Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Evangeline Surya Ester Dhawan-Maloney, ROBICHAUD, SCHROEPFER &
CORREIA, PA, 7500 Olson Memorial Highway, Suite 325, Minneapolis, MN
55427, for Petitioner.
Ana H. Voss, Erin M. Secord, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 300
South Fourth Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55415 for Respondents.
Petitioner 	Abdirashid 	H. 	M. 	(“Petitioner”) 	was 	arrested 	by 	United 	States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in December 2025. Petitioner seeks a writ
of habeas corpus, asserting that he is being detained without a bond hearing in violation
of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
ABDIRASHID H. M.,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; TODD
M. LYONS; Acting Director of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; PETER BERG,
Director, St. Paul Field Office, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; SAMUEL J.
OLSON, Director of Enforcement and
Removal Operations, Chicago Field Office,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
and JOEL BROTT, Sheriff of Sherburne
County Jail, Minnesota,
Respondents.
Civil No. 25-4779 (JRT/EMB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
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Amendment. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention is lawful, if at all, under the
discretionary scheme of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and that he is not subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The Court further concludes that detaining Petitioner
without a bond hearing is a violation of his right to due process. Accordingly, the Court
will grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and order that Petitioner receive a bond
hearing.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Somalia. (Decl. of James L. Van Der Vaart (“Van
Der Vaart Decl.”) ¶ 4, Jan. 2, 2026, Docket No. 6.)1 He first entered the United States on
October 21, 2024, and was arrested by immigration authorities. 	(Pet. Writ of Habeas
Corpus (“Pet.”) ¶ 1, Dec. 26, 2025, Docket No. 1.)
On October 30, 2024, Petitioner claimed a fear of returning to his home country.
(Van Der Vaart Decl. ¶ 5.) He took part in a credible fear interview on November 18, 2024.
(Decl. of Abdirashid H.M. (“H.M. Decl.”) ¶ 1, Jan. 5, 2025, Docket No. 7-1.) 	USCIS found
that Petitioner had a credible fear of returning to Somalia and issued a Notice to Appear
in immigration court in Los Angeles, California. (Van Der Vaart Decl. ¶ 7.) The Notice to
Appear charged Petitioner as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. (Id.
1 James L. Van Der Vaart, a Deportation Officer with ICE, has submitted a declaration
setting forth the facts relevant to Mohamed’s detention.
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¶ 7, Ex. 2.) 	Petitioner’s immigration proceedings were subsequently transferred to St.
Paul, Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 8.)
On November 26, 2024, ICE released Petitioner on parole through the Alternatives
to Detention program. (Id. ¶ 9.)2 Two months later, on January 22, 2025, Petitioner filed
an I-589 asylum application. (Pet. ¶ 3.) For over a year following his release, Petitioner
remained paroled from custody. He was “required to check in with ICE via visits, phone
calls, and by sending photos of myself” via “an app that the government installed on my
phone.” (H.M. Decl. ¶ 2.) Petitioner states that he “never missed a check-in or otherwise
violated a condition of [his] release.” (Id. ¶ 3.)
On December 4, 2025, ICE arrested Petitioner. (Pet. ¶ 4.)3 According to Petitioner,
ICE officers arrested him in the parking lot outside his residence in Hopkins, Minnesota,
without providing any reason for the arrest. 4 (H.M. Decl. ¶ 4.) Petitioner has since been
detained at the Sherburne County Jail. (Pet. ¶ 5.)
2 Petitioner’s asserted timeline is slightly different—he states that “on or about December
2, 2024” he was “released . . . on his own recognizance” under 8 U.S.C. 1226. (Pet. ¶¶ 12, 24,
Exs. A, B.)
3 Respondents contend that Petitioner was arrested due to “multiple violations” of the
terms of the Alternatives to Detention program. (Van Der Vaart Decl. ¶ 10.) Petitioner denies
that these violations occurred. (Response to Declaration, Jan. 5, 2026, Docket No. 7.)
4 Petitioner speculates that he was arrested “possibly on a tip from his neighbors that
immigrants were living in the house next door,” and states that “[i]t appears the only reason that
Petitioner was detained is because he is Somali.” (Pet. ¶ 4.)
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On December 26, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
(Docket No. 1.) 	Petitioner contends, among other things, that his detention without a
bond hearing is unlawful under federal statute and violates his rights to due process under
the Fifth Amendment. He asks the Court for an order declaring that he is entitled a bond
hearing. (Id. at 17.)
DISCUSSION
It is well-established that “absent suspension” by Congress, the Constitution
guarantees that the “writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained
within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const.,
Art. 1. § 9, cl. 2). The writ of habeas corpus has served as a vital check on executive power
throughout our nation’s history. 	A petitioner must prove unlawful detention by a
preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D.
Minn. 2025).
Petitioner, arrested by ICE on December 4, 2025, contends that his detention
without a bond hearing is unlawful. 	Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to
mandatory detention, and therefore not entitled to a bond hearing, under two separate
statutory provisions: 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and § 1225(b)(2). The Court will first address
the applicability of the relevant statutes, before turning Petitioner’s claim that his
detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights.
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A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner argues that the sole statutory provision that authorizes his arrest and
detention is 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides that he must be granted an individualized
bond hearing.
Respondents disagree. 	First, Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides that “in the case of an
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines
that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a.” This argument mirrors
those advanced by Respondents in other similar cases, including Herrera Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-3741, 2025 WL 2976539 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025) and Romero Santuario v. Bondi,
No. 25-4296, 2025 WL 3469577 (D. Minn, Dec. 2, 2025). 	As in those cases, the factual
record before the Court shows that Petitioner was arrested while already in the United
States. Indeed, Petitioner’s Notice to Appear designated him as someone “present in the
United States who has not been admitted or paroled.” (Van Der Vaart Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 2.)
For the same reasons articulated in Herrera Avila and Romero Santuario, the Court
concludes that Petitioner’s detention is not governed by § 1225(b)(2).
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Respondents argue “[i]n the alternative” that Petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).5 (Response at 8, Jan. 2., 2026, Docket No. 5.)
The U.S. Supreme Court has previously discussed the relationship between §§ 1225(b)(1)
and (b)(2):
Both § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2) authorize 	the 	detention 	of 	certain
aliens. 	Aliens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally ordered removed
“without further hearing or review” pursuant to an expedited removal
process. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if a § 1225(b)(1) alien “indicates either an
intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution,” then that alien is
referred for an asylum interview. 	§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). 	If an immigration
officer determines after that interview that the alien has a credible fear of
persecution, “the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the
application for asylum.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Aliens who are instead covered
by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a different process. Those aliens
“shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding” if an immigration officer
“determines that [they are] not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted” into the country. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (alterations in original).
The subsection on which Respondents rely, § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), provides that if an
immigration officer “determines at the time of the interview that an [asylum applicant]
has a credible fear of persecution,” then the noncitizen “shall be detained for further
consideration of the application for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Petitioner was
interviewed and found to have a credible fear of returning to Somalia, which seems to
5 Respondents are not entirely clear as to whether they believe that Section 1225(b)(2)
does in fact provide a statutory basis for Petitioner’s mandatory detention. Respondents argue
extensively that the Court “should uphold Petitioner’s mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2),”
but they later contradict themselves, stating that Petitioner “is not subject to § 1225(b)(2) or the
government’s contested interpretation of it.” (Response at 6, 11, Jan. 2, 2026, Docket No. 5.)
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bring him under the umbrella of this section. (H.M. Decl. ¶ 1.) But critically, no party to
this case has cited any binding authority addressing whether mandatory detention is
permissible when an individual who participates in a credible fear interview is paroled
into the country (as Respondents acknowledge Petitioner was, see Response at 13, Jan.
2, 2026, Docket No. 5), or placed in full removal proceedings and released into the
community on recognizance under § 1226(a) (as Petitioner also appears to have been, see
Pet. ¶ 2, Exs. A, B), only to be suddenly re-arrested without notice, and held without bond.
The Court finds a recent decision from the Southern District of New York, Qasemi
v. Francis, Civ. No. 25-10029, 2025 WL 3654098 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025), to be instructive.
Qasemi, like this case, involved a noncitizen previously found to have a credible fear of
returning to their home country who was subsequently placed on parole. Id. at *9. The
court held that the noncitizen was not subject to mandatory detention under §
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), even upon the termination of parole, because the relevant statutes are
“most sensibly read to exclude from the expedited removal provisions in Section
1225(b)(1) those noncitizens who . . . were at any time paroled into the United States.”
Id. The court concluded that “when ICE affirmatively chose to release Qasemi on parole,
it made the decision that he would no longer be subject to the mandatory detention
provision of Section 1225(b)(1),” and that his detention must instead “be conducted
under the discretionary framework of Section 1226(a).” Id. at *11.
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The Court finds this reasoning to be consistent with the principle that § 1226
“applies to [noncitizens] already in the United States,” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, as well
as the text and structure of the relevant statutes. Accordingly, the Court concludes that
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which provides for the initial mandatory detention of noncitizens
subject to § 1225(b)(1) who are found to have a credible fear of persecution in their home
country, does not authorize the mandatory detention of that noncitizen once they have
been paroled into the country and released. 6 	To the extent that Petitioner’s present
detention is authorized by federal statute, it is pursuant to the discretionary detention
scheme under § 1226(a).
B. 	Due Process
The Court separately concludes that Petitioner’s detention without bond violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens],
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see also Lopez v. Heinauer, 332 F.3d 507, 512 (8th Cir.
6 Moreover, unlike the petitioner in Qasemi, who did “not dispute that his parole status
has ended,” in this case Petitioner never received any notice that his parole status had ended.
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2003) (“The Supreme Court has long recognized that deportable [noncitizens] are entitled
to constitutional protections of due process.”).
When a noncitizen alleges that civil detention violates their right to due process,
courts often apply the three-part test derived from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976). See, e.g., Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1185 (D. Minn. 2025). The
three relevant factors to assessing a due process claim are: (1) “the private interest that
will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Petitioner does not seek full release—rather, he seeks a bond hearing. He argues
that because he “was previously released on his own recognizance, has a private interest
in being free from detention”; that a bond hearing is necessary to allow him to challenge
Respondents’ asserted basis for his arrest (that he violated the terms of his parole); and
that a bond hearing will impose only a minimal burden on the government. (Pet’r’s Reply
at 4–5, Jan. 5, 2025, Docket No. 7.)7
7 Respondents do not address Petitioner’s due process claim.
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Turning to the first Mathews factor, Petitioner’s private interest, it is axiomatic that
“the interest in being free from physical detention” is “the most elemental of liberty
interests.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. Importantly, prior to his arrest, Petitioner had been
released from Respondents’ custody on parole as part of the Alternatives to Detention
program. 	The Court joins several district courts around the country in recognizing the
self-evident idea that an individual who has been released from custody to live a
productive life in the community obtains a protected interest in their “continued liberty.”
See, e.g., Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons, No. 5:25-CV-00773, 2025 WL 2976923, at *9
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025); Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-0571, 2025 WL 1676854, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. June 14, 2025). Although the length of Petitioner’s detention to this point is brief,
which weighs against finding a due process violation, the Court considers the potential
indefinite nature of his detention, after the sudden revocation of his release, to weigh in
favor of relief.
Second, the Court considers there to be a high degree of risk of erroneous
deprivation given the lack of process that occurred prior to the de facto revocation of
Petitioner’s parole through his arrest on December 4. Petitioner, who had been living and
working in his community since his release from custody, contends that he never
“violated any conditions of [his] release” and has cooperated fully with ICE throughout
the pendency of his asylum application. 	(H.M. Decl. ¶ 3.) 	Respondents dispute
Petitioner’s characterization of the facts, alleging that he was arrested “due to multiple
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violations” of his release program, “missing three . . . separate biometric check ins over a
10 month period in 2025.” 	(Van Der Vaart Decl. ¶ 10.) 	Given (1) these contradictory
recitations of the facts; (2) that ICE approached Petitioner at his home and arrested him
without providing any rationale; (3) that Respondents appear not to have provided
Petitioner with any reason for his arrest until their filings to the Court; and (4) that
Respondents have not provided the Court with any evidence of parole violations, the
Court concludes that the second Mathews factor weighs in favor of granting the petition.
The risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s interest in his “continued liberty” is high,
and additional procedural safeguards—specifically, individualized bond hearing—would
alleviate these risks.
Third, the Court finds that an order compelling the government to provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing would impose minimal, if any, financial or administrative
burden on Respondents. Moreover, aside from asserting that they have the authority to
do so, Respondents identify no additional rationales, such as public safety, supporting the
need to detain Petitioner without bond hearing.
On these narrow facts, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention without a
bond hearing constitutes a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights.
CONCLUSION
The 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Petitioner’s 	arrest 	is 	authorized 	only 	under 	the
discretionary detention scheme of § 1226. 	The Court separately concludes that
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Respondents’ 	arrest 	and 	detention 	of 	Petitioner 	without 	providing 	him 	with 	an
individualized bond hearing constitutes a violation of his rights under the Due Process
Clause. 	The Court will grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and order that
Petitioner be given a bond hearing at which both parties will be allowed to present
evidence and argument as to whether Petitioner is a danger to the community or presents
a flight risk.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Petitioner Abdirashid H.M.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1] is
GRANTED, as follows:
a. 	Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b),
and is instead subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
b. 	Petitioner’s detention without an individualized bond hearing violates his
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
c. 	Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bond hearing in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 7 days of the date of this Order, in which the
parties will be allowed to present evidence and argument about whether
Petitioner is a danger to the community and presents a flight risk if not
detained;
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d. 	If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately released from
detention; and
e. 	Within 10 days of the date of this Order, the parties shall provide the Court
with a status update concerning the results of any bond hearing conducted
pursuant to this Order, or if no bond hearing was held, advise the Court
regarding Petitioner's release. Further, the parties shall advise the Court
whether any additional proceedings in this matter are required and submit
any proposals for the scope of further litigation.
2. 	Respondents are ENJOINED from removing, transferring, or otherwise facilitating
the removal of Petitioner from the District of Minnesota before the ordered bond
hearing. After such bond hearing, Respondents may request permission from the
Court to move Petitioner if unforeseen or emergency circumstances arise which
require Petitioner to be removed from the District. Any such request must include
an explanation for the request as well as a proposed destination. The Court will
then determine whether to grant the request and permit transfer of Petitioner.
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3. 	Within 3 days of the date of this Order, the parties shall file any requests for
redaction.
DATED: January 9, 2026
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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