis for seeking removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)–(2). “While removal
proceedings are in progress, most aliens may be released on bond or paroled.” Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2), (c) (1994 ed., Supp. V)). Detention during
the pendency of removal proceedings may also be mandatory in certain circumstances
that are not applicable to Petitioner, such as when the person has been convicted of
serious crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). But here, where nothing before the Court
suggests that Petitioner has been placed in removal proceedings, § 1229a is irrelevant and
does not justify his continued detention.
Instead, it appears that Respondents consider Petitioner’s detention an interim
status as he awaits a determination on his LPR application. Respondents argue that the
Court should deny Petitioner’s habeas petition because his status is “preliminary,” and his
“inspection will occur in due course.” (Dkt. 10 at 3.) But again, even had he not already
applied to adjust his status, a failure to apply for “adjustment of status under [§ 1159] is
not a sufficient ground to place [refugees] in removal proceedings, and therefore not a
proper basis for detaining them.” 2010 DHS Guidance at 2. And “except in case of
emergency or other extraordinary circumstances, upon the arrest of an unadjusted refugee
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upon reasonable belief of removability,” ICE must make a prompt determination
“whether to release the individual or issue a Notice to Appear (NTA)” that “indicat[es]
the removal charge(s) applicable to the alien.” Id. (stating that the ICE DRO Field Office
must make such a determination within “48 hours after the arrest”).5 Respondents cannot
justify Petitioner’s continued detention through an open-ended assurance that they will
get around to conducting the inspection and examination required by § 1159(a), which
presents their only identified basis for continued detention. See Corina E. v. Bondi,
No. 26-cv-313 (JWB/DTS), Dkt. 7 at 8 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026) (“Respondents’
reassurances that Petitioner’s detention ‘is not indefinite’ and that her ‘inspection will
occur in due course’ also cannot justify detention.”); E.E. v. Bondi, Dkt. 7 at 7 (same).
In sum, the Court concludes that § 1159(a) does not justify Petitioner’s continued
detention because he is not detained in accordance with §§ 1225, 1229a, or 1231.
Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner has met his burden to show that he is in custody
in violation of the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). As courts within this
district have recognized, when there is no valid statutory basis for detention, release is
5 Petitioner was arrested by ICE on January 9, 2026. By January 17, 2026,
Respondents had not conducted the inspection and examination required by § 1159 and
represented only that it will occur within an undefined period. This exceeds the 2010
DHS Guidance document, which provides a 48-hour timeline for an inspection and
examination. See 2010 DHS Guidance at 3 (“If a determination to place an unadjusted
refugee in removal proceedings has not been made within the initial 48-hour period
discussed above, the DRO Field Office should release the alien with a reminder that the
INA imposes an obligation upon him or her to apply for adjustment of status under
section 209(A) and to provide DHS with updated address information[.]”). As of today,
Respondents have had almost two weeks to conduct the required examination, and they
do not claim to have done so.
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both “an available and appropriate remedy.” Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4711
(ECT/SGE), 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (citing cases). Here, the
Court finds that Respondents must promptly complete Petitioner’s inspection and
examination, failing which, they must release him. See Corina E. v. Bondi, Dkt. 7 at 9
(finding that “conditional relief” was appropriate in a case involving continued detention
under § 1159(a)).6
ORDER
For the reasons stated above, and based on the entire record, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT
1. 	Petitioner Aleksander B.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED in
part as set forth herein.
2. 	Respondents shall, within three days of this Order, either:
a. 	Complete inspection and examination of Petitioner Aleksander B. pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a), and file a notice confirming that inspection has been
completed, 	identifying 	the 	outcome, 	and 	stating 	whether 	Respondents
contend that continued detention is authorized on a specified lawful basis; or
b. 	Immediately release Petitioner from custody in Minnesota, and file a notice
confirming the date, time, and location of release.
Let Judgment be entered accordingly.
Dated: January 22, 2026 	s/ Katherine Menendez_______
Katherine Menendez
United States District Judge
6 Petitioner raises an additional and important argument in his Reply that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1159 does not authorize detention at all. (Dkt. 17 at 2–18.) Because relief has been
granted on other grounds, the Court declines to address that argument at this time.
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