Groschen v. Kopel et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Steven Groschen,
Plaintiff,
v.
Alana 	Kopel, 	Officer; 	and 	Robin 	Kivel,
Officer,
Defendants.
File No. 25-CV-01691 (JMB/SGE)
ORDER
Steven Groschen, St. Paul, MN, self-represented.
Ryan M. Zipf, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, MN, for Defendants Woodbury Police
Department, Alana Kopel, and Robin Kivel.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Alana Kopel’s and Robin Kivel’s
(together, Defendants) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Steven Groschen’s Amended Complaint.
(Doc. No. 27.) For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the motion.
BACKGROUND
On August 18, 2024, Alana Kopel, a police officer with the Woodbury Police
Department, pulled over Groschen’s vehicle. 	(Doc. No. 26 [hereinafter, “Compl.”] ¶ 6.)
During the encounter, Kopel told Groschen that she had pulled him over because
Groschen’s vehicle did not have appropriate registration or license plates. (Id.) Groschen
declined to give Kopel his identification or insurance information when asked because he
believed that he had not committed a crime. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.) Groschen does not allege that
his vehicle registration was current or that his license plates were properly displayed. (See
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generally Compl.) Then, when Kivel arrived on the scene, Groschen continued to refuse
to provide officers with his identification. 	(Id. ¶ 9.) 	Kopel then placed Groschen under
arrest and put him in a squad car. (Id. ¶¶ 9–11.) When doing so, the officers searched of
Groschen’s person. (Id. ¶ 10.)
Groschen was later charged with several traffic violations in Washington County
District Court, including failure to possess or display a driver’s license, failure to carry
proof of insurance, and failure to display a vehicle registration. See State v. Groschen, No.
82-VB-24-9197 (Sept. 16, 2024). 	Ultimately, the City dismissed all charges against
Groschen pursuant to a plea agreement. (Doc. No. 29-5.)
In his Amended Complaint, Groschen alleges that, during the traffic stop, Kopel and
Kivel1 violated 	his 	constitutional 	rights.2 	Specifically, 	Groschen—a 	self-identified
sovereign citizen (Doc. No. 37 at 2)—asserts that the officers encumbered his “right to
locomotion in [his] personal property” under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution by accusing him of violating state license and registration laws, and further
violated his right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
1 Groschen’s original Complaint appeared to assert official-capacity claims against the
Woodbury Police Department. (See Doc. No. 1 at 1.) The Amended Complaint, however,
identifies only the individual officers Kopel and Kivel as defendants. (Doc. No. 26 at 1–
2.) 	The Court construes the Amended Complaint—the only operative pleading—as
asserting 	claims 	against 	Kopel 	and 	Kivel, 	and 	not 	against 	the 	Woodbury 	Police
Department. 	See Allen v. Amsterdam, 132 F.4th 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2025) (“In our
Circuit, it is well-established that an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint
and renders the original complaint without legal effect.” (quotation omitted)).
2 The Court construes Groschen’s constitutional claims as being brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
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Amendment by searching his person during his arrest. He also asserts that Kopel and Kivel
violated his constitutional rights under color of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, a
federal criminal statute. 	(Compl. ¶ 4.) 	Groschen seeks more than $2 million in
compensatory and special damages. (Id. at 5.)
DISCUSSION
Defendants have moved to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim. 	On a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts consider all facts alleged in the complaint to
be true and then determine whether the complaint states a “claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 	A pleading has facial plausibility when its
factual allegations “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In this analysis, courts construe
the allegations and draws inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co., 911 F.3d 505, 512 (8th Cir. 2018).
However, courts will not give plaintiffs the benefit of unreasonable inferences, Brown v.
Medtronic, Inc., 628 F.3d 451, 461 (8th Cir. 2010), and the Court is “not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” 	Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 286 (1986). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the motion.
I. 	FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
Defendants argue that they are immune from Groschen’s constitutional claims in
their individual capacities by the doctrine of qualified immunity. 	The Court agrees and
dismisses these claims because the Amended Compliant fails to plausibly plead a viable
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claim under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment.
In general, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials like
police 	officers 	from 	liability 	“unless 	their 	conduct 	violated 	a 	clearly 	established
constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Littrell
v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 2004). 	This immunity shields all government
officials, except for “the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); see also Luckert v. Dodge Cnty., 684 F.3d 808,
817 (8th Cir. 2012) (advising that officers “are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they
are liable for transgressing bright lines”). 	Courts can and should rule on defendants’
assertions of qualified immunity “at the earliest possible stage in litigation,” including at
the pleading stage. 	Payne v. Britten, 749 F.3d 697, 701–02 (8th Cir. 2014). 	When an
assertion of qualified immunity arises at the pleading stage, as here, the Court asks “only
whether the facts as alleged plausibly state a claim,” and, if so, “whether that claim asserts
a violation of a clearly established right.” Id. at 702.
A. 	Fourteenth Amendment
In his Amended Complaint, Groschen alleges that Kovel and Kipel violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by citing him for violations of state licensing and registration laws.
(Compl. ¶ 9.) 	Groschen takes the position that such conduct violates the Fourteenth
Amendment becuase the U.S. Constitution guarantees him the right to “move as [he]
please[s],” and that he has “a right to locomotion according to modern day values,” which
values include the use of an automobile. 	(Doc. No. 37 at 4.) 	The gist of Groschen’s
Fourteenth Amendment claim is that state laws requiring drivers to submit to licensing and
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registration regimes apply only to actors conducting commercial activity (which he asserts
he was not at the time of the August 2024 traffic stop) and are otherwise unconstitutional
restraints on a private person’s “absolute right” to travel. (Id. at 6; see also id. at 2–16.)
The Court—like many other courts—disagrees with Groschen’s legal premise.
State laws requiring the display of license plates, vehicle registration, proof of insurance,
and other licensing requirements do not unduly impinge upon any constitutional right to
travel. E.g., Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids, 840 F.3d 987, 995 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding
that the enforcement of traffic regulations does not violate any right to travel); Connradt v.
Krichbaum, 2024 WL 4495113, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 17, 2024) (rejecting sovereign-
citizen plaintiff’s assertions that state vehicle and licensing laws violated right to travel);
Schoeszler v. Nettell, No. 24-CV-1197 (JWB/ECW), 2024 WL 3928875, at *3 (D. Minn.
Aug. 14, 2024) (“While the right to travel is established, states may regulate driving for
public safety.”); report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4494168 (D. Minn. Oct.
15, 2024); Triemert v. Washington Cnty., No. 13-CV-1312 (PJS/JSM), 2013 WL 6729260,
at *7–10 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2013) (collecting cases and dismissing sovereign-citizen
plaintiff’s claims under section 1983 that state laws requiring vehicle registration,
licensing, and proof of registration do not impinge any constitutional right to travel), aff’d
571 Fed. App’x 509 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Reed v. Hovey, No. 4:20-CV-3151, 2021 WL
949612, at *2–3 n.2 (D. Neb. Mar. 12, 2021).
Thus, the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts that would establish a viable
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, much less a clearly established right, and the
factual allegations cannot overcome Kovel’s and Kopel’s assertion of qualified immunity.
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B. 	Fourth Amendment
The Amended Complaint includes allegations that Kopel and Kivel violated the
Fourth Amendment. 	However, his allegations are mere legal conclusions that are
unsupported by fact. The allegations are, in full, as follows:
At this time [of arrest], under custody the officers searched me
violating my 4th amendment to unreasonable searches acting
under color of law.
They put me in the back of Kopel’s squad car and illegally
seized my personal property. 	This was another violating
against my 4th amendment right unconstitutionally seizing my
property while acting under color of law.
(Doc. No. 26 at 4.) These conclusory statements include no factual detail to support a claim
that the officers’ conduct was unreasonable.3 	For instance, although the Amended
Complaint alleges that the officers “illegally seized [his] personal property” (id.), the
Amended Complaint does not allege what personal property was seized during this
encounter. 	Without additional factual allegations, the Court is unable to “draw the
reasonable inference that [any] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. 	Again, the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts that would establish a
3 The Amended Complaint does not primarily allege that the officers lacked a reasonable
basis to suspect Groschen of violating Minnesota laws requiring valid vehicle registration
and the display of valid license plates on their vehicles, Minn. Stat. § 169.79, subd. 1. (See
generally Compl.) 	Instead, the Amended Complaint purports to claim Groschen’s
constitutional 	rights 	to 	travel 	are 	violated 	by 	the 	vehicle 	registration 	and 	license
requirements themselves. Thus, Groschen’s claim necessarily requires a holding that such
state-law requirements are unconstitutional. In this way, the Amended Complaint does not
allege an unreasonable seizure. Nevertheless, to the extent that any of the allegations can
be construed to challenge the reasonableness of his arrest, such a claim fails. The Fourth
Amendment permits warrantless arrests based on probable cause, even for minor offenses.
Lawyer v. City of Council Bluffs, 361 F.3d 1099, 1105–06 (8th Cir. 2004).
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viable claim (much less a clearly established right). 	Therefore, the Court dismisses
Groschen’s Fourth Amendment claim.
II. 	STATUTORY CLAIM
Defendants also argue that no private right of action exists under 18 U.S.C. § 242
and, as a result, Groschen’s claim under section 242 fails. 	Groschen offers no response.
The Court agrees. 	The law is clear that there is no private right of action under section
242—a federal criminal statute—in a civil lawsuit such as this. 	E.g., Hansen v. Westly,
No. 24-CV-2653 (ECT/JFD), 2024 WL 4851300, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2024)
(collecting cases and dismissing claim under section 242 on grounds that it does not
provide for private right of action); see also, e.g., also Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st
Cir. 1989) (“Only the United States as prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241–42.”). As a result, Groschen’s claim under section 242 fails.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 27) is
GRANTED as follows:
1. 	Groschen’s Fourteenth Amendment claim and his claim under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. 	Groschen’s 	Fourth 	Amendment 	claim 	is 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 24, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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