Wren v. Minnesota Department of Corrections et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
James D. Wren, 	Case No. 25-cv-03623 (JMB/LIB)
Plaintiff,
v. 	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Minnesota Department of Corrections, et. al,
Defendants.
This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a
general assignment made in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and upon Plaintiff’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, [Docket No. 16]. Finding no hearing necessary, the Court took
Plaintiff’s Motion under advisement. (Briefing Order [Docket No. 24]).
For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, [Docket No. 16], be DENIED.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at Minnesota Correctional Facility-Stillwater (“MCF-
Stillwater”) in Bayport, Minnesota. (See Compl. [Docket No. 1] at 20). The Complaint’s
allegations center on a practice, started by the Minnesota Department of Corrections (hereafter
“DOC”) in mid-2024, of using a “national guard ion scanner” (or “trunarc scanner”) to detect drugs
on incoming mail and inmate papers. (Id. at 6; see also, e.g., Id. at 1–2, 11). Plaintiff alleges that
these handheld tests are intended only for initial screenings and that the manufacturer warns they
are susceptible to false positives and should be confirmed by laboratory testing. (See Id. at 3–4).
Nevertheless, DOC officials have allegedly relied on unconfirmed “presumptive positive” results
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to punish inmates. (Id. at 4; see also Id. at 5, 10). Plaintiff alleges that DOC staff have unfettered
discretion to decide what to test, at times for retaliatory reasons, and that even innocent items like
blank paper or envelopes have triggered false positives. (See Id. at 4–6). Plaintiff points to
litigation in Massachusetts in which plaintiffs alleged that similar tests were unreliable and the
court there likened them to being “‘only marginally better than a coin[-]flip.’” (Id. at 3 (quoting
Green v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2184-cv-02283C, 2021 WL 6335670, at *5 (Mass. Super. Nov.
30, 2021)). Plaintiff alleges that “DOC officials know, or should know,” of these problems with
the tests. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that he was personally mistreated because of the tests in July 2024. (See
Id. at 8). At that time, “DOC staff” (including Defendant “Sgt. Gary”) searched Plaintiff’s cell
with a K9 unit. (Id. at 7–8). Sgt. Gary found two small scraps of paper, tested them using an ion
scanner, and obtained a “presumptive positive” result for narcotics. (See Id. at 8–9). Plaintiff,
however, immediately took a breathalyzer test (which registered “all zeros”) and provided a urine
sample, which also “returned clean.” (Id. at 8). Despite the absence of drugs in Plaintiff’s system,
prison officials placed him in administrative segregation and “confiscated” his legal materials,
which Plaintiff describes as “thousands of pages of court documents related to his criminal case
and ongoing appeals.” (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Gary handled multiple inmates’ papers during the search without
changing gloves or cleaning the testing area, likely cross-contaminating the paper scraps with drug
residue from another inmate’s property. (See Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that the “two pieces of
paper” were “fabricated or planted.” (Id.). At his disciplinary hearing, officials did not produce
these paper scraps as evidence, and when Plaintiff (and his attorney) asked to send the items to an
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outside lab for confirmation testing, officials denied the request. (See Id.). Prison staff also did not
tell Plaintiff why his cell was targeted for this shakedown in the first place. (See Id. at 9).
As for Plaintiff’s legal files, he alleges that they were not returned to him. (See Id. at 10).
Instead, prison staff claimed they would photocopy all his documents and either send the originals
out of the prison or destroy them. (See Id. at 9). Plaintiff alleges that the photocopies he received
were largely unusable: many pages were illegible, “out of order,” cut off, or even blank. (Id.).
Further attempts at copying were allegedly no better. (See Id.). As a result, Plaintiff claims, he
effectively lost access to his legal materials, which hindered his ability to participate in his ongoing
court appeals. (See Id. at 10).
Plaintiff remained in solitary confinement pending discipline for the incident described
above. (See Id. at 9). After a disciplinary hearing, officials found him guilty of possessing
contraband based on the unconfirmed test. (See Id. at 10). The punishments included 90 days in
segregation, loss of all visitation privileges, termination of phone access, loss of prison-job and
program opportunities, and a change to a “more restrictive custody level.” (Id.). Warden William
Bolin rejected Plaintiff’s request for a laboratory test of the supposed drug evidence, responding
in an August 2024 letter that Plaintiff “did not have a right to confirmatory testing.” (Id.). Plaintiff
alleges that, as a result of these events, he suffered significant harm: he lost his prison employment,
lost personal property (including irreplaceable family photographs and obituaries), was cut off
from contact with family, and endured solitary confinement. (See Id. at 10–11). He also nearly
missed court deadlines because the confiscation and disarray of his legal papers impeded his ability
to litigate his cases. (See Id. at 9–11).
Plaintiff further alleges that the DOC’s handling of legal mail violated his rights. (See Id.
at 13–14). According to the Complaint, MCF-Stillwater officials have treated legal mail as regular
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mail despite its confidential nature. (See Id.). Staff allegedly open and copy incoming legal mail
outside the relevant inmate’s presence, then deliver the copies with the normal mail late at night.
(See Id. at 13). On some occasions, Plaintiff alleges, officials have returned legal mail (including
his own) to senders without notice to the inmate. (See Id. at 14). Plaintiff alleges that these practices
interfere with attorney-client confidentiality and impede inmates’ access to legal counsel. (See
Id.). For example, he alleges that his own mail from a federal judge and a city attorney was opened
or mishandled in this way, “causing confusion” and “miss[ed] time limits” on unspecified legal
actions. (Id. at 13–14).
Finally, Wren alleges that certain officers harassed and targeted him beyond the incident
described above. (See Id. at 15). In particular, Defendant “Lt. Terra O’Connor” (who also serves
as a watch commander) and other unspecified Defendants allegedly searched Plaintiff’s cell
repeatedly and sent him to segregation on other occasions for charges that were later dropped. (See
Id. at 15–16). Plaintiff also alleges that Lt. O’Connor tried, without cause, to strip him of his inmate
mentor job, which would have confined him to his cell 22 hours a day. (See Id. at 16).
The Complaint names seven defendants: the DOC; MCF-Stillwater itself; Paul Schnell, the
DOC’s commissioner; Warden Bolin; Sgt. Gary; Lt. O’Connor; and “Lt. Jenny Carufel.” The
Complaint also presents seven counts. (See Id. at 11–17). Count I (“Right to Counsel”) argues that
DOC officials, under Schnell, frustrated Plaintiff’s right to counsel and right of access to the courts
by drug-testing legal mail with unreliable tests and treating positives as grounds for immediate,
severe sanctions. (See Id. at 11–12). Count II (“Due Process”) alleges violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Minnesota’s analogous constitutional provisions based on various conduct. (See
Id. at 12–14). Count III (“Negligence”) alleges that Defendants had a duty to use reliable testing
and follow confirmatory testing policies, knew of high false positives, yet relied on faulty results,
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foreseeably harming Plaintiff. (See Id. at 14–15). Count IV (“Discrimination”) alleges arbitrary
unequal treatment with respect to Plaintiff’s legal records. Staff allegedly copied only “a certain
few” documents and forced Plaintiff to send out originals, leaving him with poor copies; other
prisoners, he suggests, were able to keep originals. (Id. at 15). Count V (“Harassment”) discusses
the alleged continued targeting of Plaintiff by O’Connor. (See Id. at 15–16). Count VI (“Right to
Use the Courts”) contends that Plaintiff’s loss of his legal records impaired active federal and state
cases. (See Id. at 16). Finally, Count VII alleges unconstitutional policies or customs (i.e., Monell1
claims) and a §1985(3) conspiracy: Defendants supposedly acted together to “target Plaintiff and
cover for each other.” (Id.).
For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages from all Defendants. (See
Id. at 17–19). He also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. He seeks a declaration that
Defendants’ actions violated his rights under the federal and Minnesota constitutions. (See Id. at
19). He also seeks an injunction to prohibit the DOC from “subjecting [him] to” the “practices
described in this Complaint,” as well as injunctions requiring that MCF-Stillwater perform
“confirmation testing” on any positive ion-scanner results through confirmatory lab testing, that
MCF-Stillwater staff stop opening legal mail outside inmates’ presence, and that the DOC
reconsider or expunge past disciplinary actions based on unconfirmed tests. (Id. at 19–20). Plaintiff
also requests restoration of any good-time credits lost as a result of unconfirmed ion-scanner tests.
(See Id. at 19).
On January 27, 2026, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Preliminary Injunction, [Docket
No. 16]. Through this Motion, Plaintiff seeks an Order from this Court reversing several newly
1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (discussing so-called Monell claims).
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enacted DOC policies, including Policy 302.020, 302.250, 302.015, and 303.040. (See Mot. for
Prelim. Injunction [Docket No. 16]).2
Policy 302.020 (hereafter “Mail Policy”),3 defines “special mail” as “any exchange of
communications/correspondence to or from all levels of government officials . . . .” (Policy
302.020 at 2). The Mail Policy details that if DOC staff observe “special mail” with any
confidential or privileged markings, they will open the mail in the presence of the incarcerated
recipient. (Id. at 11). If “special mail” has no confidential or privileged markings, DOC staff will
open it before delivering the mail to the incarcerated recipient. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges allowing
DOC staff to open “special mail” outside the presence of the incarcerated recipient gives
“Defendants a[n] unfair advantage over all inmates who are working on their appeals or suing the
state or the Defendants.” (Mot. for Prelim. Injunction [Docket No. 16] at 2).
Policy 302.250 (hereafter “Property Policy”), limits incarcerated persons to two storage
bins for the storage of their personal possessions, including legal materials. (Policy 302.250 at 3).
Plaintiff alleges the previous Property Policy allowed inmates, upon request and approval, to have
three storage bins for their belongings and legal materials. (Mot. for Prelim. Injunction [Docket
No. 16] at 3). Plaintiff contends this new two storage bin limitation unconstitutionally restricts
incarcerated persons storage in “retaliat[ion] against inmates who placed law suits [sic] against
them.” (Id.).
2 Copies of the exact DOC policies which Plaintiff is referencing can be found on the DOC’s website,
https://policy.doc.mn.gov/DocPolicy/.
3 Plaintiff challenges the Mail Policy which went into effect on February 11, 2025. (Mot. for Prelim. Injunction
[Docket No. 16] at 2). The most recent Mail Policy, however, went into effect on January 12, 2026. (Defs.’ Mem. in
Opp. [Docket No. 28] at 3 fn. 2). Given Plaintiff is challenging the Mail Policy solely on the basis that it allows DOC
staff to open “special mail” outside of the presence of inmates, and that portion of the Mail Policy is consistent in both
the previous February 11, 2025, Mail Policy, and the current January 12, 2026, Mail Policy, the Court cites only to
the current January 12, 2026, Mail Policy.
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Policy 302.015 (hereafter “Access to Electronic Legal Materials Policy”), provides that
incarcerated persons may only retain access to “legal DVDs” for sixty days. (Policy 302.015 at 2;
Mot. for Prelim. Injunction [Docket No. 16] at 3). Plaintiff asserts this is an unconstitutional
restriction, especially given the previous Access to Electronic Legal Materials Policy contained no
time constraint on an inmate’s retention of legal DVDs. (Id. at 3, 4).
Policy 303.040 (hereafter “Use of Electronic Equipment Policy”), imposes several
restrictions on electronic legal materials, including that (1) DOC staff are allowed to monitor
inmate documents that are stored on DOC computers; (2) inmates are allowed thirty megabytes of
storage (in contrast to the previously allowed sixty megabytes); and (3) inmate documents will be
deleted from DOC computers after one year of inactivity. (Policy 303.040 at 2). Plaintiff generally
alleges that these restrictions are unconstitutional. (See gen., Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 31]).
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that all of the relevant DOC Policies unconstitutionally limit the
rights of incarcerated persons to have meaningful access to the courts. (See Id. at 2–6).
II. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. [Docket No. 16].
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeks an Order of this Court reversing the
DOC Mail Policy, Property Policy, Electronic Legal Materials Policy, and Use of Electronic
Equipment Policy. (See Mot. for Prelim. Injunction [Docket No. 16]). Plaintiff argues a
preliminary injunction is necessary to stop the DOC from infringing on not only Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, but also the constitutional rights of all incarcerated persons in DOC facilities
who are subject to these new DOC policies. (See Id.).
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s Motion. (See Mem. in Opp. [Docket No. 28]). As to
Plaintiff’s request for the reversal of the Property Policy, Electronic Legal Materials Policy, and
Use of Electronic Equipment Policy, Defendants argue these policies are unrelated to Plaintiff’s
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underlying claims which concern the trunarc scanner drug test and Plaintiff’s alleged injuries from
the deployment of the trunarc scanner. (Id. at 5–7). As to Plaintiff’s request for the reversal of the
Mail Policy, Defendants argue none of the Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc. (Dataphase), 640
F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir.1981) (en banc), factors favor the imposition of a preliminary injunction.
(Id. at 7–11).
A. Analysis
As noted above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeks an Order of this Court
“reversing” the DOC Mail Policy, Property Policy, Electronic Legal Materials Policy, and Use of
Electronic Equipment Policy. (See Mot. for Prelim. Injunction [Docket No. 16]).
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). When determining whether to grant a
motion for a preliminary injunction, courts consider four factors (i.e., the Dataphase factors): “(1)
the probability of the movant’s success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the
movant; (3) the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict
on other interested parties; and (4) whether the issuance of the preliminary injunction is in the
public interest.” Emerson Elec. Co. v. Rogers, 418 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir.2005); see also S.J.W.
ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir.2012) (citing Dataphase,
640 F.2d at 113). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy . . . and the burden of
establishing the propriety of an injunction is on the movant.” Watkins, Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841,
844 (8th Cir.2003) (citations omitted). “At base, the question is whether the balance of equities so
favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the
merits are determined.” Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113.
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Here, however, it is not appropriate to consider the Dataphase factors given Plaintiff’s
requested injunctive relief bears no relationship to the underlying Complaint.
“[T]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo related to the
underlying lawsuit . . . there must be a connection between the preliminary relief sought and the
conduct asserted in the complaint.” Fields v. Henry, No. 17-cv-2662, (WMW/KMM), 2017 WL
9275052, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2017), report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2018
WL 564731 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2018) (citing Munt v. Larson, No. 15-cv-0582 (SRN/SER), 2015
WL 5673108, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 23, 2015). As such, “[a] party seeking a preliminary injunction
‘must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the
conduct asserted in the complaint.’” Shannon v. Williams, No. 11-cv-3404, (JRT/FLN), 2012 WL
1657526, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 20, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1657524
(D. Minn. May 11, 2012) (citing Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir.1994) (per
curiam).
A court must deny a motion for preliminary injunction when the injunction sought differs
from the issues raised and relief requested and concerns matters unrelated to the underlying action.
See, e.g., Devose, 42 F.3d at 471; Dahhane v. Stanton, No. 15-cv-1229, (PJS/JJK), 2015 WL
9244490, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 9165883
(D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2015); Fiorito v. Fikes, No. 22-cv-00512, (WMW/HB), 2022 WL 2276734, at
*2 (D. Minn. May 23, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2275866 (D. Minn.
June 23, 2022).
This lawsuit concerns Plaintiff’s allegations that DOC officials frustrated his right to
counsel and right of access to the courts by drug testing legal mail through unreliable means and
enforcing immediate, severe sanctions upon positive test results. (See Compl. [Docket No. 1] at
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12–14). Plaintiff additionally alleges he has experienced arbitrary unequal treatment with respect
to his legal records. (See Id. at 9–11). For relief, Plaintiff seeks (1) a declaration that Defendants’
actions violated his rights under the federal and Minnesota constitutions; (2) an injunction to
prohibit the DOC from “subjecting [him] to” the “practices described in this Complaint;” (3)
injunctions requiring MCF-Stillwater perform “confirmation testing” on any positive ion-scanner
results, stop opening inmate legal mail, and the DOC reconsider or expunge past disciplinary
actions based on unconfirmed tests; and (4) restoration of any good-time credits lost as a result of
unconfirmed ion-scanner tests. (See Id. at 17–19).
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeks an Order from the Court enjoining the
enforcement of the DOC Mail Policy, Property Policy, Electronic Legal Materials Policy, and Use
of Electronic Equipment Policy. Plaintiff specifically requests the Court enjoin the enforcement of
specific portions of each Policy, including (1) the portion of the Mail Policy which allows DOC
staff to read legal mail from state and federal officials outside the presence of the incarcerated
recipient; (2) the portion of the Property Policy which limits inmates to two storage bins for their
personal belongings and legal documents; (3) the portion of the Access to Electronic Materials
Policy which restricts inmate access to legal DVDs to sixty days; and (4) the portions of the Use
of Electronic Equipment Policy which allows DOC staff to monitor inmate legal work stored in
the home folder of DOC computers, limits inmate computer storage to thirty megabytes, and
deletes inmate documents from DOC computers after one year of inactivity. (See Mot. for Prelim.
Injunction [Docket No. 16]).
Plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary connection between the injuries claimed in
his motion for preliminary injunction and the conduct asserted in his Complaint. Plaintiff’s
underlying Complaint concerns the DOC’s use of the trunarc scanner on his mail, and injuries
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resulting from positive trunarc scanner results. The present Motion for Preliminary Injunction is
based on four DOC policies relating, generally, to the DOC procedures and restrictions
surrounding inmate legal materials. Ultimately, the conduct alleged in the present motion
constitutes new conduct and injuries that are not the result of the use of the trunarc scanner on
legal mail, or the repercussions following the use of the trunarc scanner on legal mail. Because the
injuries claimed and the relief requested in his Motion for Preliminary Injunction are unrelated to
the conduct alleged in his Complaint, they cannot support a preliminary injunction. See, e.g.,
Devose, 42 F.3d at 471 (“new assertions of mistreatment that are entirely different from the claim
raised and relief requested . . . . cannot provide the basis for a preliminary injunction[.]”); Hale v.
Wood, 89 F.3d 840, 840 (8th Cir.1996); Semler v. Ludeman, No. 09-cv-0732, 2010 WL 145275,
at *30 (D.Minn. Jan. 8, 2010) (denying a request for injunctive relief because the claim “involve[d]
an entirely different set of events that are not part of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit.”).
The only aspect of Plaintiff’s requested relief that is conceivably related to the underlying
Complaint is Plaintiff’s claim that these new policies are interfering with his ability to access the
courts. (See Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 31] at 2–6). However, courts in this District have denied
motions for preliminary injunctions even in these circumstances. See, e.g., Munt, 2015 WL
5673087, at *20–21 (plaintiff’s alleged access to courts claim did not “create a connection to the
varied and all-encompassing requests for relief in [Plaintiff’s] Motions for Preliminary Relief.”);
Fiorito, 2022 WL 2276734, at *3 (same).
Further, even if the Court were to consider Plaintiff’s motion “based on that narrow
arguable connection to his petition,” Plaintiff would still not be entitled to a preliminary injunction
because he failed to show “the imminent risk of irreparable harm necessary for a preliminary
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injunction” given Plaintiff has undoubtedly been an active litigant, which is evidenced by his
participation in the present case. Fiorito, 2022 WL 2276734, at *3.
On September 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Complaint, [Docket No. 1], along with eighty-
three pages of Exhibits, [Docket No. 1-1], and a Declaration in Support, [Docket No. 4]. Also on
September 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed in District Court in Forma Pauperis,
[Docket No. 2], along with a supporting Exhibit, [Docket No. 3]. On December 22, 2025, Plaintiff
filed a Letter with the Court, [Docket No. 9], requesting an update on the status of his Complaint.
Thereafter, 	on 	January 	26, 	2026, 	after 	the 	undersigned’s 	issuance 	of 	a 	Report 	and
Recommendation, [Docket No. 10], relating to Plaintiff’s Complaint on January 6, 2026, Plaintiff
filed his Objection, [Docket No. 12], along with an Exhibit, [Docket No. 13], and two Certificates
of Service, [Docket Nos. 15, 27].4 On January 27, 2026, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, [Docket No. 16], and on February 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Letter to the
Clerk’s Office, [Docket No. 25], requesting confirmation that the Court had received Plaintiff’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Lastly, on March 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Response to
Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, [Docket No. 30], a Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and five accompanying Exhibits, [Docket Nos. 31,
32], and a Certificate of Service, [Docket No. 33].
Based on the above filings, Plaintiff has undoubtedly been able to actively engage with the
Court regarding all relevant claims and issues.5 Similarly, Plaintiff’s citations to case law and his
4 Plaintiff’s second Certificate of Service, [Docket No. 27], though timely filed, was inadvertently filed late by the
Clerk’s Office on February 26, 2026, resulting in the Docket Number of 27.
5 Notably, the Electronic Legal Materials Policy and the Use of Electronic Equipment Policy went into effect on
November 4, 2025; the Property Policy went into effect on January 5, 2026; and the Mail Policy went into effect on
February 11, 2025, and then, with the relevant portions of the Policy remaining the same, the current Mail Policy went
into effect on January 12, 2026. As such, though a number of Plaintiff’s filings in the present case predate the
implementation of the relevant DOC Policies, all of Plaintiff’s filings after January 5, 2026, were filed when all of the
relevant DOC Policies were in effect.
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Exhibits throughout his Memorandum in support of this Motion illustrate his continued ability to
access case files and legal materials. (See e.g., Mem. in Supp. [Docket No. 31] at 1, 4–6, 8).
Thus, even if Plaintiff’s requested relief related to access to the courts were sufficiently
related to the claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff would not be entitled to injunctive relief
given his failure to demonstrate he will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction.
See, Graham v. Koenig, No. 23-cv-263 (JWB/DLM), 2024 WL 2991221, at *5 (D. Minn. June 14,
2024) (denying motion for preliminary injunction where plaintiff failed to allege an imminent risk
of irreparable harm to his ability to prosecute the civil action “particularly when tested against the
docket in his case”); see also Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (“the absence of a
finding of irreparable injury is sufficient grounds” for denying a preliminary injunction).
Accordingly, the Court finds that all of Plaintiff’s requested relief is unrelated to the claims
in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Further, to the extent Plaintiff’s requests for relief could be considered
sufficiently related to the claims in the underlying Complaint, Plaintiff has not established his
entitlement to a preliminary injunction.
III. 	Conclusion
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, and based on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY 	RECOMMENDED 	THAT 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for 	Preliminary
Injunction, [Docket No. 16], be DENIED.
Dated: April 27, 2026 	s/Leo I. Brisbois
Hon. Leo I. Brisbois
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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N O T I C E
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District Court
and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “A party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate
judge’s proposed findings and recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy of the
recommended disposition[.]” A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being
served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the
word or line limits set forth in LR 72.2(c).
Under Advisement Date: This Report and Recommendation will be considered under advisement 14
days from the date of its filing. If timely objections are filed, this Report and Recommendation will be
considered under advisement from the earlier of: (1) 14 days after the objections are filed; or (2) from
the date a timely response is filed.
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