Meranelli v. Minnesota Department of Human Services et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Cherrity Honesty-Alexis Meranelli, 	Case No. 25-cv-2292 (LMP/LIB)
Plaintiff,
v.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Minnesota Department of Human Services, et al.,
Defendants.
This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a
general assignment, made in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636, and upon
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, [Docket No. 9]. The Court took Defendants’
Motion under advisement on the written submissions of the parties.
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, [Docket No. 9], be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and
the above captioned matter be DISMISSED.
I. 	Background1
Plaintiff Cherrity Honesty-Alexis Meranelli,2 a civil detainee in the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (hereafter “MSOP”), proceeding pro se, initiated this action on May 30, 2025,
naming as Defendants Minnesota Department of Human Services (hereafter “DHS”); Direct Care
1 For the purposes of the present motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the Complaint as true and
construes said facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Stodghill v. Wellston Sch. Dist., 512 F.3d 472, 476
(8th Cir. 2008). The facts here are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint, [Docket No. 1], as well as documents included
as exhibits in the Complaint. Generally, in evaluating a complaint, materials outside the pleading cannot be considered
on a motion to dismiss. See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). However, a Court
“may consider the pleadings themselves, exhibits attached to the pleadings, and matters of public record.” See e.g.,
Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Porous Media Corp., 186 F.3d at 1079); Mattes
v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003); Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007).
2 Plaintiff’s legal name is Eric M. Sorenson, however, Plaintiff is a transgender female who prefers the name
Cherrity Honesty-Alexis Meranelli. (Compl. [Docket No. 1] at 1).
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and Treatment (hereafter “DCT”); Minnesota Sex Offender Program (hereafter “MSOP”); DHS
commissioner, Shireen Ghandi;3 MSOP Executive Director, Nancy Johnston; Plaintiff’s primary
therapist, Tony Klar; MSOP 1-B Clinical Supervisor, Rachel Broadway; Registered Nurse,
Destany Anderson; Psychologist, Jonathan Klingaman; and Jane/John Does. (See Compl. [Docket
No. 1]). Plaintiff sues each Defendant in their individual and official capacities. (Id.).
During the time she has been in MSOP, Plaintiff has made frequent requests through Client
Request Forms4 for certain Gender-Affirming Care (hereafter “GAC”) accommodations pursuant
to MSOP’s Provision of Gender Affirming Care Policy (hereafter “Gender Policy”). (Id. ¶¶ 23–
37). The following is the relevant excerpt from the Gender Policy included in Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
1. MSOP provides clients with social, psychotherapeutic and psychiatric treatment
to address concerns, ambivalence and/or discomfort regarding gender identity.
2. Clients who identify as transgender and/or gender diverse may submit a Client
Request 	(420-5099a) 	to 	their 	primary 	therapist 	to 	request 	a 	specific
accommodation(s) and/or treatment interventions related to their gender identity.
3. The primary therapist consults with the clinical supervisor and the treatment
psychologist to determine the treatment implications of the client’s request(s) and
if further consultation with the facility assessment director/designee is warranted.
The clinical supervisor notifies the facility clinical director of the request.
4. The facility assessment director/designee, in consultation with the treatment team
and treatment psychologist may recommend specific treatment interventions
including additional assessment(s), consultation with community-based providers
and/or other services including, but not limited to psychiatry.
5. The primary therapist:
a) addresses identified gender identity distress or impairment in the client’s
Individual Treatment Plan (ITP) (215-5007a-3050) (Phoenix); and
b) completes a Referral for Psychiatric Services (215- 5007s-3070M) if
recommended.
(Compl. [Docket No. 1] ¶¶ 23).
3 Former commissioner Jodi Harpstead is automatically substituted by acting Commissioner Shireen Gandhi pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
4 Throughout her Complaint, Plaintiff refers to these requests as either “Client Request Forms” or “Client Medical
Requests.” (Compl. [Docket No. 1] at 10–13). Based on Plaintiff’s exhibits, both phrases are used to refer to “Client
Request Forms.” Thus, the Court will use the verbiage “Client Request Forms” when discussing Plaintiff’s requests
for Gender Affirming Care.
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On May 26, 2024, Plaintiff submitted her first Client Request Form to her primary
therapist, Defendant Klar, requesting “medically necessary lazer[sic] hair removal.” (Ex. VI
[Docket No. 1-1] at 17). Defendant Klar responded on May 30, 2024, stating he would “bring [her]
request to the Unit 1B clinical team and keep [her] updated.” (Id.).
Plaintiff submitted her next Client Request Form to Defendant Klar on June 6, 2024,
requesting “voice training and . . . permission to self-purchase thong female underwear.” (Ex. VII
[Docket No. 1-1] at 19). Defendant Broadway responded to this request on behalf of Defendant
Klar on July 12, 2024, stating her “requests had been forwarded as outlined in the Gender
Affirming Care Policy.” (Id.).
Plaintiff notes her third Client Request Form was submitted on May 11, 2024, to Defendant
Klar.5 This form asked for any “updates” there may be regarding her two previous requests.
(Compl. [Docket No. 1] ¶ 28). Defendant Broadway responded on July 12, 2024, stating her
“request had been passed forward as outlined in the Gender Affirming Care Policy.” (Id. ¶ 29).
On July 18, 2024, Plaintiff submitted another Client Request Form directly to Defendant
Broadway, again asking about the status of her previous requests. (Ex. IX [Docket No. 1-1] at 21).
Defendant Broadway responded on July 23, 2024, with confirmation that Plaintiff’s prior requests
were forwarded on, and that she “will be notified once they make a decision.” (Id.).
Plaintiff submitted her next Client Request Form on July 18, 2024, to Defendant
Klingaman, requesting an update on her previous Client Request Forms. (Compl. [Docket No. 1]
¶ 32). On July 26, 2024, Defendant Anderson responded, on behalf of Defendant Klingaman, and
stated there were no updates at that time. (Id. ¶ 33). Plaintiff submitted another Client Request
5 Given the previous dates Plaintiff has provided for when she submitted her first two Client Request Forms, May 26,
2024, and June 6, 2024, and the corroboration of those dates from Plaintiff’s Exhibits VI and VII, the May 11, 2024,
date for the submission of her third Client Request Form is likely inaccurate. (Ex. VI [Docket No. 1-1] at 16, 17; Ex.
VII [Docket No. 1-1] at 18, 19).
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Form on July 31, 2024, again asking for an update; she received the same response from Defendant
Anderson later that day. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 35).
Plaintiff’s final Client Request Form was submitted to Defendant Klingaman on September
17, 2024, and requested updates on her previous submissions. (Id. ¶ 36). Defendant Anderson
responded on September 18, 2024, and stated “there was no decision on the three forms of GAC
that Ms. Meranelli requested per the WPATH SOC-8.” (Id. ¶ 37).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ failure to grant her GAC as requested in her Client
Request Forms has caused her to experience “suicidal behavior and ideation brought on by her
Gender Dysphoria, as well as nightmares and severe mental and psychological distress.” (Id. ¶
40).6
Based on the allegations in her Complaint, Plaintiff affirmatively rases three causes of
action. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “have and continue to willfully and maliciously
providing[sic] inadequate medical care via failing to provide for the Standards of Care (‘SOC’)
published by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (‘WPATH’) at Version
8 (‘SOC-8’)” because Defendants have not allowed GAC in the form of “(1) Laser Hair Removal
(‘LHR’), and (2) Voice Pitch Training/Surgery (‘VPT’)” in violation of Plaintiff’s “constitutional
right to adequate medical care[.]” (Id. ¶ 2).7 In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants [Ghandi]
and Johnston have failed to provide a constitutional policy to provide Ms. Meranelli . . . GAC as
well as they have failed to train and supervise in accordance with the SOC-8.” (Id. ¶ 50). In Count
6 Notably, based upon the record before the Court including Plaintiff’s Complaint and the excerpt of MSOP’s Gender
Policy, Defendant Klar, Defendant Broadway, Defendant Anderson, and Defendant Klingaman have not denied any
of Plaintiff’s Client Request Forms. Even further, Plaintiff has not yet been denied any GAC by any Defendant,
including LHR and VPT.
7 Plaintiff further alleges the Defendants violated the “Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to be
enforced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act by and through its Amendments
Act, and Rehabilitation Act[.]” (Compl. [Docket No. 1] ¶ 2, 47). Plaintiff only mentions the violations of these specific
Acts in passing reference and, when viewing Plaintiff’s Complaint as a whole, Plaintiff’s allegations are adequately
addressed under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ deliberate indifference analysis.
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III, Plaintiff alleges “Defendants DHS And[sic] MSOP have violated the SCOTUS case in Monell
by implementing an unconstitutional policy, practice and procedure that violates Ms. Meranelli’s
right to GAC of LHR and VPT.” (Id. ¶ 53). Plaintiff raises these federal causes of action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶ 1).
Plaintiff also raises two state law claims alleging violations of the Minnesota Human Rights
Act and for negligence. (Id. ¶ 2). Notably, however, Plaintiff’s two mentions of these claims arise
when describing Count I, “in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution and is sought to be upheld under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . [the] Minnesota
Human Rights Act, and Professional Negligence, Negligence.” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 47). Although Plaintiff’s
Complaint does not clearly outline her causes of action for a violation of the Minnesota Human
Rights Act or for negligence, Plaintiff’s Complaint, when read as a whole, appears to raise a cause
of action for a violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act and for negligence based on
Minnesota state law. (See Id.). 	Thus, the Court will liberally construe Plaintiff’s Complaint as
raising these two additional state law claims.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the form of nominal, compensatory,
statutory, and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief in the form of LHR, VPT and a
constitutional policy that aligns with either WPATH SOC-8 or WPATH SOC. (Id. at 18, 19).
II. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. [Docket No. 9].8
As noted above, Plaintiff alleges the Defendants violated her constitutional rights when
they failed to provide Plaintiff with LHR and VPT. On this basis, Plaintiff asserts, pursuant to §
8 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss operates as an abandonment of
her claim and a waiver of any argument in opposition to Defendants’ request for dismissal. See e.g., Carlson v. Univ.
of Nw. St. Paul, No. 23-cv-577 (JMB/ECW), 2024 WL 3495802, at *2 (D. Minn. July 22, 2024) (collecting cases).
This represents a sufficient, independent basis upon which to recommend that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed without
prejudice, and the Court recommends dismissal on that basis. See Carlson, 2024 WL 3495802, at *2; Moore v. Robert
Half Int’l Inc., No. 23-cv-906 (JRT/ECW), 2023 WL 5960361, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2023). However, for the sake
of completeness, the Court will also consider the substantive merits of Plaintiff’s claims.
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1983, an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendants in their official and
individual capacities for failing to provide adequate medical care. Plaintiff additionally alleges that
Defendant Ghandi and Defendant Johnston failed to train and supervise their employees in
compliance with SOC-8, and failed to implement a constitutional GAC policy. Plaintiff also raises
a Monell claim against Defendant DHS and Defendant MSOP. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). Lastly, Plaintiff alleges
a violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act and a Minnesota state law claim of negligence
against all Defendants.
Defendants seek an Order of this Court dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims in her
Complaint. (See gen., Defs.’ Mot. [Docket No. 9]). Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims should be
dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over some of Plaintiff’s claims and
because Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable claim. (See Defs.’ Mem. [Docket No. 10] at
10–24). In the alternative, Defendants argue that they are protected from liability by the doctrine
of qualified immunity. (Id. at 24, 25).
A. Standard of Review
In addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, courts accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See e.g., Varga v. U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n,
764 F.3d 833, 838 (8th Cir. 2014); Riley v. St. Louis County Mo., 153 F.3d 627, 629 (8th Cir.
1998) (citing Double D Spotting Serv., Inc. v. Supervalu, Inc., 136 F.3d 554, 556 (8th Cir. 1998));
Maki v. Allete, Inc., 383 F.3d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 2004). The court may, however, disregard legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Hager
v. Ark. Dep’t of Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013). “While legal conclusions can provide
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the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679.
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” and “[w]here a
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–67).
In considering a motion to dismiss aimed at a pro se complaint, the Court must “liberally
construe[]” the pro se complaint because “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erikson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see Sorenson v. Minnesota Dep’t of Corr., No. 12-cv-1336 (ADM/AJB), 2012
WL 3143927, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2012) (citing Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286
(8th Cir. 1980)). “Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not
excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.” Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d
526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984); see Martin, 623 F.2d at 1286. Pro se complaints “still must allege
sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
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B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants claim that as a matter of law, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff from
recovering monetary damages from Defendant DHS, Defendant MSOP,9 Defendant DCT, and the
individual Defendants in their official capacities. (Defs.’ Mem. [Docket No. 10] at 10).
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits an action for monetary damages against a state unless
it has unequivocally consented to suit or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity for a
particular federal cause of action. Hadley v. North Arkansas Community Technical College, 76
F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996); Faibisch v. University of Minnesota, 304 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir.
2002). States are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal claims brought under §
1983. Hadley, 76 F.3d at 1438. The immunity afforded a state in federal court extends to agencies
of the state. Minnesota Pharmacists Ass’n v. Pawlenty, 690 F. Supp. 2d 809, 815 (D. Minn. 2010)
(citing Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S.
147 (1981)).
Defendant DHS and Defendant DCT are agencies of the State of Minnesota. See Daniels
v. Jesson, No. 13–cv–736 (JNE/SER), 2014 WL 3629874, at *5 (D. Minn. July 22, 2014). Thus, a
suit against Defendant DHS and Defendant DCT must be construed as a suit against the State of
Minnesota. See Geiger v. Minn. Dept. of Human Servs., No. 13–cv–2140 (JRT/LIB), 2013 WL
5596599, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 11, 2013). It follows, then, that Defendant DHS and Defendant
9 MSOP is a state operated program, not a cognizable legal entity that has the capacity to be sued. See Minn.Stat. §
246B.02. To be capable of being sued, MSOP must be a separate legal entity from the State of Minnesota, which
they are not. Meranelli v. Minnesota Dep't of Hum. Servs., No. 23-cv-848 (JWB/TNL), 2024 WL 992623, at *3 (D.
Minn. Jan. 11, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 639476 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2024). Plaintiff has
failed to allege any facts to show MSOP is a separate legal entity that has the capacity to be sued. Therefore, to the
extent Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 9], seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against MSOP,
the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 9], be GRANTED. It is further
recommended that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims alleged against MSOP be DISMISSED with prejudice. See Meranelli,
2024 WL 992623.
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DCT enjoy the same Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit as the State, regardless of the relief
sought. See Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782.
Similarly, a suit against a state employee in that person’s official capacity constitutes a suit
against the public employer, namely, the state itself. Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d
531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)); see Uland v.
City of Winsted, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1119–20 (D. Minn. 2008) (citing Baker v. Chisom, 501
F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2007); Bankhead v. Knickrehm, 360 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2004)). “The
law is clear that, ‘the real party in interest in an official capacity suit is the governmental entity
and not the named official.’” Semler v. Ludeman, No. 9-cv-732 (ADM/SRN), 2010 WL 145275,
at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2010) (citing Baker, 501 F.3d at 925). The individuals named as Defendants,
as alleged employees of MSOP, the executive director of MSOP, and the DHS Commissioner, are
state officials. Semler v. Johnston, No. 20-cv-1062 (WMW/LIB), 2020 WL 9171089, at *5 (D.
Minn. Nov. 9, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 942095 (D. Minn. Mar. 12,
2021).
Therefore, the Court must necessarily construe Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims seeking monetary
damages from the individuals named as Defendants in their official capacities, and from Defendant
DHS and Defendant DCT as agencies of the state, as claims alleged against the State of Minnesota.
Even when liberally construing the record in Plaintiff’s favor, the record presently before
the Court lacks any evidence or authority demonstrating either Minnesota’s consent to suit or
Congressional abrogation of the state’s sovereign immunity. It is well established that “neither the
history nor the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 expresses any” intent “to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity” afforded to the States. Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 540 (8th Cir.
1988).
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Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 9], seeks dismissal
of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant DHS and Defendant DCT and Plaintiff’s § 1983
official-capacity 	claims 	for 	monetary 	damages 	from 	Defendants 	Ghandi, 	Johnston, 	Klar,
Broadway, Anderson, and Klingaman, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, [Docket No. 9], be GRANTED. It is further recommended that these claims be
DISMISSED with prejudice. Semler, 2020 WL 9171089, at *6.
C. Defendant Klar, Defendant Broadway, Defendant Anderson, and Defendant
Klingaman
As already noted above, Plaintiff raises a federal law claim of deliberate inference against
Defendant Klar, Defendant Broadway, Defendant Anderson, and Defendant Klingaman in their
individual capacities, as well as in their official capacities for injunctive relief, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff argues that these Defendants “have and continue to willfully and
maliciously providing[sic] inadequate medical care” as they failed to administer the LHR and VPT
that Plaintiff requested. (Compl. [Docket No. 1] ¶ 2).
To establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to demonstrate
that an individual defendant was directly and personally involved in an alleged constitutional
violation. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985); Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477
F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007). In the present case, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to
demonstrate 	Defendant 	Klar, 	Defendant 	Anderson, 	Defendant 	Broadway, 	or 	Defendant
Klingaman were directly and personally involved in withholding LHR and VPT from Plaintiff.
However, if, for the sake of argument, Plaintiff had sufficiently pled sufficient facts to demonstrate
Defendant Klar’s, Defendant Anderson’s, Defendant Broadway’s, or Defendant Klingaman’s
direct involvement, Plaintiff still failed to establish the prongs of a deliberate indifference claim
as discussed below.
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“Although an involuntary committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his
confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.” Revels v.
Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, although deliberate indifference claims
proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment when alleged by a civilly committed plaintiff, the
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard of review applies. Revels, 382 F.3d at 874;
Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 889 (8th Cir. 2006).
Any “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment and, therefore, violates the Eighth Amendment “because it constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary standards of decency.” Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Gregoire v. Class,
236 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 2000) (“It is well established that the Eighth Amendment prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment extends to protect prisoners from deliberate indifference from
serious medical needs.”) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
To demonstrate the “deliberate indifference” necessary to sufficiently plead an Eighth
Amendment—or, in the present case, Fourteenth Amendment—violation, a plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) that she had an objectively serious medical need, and (2) that prison officials knew
of, but deliberately disregarded, that need. Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000).
In alleging deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must demonstrate “more than negligence, more even
than gross negligence 	. . . .” Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995).
“Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal recklessness . . . .” Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 445
F.3d 1038, 1042 (8th Cir. 2006). “Specifically, the prisoner must show both (1) that a prison
official had actual knowledge that the prisoner’s medical condition created a substantial risk of
serious harm to the prisoner’s health, and (2) that the prison official failed to act reasonably to
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abate that risk.” Baez v. Rosemack, No. 9-cv-2121 (RHK/LIB), 2011 WL 4062586, at *4 (D.
Minn. Aug. 9, 2011) (citing Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 785 (8th Cir. 1997)).
“The failure to treat a medical condition does not constitute punishment within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment unless prison officials knew that the condition created an excessive risk
to the inmate’s health and then failed to act on that knowledge.” Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d
1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997). “As long as this threshold is not crossed, inmates have no constitutional
right to receive a particular or requested course of treatment, and prison doctors remain free to
exercise their independent medical judgment.” Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1239.
Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference against Defendant Klar, Defendant Broadway,
Defendant Anderson, or Defendant Klingaman turn on Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendants
are “willfully and maliciously” failing to provide Plaintiff with LHR and VPT. (Compl. [Docket
No. 1] ¶ 2). Plaintiff bases this contention on her allegations that Defendants’ delay in allowing
Plaintiff LHR and VPT fails to comply with the WPATH SOC-8. (Id.). In support of these
allegations, Plaintiff relies on the timeline of her Client Medical Request Forms.
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any facts that would present a facially plausible claim
on either of the required prongs. Even construing the Complaint liberally, taking all factual
allegations in the Complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor,
Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support a plausible claim that Defendant Klar,
Defendant Broadway, Defendant Anderson, or Defendant Klingaman knew of, but deliberately
disregarded, Plaintiff’s objectively serious medical need.
In fact, even again construing the Complaint liberally, taking all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff has failed to
plead sufficient facts to demonstrate she suffered from any objectively serious medical need.
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Instead, Plaintiff conclusorily asserts that she required the specific GAC of LHR and VPT.
However, Plaintiff does not support her conclusory assertion with any factual allegations that
plausibly indicate Defendant Klar, Defendant Broadway, Defendant Anderson, or Defendant
Klingaman negligently withheld GAC, much less in a manner akin to criminal recklessness as
required for deliberate indifference. Drake, 445 F.3d at 1042.
Even assuming solely for the sake of argument that Plaintiff’s need for LHR and VPT was
to treat an objectively serious medical need, Plaintiff has still failed to plead sufficient facts
demonstrating that not receiving LHR and VPT created a substantial risk of serious harm to her
health, and that Defendant Klar, Defendant Broadway, Defendant Anderson, and Defendant
Klingaman knew of that risk.10 “To find a prison official liable for showing deliberate indifference,
we require the plaintiff to show that the official actually knew that the inmate faced a substantial
risk of serious harm and failed to respond reasonably to abate that risk.” Drake, 445 F.3d at 1042
(citing Gregoire, 236 F.3d at 417). Plaintiff has failed to present any facts demonstrating Defendant
Klar, Defendant Broadway, Defendant Anderson, or Defendant Klingaman had any knowledge of
Plaintiff facing a risk of serious harm. Even construing the Complaint liberally, taking all factual
allegations in the Complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor,
Plaintiff’s factual allegations here fail to specifically demonstrate Defendants’ actual knowledge
and subsequent disregard of an excessive and actual risk to Plaintiff’s health.
10 Plaintiff does note she has experienced suicidal behavior and ideation as a result of her Gender Dysphoria,
including nightmares and severe psychological distress. (Compl. [Docket No. 1] ¶ 40). However, Plaintiff
additionally acknowledges that her diagnosis with Gender Dysphoria occurred “[p]rior to the incidents in this
Complaint[.]” (Id. ¶ 39). It would therefore be an unreasonable inference for the Court to construe Plaintiff’s
pleading as implicitly linking her symptoms stemming from Gender Dysphoria to not receiving LHR or VPT.
Additionally, Plaintiff fails to plead facts demonstrating that Defendant Klar, Defendant Broadway, Defendant
Anderson, or Defendant Klingaman knew that not receiving GAC in the form of LHR and VPT would additionally
result in nightmares and severe psychological distress.
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Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 official-
capacity claim for injunctive relief against Defendant Klar, Defendant Broadway, Defendant
Anderson, and Defendant Klingaman and dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 individual-capacity claim
against Defendant Klar, Defendant Broadway, Defendant Anderson, and Defendant Klingaman
(regardless of the relief sought), the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
[Docket No. 9], be GRANTED. See Brooks v. Lindlbauer, No. 22-cv-2011 (JWB/LIB), 2023 WL
2976034, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 17, 2023). Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks to
have these claims dismissed with prejudice, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss, [Docket No. 9], be DENIED in part.
D. Defendant Ghandi and Defendant Johnston
As observed above, Plaintiff additionally alleges her deliberate indifference claim against
Defendant Ghandi and Defendant Johnston, as well as alleging these Defendants failed to institute
a constitutional GAC policy, and failed to train and supervise their employees.
1. Deliberate Indifference
As noted above, to establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to
demonstrate that an individual defendant was directly and personally involved in an alleged
constitutional violation. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985); Clemmons v.
Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal
link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the
supervisory defendants, [the plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or
direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.”). Thus, to survive the
Defendants’ current Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff in the present case must have alleged each
Defendants’ personal involvement in the asserted violations with “more than labels and
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conclusion, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In the present case, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts upon which this Court could
reasonably infer Defendant Ghandi’s or Defendant Johnston’s personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional violations underlying Plaintiff’s Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid
of any factual allegations whatsoever demonstrating Defendant Ghandi’s or Defendant Johnston’s
direct and personal involvement in any conduct related to the alleged constitutional violations in
Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Ghandi or Defendant Johnston
participated in Plaintiff not receiving LHR or VPT, or that Defendant Ghandi or Defendant
Johnston knew of any alleged constitutional violations allegedly committed by Defendant Klar,
Defendant Broadway, Defendant Anderson, or Defendant Klingaman. “To state a claim under §
1983, a plaintiff must describe the individual actions taken by named defendants.” Heggs v.
Lindblom, No. 20-cv-2118 (DSD/KMM), 2021 WL 1877614, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 16, 2021),
report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1864123 (D. Minn. May 10, 2021). Plaintiff has
failed to meet this requirement as she has not associated any individualized actions with Defendant
Ghandi or Defendant Johnston.
Even liberally construing her Complaint, accepting all factual allegations therein as true,
and drawing all reasonable inferences therein in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to
allege the direct and personal involvement of Defendant Ghandi or Defendant Johnston in the
alleged constitutional violations underlying Plaintiff’s Complaint. Consequently, Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to allege any § 1983 deliberate indifference claim upon which relief may be
granted relative to Defendant Ghandi or Defendant Johnston.
2. Unconstitutional Policy Regarding GAC
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Plaintiff 	alleges 	Defendant 	Ghandi 	and 	Defendant 	Johnston 	failed 	to 	provide 	a
constitutional policy related to administering GAC. (See Compl. [Docket No. 1]). However,
liberally construing her Complaint, accepting all factual allegations therein as true, and drawing
all reasonable inferences therein in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff likely intended to argue that the
MSOP Gender Policy, through its non-compliance with WPATH SOC-8, violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional right to adequate medical care in failing to provide Plaintiff with LHR and VPT.
Plaintiff, however, provides no support for the contention that MSOP’s Gender Policy must
comply with WPATH SOC-8. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that MSOP’s Gender
Policy was required to comply with WPATH SOC-8, Plaintiff has failed to show that compliance
with WPATH SOC-8 would even necessitate providing Plaintiff with LHR and VPT.
The portions of WPATH SOC-8 that Plaintiff includes in Exhibit II and Exhibit III do not
mention a requirement of LHR or VPT. (Ex. II [Docket No. 1-1] at 4, 5; Ex. III [Docket No. 1-1]
at 4, 6, 7).11 Plaintiff’s Exhibit II mentions only the following concerning LHR and VPT when
providing assistance to transgender and gender diverse (hereafter “TGD”) people: “[t]his
assistance may include but is not limited to hormonal and surgical treatments, voice and
communication therapy, primary care, hair removal, reproductive and sexual health, and mental
health care.” (Ex. II [Docket No. 1-1] at 5). The passage further states that “[h]ealthcare systems
should provide medically necessary gender-affirming health care for TGD people[.]” (Id.).
Plaintiff’s Exhibit III, while more detailed regarding LHR, similarly does not impose a requirement
of LHR. (Ex. III [Docket No. 1-1] at 6, 7). This Exhibit explains WPATH “recommend[s] health
care professionals offer transgender and gender diverse people referrals for hair removal from the
face, body, and genital areas for gender-affirmation or as part of a preoperative preparation
11 Plaintiff’s Exhibit IV contains additional information about WPATH SOC-8, yet this excerpt relates solely to the
background and creation of SOC-8, and contains no discussion of LHR or VPT. (Ex. IV [Docket No. 1-1 at 4, 8).
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process.” 	(Id.). 	Neither 	excerpt 	from 	WPATH 	SOC-8 	provides 	anything 	more 	than 	an
acknowledgement that LHR and VPT can be beneficial for TGD people, and a recommendation
to administer medically necessary GAC.
As noted above, to establish a deliberate indifference claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate
(1) that she had an objectively serious medical need, and (2) that prison officials knew of, but
deliberately disregarded, that need. Jolly, 205 F.3d at 1096. In the present case, Plaintiff merely
asserts that through utilizing MSOP’s Gender Policy, which is not in compliance with the WPATH
SOC-8, Defendants are “willfully and maliciously providing inadequate medical care.” (Compl.
[Docket No. 1] ¶ 2).
Based on the record currently before the Court, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts
sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff is currently experiencing an objectively serious medical
need, and that MSOP’s current Gender Policy deliberately disregards that need. The record is
ultimately devoid of any indication that MSOP is required to comply with the WPATH SOC-8,
and, even if MSOP was required to comply with WPATH SOC-8, Plaintiff’s provided excerpts
fall short of stating any requirement for LHR or VPT. Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to
allege any § 1983 deliberate indifference claim regarding MSOP’s Gender Policy upon which
relief may be granted relative to Defendant Ghandi or Defendant Johnston.
3. Failure to Train and Supervise Employees
Plaintiff’s failure to train and supervise claim is based upon Defendant Ghandi’s and
Defendant Johnston’s alleged failure to train and supervise their employees, Defendant Klar,
Defendant Broadway, Defendant Anderson, and Defendant Klingaman, in accordance with
WPATH SOC-8. (Id. ¶ 50).
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Though Defendant Ghandi and Defendant Johnston may not be liable under a respondeat
superior theory of liability, they “may be subject to § 1983 liability for inadequate training of
[their] employees that directly causes constitutional injury.” B.A.B., Jr. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of
St. Louis, 698 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 2012). A government official is liable under this theory
if the plaintiff shows “the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so
likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that [the government official] can
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” B.A.B., Jr., 698 F.3d at 1039
(quoting Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting, in turn, City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989))).
A government official may also be held liable for a failure to supervise “if the official
‘demonstrated deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive acts.’” Kahle v.
Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 579 (8th Cir.
1998) (citation and quotations omitted)). The subjective deliberate indifference standard requires
that “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). If the risk was obvious, a fact finder may conclude the official knew of
the substantial risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 826.
Here, Plaintiff’s failure to train and failure to supervise allegations necessarily fail as the
Court has determined Defendant Klar, Defendant Broadway, Defendant Anderson, and Defendant
Klingaman did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. “[P]laintiff’s’ failure to train and failure
to supervise claims . . . could not be sustained absent an underlying constitutional violation[.]”
Sitzes v. City of W. Memphis Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 470 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing City of Los Angeles
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v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (per curiam); Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 9], seeks dismissal
of Plaintiff’s § 1983 official-capacity claims for injunctive relief against Defendant Ghandi and
Defendant Johnston and Plaintiff’s § 1983 individual-capacity claims against Defendant Ghandi
and Defendant Johnston (regardless of the relief sought), the undersigned recommends that
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 9], be GRANTED in part. The undersigned further
recommends that these claims be DISMISSED without prejudice. See Brooks v. Lindlbauer, No.
22-cv-2011 (JWB/LIB), 2023 WL 2976034, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 17, 2023). Accordingly, to the
extent the Defendants’ Motion seeks to have this claim dismissed with prejudice, the undersigned
recommends that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 9], be DENIED in part.
E. Jane/John Does
Plaintiff also includes Jane/John Does in the present action. (Compl. [Docket No. 1] at 1).
However, the only mention of these Defendants is when Plaintiff lists them on the title page of her
Complaint. (Id.). Plaintiff’s Complaint is completely devoid of any actual reference to the
Jane/John Doe’s individual liability or even any identifying details regarding who these
Defendants are.
As stated above, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that an individual
defendant was directly and personally involved in an alleged constitutional violation. Martin v.
Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985); Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th
Cir. 2007) (“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the
deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [the plaintiff]
must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of
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his constitutional rights.”). Thus, to survive the Defendants’ current Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff
in the present case must have alleged each Defendants’ personal involvement in the asserted
violations with “more than labels and conclusion, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts upon which this Court could reasonably infer the
Jane/John Does had any involvement in the alleged constitutional violations underlying Plaintiff’s
Complaint. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must describe the individual actions taken
by named defendants.” Heggs v. Lindblom, No. 20-cv-2118 (DSD/KMM), 2021 WL 1877614, at
*1 (D. Minn. Apr. 16, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1864123 (D. Minn.
May 10, 2021).
Even liberally construing her Complaint, accepting all factual allegations therein as true,
and drawing all reasonable inferences therein in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to
allege any involvement of the Jane/John Does in the alleged constitutional violations underlying
Plaintiff’s Complaint. Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any § 1983 claim upon
which relief may be granted relative to the Jane/John Does.
Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
against the Jane/John Does, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
[Docket No. 9], be GRANTED in part. The undersigned further recommends that these claims
be DISMISSED without prejudice. See Brooks, 2023 WL 2976034, at *1. Accordingly, to the
extent Defendants’ Motion seeks to have these claims dismissed with prejudice, the undersigned
recommends that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 9], be DENIED in part.
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F. 	State Law Claims
As noted above, Plaintiff also raises two state law claims against all Defendants for
violating the Minnesota Human Rights Act and for negligence. (See Compl. [Docket No. 1]).
Supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 by a federal court over state law claims
may be exercised at the discretion of the district court. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 581 F.3d
737, 749 (8th Cir. 2009). “[Supplemental jurisdiction] justification lies in considerations of judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should
hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to apply state law to them.”
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). “Needless decisions of state law
should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by
procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” United Mine Workers of Am., 383
U.S. at 726. If it appears that state issues substantially predominate, courts have tended towards
dismissing said state law claims without prejudice, to be left for resolution by the state courts. Id.
Because this Court recommends dismissing all of Plaintiff’s federal law claims, at this early
stage of this litigation, the Court also recommends declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See Gregoire, 236 F.3d at 419–20 (stating federal courts should
exercise judicial restraint and avoid state law issues whenever possible); United Mine Workers of
Am., 383 U.S. at 726. Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s
state law claims against the Defendants, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, [Docket No. 9], be GRANTED in part. The undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
state law claims be DISMISSED without prejudice. See Brooks, 2023 WL 2976034, at *1.
Accordingly, to the extent Defendants’ Motion seeks to have these claims dismissed with
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prejudice, the undersigned recommends that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 9],
be DENIED in part.
III. 	Conclusion
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, [Docket No. 9], be GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part, as set forth above;
2. 	Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant MSOP be DISMISSED with prejudice;
3. 	Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant DHS be DISMISSED without prejudice;
4. 	Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for monetary and punitive damages against all individual named
Defendants in their official capacities be DISMISSED with prejudice;
5. 	Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for monetary and punitive damages against all Defendants in their
individual capacities be DISMISSED without prejudice;
6. 	Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against all individual named
Defendants in their official or individual capacities be DISMISSED without prejudice;
and
7. 	Plaintiff’s state law claims be DISMISSED without prejudice.
Dated: December 3, 2025 	s/Leo I. Brisbois
Hon. Leo I. Brisbois
United States Magistrate Judge
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N O T I C E
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “A party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days after being served with
a copy of the recommended disposition[.]” A party may respond to those objections within 14 days
after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must
comply with the word or line limits set forth in LR 72.2(c).
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