Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Elian J.,
Petitioner,
v.
Kristi Noem, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Department of Homeland Security;
Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Daren Margolin, Acting Director for
Executive Office for Immigration Review;
Executive Office for Immigration Review;
David Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement;
Respondents.
File No. 26-CV-94 (JMB/DJF)
ORDER
David L. Wilson and Gabriela Sophia Anderson, Wilson Law Group, Minneapolis, MN,
for Elian J.
Trevor Brown and Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for
Respondents 	Kristi 	Noem, 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security, 	Todd 	M. 	Lyons,
Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement, 	Daren 	Margolin, 	Executive 	Office 	for
Immigration Review, and David Easterwood.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Elian J.’s1 Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Petition) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1 [hereinafter, “Pet.”].) Respondents
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in immigration cases.
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Kristi Noem, Department of Homeland Security, Todd M. Lyons, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Daren Margolin, Executive Office for Immigration Review, and
David Easterwood (together, Respondents) oppose the Petition. For the reasons explained
below, the Court grants the Petition in part.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	Elian J. is a native and citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States
without inspection in June 2019. (Pet. ¶¶ 37–38.)
2. 	Respondents encountered Elian J. and transferred him to the custody of the
Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement. (Pet. ¶ 39.)
3. 	Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 279 and 8 U.S.C. § 1232, Elian J. was released from
Federal custody. (Id. ¶ 40.)
4. 	Elian J. filed an application for asylum with the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) pursuant to the Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(C). (Id. ¶ 41.) This application remains pending with USCIS.
(Id. ¶ 42.)
5. 	Respondents’ removal proceedings were dismissed in 2023. (Id. ¶ 44.)
6. 	Respondents detained Elian J. on January 7, 2026. (Id. ¶ 45.)
7. 	On January 8, 2026, Elian J. filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(Pet.) 	Elian J. seeks a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) or immediate release. (Id. at 34.) Elian J. also seeks a variety of additional relief
from the Court, including a declaration that Respondents’ action is arbitrary and capricious,
the Respondents failed to adhere to its regulations, and that Respondents adopted a new
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policy without undergoing the required notice and comment period in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
Respondents generally oppose Elian J.’s Petition, explaining that the Petition “raises
legal and factual issues similar to those in prior habeas petitions this Court has decided”
and that Respondents have appealed one such petition (see Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248
(8th Cir.)). (Doc. No. 6.) Respondents then incorporate by reference all of the arguments
raised in the Avila appeal and request denial of the petition. (Id.) In this way, Respondents
reiterate their argument that the detention of petitioners similarly situated to Elian J. is
mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). 	As this Court has previously concluded,
however, Respondents’ interpretation lacks merit. 	For the reasons discussed below, the
Court concludes that because section 1225(b) is not applicable to him, Elian J. is entitled
to a bond hearing pursuant to section 1226(a)(1).2 	The Court therefore grants Elian J.’s
Petition. 3
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted
to any person who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of
2 The transfer of Elian J. after the initiation of this proceeding does not deprive this Court
of jurisdiction over the Petition. Weeks v. Wyrick, 638 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1981).
3 Because a bond hearing is the primary relief available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Court
declines to address the remaining relief requested. In addition, to the extent that the Petition
also includes a request for immediate release, the Court declines to address this requested
relief because the Petition does not develop an argument that Elian J.’s January 7, 2026
arrest was unlawful, separate and apart from the challenged legal basis for his continued
detention without a bond hearing.
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the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to
every individual detained within the United States” (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2));
Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025). For most of the nation’s
history, habeas review “has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it
does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” 	Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525
(quotation omitted). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “extends to . . . immigration-related detention.” Deng
Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (citation omitted). 	The
petitioner bears the burden of proving that his detention is illegal by a preponderance of
evidence. 	Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 2025 WL 2466670, at *5
(D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H., 782 F. Supp. 3d at 703).
The fundamental question raised in this case is whether Elian J. is an applicant for
admission under section 1225(b), or a noncitizen residing in the United States under
section 1226. In other cases, Respondents have argued that a noncitizen who is present in
the United States without having been admitted, like Elian J., is an “applicant” for
admission under section 1225(b) and therefore subject to mandatory detention under
section 1225(b)(2). Courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ interpretation that
section 1225(b)(2) requires the mandatory detention of all noncitizens living in the country
who are “inadmissible” because they entered the United States without inspection. 	See,
e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 & n.22
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that this interpretation had been rejected in 350 cases
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“decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across
the United States” and collecting cases in an Appendix A); Jose Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No.
25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025)
(collecting cases); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL
2802947, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 	This Court also finds
Respondents’ interpretation unpersuasive.
When interpreting a statute, “every clause and word of a statute should have
meaning.” 	United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432
(2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883)). 	Noncitizens who have been residing in the United States but who entered
without inspection have not, historically, been considered to still be “arriving” under
section 1225(b). 	This is because the statute itself states that, in order to apply, several
conditions must be met; specifically, an immigration officer must determine that the
noncitizen “is an applicant for admission . . . seeking admission . . . [and] not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Determining the plain
meaning of the statute requires consideration of the tense of the verb “is” and the present
participle “seeking.” 	Here, section 1225(b)(2) applies to persons who presently are
applicants for admission and who presently are seeking admission at the time of their
detention. 	To be seeking admission means to be seeking entry, which “by its own force
implies a coming from outside.” United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401
(1929). In this case, Elian J. has been residing in the United States and is, therefore, not
currently “seeking admission” into the United States.
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In addition, Respondents’ interpretation of 1225(b)(2) renders superfluous other
immigration laws. Specifically, interpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens
who have already entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the
country, as Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section
1226 by the Laken Riley Act (LRA). The LRA added new categories of noncitizens subject
to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), and one such category was for noncitizens
lacking valid documentation and who have been charged with or convicted of certain
crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). But if Respondents’ interpretation of section
1225 were correct, then there would have been no need for the LRA to create these
additional categories because all noncitizens who are present in the United States and have
not 	been 	admitted 	would 	have 	already 	been 	ineligible 	for 	bond 	under 	section
1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court also agrees with those courts that have found that Respondents’
interpretation of section 1225(b) is “at odds with both the relevant legislative history and
longstanding agency practice.” Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *7; see, e.g., Maldonado
v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150 (D. Minn. 2025) (discussing the longstanding practice
of treating noncitizens who resided in the United States, but who had entered without
inspection, as being subject to section 1226(a)).
The fact that Elian J. has applied for asylum does not change the conclusion. The
definition of “admission” in this context means “the lawful entry of the noncitizen into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 	Barco
Mercado, 2025 WL 3295903 at *5 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis altered)).
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Even by applying for asylum, a “noncitizen who already has entered the United States
illegally and is living here cannot be said to be actively seeking lawful entry into the United
States,” because the “entry, whether lawful or unlawful, occurred years ago.” Id. (emphasis
in original). 	Other courts have reached this same conclusion under similar facts. 	E.g.,
Quishpe-Guaman v. Noem, No. 4:25-CV-00211-TWP-KMB, 2025 WL 3201072, at *4
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2025) (finding it was “strong evidence” that the federal government
earlier released a noncitizen on her own recognizance under section 1226 and rejecting
Respondents’ argument that her asylum application shows that she “is plainly seeking
admission to the United States”); Mayamu K. v. Bondi, File No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025
WL 3641819, at *4, 8 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025) (concluding that despite a pending asylum
application, the petitioner’s previous Order of Release on Recognizance under section 1226
precludes detention under section 1225).
Therefore, because section 1225(b) is inapplicable to Elian J., he is subject to the
provisions of section 1226, which “sets forth a discretionary process for the apprehension
and detention of aliens who are already present in the United States and eligible for
removal.” Selvin Adonay E.M. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL 3157839,
at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025). Pursuant to section 1226(a), Elian J. is entitled to a bond
hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)(2); see also Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *5–6; Jose
Andres R.E., 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2. 	For these reasons, the Court finds that Elian
J.’s detention is governed by section 1226(a), and he is not subject to section 1225(b)’s
mandatory detention. Accordingly, the Court grants the Petition to the extent Elian J. seeks
a bond redetermination hearing.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, as follows:
1. 	Respondents must immediately provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and in any event, on or before 5:00 p.m. CT on January
16, 2026.
2. 	If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately released from
detention.
3. 	On or before 11:00 a.m. CT on January 20, 2026, Respondents shall provide
the Court with a status update concerning the results of any bond hearing
conducted pursuant to this Order, or if no bond hearing was held, advise the
Court regarding Petitioner’s release.
4. 	Respondents shall not remove, transfer, or otherwise facilitate the removal
of Petitioner from the United States of America.
5. 	No other person or agency shall remove, transfer, or otherwise facilitate the
removal of Petitioner from the United States on Respondents’ behalf.
6. 	To the extent Petitioner seeks additional relief, the Petition is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 14, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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