Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Byron V.G.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-99 (KMM/DJF)
ORDER
On January 15, 2026, the Court granted Petitioner Byron V.G.’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, ordering his immediate release. (Dkt. 8.) The Order narrowly qualified
that release by stating that “[i]f the Petitioner is on conditions of release from a previous
Order, those conditions remain in effect.” (Id. at 2 ¶ 3.) Otherwise, the Order nowhere
grants Respondents leave to issue additional conditions on V.G.’s release.
Petitioner now seeks an order enforcing this prior judgment because Respondents
released V.G. on a long list of conditions to which he was not previously subjected. (Dkt.
12.) Specifically, Respondents released V.G. on an Order for Release on Recognizance
(“Recognizance Order”) that imposed multiple requirements, including GPS monitoring
and enrollment in a substance abuse program and sexual deviancy counseling (despite V.G.
averring that he has no history of either). (Dkt. 14 at 3; Dkt. 15-1.)
Respondents raise two arguments justifying such conditions. (Dkt. 18.) First,
Respondents assert that they complied with the January 15th Order because that Order did
not affirmatively bar any conditions on release. (Id. at 1.) Second, Respondents argue that,
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regardless, they have obtained and served a warrant on V.G., authorizing those conditions
pursuant to § 1226(a). (Id. at 1–2.)
However, both arguments are unavailing. First, Respondents are correct that the
Court did not explicitly preclude all conditions on V.G.’s release. Instead, the Order made
clear that Petitioner could be released with conditions if those conditions existed “from a
previous Order.” (Dkt. 8 at 4 ¶ 3.) Yet at no point prior to the January 15 Order—or this
Order—have Respondents identified any previous order implementing the conditions V.G.
was released with. Instead, Respondents attempt to seize on the lack of an express bar to
subject V.G. to any conditions they please. But no reasonable reading of the Order supports
this conclusion; instead, because the Order contemplates conditions “if” they were
previously in effect, the evident implication is that, without a previous order, no conditions
could be imposed. The Court rejects Respondents’ reading of the January 15th Order to the
contrary.
Respondents’ second argument fares no better. Submitting a never-before-seen
warrant issued days after the arrest, Respondents reason that Byron V.G. was released
pursuant to § 1226(a), allowing them to impose additional conditions on his release. But
V.G. was not released pursuant to § 1226(a); he was released pursuant to this Court’s Order.
So, whether § 1226(a) properly invoked could have provided Respondents discretion to
impose additional release conditions is irrelevant here. And because the January 15th Order
precluded new conditions, those imposed by Respondents in the Recognizance Order
violate the Court’s Order.
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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Petitioner Byron V.G.’s Motion to Enforce Judgment (Dkt. 12) is GRANTED;
2. 	Respondents are ORDERED to file a notice on ECF by no later than 12:00 PM
on February 20, 2026 certifying that:
a. 	The conditions imposed on Byron V.G. in the Recognizance Order have been
removed; and
b. 	Byron V.G. has been released from Respondents’ custody without any
conditions.
Dated: February 18, 2026 	s/Katherine M. Menendez
Katherine M. Menendez
United States District Judge
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