Williams v. Rardin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Joseph Williams, 	Case No. 25-cv-2302 (JRT/DTS)
Petitioner,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
v.
Jared Rardin, Warden,
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Joseph Williams, currently incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center
in Rochester, Minnesota, seeks a Writ of Habeas Corpus reinstating 41 days of good
conduct time he lost following a disciplinary hearing. At the hearing, a Disciplinary Hearing
Officer (DHO) concluded that Williams had violated prison rules by possessing a
sharpened aluminum can lid. Williams contends that he was unconstitutionally deprived
of the good conduct time because the DHO lacked sufficient evidence to support their
conclusion, and the hearing violated BOP policy. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court recommends his petition be denied.
FINDINGS OF FACT
In January 2025, Corrections Officer Burkholder conducted a cell search and found
a sharpened aluminum can lid located under the mattress of Williams’ bunk. Fitcher Decl.
¶ 9, Ex. D at 1, Dkt. No. 12. Four inmates, including Williams, were assigned to the cell.
Id. Williams was charged with possession of a hazardous tool. Id. ¶ 9, Ex. C. He received
a copy of the incident report and was advised of his rights during the disciplinary process.
Id. ¶ 14, Ex. D at 3. Williams claimed that his cellmate, J. Mc., placed the can lid under
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his mattress. Id. The incident was referred to the Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC) who
conducted an initial review of the charge. Id.
At the UDC hearing, Williams again denied ownership of the can lid, reiterating
that it belonged to J. Mc. Id. ¶ 15, Ex. F at 2. Lieutenants interviewed J. Mc. who confirmed
that the can lid was his and that he had left it under Williams’ mattress prior to his removal
to the Special Housing Unit three weeks earlier. Id. Ex. F at 2-3. Upon consideration of
the evidence, the UDC recommended that the incident report for Williams be expunged.
Id. Ex. F at 2. Because of the nature of the charge, the UDC referred the report to a DHO.
Id. ¶ 15, Ex. F at 2. Williams received and signed a form explaining his rights during the
DHO hearing. Id. Ex. G.
The hearing in front of the DHO occurred in March 2025. Id. ¶ 16. Williams again
denied ownership of the can lid stating
I work everyday. The only time I'm in the unit is during count
time. I was in there only two months. They threw me in there
with 	a 	bunch 	of 	junkies. 	I 	wouldn't 	risk 	everything 	for
something to cut my food up. That lid is not mine.
Id. ¶ 17, Ex. I at 1. The DHO also obtained a written statement from J. Mc. confirming that
it “was [his] can lid” and that he hid it under Williams’ mattress because “that’s [his]
cousin.” Id. ¶ 17, Ex. I at 2.
Considering the testimony at the hearing and the documentary evidence, the DHO
determined that Williams possessed the can lid. Id. ¶ 18, Ex. I at 3. The DHO did not deny
the possibility that J. Mc. placed the can lid under Williams’ mattress. Id. ¶ 19, Ex. I at 3-
4. Nonetheless, they concluded that it was Williams’ “responsibility to ensure [his] area is
free of contraband,” particularly since J. Mc. had not been in the cell for three weeks. Id.
¶ 19, Ex. I at 4. Further, the DHO found J. Mc.’s statement unpersuasive, reasoning that
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“[i]nmates lie to staff all the time, in an attempt to help other inmates avoid consequences.”
Id. As a sanction, the DHO revoked 41 days of Williams’ good conduct time, imposed 23
days of disciplinary segregation, issued a $100 fine, and suspended commissary and
email privileges for three months. Id. ¶ 18, Ex. I at 4. Williams received a copy of the DHO
Report on March 13, 2025. Id. ¶ 16, Ex. I at 5. The written report advised him of his right
to appeal the decision using the BOP administrative remedies process. Id.
On April 8, 2025, Williams appealed the sanctions to the BOP Regional Director’s
Office.1 Bush Decl. ¶ 18, Ex. B at 2. On May 14, 2025, the Regional Director denied the
appeal finding that the DHO had “sufficiently addressed the evidence used to make a
finding of guilt.” Id. Ex. B at 1. The written report advised Williams of his right to appeal
the decision to the BOP Office of General Counsel within 30 days. Id. Williams did not do
so. Id. ¶ 19.
Williams filed this habeas petition on June 2, 2025. Pet., Dkt. No. 1. He alleges the
DHO’s findings were not supported by the evidence and that the hearing violated BOP
policy. Amend. Pet. 2-3, Dkt. No. 9. Respondent opposes, contending that Williams failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies and, even if he had, his claims lack merit. Resp.
Mem. 1, Dkt. No. 10.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A federal prisoner generally must exhaust BOP administrative remedies before
seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. However, the exhaustion prerequisite is
1 Williams initially filed the appeal on March 27, 2025, but it was rejected for being
illegible. Bush Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. A at 2.
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judicially created, and courts may hear unexhausted grievances where proceeding with
the remedies process would be futile. E.g., Raymond v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Minn., 847 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2017).
Respondent argues that Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
because he did not file a final appeal with the Office of General Counsel. Resp. Mem. 5-
10. This Court agrees. The BOP Administrative Remedy Process detailed in 28 C.F.R. §
542.10–19 includes four essential steps. Bush Decl. ¶ 5. First, an inmate must seek
informal resolution with prison staff using a Requests for Informal Resolution Form (BP-
8). Bush Decl. ¶ 6. Second, if no informal resolution is met, he may then file a formal
Request for Administrative Remedy (BP-9) with the Warden. Id. Third, if the inmate is
dissatisfied with the Warden’s response, he can appeal to the Regional Director by filing
a Regional Office Administrative Remedy Appeal (BP-10). Id. Finally, if dissatisfied with
the Regional Director's response, the inmate may appeal to the Director, National Inmate
Appeals, in the Office of the General Counsel in Washington, D.C. by filing a Central
Office Administrative Remedy Appeal (BP-11). Id. This is the final administrative appeal.
Id. ¶ 8. When an inmate is appealing a DHO’s decision, they may bypass the first two
steps and appeal straight to the Regional Director’s Office. Id. ¶ 7.
Here, Williams filed a BP-10 appeal to the Regional Director’s Office but failed to
file a BP-11 appeal to the Office of General Counsel, despite being advised he had 30
days to do so. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Because the deadline to file a BP-11 has passed, he can no
longer complete the administrative process. Therefore, this Court considers the merits of
Williams’ claims on the basis that requiring further exhaustion would be futile. See Lueth
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v. Beach, 498 F.3d 795, 797 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding the Court has jurisdiction to
address merits notwithstanding the failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
II. 	Due Process Violation
Williams argues his due process rights were violated because (1) the DHO
improperly disregarded J. Mc.’s statement and the UDC’s recommendation that the
incident report be expunged; and (2) the DHO violated BOP policy by holding a hearing
without a referral from the UDC. Amend. Pet. 2-3.
A challenge to the revocation of good conduct time is properly raised in a habeas
petition. Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973). However, “federal courts are not
part of the appellate process for prison disciplinary proceedings.” Toombs v. Hicks, 773
F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 1985).
Deprivation of good conduct time, which may shorten a term of imprisonment,
implicates a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause. See Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). Although not entitled to “the full panoply of rights
due a defendant” in a criminal prosecution, id. at 555, an inmate subject to prison
disciplinary proceedings must receive (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary
charges; (2) an opportunity, consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written
statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary
action. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67).
In addition, the disciplinary findings must be supported by “some evidence in the
record.” Id. This standard is met if “there was some evidence from which the conclusion
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of the administrative tribunal could be deduced ....” Id. at 455-56. This does not require
the court to weigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. Id. “Even when there is
substantial evidence to the contrary, [a hearing officer] may find a guard's report to be
credible and therefore take disciplinary action.” Hrbek v. Nix, 12 F.3d 777, 781 (8th Cir.
1993).
Here, the DHO based their determination on “some evidence.” The can lid was
found under Williams’ mattress and even if J. Mc. had placed it there, J. Mc. had not
accessed the cell in three weeks. Based on those facts, the DHO made a rational
inference that Williams possessed the can lid. That a different inference or conclusion
could be drawn from the evidence is not for this Court to decide. Hrbek, 12 F.3d at 781.
Moreover, Williams’ arguments that the DHO improperly disregarded J. Mc.’s statement
and the UDC’s recommendation are unavailing. Amend. Pet. 2-3. As stated above, this
Court does not revisit the DHO’s credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence on
habeas review. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.
Additionally, Williams’ assertion that the DHO hearing violated BOP policy is
without merit. 28 C.F.R. § 541.8 provides that a DHO “will only conduct a hearing on the
incident report if referred by the UDC.” Here, the hearing aligned with BOP policy because
the 	UDC’s 	report 	referred 	the 	incident 	to 	a 	DHO 	and 	Williams 	signed 	a 	form
acknowledging such. See Fitcher Decl. Exs. F at 2, G.
Because the DHO based their determination on “some evidence” and the hearing
was conducted in accordance with BOP policy; Williams’ due process rights were
satisfied, and habeas relief is unwarranted.
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RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS THAT:
1. 	Petitioner Joseph Williams’ Amended Habeas Petition (Dkt. No. 9) be
DENIED; and
2. 	This matter be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
Dated: November 3, 2025 	__s/ David T. Schultz______
DAVID T. SCHULTZ
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court. It is not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All
objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set for in LR 72.2(c).
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