McCoy v. Marshall et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Gregory Lynn McCoy,
Plaintiff,
v.
Jeff Marshall, Deputy; Darrin Zastera,
Deputy; and Hennepin County Sherriff
Department, all sued in their individual
and official capacities,
Defendants.
Civ. No. 25-3686 (JWB/EMB)
ORDER ACCEPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
United States Magistrate Judge Elsa M. Bullard issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) on November 13, 2025, recommending dismissal of this
matter following preservice review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Doc. No. 9.) Plaintiff
Gregory Lynn McCoy (“McCoy”) filed timely objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 10.) For
the reasons below, McCoy’s objections are overruled, and the R&R is accepted.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Legal Standard
Courts review de novo any objected-to portions of an R&R and “may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3). Any aspect of an R&R
to which no specific objection is made is reviewed for clear error. Grinder v. Gammon,
73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996). Because McCoy is pro se, his objections are entitled to
liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
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II. 	Analysis
McCoy objects to the recommendation to dismiss Count One of his Complaint
with prejudice. Count One is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants violated the
Fourth Amendment by illegally seizing, searching, and selling his vehicle based on a
search by an allegedly undertrained police dog. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) None of McCoy’s
arguments warrant rejecting the R&R.
First, McCoy contends the R&R wrongfully treated Count One as barred by Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). But the R&R does not find McCoy asserted a Heck-
barred claim. Rather, it recognizes that McCoy is trying to avoid the bar and correctly
notes that Heck would preclude an argument that there was no lawful basis to discover
the gun that led to his conviction. (See Doc. No. 9 at 4 n.2.) The R&R does not find that
McCoy made such an argument. Thus, McCoy’s arguments for why Count One is not
Heck-barred are irrelevant.
Second, McCoy contends that the R&R’s dismissal analysis failed to account for
additional forged warrant materials, the “fabricated nexus” between his residence and his
vehicle, and false statements used to justify the search. But McCoy’s objection does not
offer more specifics about which other fraudulent materials or statements the R&R failed
to consider. The Complaint only references falsehoods and fabrications relating to the
training certification of the police dog whose search ultimately led officers to tow his
vehicle and apply for a warrant to search it. There are no allegations that identify other
fraudulent acts which McCoy could now be referencing in his objection.
Even if McCoy had been more detailed, he cannot amend his pleading simply by
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objecting to the R&R. See Lee v. Minn. Bureau of Crim. Apprehension, Civ. No. 24-4259
(JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 408147, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2025). New theories, arguments,
and claims cannot be raised for the first time in an R&R objection. Smith v. Eischen, Civ.
No. 23-2866 (JMB/SGE), 2025 WL 732304, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2025) (citing
Ridenour v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., 679 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2012)).
As the R&R explains, McCoy’s Fourth Amendment claim cannot succeed based
on the dog-certification allegations due to issue preclusion. (Doc. No. 9 at 4–5.) The dog-
certification issue was resolved against McCoy on two fronts. First, independent probable
cause supported the vehicle search, which renders the certification irrelevant to the
Fourth Amendment analysis. Second, the officers’ warrant application statements about
the certification were found to be true. McCoy cannot re-litigate either issue in this case.
McCoy cannot prevail on Count One as presented in the Complaint because the
underlying Fourth Amendment issues relating to his dog-certification allegations have
already been resolved against him, and not because the claim is Heck-barred. Therefore,
his objection to the recommendation to dismiss the claim with prejudice is overruled.
McCoy does not specifically object to the R&R’s other recommendations: to
dismiss Count Two with prejudice because 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides no private right of
action; to dismiss Count Three without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction; to deny his
application to proceed in forma pauperis; and to deny his motion to appoint counsel.
Upon review, there is no clear error in the R&R’s analysis of those issues.
ORDER
Based on the R&R of the Magistrate Judge, and on all the files, records, and
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proceedings in this case, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Plaintiff Gregory Lynn McCoy’s Objections to the November 13, 2025
Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 10) are OVERRULED.
2. 	The November 13, 2025 Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 9) is
ACCEPTED.
3. 	This matter is DISMISSED as follows:
a. 	Counts One and Two of the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
b. 	Count Three of the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction.
4. 	McCoy’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is
DENIED.
5. 	McCoy’s motion to appoint counsel (Doc. No. 4) is DENIED.
6. 	McCoy must pay the unpaid balance ($326.17) of the statutory filing fee for
this action in the manner prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), and the Clerk of Court
must provide notice of this requirement to the authorities at the institution where McCoy
is confined.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: January 28, 2026 	s/ Jerry W. Blackwell
JERRY W. BLACKWELL
United States District Judge
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