Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Cynthia E.,1
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 25-cv-1095 (NEB/LIB)
v. 	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Frank Bisignano,
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
Plaintiff, Cynthia E. (hereafter “Plaintiff”), seeks judicial review of the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (hereafter “Defendant”) denying her application for disability
benefits and supplemental security income. The matter is before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rules 7.2(a)(1). This Court
has jurisdiction over the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Pursuant to the Federal Supplemental Rules of Civil Procedure which govern actions
seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, the present action
“is presented for decision by the parties’ briefs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. SS Rule 5. Plaintiff filed a
brief requesting reversal of the Commissioner’s final decision and the immediate award of
benefits, or in the alternative, remand to the Social Security Administration for further
administrative proceedings. [Docket No. 9]. Defendant filed a brief asking this Court to affirm the
Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff’s request for disability benefits and supplemental
security income. [Docket No. 11].
1 This District has adopted the policy of using only the first name and last initial of any nongovernmental parties in
Social Security opinions such as the present Report and Recommendation. Thus, when the Court refers to Plaintiff by
her name only her first name and last initial are provided.
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For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s request for
relief, [Docket No. 9], be DENIED, and Defendant’s request for relief, [Docket No. 11], be
GRANTED.
I. 	Background
On September 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and
disability benefits, as well as a Title XVI application for supplemental social security income. (Tr.
18, 225–227).2 In both of her applications, Plaintiff alleged that her disability began on March 20,
2020. (Id.). The Commissioner initially denied Plaintiff’s claims on January 17, 2023, and again,
upon reconsideration, on March 30, 2023. (Tr. 18, 105–110, 122–137). On April 20, 2023, Plaintiff
filed a written request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (Tr. 18, 138, 139).
Administrative Law Judge Kathleen Kadlec (hereafter “ALJ”) conducted a telephonic
hearing on March 6, 2024. (Tr. 18, 38–72). Plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing, along
with an independent vocational expert, Edward Pagella, (“IVE Pagella”). (Id.). At the hearing,
Plaintiff was represented by counsel. (Id.).
On May 20, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s request for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits, as well as Plaintiff’s request for supplemental social
security income. (Tr. 15–32). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 32).
Plaintiff thereafter sought review of the decision by the Appeals Council. (Tr. 187–189).
Subsequently, on October 27, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr.
2 Throughout this Report and Recommendation, the Court refers to the Administrative Record, [Docket No. 7], by the
abbreviation “Tr.” The Administrative Record is consecutively paginated across 57 exhibits. (See Administrative
Record [Docket No. 7]). Where the Court cites to the Administrative Record, it refers to the page numbers found in
the bottom-right corner of these exhibits.
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1–4). As a result, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.981, 416.1481.
On March 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action. (Compl. [Docket No. 1]). Thereafter, this
matter was presented to the Court for review pursuant to the parties’ briefs, [Docket Nos. 9, 11],
and the Court took the matter under advisement on the written submissions.
II. Standards of Review
A. Administrative Law Judge’s Five-Step Analysis
If a claimant’s initial application for disability benefits is denied, she may request
reconsideration of the decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907–404.909. A claimant who is dissatisfied
with the reconsidered decision may then obtain administrative review by an administrative law
judge (“ALJ”). 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.929.
To determine the existence and extent of a claimant’s disability, the ALJ must follow a
five-step sequential analysis. This analysis requires the ALJ to make a series of factual findings
about the claimant’s impairments, residual functional capacity, age, education, and work
experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725,
727 (8th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit has described this five-step process as follows:
The Commissioner of Social Security [through the ALJ] must evaluate: (1) whether
the claimant is presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the
claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant’s physical
or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an
impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the
regulations; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the
past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs
in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003).
The claimant bears the burden under the Social Security Act of proving that she is disabled.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); Whitman v. Colvin, 762 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2014). Once the
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claimant has demonstrated she cannot perform any of her prior, relevant work due to a disability,
the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant retains the residual functional
capacity (hereafter “RFC”) to engage in some other substantial, gainful activity. Goff v. Barnhart,
421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005).
B. Appeals Council Review
If the claimant is dissatisfied with the ALJ’s decision, she may request review by the
Appeals Council, although the Appeals Council need not grant that request for review. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.967–404.982. The decision of the Appeals Council (or, if the request for review is
denied by the Appeals Council, then the decision of the ALJ) is final and binding upon the
claimant, unless the matter is appealed to federal court within sixty days after notice of the Appeals
Council’s action. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. In this case, the Appeals Council
declined to review the ALJ’s decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 1).
C. Judicial Review
Judicial review of the administrative decision generally proceeds by considering the
decision of the ALJ at each of the five steps. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to
deny disability benefits, however, is constrained to a determination of whether the decision is
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bradley v. Astrue,
528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008); Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2005);
Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000) (“We may reverse and remand findings of
the Commissioner only when such findings are not supported by substantial evidence on the record
as a whole.”). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable
mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Buckner, 213 F.3d
at 1012 (quoting Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000)); see Coleman v. Astrue,
498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007).
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In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court may not substitute its own
judgment or findings of fact for that of the ALJ. Hilkemeyer v. Barnhart, 380 F.3d 441, 445 (8th
Cir. 2004). The possibility that the Court could draw two inconsistent conclusions from the same
record does not prevent a particular finding from being supported by substantial evidence.
Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994). The Court should not reverse the
Commissioner’s finding merely because evidence may exist in the administrative record to support
the opposite conclusion. Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).
After balancing the evidence, if it is possible to reach two inconsistent positions from the
evidence and one of those positions represents the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm
the decision. Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992). Thus, the Court will not
reverse the ALJ’s “denial of benefits so long as the ALJ’s decision falls within the ‘available zone
of choice.’” Bradley, 528 F.3d at 1115. The decision of the ALJ “is not outside the ‘zone of choice’
simply because [the Court] might have reached a different conclusion had [it] been the initial finder
of fact.” Id.
III. Decision Under Review
Before beginning the five-step disability evaluation process in the present case, the ALJ
first determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirement of the Social Security Act through
March 31, 2025. (Tr. 18). This finding is not in dispute.
The ALJ then made the following determinations during the five-step disability evaluation
process.
At step one, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since her alleged onset date of March 20, 2020. (Id.). This finding is not in dispute. The Court will
refer to the time period between Plaintiff’s alleged onset date and the date of the ALJ’s decision
as “the adjudicated period.”
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At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had “the following severe impairments:
multiple sclerosis, thoracic scoliosis, and degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine.” (Id.).
Plaintiff does not challenge the findings made by the ALJ at step two.
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 22). Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not
have any impairment or combination of impairments which met or medically equaled listings 1.15
and 11.09. (Tr. 22–24). Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s findings at step three.
At step four, the ALJ made the following RFC determination:
[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). She can lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and
10 pounds frequently. She can push/pull as much as she can lift/carry. She can
operate foot controls with left foot frequently. She can frequently perform reaching
overhead to the left, and frequently perform reaching overhead to the right. She can
frequently climb ramps and stairs, occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,
and frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. She can occasionally work at
unprotected heights and around moving mechanical parts. She is limited to
occasionally operating a motor vehicle. She can occasionally work in extreme cold,
extreme heat, and vibration.
(Tr. 24) (footnote omitted). Plaintiff challenges this RFC determination made by the ALJ.
In making this RFC determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms”; however, the ALJ also
concluded that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the
record for the reasons explained in [the ALJ’s] decision.” (Tr. 27). Plaintiff does not challenge this
credibility determination by the ALJ.3
3 “Social Security Ruling 16-3p eliminates the use of the term ‘credibility’ and clarifies that the Commissioner’s
review of subjective assertions of the severity of symptoms is not an examination of a claimant’s character, but rather,
is an examination for the level of consistency between subjective assertions and the balance of the record as a whole.”
Noerper v. Saul, 964 F.3d 738, 745 n.3 (8th Cir. 2020). SSR 16-3p applies to the present case, “but it largely changes
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At step five, based on her RFC determination and relying on the testimony from the
independent vocational expert, IVE Pagella, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable to perform
her past relevant work as a bartender. (Tr. 30). The ALJ further determined, however, that Plaintiff
was capable of performing the requirements of such representative occupations as an informal
waitress, with approximately 230,000 jobs in the national economy; and waiter/waitress, buffet,
with approximately 36,217 jobs in the national economy. (Id.).
Based on her findings at each step of the sequential analysis, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff was not under a disability, as that term is defined by the Social Security Act, at any time
during the adjudicated period. (Tr. 31, 32).
IV. Analysis
Plaintiff asserts one overarching argument in her appeal of the ALJ’s decision: the ALJ’s
RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. (See Plf.’s Mem.
[Docket No. 9] at 10–13). Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly account for
evidence in the record, including Plaintiff’s subjective reports, which Plaintiff characterizes as
demonstrating chronic mobility and pain issues in Plaintiff’s left foot and numbness and tingling
in her hands. (Id. at 11–13).
Defendant contends that he is entitled to judgment being entered in his favor, arguing that
Plaintiff’s allegations lack merit. (See Def.’s Mem. [Docket No. 11]). Defendant further contends
that the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. (Id.).
Although within the ALJ’s administrative determinations, “a claimant’s RFC is a medical
question,” and therefore, “an ALJ’s assessment of [a claimant’s RFC] must be supported by some
medical evidence of the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Combs v. Berryhill, 878
terminology rather than the substantive analysis to be applied,” and in discussing said determination, Courts have
continued to use the “credibility” terminology. Noerper, 964 F.3d at 745 n.3.
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F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 2008)).
“[A]lthough medical source opinions are considered in assessing RFC, the final determination of
RFC is left to the Commissioner [through the ALJ] based on all the relevant evidence, including
the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own
description of [her] limitations.” Noerper, 964 F.3d at 745 (first alteration in original) (internal
citations omitted); see Combs, 878 F.3d at 646; Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1070 (8th
Cir. 2004). An ALJ’s RFC determination need not contain the specific wording of any specific
medical opinion; instead, it is based on the ALJ’s consideration of the relevant medical evidence
in the record as a whole. Noerper, 964 F.3d at 745.
In making the RFC determination, the ALJ has a duty to sufficiently develop the record to
permit meaningful review on appeal. Id. This duty to develop the record “arises from the simple
fact that the disability determination process is not an adversarial process,” and thus, the duty to
develop the record “exists alongside the claimant’s burden to prove [her] case.” Id. Moreover, the
ALJ’s duty exists even when a claimant is represented by counsel. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has “repeatedly recognized this duty,” and it has “remanded for further development of
the record not only where evidence of functional limitations is lacking, but also where the record
presents conflicting medical opinions as to which the Commissioner fails to explain a choice.” Id.
Plaintiff’s argument generally asserts that the ALJ failed to properly address her subjective
complaints. However, in making this argument, Plaintiff disregards the ALJ’s actual discussion of
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, summarizes only those portions of the evidence in the records
which Plaintiff believes is supportive of and consistent with her subjective complaints, and asks
this Court to reevaluate said evidence to reach a different conclusion than that of the ALJ when
she considered the same evidence. (See Plf.’s Mem. [Docket No. 9]). Plaintiff ultimately takes
issue with the evidence the ALJ chose to credit. (See Id.).
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The Court may not, however, reverse the ALJ’s decision simply because substantial
evidence may also support an opposite conclusion. See Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th
Cir. 2015). Nor can the Court substitute its own judgment or findings of fact for those of the ALJ.
See Woolf, 3 F.3d at 1213. Instead, the Court “must consider evidence that both supports and
detracts from the ALJ’s decision,” and “must affirm the denial of benefits if ‘it is possible to draw
two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s
findings.’” See Milam, 794 F.3d at 983 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Such is the present
case now before the Court. Plaintiff merely highlights selective evidence favorable to her position,
and she asks this Court to reevaluate said evidence to reach a conclusion different than the one
reached by the ALJ when she considered the same record.4 This the Court cannot do. See Id.
Although Plaintiff may perceive evidence in the record which supports a finding in her
favor, the record now before the Court when considered as a whole also contains substantial
evidence which supports the ALJ’s decision regarding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and
therefore, the Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision. See Robinson, 956 F.2d at 838; Bradley, 528
F.3d at 1115; Medhaug v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 813 (8th Cir. 2009). “The fact that there was some
medical evidence supporting [Plaintiff’s] position concerning the severity of her symptoms does
not mean that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.” Adamczyk v. Saul,
817 F. App’x 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Fentress v. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir.
2017)).
Moreover, the Court’s review of the record as a whole finds that the ALJ’s determinations
regarding Plaintiff’s subjective reports are supported by substantial evidence.
4 Moreover, much of the evidence Plaintiff now highlights is based upon her own subjective, self-reported statements;
the ALJ, however, specifically found that Plaintiff’s subjective “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of [her] symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the
record for the reasons explained in [the ALJ’s] decision.” (Tr. 27). Plaintiff does not substantively challenge the ALJ’s
findings regarding the credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective statements. (See Plf.’s Mem. [Docket No. 9]).
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The ALJ did consider Plaintiff’s self-reported subjective claims of disabling-level foot
pain. The ALJ discussed that the Plaintiff “reported that she cannot sit, stand, bend, or drive for
more than [a] ½ hour.” (Tr. 25, 268). Additionally, the ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s self-reports that
she cannot stand for more than 10–15 minutes without numbness in her arms and legs; Plaintiff’s
self-reports of having a limp; and Plaintiff’s failure to obtain new orthotics. (Tr. 25–27, 48, 49,
268). See Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 965 n.3 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that an ALJ may
properly consider a claimant’s noncompliance with suggested treatment, even when compliance
alone would not remove all of his symptoms). The ALJ further noted the testimony at the
administrative hearing, where Plaintiff stated that due to her foot pain, she suffers from a “limp,”
which “throws [her] balance off.” (Tr. 27, 48).
The ALJ then identified objective medical evidence in the record that undermined
Plaintiff’s self-reported subjective claims of disabling-level foot pain. The ALJ specifically cited
to the numerous records reporting that Plaintiff’s foot pain was not affecting her gait. Specifically,
the ALJ cites a physical examination that recorded Plaintiff’s “normal gait” on August 24, 2020,
and again on August 8, 2022, as well as a visit with Anoka Pain Management which observed
Plaintiff as having a “[n]ormal reciprocal gait.” (Tr. 27, 377, 456, 584). The ALJ also noted that,
despite Plaintiff claiming she was waiting for neuroma surgery to address her foot pain, there was
no indication in the record that acknowledged any current recommendation for such surgery. (Tr.
28). The podiatrist, instead, noted foot pain for which orthotics and a steroid injection were
prescribed, and a normal gait was again recorded. (Tr. 26, 465–478). Even further, at that time,
Plaintiff was still working as a bartender. (Tr. 26, 120).
Plaintiff has additionally described daily activities that are not entirely consistent with her
complaints of constant foot pain. In her Function Report, Plaintiff’s daily activities included
“sewing, doing housework, reading, taking her partner to medical appointments and cooking for
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her partner, feeding her cat and emptying the litter, preparing food or meals daily, driving,
shopping in stores by phone and by computer, picking up groceries curbside, and gardening.” (Tr.
28, 269–272). Consistent with her descriptions, a progress note recorded by the Elk River Clinic
on August 29, 2022, noted that Plaintiff was gardening often. (Tr. 28, 372). Additionally, on
November 1, 2022, a progress note from HealthPartners stated Plaintiff had reported “doing light
chores, taking short walks, and doing housework and yardwork.” (Tr. 28, 593).
The ALJ likewise considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of numbness and tingling in
her hands. On October 29, 2021, Plaintiff self-reported numbness and tingling in her hand and feet.
(Tr. 26, 427). In September 15, 2022, after not being on any treatment for several years for her
multiple sclerosis, Plaintiff self-reported numbness and tingling in both hands. (Tr. 26, 346).
Additionally, at the hearing, Plaintiff testified that standing for more than 10–15 minutes “causes
numbness and tingling in her arms and legs.” (Tr. 25, 49).
The ALJ then identified objective medical evidence in the record that undermined
Plaintiff’s contention that her hand numbness and tingling would prevent her from performing the
representative jobs provided for by the ALJ in her RFC determination. (Tr. 26). On October 29,
2021, Plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis was described as “stable,” and Plaintiff felt “she was doing well
without any medications at this time.” (Tr. 26, 427). The September 15, 2022, records indicated
that Plaintiff’s extremities “had giveaway weakness throughout due to pain but full (5/5) strength,”
and her sensations were described as “intact.” (Tr. 26, 348). Ultimately, the ALJ determined that
even if a limitation regarding frequent hand use was warranted, Plaintiff would still be able to
perform the provided RFC representative jobs. (Tr. 28).
All of the foregoing evidence undercuts Plaintiff’s subjective claims that she is unable to
return to a job that requires no more than six hours of standing or walking a day and properly
demonstrates the inconsistency of her claims with the record as a whole. The ALJ may properly
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consider such “inconsistencies between [the claimant’s] complaints, personal history, and the
medical record.” Bryant v. Colvin, 861 F.3d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 2017). Indeed, the ALJ considered
many factors, including the medical reports regarding the duration, frequency, and intensity of
Plaintiff’s pain; Plaintiff’s daily activities; Plaintiff’s use of medication; Plaintiff’s failure to obtain
new orthotics; Plaintiff’s documented hand strength and sensations; and the lack of medical
treatment from Plaintiff’s alleged onset date through July 2020, September 2020 through March
2021, and May 2021 through September 2021. (See gen., 25–28).
In sum, Plaintiff’s argument that the RFC was not supported by substantial evidence or
consistent with the overall record as a whole is not persuasive. As stated above, although Plaintiff
disagrees with the ALJ’s RFC finding, this Court may not reverse simply if it “would have reached
a different conclusion than the Commissioner or because . . . evidence supports a contrary
conclusion.” Fentress v. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Igo v. Colvin,
839 F.3d 724, 728 (8th Cir. 2016)) (cleaned up). It is not the role of this Court to reweigh the
evidence. Schmitt v. Kijakazi, 27 F.4th 1353, 1361 (8th Cir. 2022).
As a result, the Court finds that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the
ALJ’s finding. There was sufficient evidence documenting Plaintiff’s symptoms and impairments
relating to Plaintiff’s chronic mobility and pain issues in her left foot and numbness and tingling
in her hands. The record, however, indicates that Plaintiff can perform the work activities described
by Plaintiff’s RFC even when experiencing these symptoms. The ALJ’s RFC determination fell
within the zone of choice, which this Court will not disturb. See Winship v. Saul, No. 4:20-cv-
00039-MDH, 2021 WL 1055196, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 19, 2021) (citing Hurd v. Astrue, 621
F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010)); Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Courts ‘defer
heavily to the findings and conclusions of the Social Security Administration’ and will disturb the
Commissioner’s decision only if it falls outside the ‘zone of choice.’”).
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As a result, although Plaintiff may disagree about the ALJ’s decision—namely regarding
the weight the ALJ gave Plaintiff’s subjective complaints—Plaintiff has not established a
reversible error that would warrant remand for further consideration. See Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465
F.3d 881, 888–89 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that the claimant failed to establish the prejudice
necessary for a reversal).
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RCF finding.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court’s review of the record as a whole indicates that the ultimate decision that
Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Administration Act during the
adjudicated period was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Specifically, on the Court’s
review of the record as a whole, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ’s decision to discount
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ’s RFC determination, and her decision that jobs existed
in significant numbers in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform within the RFC
determination were each supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff’s request for relief, [Docket No. 9], be DENIED, as set forth herein;
2. 	Defendant’s request for relief, [Docket No. 11], be GRANTED, as set forth herein.
Dated: January 14, 2026 	s/Leo I. Brisbois
Hon. Leo I. Brisbois
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being
served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the
word or line limits set forth in LR 72.2(c).
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