Jackson v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Ryan D. Peterson, CONSUMER JUSTICE LAW FIRM PLC, 6600 France
Avenue, Suite 602, Edina, MN 55435, for Plaintiff.
Nicolas Aalberg, JONES DAY, Wells Fargo Center, 90 South Seventh Street,
Suite 4950, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Defendant Experian Information
Solutions, Inc.
Plaintiff 	Angela 	Jackson 	sued 	Equifax 	Information 	Services, 	LLC; 	Experian
Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”); Trans Union, LLC; and Portfolio Recovery
Associates LLC (“Portfolio”) (collectively, Defendants) claiming Defendants violated the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and Portfolio violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“FDCPA”). 	Plaintiff subsequently dismissed her claims against Equifax Information
ANGELA JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS,
INC.;
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC;
TRANS UNION LLC; and
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES LLC,
Defendants.
Civil No. 25-730 (JRT/EMB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION
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Services, LLC and Trans Union, LLC. 	Experian now moves to compel arbitration.1 	The
Court will grant Experian’s motion because a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and
Experian has presented sufficient evidence that Jackson assented to enter into that
agreement.
BACKGROUND
Jackson enrolled in CreditWorks on January 25, 2021. (Decl. of Dan. Smith (“Smith
Decl.”) ¶ 3, June 17, 2025, Docket No. 33.) 	CreditWorks is a credit monitoring service
provided by Experian Consumer Services (“ECS”), an Experian affiliate. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 8.)
To enroll, Jackson had to complete a single webform which required Jackson to
enter her personal information (e.g., her name, address, and e-mail address) and create
a password. (Id. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1.) Below the boxes to enter her e-mail address and a password
and above a “Create Your Account” button was a disclosure that read: “By clicking ‘Create
Your Account’: I accept and agree to your Terms of Use Agreement, as well as
acknowledge receipt of your Privacy Policy.” (Id.) The phrases “Terms of Use Agreement”
and “Privacy Policy” were in bold, blue text; the phrase “Terms of Use Agreement”
hyperlinked to the full text of the Terms of Use. (Id. ¶ 4 & Ex. 1.)
The Terms of Use Agreement contained an arbitration clause. 	(Id. ¶ 6 & Ex. 2
(under the header “Dispute Resolution by Binding Arbitration”).) The arbitration clause
1 Portfolio takes no position on Experian’s motion but requests that, regardless of the
outcome, Jackson’s claims against Portfolio should remain in this Court. 	(Portfolio’s Resp.
Experian’s Mot. Dismiss, June 20, 2025, Docket No. 43.)
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requires any claims against “ECS” that arise out of the Terms of Use Agreement and are
“directly related to the Services or Websites” or that arise out of a CreditWorks
membership to be litigated in arbitration. (Id., Ex. 2.) “ECS” is defined to include ECS’s
affiliates. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party who believes that a dispute is subject to arbitration may move for an order
compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). 	9 U.S.C. § 3. 	In
considering such a motion, the Court does not determine the merits of the substantive
issues but simply whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to
arbitration. Express Scripts, Inc. v. Aegon Direct Mktg. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 695, 699 (8 th
Cir. 2008). The Court may consider agreements stating arbitration terms whether or not
those agreements are cited in the complaint. City of Benkelman v. Baseline Eng’g Corp.,
867 F.3d 875, 881 (8 th Cir. 2017).
The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden to prove a valid and
enforceable agreement. 	Shockley v. PrimeLending, 929 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8 th Cir. 2019).
Federal law and policy favor the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
“State contract law governs whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists.” Triplet
v. Menard, Inc., 42 F.4th 868, 870 (8 th Cir. 2022). The parties agree that Minnesota law
applies. Under Minnesota law, the formation of a sales contract “requires mutual assent
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among the parties involved in the transaction.” 	SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v.
Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. 2011). “Whether mutual
assent exists is tested under an objective standard.” 	Id. 	That is, a party’s assent to a
contract is judged by that party’s objective conduct, not their subjective intent. 	See
Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 117 N.W.2d 213, 221 (Minn. 1962).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Experian moves the Court to compel arbitration, arguing that the arbitration clause
contained in the Terms of Use Agreement requires the parties to arbitrate this dispute,
and that Jackson provided her assent to enter into that agreement when she clicked the
“Create Your Account” button during the CreditWorks enrollment process. 	In support,
Experian provides the declaration of Dan Smith, the Director of Product Operations for
ConsumerInfo.com, Inc. (“CIC”).2 	(Smith Decl. ¶ 1.) 	Smith’s declaration details the
enrollment process and confirms Jackson would have had to click the “Create Your
Account” button to enroll, affirming the Terms of Use Agreement. (Id. ¶ 5.)
Jackson argues that Experian has not shown that a valid arbitration agreement
exists for two reasons. 	First, the only evidence it has provided in support that an
arbitration agreement exists is the Smith declaration, which, Jackson argues, fails to meet
minimum evidentiary standards for admissibility. 	Second, even if the Court were to
2 CIC also does business as Experian Consumer Services (“ECS”); ECS is an Experian
affiliate. (Smith Decl. ¶¶ 1–2.)
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accept the testimony in the Smith Declaration, Jackson argues that the agreement
described in the Smith Declaration is insufficient to establish mutual assent under
Minnesota law.
A. 	The Smith Declaration
The Smith declaration is evaluated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4),
which requires that an affidavit must be “made on personal knowledge[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(4); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(c) (“When a motion relies on facts outside the record,
the court may hear the matter on affidavits . . . .”).
Jackson argues that the Smith Declaration does not meet this standard because
Smith could not possess personal knowledge sufficient to make the statements contained
in his declaration. The Court disagrees. “Smith’s firsthand knowledge of the enrollment
process—including the screens viewed, the forms completed, and the buttons clicked—
suffices to make his declaration admissible.” Jones v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., Civ. No. 23-
3887, 2025 WL 227198, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2025) (addressing a case with similar facts
in which Smith also submitted a declaration). 	See also Jain v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 779
F.3d 753, 758 (8 th Cir. 2015) (“Lay opinion testimony is admissible if the witness has
personal knowledge or perceptions based on industry experience.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Smith has attested that as the Director of Product Operations for CIC, his job duties
require him to be familiar with how consumers enroll in CreditWorks, the forms they must
complete to enroll, the webpages a consumer would have encountered to complete
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enrollment, and the Terms of Use governing CreditWorks services. 	(Smith Decl. ¶ 1.)
Smith’s knowledge is based on information learned through the course of his job and
through reviewing business record documents. 	(Id.) 	As in Jones, Jackson “has not
provided Eighth Circuit authority . . . that would require Smith to specifically identify the
documents he relied on when making his declaration.” 2025 WL 227198, at *2.
The Court will, therefore, consider the Smith Declaration when addressing
Jackson’s argument that Experian has not provided evidence sufficient to establish mutual
assent under Minnesota law.
B. 	Mutual Assent
“In a ‘clickwrap agreement,’ a seller displays terms on a computer screen, and the
user can proceed only by clicking a button to affirmatively accept the terms.” Ballou v.
Asset Mktg. Services, LLC, 46 F.4th 844, 852 (8 th Cir. 2022). 	Jackson argues that the
clickwrap agreement described in the Smith Declaration is insufficient to establish mutual
assent under Minnesota law. The Court disagrees. Rather, “the ‘click’ represents assent
to the contract, including the arbitration clause.” 	Siebert v. Amateur Athletic Union of
U.S., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039–40 (D. Minn. 2006); Jones, 2025 WL 227198, at *2
(“By clicking, this step constituted Plaintiff’s assent to the arbitration clause.”).
Jackson points to Sgouros v. TransUnion Corporation, where the Seventh Circuit
found that an Experian website failed to provide sufficient notice to support a finding of
mutual assent. 817 F.3d 1029, 1036 (7 th Cir. 2016). But the webpage used by Jackson is
markedly different from the webpage in Sgouros, 817 F.3d 1029. 	“In Sgouros, the
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webpage did not direct users to the full agreement or mention that its users were
agreeing to contractual terms.” Jones, 2025 WL 227198, at *2 (citing Sgouros, 817 F.3d
at 1035–36.). Here, as in Jones, “the notification and hyperlink to the Terms of Use were
clear, conspicuous, next to one another, and not hard to find or placed in small font at
the bottom of the page.” Id. (citing cases where courts have upheld similar agreements
under similar circumstances).
Experian has presented evidence that shows that Jackson was notified of the
Terms of Use, including the arbitration agreement, and agreed to be bound by the Terms
of Use by clicking the “Create Your Account” button. Jackson has provided no evidence
to the contrary. The Court will, therefore, grant Experian’s motion to compel arbitration.
CONCLUSION
Because Experian has presented evidence that an arbitration agreement exists and
that Jackson assented to entering into that agreement, the Court will grant Experian’s
motion to compel arbitration and will stay this litigation with respect to Jackson and
Experian.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
(Docket No. [30]) is GRANTED.
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2. 	This matter is STAYED pending arbitration solely with respect to Plaintiff Angela
Jackson’s dispute against Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
3. 	Plaintiff Angela Jackson and Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
must file a joint status report within 30 days after a final arbitration order is
entered.
DATED: March 23, 2026 	_____/s/ John R. Tunheim ____
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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