Stevenson v. Eischen

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Michael Stevenson,
Petitioner,
v.
B. Eischen,
Respondent.
Case No. 25-cv-1308-ECT-EMB
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Michael Stevenson filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., Dkt. No. 1). Stevenson’s petition case is
referred to me for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636
and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1. Because it appears that
Stevenson has been afforded the relief he seeks in the petition, the case does
not present a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III of the
U.S. Constitution, and I recommend that the petition be denied as moot. See,
e.g., Newton v. Barnes, No. 19-CV-1037-ECT/ECW, 2019 WL 2743712, at *1
(D. Minn. July 1, 2019).
I. Background
Stevenson was convicted of a controlled-substances offenses in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. He was sentenced to 200 months of
imprisonment. Stevenson alleges that he was eligible to earn time credits on
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his sentence under the First Step Act (“FSA”) when he began serving his
sentence in 2019.
The FSA permits eligible federal prisoners who “participate in and
complete evidence-based recidivism reduction programs” to earn time credits
toward reducing their sentence, with the rate of accrual depending on the
prisoner’s risk of reoffending upon release. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d). Up to twelve
months of FSA credits may be applied towards shortening a person’s overall
sentence. Any remaining FSA credits beyond that cannot be used to shorten
the prisoner’s sentence but may be applied towards accelerating the date on
which the prisoner would otherwise be eligible for prerelease custody—that
is, a transfer out of prison and into a residential reentry center or home
confinement.
In December 2024, Stevenson’s Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) counselor
advised him that his FSA status was being changed from “eligible” to
“ineligible.” (Pet. at 1.) Stevenson also was informed that he was being
denied all FSA credits that he had earned up to that point. (Id.)
Stevenson filed this petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the
BOP’s determination of this FSA eligibility and credits earned. (Id.)
After Stevenson filed his petition, the BOP made a new determination
of Stevenson’s eligibility and issued a new assessment of Stevenson’s FSA
time credits. (Gov’t Resp., Dkt. No. 16 at 1–2.) The BOP’s revised
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determination shows that Stevenson is indeed eligible for FSA credits and
has received the maximum allowable amount (365 days) of FSA credits
toward early release as well as 580 time credits toward pre-release custody.
(Gov’t Resp., Dkt. No. 16 at 2; Bush Decl., Dkt. No. 17, at 2.)
The government contends that this is the entirety of the relief for which
a prisoner is eligible under the FSA and the entirety of the remedy that
Stevenson seeks. (Gov’t Resp. at 2.) The government therefore urges the
Court to dismiss Stevenson’s petition as moot. (Id.)
The Court offered Stevenson the opportunity to file a reply brief
responding to the Government’s mootness argument. (Orders, Dkt. Nos. 5,
15.) Stevenson did not file a reply. (See generally Dkt.)
II. Discussion
“‘Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to actual, ongoing cases and controversies.’” Ali v.
Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 723 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Haden v. Pelofsky, 212
F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “‘When,
during the course of litigation, the issues presented in a case lose their life
because of the passage of time or a change in circumstances . . . and a federal
court can no longer grant effective relief, the case is considered moot.’” Id.
(quoting Haden, 212 F.3d at 469) (cleaned up). And when a case becomes
moot, a federal court cannot “address the merits because any opinion [the
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court] would issue would be merely advisory.” In re Search Warrants Issued
in Connection with Investigation of S. Cent. Career Ctr., W. Plains, Mo. (“In re
Search Warrants”), 487 F.3d 1190, 1192 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Haden, 212
F.3d at 469).
Here, after Stevenson filed his petition challenging his FSA eligibility
determination, the BOP re-determined his status and found that he was
eligible to receive the full scope of time credits available under the FSA. The
government submitted documentation showing that all available FSA time
credits have been applied to Stevenson’s sentence. (See Exhs. B and C to
Bush Decl., Dkt. Nos. 17-2 and 17-3.) This was the relief that Stevenson
sought in his habeas petition. Thus, the matter raised in the petition has
been resolved, the case or controversy is moot, and the Court “can no longer
grant effective relief.” Ali, 419 F.3d at 723.
Still, a court shouldn’t dismiss a habeas petition as moot if any of the
following exceptions apply:
(1) secondary or ‘collateral’ injuries survive after resolution of the
primary injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of
repetition yet evading review; (3) the defendant voluntarily
ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any
time; or (4) it is a properly certified class action suit.
Ahmed v. Sessions, No. 16-cv-02124-DSD-HB, 2017 WL 3267738, at *2 (D.
Minn. July 11, 2017) (quoting Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir.
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2002)), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3268176 (D. Minn.
July 31, 2017).
None of these exceptions applies here.
First, Stevenson has not identified any cognizable collateral
consequences from BOP’s initial, incorrect determination. And there is no
evidence that BOP made its initial, incorrect determination to preclude
judicial review or otherwise in bad faith. Cf. Scheper v. Rios, 19-cv-402-MJD-
ECW, 2020 WL 4060729, at *3 (D. Minn. June 5, 2020) (determining
exception did not apply where petitioner did not identify cognizable collateral
consequences arising from the fact that he was not released as quickly as he
thought he should have been), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL
4059875 (D. Minn. July 20, 2020). The first exception therefore does not
apply.
The second exception—for a wrong capable of repetition yet evading
review—only “applies if the matter is too short in duration to be fully
litigated before it ends or expires and there is a reasonable expectation that
[the petitioner] will be subjected to the same action again.” In re Search
Warrants, 487 F.3d at 1193. That narrow exception is not present. Here,
there is nothing remaining to litigate in this case. See Ahmed, 2017 WL
3267738, at *3 (“Because there is nothing further to litigate in Petitioner’ s
case, [this] situation does not apply.”). Stevenson would be able to bring a
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new habeas petition under a new set of facts and circumstances should he
believe a future re-calculation of his FSA time credits is required. Thus, the
second exception also does not apply.
Third, the “voluntary cessation of illegal conduct can be resumed”
exception does not apply. This exception exists to prevent a defendant from
engaging in “strategies” whereby challenged conduct is suspended after being
sued and then renewed after the defendant has won a dismissal. Fed. Bureau
of Investigation v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 241 (2024) (“A live case or controversy
cannot be so easily disguised, and a federal court's constitutional authority
cannot be so readily manipulated.”). Here, there is no indication that the
government’s redetermination of Stevenson’s FSA eligibility and time credits
was part of a strategy to lure the Court into an improper dismissal. The BOP
has already deemed Stevenson eligible for FSA time credits and applied the
earned credits to his sentence. It would thus be “impossible for the
government to repeat the same unlawful conduct that [Stevenson]
challenged.” Kargbo v. Brott, No. 15-cv-2713-PJS-LIB, 2016 WL 3676162, at
*2 (D. Minn. July 6, 2016) (emphasis in original). If the BOP were somehow
to make a new determination of ineligibility or remove credits, it would
necessarily be under new facts and circumstances. In that event, Stevenson
would have the ability to bring a new habeas petition. The third exception is
thus inapplicable.
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Finally, the fourth exception does not apply because Stevenson filed his
petition on behalf of himself as an individual, not on behalf of a class of
individuals. Ahmed, 2017 WL 3267738, at *3.
In short, the Court cannot grant effective relief in this case as
Stevenson has been afforded the relief he seeks. None of the exceptions to
the mootness doctrine applies. Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissal
of the Petition as moot.
III. Recommendation
Based upon the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Petitioner Stevenson’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. No. 1) be DENIED AS MOOT.
2. This case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Dated: February 25, 2026 /s/ Elsa M. Bullard____________
Elsa M. Bullard
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or
judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations
within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
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A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a
copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses
must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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