Rivera v. Walanis et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Alveto Rivera,
Plaintiff,
v.
Meg Walanis; Kara Lehman; and
Austin Wuebker, sued in their
individual capacities and in their
official capacities,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-CV-4441 (ECT/EMB)
ORDER AND
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) filed by Plaintiff Alveto
Rivera, a client of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”). Mr.
Rivera has also filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
Application”) (Dkt. No. 2) and a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. 4). For
the following reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS this action be
dismissed and the IFP application be denied, and DENIES the motion to
appoint counsel.
I. Background
A. Mr. Rivera’s Previous Action
In May 2025, Mr. Rivera filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claiming the attorney who represented him during his civil commitment
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proceedings provided ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rivera v. Gray,
No. 25-CV-2215 (JWB/LIB) (D. Minn) (“Rivera I”). The magistrate judge
recommended dismissal of that action because Mr. Rivera’s claims challenged
the lawfulness of his civil detention. See id., R&R (Dkt. No. 6) at 2–3 (“If
Plaintiff were to establish that [his lawyer] provided ineffective assistance of
counsel during the underlying civil-commitment proceedings, this would
necessarily imply that the civil-commitment proceedings should be
invalidated.”). As the magistrate judge recognized, such a challenge is barred
by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Rivera I, R&R, at 2–3. The
district judge agreed Mr. Rivera’s claims were barred by Heck, adopted the
R&R over Mr. Rivera’s objections, and dismissed the case. See id., Order
(Dkt. No. 8) at 3.
Mr. Rivera appealed the dismissal to the Eighth Circuit. See Rivera v.
Gray, No. 25-2757 (8th Cir. Sept. 9, 2025). He filed his brief in support on
October 1, 2025. Just two days later, and without ordering briefing from the
respondent, the Eighth Circuit summarily affirmed this Court’s dismissal of
Mr. Rivera’s lawsuit. That court also sent Mr. Rivera a letter (1) explaining
“any petition for rehearing [must] be filed within 14 days after entry of
judgment”—that is, by October 17—and (2) cautioning that the 14-day
deadline was “strictly enforce[d].” See id., Cover Letter (Oct. 3, 2025).
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B. Mr. Rivera’s Current Action
On October 3, 2025—the same day the Eighth Circuit entered
judgment in his appeal—MSOP officials informed Mr. Rivera he would be
transferred from its Moose Lake facility to its St. Peter Facility.1 (See Dkt.
No. 1 ¶¶ 7, 9.) Mr. Rivera arrived at St. Peter on October 6, but did not
receive his property until the next day. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 22.) When he went to
retrieve his things, MSOP employees informed him “there may be a problem
with [his] property,” but he could take some of it with him immediately. (Id.
¶ 23.)
Mr. Rivera told MSOP staff that he “need[ed] all law books, legal
documents and typing paper” because he had a deadline approaching in his
appeal before the Eighth Circuit. (Id. ¶ 25.). After several requests, MSOP
officials returned “all [Mr. Rivera’s] legal property” to him on October 24,
2025, but kept “his T.V. remote, [and] his stand light.” (Id. ¶¶ 37–38.)
Mr. Rivera alleges the mishandling of his legal papers interfered with
his ability to request a rehearing from the Eighth Circuit by the October 17
deadline. (Id. ¶¶ 47–48.) He has now sued the MSOP staff members tasked
with handling his property during the move, claiming they impeded his right
1 As explained more fully below, the Court accepts the allegations in the
Complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to Mr.
Rivera. See Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594–95 (8th Cir.
2009).
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of access to the courts by keeping his legal papers following the transfer. He
seeks monetary relief under both § 1983 and state law. Mr. Rivera filed an
IFP Application instead of paying the filing fee. (See Dkt. No. 2.)
II. Legal Standard
If a litigant lacks the financial resources to prepay the required filing
fee, the Court may allow his lawsuit to proceed without prepayment. But
even if a litigant’s financial condition would otherwise qualify him to proceed
with prepaying the fee, the Court may still deny IFP status and dismiss an
action if the litigant’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also Atkinson v. Bohn, 91
F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
When deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, the Court must accept the complaint’s factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594–95 (8th Cir. 2009).
Although the factual allegations in the complaint need not be detailed, they
must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In other words, the
complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.
at 570. In deciding whether this standard is met, the Court disregards legal
conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
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U.S. 662, 679 (2009). And although “pro se complaints are to be construed
liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims
advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted).
III. Analysis
The allegations in Mr. Rivera’s complaint do not clear this hurdle. The
Court addresses his federal and related state-law claims below.
A. Federal Claims
“The Constitution guarantees prisoners a right to access the courts.”
White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Pittman v.
Swanson, 11-CV-3658 (PJS/TNL), 2023 WL 2404044, at *11 (D. Minn. Jan.
27, 2023) (recognizing same standard applies to civil detainees), report and
recommendation adopted, 11-CV-3658 (PJS/TNL), 2023 WL 2238703 (D.
Minn. Feb. 27, 2023). To state a claim for denial of access to the courts under
§ 1983, however, a plaintiff must establish “the hindrance of a nonfrivolous
and arguably meritorious underlying legal claim.” White, 494 F.3d at 680.
Because Mr. Rivera did not have “a nonfrivolous and arguably
meritorious” claim to raise in his prior lawsuit, his complaint fails. As a
practical matter, the Eighth Circuit had already affirmed this Court’s
dismissal when MSOP officials mishandled his property. Even if MSOP
officials interfered with Mr. Rivera’s ability to file a petition for rehearing,
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such a request is an uphill battle in the best of circumstances. Here, Mr.
Rivera offers no reason to believe a timely request for rehearing would have
had any chance at success. Because his case did not present a close call, Mr.
Rivera did not have an “arguably nonfrivolous” claim available to him at the
time MSOP officials seized his legal paperwork.
In any event, Mr. Rivera must plead more than the existence of just
any “arguably meritorious underlying legal claim.” Id. Instead, he must
plausibly allege that his “arguably meritorious” claim relates to an attack on
either the legality of his detention or the conditions of his confinement. See
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (“Impairment of any other litigating
capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional)
consequences of conviction and incarceration.”); see also Prouty v. Miles, 21-
CV-2606 (WMW/TNL), 2022 WL 3030551, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2022)
(applying Lewis to MSOP civil detainee).
Mr. Rivera did not (and cannot) plausibly satisfy both of these
requirements. This Court dismissed his prior lawsuit, reasoning Heck barred
his claim because it challenged the validity of his commitment. The Eighth
Circuit affirmed this conclusion. So to avoid the Heck bar on his petition for
rehearing (that is, to have an arguably nonfrivolous claim), Mr. Rivera
would’ve had to argue that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not
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an attack on the lawfulness of his commitment. Otherwise, the underlying
claim would have been barred by Heck.
But that argument would be fatal to his claim here. As set forth in
Lewis, Mr. Rivera’s access-to-the-court claim must relate to either the legality
of his detention or the conditions of his confinement. See 518 U.S. at 355.
Based on the posture of his previous case, there is simply no way Mr. Rivera
can successfully show that he has an arguably nonfrivolous claim that fits
within the two permissible types of access-to-the-court claims allowed under
Lewis.
The pleading is overwhelmingly focused on Rivera’s access-to-the-
courts claim, but for the sake of completeness, this Court has considered
Rivera’s claims from another angle as well: Did the withholding of Rivera’s
items—not only his legal materials, but also his T.V. remote and stand
light—amount to a deprivation of property without adequate due process
protections in violation of § 1983? The answer is no.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause provides that “[n]o
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. To comport with due process
requirements, the state must typically provide a hearing before it deprives a
person of his property. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).
That is not the case, however, where the deprivation “result[s] from ‘a
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random and unauthorized act by a state employee’—versus ‘some established
state procedure.’” Walters v. Wolf, 660 F.3d 307, 312 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), overruled on other grounds by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986)).
The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint demonstrate that the
deprivation did not occur pursuant to any state procedure. Plaintiff alleges
the Moose Lake staff “was in a rush to have [him] pack up his property,” but
told him they thought they packed his remote and light. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 14,
17.) Similarly, Defendant Wuebker told Mr. Rivera he “did not know why
property [staff] was holding on to [Mr. Rivera’s] property,” and that those
actions “failed to comply with the rules of MSOP.” (Id. ¶¶ 40, 43). Mr. Rivera
also claims he is “the only one that this happen[ed] to,” that MSOP could not
provide any reason the property was withheld, and that Defendants withheld
his property “maliciously and sadistically.” (Id. ¶¶ 53, 56.)
Because Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ actions were random and
unauthorized, he cannot establish a violation of his due process rights where
state law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Minnesota law provides such a remedy—
an action for replevin. See Jones v. Roy, 449 F. App’x 526, 527 (8th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (citing Storms v. Schneider, 802 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. App.
2011)). Because the Complaint fails to state a federal claim upon which relief
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may be granted, and because amendment would be futile, the undersigned
recommends this portion of the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).
B. State Law Claims
Mr. Rivera’s complaint briefly references an entitlement to relief under
state law. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 15–16.) There is no basis for the Court to
exercise original jurisdiction over Mr. Rivera’s state-law claims against
MSOP officials. Because the federal claim lacks merit, as explained above,
the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss
the state-law claims without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also
Johnson v. City of Shorewood, 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming
dismissal without prejudice of supplemental state-law claims after federal
claims failed on the merits).
In light of the recommendation that this action be dismissed in its
entirety, the undersigned recommends that Mr. Rivera’s pending IFP
application be denied.
IV. Motion to Appoint Counsel
Finally, Mr. Rivera filed a motion asking the Court to appoint an
attorney to assist him. “A pro se litigant has no statutory or constitutional
right to have counsel appointed in a civil case.” Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d
538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 668 (8th
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Cir. 1985)). “In ruling upon a motion for appointment of counsel, the district
court may consider the merits of the claim, the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain
counsel, and the plaintiff’s financial ability to retain an attorney.” Hale v. N.
Little Rock Hous. Auth., 720 F.2d 996, 998 (8th Cir. 1983).
Because Mr. Rivera’s federal claims have no hope of success on the
merits, as explained above, appointment of counsel is unwarranted.
Additionally, his case is neither factually nor legally complex, and he has
demonstrated an ability to clearly present his claim to the Court.
See Plummer v. Grimes, 87 F.3d 1032, 1033 (8th Cir. 1996). The Motion to
Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. 4) is therefore DENIED.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Mr. Rivera’s motion
for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 4) is DENIED.
RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. This matter be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) as follows:
a. Mr. Rivera’s claims under federal law be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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b. Mr. Rivera’s claims under state law be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. Mr. Rivera’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2)
be DENIED.
Dated: January 7, 2026 s/Elsa M. Bullard
Elsa M. Bullard
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or
judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations
within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a
copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses
must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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