USA v. Perez-Mejia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Diego Perez-Mejia,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cr-00317 (ECT/EMB)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court are Defendant Diego Perez-Mejia’s two motions to
suppress. First, Mr. Perez-Mejia filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence
Obtained as a Result of a Warrantless Seizure (Dkt. No. 24). Second, he filed
a Motion to Suppress Statements, Admissions, and Answers (Dkt. No. 25).
The motions have been referred to me for a report and recommendation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1. For
the following reasons, I recommend Mr. Perez-Mejia’s first motion be denied,
and his second motion be granted in part and denied as moot in part.
I. Introduction
Mr. Perez-Mejia is charged by indictment with (1) illegal reentry with a
prior aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2); and
(2) failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).
(Dkt. No. 4.)
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Police officers in Marshall, Minnesota pulled Mr. Perez-Mejia over for
speeding on July 25, 2025. They questioned him at the traffic stop without
providing Miranda warnings.1 They then transported him to the police
station, where he was Mirandized and questioned by another law
enforcement officer. Mr. Perez-Mejia contends the traffic stop was not
supported by probable cause, (see Dkt. No. 24), and all statements he made to
law enforcement officers should be suppressed, (see Dkt. No. 25).
The Court heard both motions on November 19, 2025. (See Dkt. No.
30.) The Government called two witnesses to testify: (1) Marshall Police
Officer Zachary Bos, one of the officers who conducted the traffic stop; and
(2) Detective Jason Kopitski, who questioned Mr. Perez-Mejia at the police
station. The Government introduced three exhibits: Exhibit 1 is Officer Bos’s
body camera footage; Exhibit 2 is body camera footage from Officer Wilson,
who was also present at the traffic stop; and Exhibit 3 is Detective Kopitski’s
body camera footage.2 (Tr. (Dkt. No. 35) at 4:21–5:1.) The defense did not
call any witnesses or introduce any exhibits.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 The parties asked the Court to pre-admit the Government’s three exhibits at the
beginning of the hearing. (See Tr. (Dkt. No. 35) at 4:14–20.) All three exhibits were
conventionally filed.
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Following the hearing, Mr. Perez-Mejia filed a supplemental brief (Dkt.
No. 32), the Government filed a response (Dkt. No. 33), and Mr. Perez-Mejia
filed a reply (Dkt. No. 34).
II. Factual Findings
a. The initial stop
Officer Bos joined the Marshall Police Department in June 2025—
about one month before the July 25, 2025 traffic stop in question. (Tr. at 6:5–
10.) Officer Wilson, a field training officer, was in the car to supervise Officer
Bos at the time of the stop. (Id. at 10:3–13.) Officers Bos and Wilson were
driving a marked police vehicle when they encountered the red van driven by
Mr. Perez-Mejia. (Id. at 10:14–18.)
Officer Bos testified that he drove the police cruiser toward the red van,
which was driving in the opposite direction. (Id. at 10:19–25.) He claimed he
“visually saw the car speeding” at that time and then “activated [his] front
facing radar” as the red van was passing. (Id. at 11:7–13.) Officer Bos
testified that his radar “[e]mitted a clear high tone” and indicated the van
was driving “40 miles an hour in a known posted 30-mile an hour zone.” (Id.
at 7:15–23.)
Officer Bos then turned the police cruiser around, drove up behind the
red van at a stoplight, and activated his lights to initiate a stop. (Id. at
11:16–12:1, 12:24–25.) Neither Officer Bos’s nor Officer Wilson’s body
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cameras recorded the radar alert. Instead, both cameras began recording
while Officer Bos was in the process of turning the cruiser around. (See Gov’t
Ex. 1 at 00:00–00:05; Gov’t Ex. 2 at 00:00–00:05.) Similarly, the cruiser’s
dashcam did not record the van speeding.3 (Tr. at 12:15–21.)
After the van pulled over, Officers Bos and Wilson approached the
driver’s side of that vehicle. (Id. at 13:1–6; see also Gov’t Ex. 2 at 1:15–1:35.)
Both officers were fully uniformed, with their tasers and firearms on their
hips. (Tr. at 13:7–24.) Mr. Perez-Mejia was driving the red van, and he had
a male passenger in the front seat. (Id. at 9:16–19; see also Gov’t Ex. 1 at
01:39.) Officer Bos asked Mr. Perez-Mejia where he and his passenger “were
coming from,” but Mr. Perez-Mejia appeared not to understand the question
due to a language barrier. (See Gov’t Ex. 1 at 01:48–2:00; see also Tr. at 8:24–
9:2.) Officer Bos then asked Mr. Perez-Mejia for his proof of insurance and
driver’s license. (Gov’t Ex. 1 at 2:01–2:04; Tr. at 14:4–9.) When Mr. Perez-
Mejia provided proof of insurance, Officer Wilson asked Mr. Perez-Mejia if he
had a license. (Gov’t Ex. 1 at 2:05–2:14.) Mr. Perez-Mejia responded, “no
license,” but he provided a Guatemalan ID card. (Id. at 2:10–25; see also Tr.
at 14:12–22.) After learning neither occupant had a license, Officer Wilson
told them they’re “not going to be able to drive from this spot.” (Gov’t Ex. 1 at
3 The dashcam footage was not introduced as an exhibit.
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2:17–2:22.) The officers then instructed Mr. Perez-Mejia to wait in the van
while they returned to the police cruiser. (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 2:25–2:40, 3:11–
3:15; Tr. at 14:23–15:1.)
Back in the cruiser, Officer Wilson ran the Guatemalan ID and learned
Mr. Perez-Mejia was required to register as a sex offender and had been
deported to Guatemala in 2024. (Tr. at 15: 2–17, 22:3–8; Gov’t Ex. 2 at
09:45–10:21.) Officer Wilson then placed a phone call to Detective Kopitski,
who had experience with offender registrations. (Tr. at 15:15–24.) Detective
Kopitski advised Officers Wilson and Bos to detain Mr. Perez-Mejia and bring
him to the station for questioning. (Id. at 16:5–10; see also Gov’t Ex. 2 at
12:43–13:28.) Officer Wilson also called Marshall Police Officer Monterroso
to the scene “for an interpreter.” (Tr. at 8:21–23.)
b. Questioning during the stop
Officers Bos and Wilson then returned to the red van and told
Mr. Perez-Mejia that there was a “translator on the way.” (Gov’t Ex. 2 at
13:40–13:51; Tr. at 16:11–16.) Before the Spanish-speaking officer arrived,
Officer Wilson asked Mr. Perez-Mejia who owned the red van, and Mr. Perez-
Mejia responded by showing Officer Wilson a document. (Gov’t Ex. 2 at
14:05–14:26.)
Officer Monterroso arrived at the scene about one minute later. (See
id. at 15:12.) Officer Wilson explained they stopped Mr. Perez-Mejia for
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speeding and learned he didn’t have a driver’s license. (Id. at 15:20–15:24.)
Officer Monterroso introduced himself to Mr. Perez-Mejia and then
translated a number of questions for Officer Wilson,4 including:
• “Where he’s living, like, what’s his current address?” (Id. at 15:42–
15:44.) Mr. Perez-Mejia provided an address, which Officer
Monterroso translated into English. (Id. at 15:50–15:56.)
• “How long have you been living there for?” (Id. at 15:57–16:00.)
Mr. Perez-Mejia says something before his passenger answers “five
months” in Spanish, which Officer Monterroso translated into
English. (Id. at 16:01–16:14.)
• “Do you know you’re supposed to register when you have a change of
address?” (Id. at 16:20–16:26.) Officer Monterroso translated
Mr. Perez-Mejia’s response as: “he didn’t know that.” (Id. at 16:31–
16:33.)
• Officer Monterroso asked Mr. Perez-Mejia a question related his
status as an offender, but Mr. Perez-Mejia responded that “he ha[d]
4 Neither party provided the Court with an official translation of the dialogue
between Mr. Perez-Mejia and Officer Monterroso. The Court proceeds, like the
parties, with the understanding that Officer Monterroso’s English translations of
Mr. Perez-Mejia’s Spanish statements—as captured by Officer Wilson’s bodycam
footage—are accurate.
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no idea” what Officer Wilson was “talking about.” (Id. at 16:33–
16:52; see also Tr. at 17:9–18:9.)
At that point, Officer Wilson indicated they should remove Mr. Perez-Mejia
from the van for “privacy” reasons so officers could “make sure [they] ha[d]
the right person.” (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 16:55–17:04; see also Tr. at 18:10–12.) Mr.
Perez-Mejia exited the vehicle, and then he, Officer Monterroso, Officer Bos,
and Officer Wilson moved behind the red van, near the taillight on the
passenger’s side. (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 17:04–17:15; see also Gov’t Ex. 1 at 17:04–
17:15.)
Officer Monterroso continued to question Mr. Perez-Mejia in Spanish.
Officer Wilson asked if Mr. Perez-Mejia had “ever been accused or anything
of a sexual contact crime.” (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 17:18–17:23; see also Tr. at 18:19–
23.) Mr. Perez-Mejia admitted he had, but that “he accomplished what he
needed to do in court.” (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 17:47–17:55.) Officer Wilson said, “that
may be true, but for the next like ten years you’re supposed to update every
time you move or get a new address.” (Id. at 17:55–18:03.) Mr. Perez-Mejia
and Officer Monterroso had a lengthy exchange in Spanish before Officer
Monterroso clarified Mr. Perez-Mejia was “talking about the [traffic] stop and
. . . I explained to him that’s kind of separate to the address thing.” (Id. at
18:05–18:55.)
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Officer Wilson then asked Officer Monterroso to explain that Mr. Perez-
Mejia was “not under arrest,” but was “being detained” and would be
transferred back to the police station to speak to a detective about having the
“right paperwork or documentation.” (Id. at 18:55–19:05; see also Tr. at 19:1–
5.)
Officer Monterroso agreed to transport Mr. Perez-Mejia while Officer
Wilson planned to drive the red van to a safe location since neither
Mr. Perez-Mejia nor his passenger had a driver’s license. (Gov’t Ex. 2 at
20:49–21:05.) Officer Monterroso led Mr. Perez-Mejia, who was not
handcuffed, back to his marked police vehicle. (Gov’t Ex. 1 at 21:57–22:18.)
Officer Monterroso then frisked Mr. Perez-Mejia and put him in the back of
the locked cruiser. (Id. at 22:19–22:37; see also Tr. at 20:04–20:15.)
At no point during this interaction did any of the three officers at the
scene advise Mr. Perez-Mejia about his Miranda rights. (Tr. at 19:22–24.)
None of the officers told Mr. Perez-Mejia he was free to leave and, in fact,
advised him he could not drive the van away from the scene because he didn’t
have a valid license. (Id. at 19:06–19:21.) None of the officers raised their
voices during the stop or threatened Mr. Perez-Mejia. (Id. at 22:09–22:16.)
c. Questioning at the station
It took two to three minutes for Mr. Perez-Mejia to arrive at the
Marshall police station, where he was immediately taken to an interview
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room. (Tr. at 20:21–21:1.) The three police officers met with Detective
Kopitski, a 28-year veteran of the Marshall police force, to discuss what
they’d learned at the traffic stop. (Id. at 21:2–10, 23:24–24:2, 30:17–31:5.)
Detective Kopitski and Officer Monterroso then entered the interview
room, where Mr. Perez-Mejia was already seated. (Gov’t Ex. 3 at 00:30–
00:32.) Detective Kopitski immediately told Mr. Perez-Mejia he was under
arrest and that he “ha[d] some questions” to ask Mr. Perez-Mejia “to clarify
kind of what’s happening here.” (Id. at 00:42–01:00.) Detective Kopitski
informed Mr. Perez-Mejia that “because [he’s] in custody, [he] do[es] have
[his] rights.” (Id. at 01:03–1:14.)
Officer Monterroso then proceeded to, presumably, issue Miranda
rights to Mr. Perez-Mejia. (Id. at 01:14–02:13; Tr. at 25:20–22.) When
Officer Monterroso purportedly asked whether Mr. Perez-Mejia wanted to
speak to officers, Mr. Perez-Mejia remained silent. (Tr. at 32:10–20.) Officer
Monterroso repeated a question in Spanish, but Mr. Perez-Mejia again didn’t
answer. (Id. at 32:21–25.) Officer Monterroso and Mr. Perez-Mejia then had
the following exchange:
Officer Monterroso: “Si?”
Mr. Perez-Mejia: “No.”
Officer Monterroso: “[Spanish.]”
Mr. Perez-Mejia: “No.”
Officer Monterroso: “[Spanish.]”
Mr. Perez-Mejia: “[Spanish.]”
Officer Monterroso: “He says ‘depends on the question.’”
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(Gov’t Ex. 3 at 02:13–02:24.) Detective Kopitski then asked, “But he does
understand his rights?” (Id. at 02:24–02:26.) Officer Monterroso apparently
translated the question into Spanish, and Mr. Perez-Mejia nodded. (Id. at
02:26–02:29.) Detective Kopitski clarified: “So you do understand that you
can not answer, you can answer, not answer any questions.” (Id. at 02:29–
02:35; see also Tr. at 26:01–09.) After Officer Monterroso relayed this
question to Mr. Perez-Mejia, he said, “Si.” (Gov’t Ex. 3 at 02:35–02:42.)
Detective Kopitski proceeded to question Mr. Perez-Mejia about his
failure to update his sex offender registration. Detective Kopitski produced a
document from May 2024 indicating Mr. Perez-Mejia’s “new primary address
was with immigration.” (Id. at 02:45–03:16.) Detective Kopistki noted
Mr. Perez-Mejia was deported to Guatemala in June 2024, then asked when
Mr. Perez-Mejia reentered the country. (Id. at 03:20–03:35.) Mr. Perez-Mejia
admitted he had reentered the United States on October 26, 2024, and had
been living in Minnesota for six months before the traffic stop. (Id. at 03:30–
04:40.) Detective Kopitski then questioned Mr. Perez-Mejia about his phone
number, his living situation, and his employment history over the previous
six months. (Id. at 05:15–05:17, 07:57–08:00, 08:59–09:40; see also Tr. at
34:16–35:13.) In the police report he completed about the incident, Detective
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Kopitski indicated that Mr. Perez-Mejia was arrested at the traffic stop. (Tr.
at 29:7–20.)
III. Analysis
Mr. Perez-Mejia argues (1) the warrantless traffic stop violated the
Fourth Amendment, and (2) officers unlawfully elicited statements from him
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. He moves to suppress the evidence
obtained as a result of those purported violations. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
12(b)(3)(C).
a. Fourth Amendment
Mr. Perez-Mejia first challenges the lawfulness of the traffic stop,
arguing it was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The
Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[S]topping an automobile and detaining its
occupants constitute[s] a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of [the Fourth
Amendment], even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
But an officer has probable cause to conduct a traffic stop if he
“objectively has a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached
a traffic law.” United States v. Linnell, 93 F.4th 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 2024)
(quoting United States v. Gordon, 741 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2013)); see also
United States v. Brown, 345 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 2003) (“An officer who
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observes a traffic violation, even a minor one, has probable cause to initiate a
traffic stop.”). In the context of a traffic stop, “[t]he government bears the
burden of establishing that probable cause existed.” United States v.
$45,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 749 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2014).
The government claims there was probable cause for the traffic stop
because Officer Bos believed Mr. Perez-Mejia was speeding.5 Officer Bos
testified that after he saw the van speeding, he confirmed the traffic violation
with his radar. Mr. Perez-Mejia urges the Court to suppress the resulting
evidence based on the lack of footage capturing the radar reading, Officer
Bos’s inexperience at the time of the stop, and the Government’s failure to
proffer a reading of the radar. (Dkt. No. 34 at 3–4.)
To be sure, the Government failed to question Officer Bos about how he
estimated the van’s speed prior to engaging his radar. See United States v.
Green, 946 F.3d 433, 438 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e have cautioned that ‘there
must be sufficient indicia of reliability for a court to credit as reasonable an
officer’s visual estimate of speed . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Gaffney, 789
F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2015))). But Officer Bos testified that he confirmed
his visual observation by activating his squad car’s radar, which indicated
5 When Officer Bos first pulled the red van over, he noted Marshall observes a 30-
mile-per-hour speed limit unless otherwise posted. (See Gov’t Ex. 1 at 01:43–01:47.)
Driving faster than the speed limit is a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.14.
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the red van was traveling at least 10 miles per hour over the 30-mile-per-
hour speed limit. Despite his relative inexperience, I find Officer Bos’s sworn
testimony regarding the radar reading credible.
And I do not find the lack of video evidence corroborating Officer Bos’s
testimony warrants suppression in this case. “[P]robable cause to effectuate
a traffic stop is not dependent on the existence of a video recording and may
rest on officer testimony alone.” United States v. Maluoth, 8:22-cr-255, 2023
WL 3882718, at *2 (D. Neb. June 8, 2023) (citing United States v. Beard, 708
F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Herbst, 17-CR-
4059, 2018 WL 445532, at *11 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 16, 2018) (“There is no
requirement of extrinsic proof that a traffic violation occurred, rather, one
officer’s credible testimony may be sufficient to establish probable cause.”
(citing United States v. Mendoza, 677 F.3d 822, 827–28 (8th Cir. 2012))). The
record shows that both officers’ cameras began recording as the squad car
was already turning around. Officer Bos testified that he activated the radar
before this, so the lack of video is consistent with the testimony introduced at
the hearing. Although Officer Bos generally lacks experience as a new
officer, nothing in the record casts doubt on his credible testimony. Because
the stop was supported by probable cause, I recommend the first motion to
suppress (Dkt. No. 24) be DENIED.
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b. Fifth Amendment
Next, Mr. Perez-Mejia moves to suppress the statements that he made
to officers. (See Dkt. No. 25.) This argument has two sub-parts. First, he
claims the statements he made during the traffic stop should be suppressed
because officers unlawfully subjected him to a custodial interrogation without
issuing Miranda warnings. Second, he asks the Court to suppress the
statements made at the station after he’d been Mirandized.
The Fifth Amendment protects a person from “be[ing] compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. To
safeguard this right, law enforcement officers must issue “warning[s] as to
the availability of the privilege against self-incrimination and to the
assistance of counsel . . . prior to questioning whenever a suspect is
(1) interrogated (2) while in custody.” United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343,
1347 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966)).
The suspect must be warned “that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79. “[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and
obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires
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exclusion of any statements obtained.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608
(2004).
i. Statements at the traffic stop
It is undisputed that Mr. Perez-Meija was not advised of his Miranda
rights until he was in the police station. Mr. Perez-Mejia argues the
statements he made at the traffic stop must be suppressed because Officers
Bos, Wilson, and Monterroso subjected him to a custodial interrogation
without issuing Miranda warnings.
The Government contends this point is moot because it does not plan to
use any of these statements in its case-in-chief. (See Dkt. No. 33 at 3.) Based
on this representation, I agree with the Government that the motion should
be denied as moot on this point. See United States v. Salean, 22-CR-175
(NEB/TNL), 2023 WL 5754192, at *6 (D. Minn. May 8, 2023) (reaching same
conclusion and citing cases), report and recommendation adopted, 22-CR-175
(NEB/TNL), 2023 WL 4927549 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2023).
Mr. Perez-Mejia’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He claims
the Government only “learned he was a registered sex offender whose last
known address was Guatemala” by “interrogating [him] without giving him
any Miranda warnings.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 2.) But the record belies this
assertion. Officers Bos and Wilson learned that information by running
Mr. Perez-Mejia’s Guatemalan ID card through their database and,
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subsequently, speaking with Detective Kopitski. (See Gov’t Ex. 2 at 07:45–
07:52 (“He is an offender. I’m just wondering if he’s up to date.”); id at 10:13–
10:21 (“I ran him in state. So it says sexual offender . . . deported.”); id. at
13:12–13:20 (“So we’re going to detain him . . . because [the state’s] last file is
that he was deported in ’24 . . . .”).) All of this happened before the officers
went back to the van to ask Mr. Perez-Mejia about his offender status.
Mr. Perez-Mejia does not challenge the officers’ decision to take his
identification at the traffic stop, nor does he claim they wrongfully prolonged
the stop by contacting Detective Kopitski about his sex offender status. See
United States v. Jaime-Perez, 14-cr-233(2) ADM, 2014 WL 5176641, at *11
(D. Minn. Oct. 14, 2014) (“[C]hecking a driver’s identification is one of the
routine but somewhat time-consuming tasks related to the traffic violation
that an officer is permitted to conduct in the course of a traffic stop.” (quoting
United States v. Roberts, 687 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 2012)).
Mr. Perez-Mejia asks the Court to suppress these statements (i.e., to
prohibit the Government from using them in their case-in-chief), and the
Government agrees not to use them. Because there is no live controversy for
the Court to rule on, I recommend this portion of Mr. Perez-Mejia’s motion be
denied as moot.
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ii. Statements at the police station
Mr. Perez-Mejia also argues the statements he made to Detective
Kopitski at the police station should be suppressed. He first argues officers
subjected him to an impermissible two-step interrogation because they issued
Miranda warnings at the station, only after conducting an unwarned
interrogation at the traffic stop.6 He then argues that his waiver of Miranda
rights was not knowing or voluntary.
“[W]hen an interrogator uses [a] deliberate, two-step strategy,
predicated upon violating Miranda during an extended interview,
postwarning statements that are related to the substance of prewarning
statements must be excluded absent specific, curative steps.” United States v.
Jones, 70 F.4th 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). If a defendant moves to suppress
pursuant to Seibert, “the prosecution must prove, by a preponderance of the
6 To the extent that the question of custody is relevant to both phases of the
two-step interrogation, the Government forfeited that issue. Although the
Government makes the conclusory assertion that the initial stop was non-
custodial, (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 33 at 1, 3), it proffers no legal or factual
argument on the question because it instead claims the point is moot.
Similarly, the Government engages with Mr. Perez-Mejia’s Seibert argument
on the merits (distinguishing the facts of that case and arguing that Oregon
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), governs) rather than claiming the framework
is inapplicable based on the non-custodial nature of the initial stop.
Considering the Government’s choice not to brief the custody issue at the
traffic stop, I conclude it has forfeited this argument. Like the parties, I
proceed to the merits of the Seibert and Elstad questions.
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evidence, that the officer’s failure to provide warnings at the outset of
questioning was not part of a deliberate attempt to circumvent Miranda.”
United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1142–43 (8th Cir. 2006).
If the Court determines a failure to warn was not deliberate, however,
“Seibert is not implicated,” and the admissibility of any “post Miranda
statement is instead governed by Elstad.” United States v. Torres-Lona, 491
F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2007). In that case, the Supreme Court made clear
“that a post warning confession is admissible so long as it was knowingly and
voluntarily made.” Id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985)).
I conclude the Government has not carried its burden pursuant to
Seibert to show the officers here didn’t deliberately attempt to circumvent
Miranda. Further, under the Elstad construct, the Government has not
shown Mr. Perez-Mejia’s post-warning statements were knowing and
voluntary.
The Government did not, for example, elicit any testimony from Officer
Bos about why he didn’t issue a Miranda warning when he and Officer
Wilson returned to the red van to question Mr. Perez-Mejia about his
offender status. The Court doesn’t have the benefit of any testimony from
Officer Wilson—the more seasoned officer and the one who most thoroughly
interrogated Mr. Perez-Mejia at the stop—because the Government didn’t
call him as a witness. Nor did the Government question Detective Kopitski
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about the details of his conversation with Officers Bos and Wilson, or his
failure to inform Mr. Perez-Mejia that his prior statements couldn’t be used
against him.
By the time Officer Wilson returned to the van to interrogate
Mr. Perez-Mejia, Detective Kopitski had already instructed him to detain Mr.
Perez-Mejia and bring him back to one of the station’s interview rooms so
Detective Kopitski—the specialist in offender registrations—could question
him. Officer Wilson nevertheless decided to interrogate Mr. Perez-Mejia
about the same conduct without first Mirandizing him. The Government
proffers no explanation for Officer Wilson’s choice. Absent some explanation
for this choice, I find that the Government hasn’t met its burden. See United
States v. Travis, 14-cr-253 DSD/SER, 2015 WL 439393, at *29 (D. Minn. Feb.
3, 2015) (reaching same conclusion where “[t]he Government offers no
reasons for why [an officer] failed to administer Miranda at the beginning of
the interview” and “elicited no testimony that explained why no Miranda
warning was given”); United States v. Gross, No. 08-cr-254 MJD/JJK, 2009
WL 430503, at *10 (D. Minn. Feb. 20, 2009) (finding the same where there
was “no testimony from any of the officers that they were not acting in a
calculated way to undermine Miranda warnings”).
Although the Government claims the officers at the traffic stop were
“trying to explain why [Mr. Perez-Mejia] needed to go with them to the police
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station,” (Dkt. No. 33 at 7), I find this characterization to be an
oversimplification of the record evidence, as described in detail above. The
officers asked Mr. Perez-Mejia multiple questions about where he lived and
his registration status before asking him to step out of the van and before any
discussion of detention and transport to the police station. See supra at 6–8.
Further, the record doesn’t indicate that the Government took any
“[c]urative measures . . . designed to ensure that a reasonable person in [Mr.
Perez-Mejia]’s situation would understand the import and effect of the
Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622
(Kennedy, J., concurring). There was not, for example, “a substantial break
in time and circumstances between the prewarning statement and the
Miranda warning.” Id. Instead, the two sessions were separated by only a
few minutes. Cf. Gross, 2009 WL 430503, at *11 (considering curative
measures by noting “several hours had passed between the interview in the
minivan and the interview at the Burnsville Police Station”). And although
the venue of the questioning changed and the length of the initial
interrogation was relatively short, Officer Monterroso—apparently the only
officer who could effectively communicate with Mr. Perez-Mejia, and the one
who transported him—participated in both stages. The initial questioning
also went beyond the routine queries typically asked at a traffic stop. Officer
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Wilson’s questions instead focused on Mr. Perez-Mejia’s failure to register, as
did Detective Kopitski’s.
Although this is a close call, the Government bears the burden to show
there was no deliberate attempt to circumvent Miranda, and it has not done
enough to satisfy that burden here. Thus, I recommend the Court suppress
Mr. Perez-Mejia’ statements at the station under Seibert.
Finally, Mr. Perez-Mejia alternatively argues that his statements at
the station should be suppressed because he did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. This argument moves into the Elstad
territory, where courts must ask whether the in-custody waiver of rights was
knowing and voluntary. 470 U.S. at 309; United States v. Magallon, 984 F.3d
1263, 1283–84 (8th Cir. 2021) (determining Elstad governs analysis whether
defendant’s waiver was voluntary).
This inquiry has “two distinct dimensions.” United States v. Figueroa-
Serrano, 971 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). First, the waiver of Miranda rights “must have been
voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id. (quoting Moran, 475
U.S. at 421). And second, the defendant “must have waived his rights ‘with a
full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.’” Id. (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at
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421). Importantly, “[t]he government bears the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the validity of a Miranda waiver.” Id. (citing
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986)).
Mr. Perez-Mejia highlights his apparent confusion at the traffic stop
and the fact that his interactions were “further limited by a language
barrier.” (Dkt. No. 32 at 23.) In its response, the Government ignores the
traffic stop and instead focuses on the interrogation at the station. It claims
Detective Kopitski “did not begin asking Perez-Mejia any questions until he
was satisfied that Perez-Mejia was fully aware of the nature of his rights and
the consequences of waiving those rights and voluntarily waived those rights
as a free and deliberate choice.” (Dkt. No. 33 at 5.)
Because the record evidence doesn’t support this assertion, the
Government hasn’t met its burden to show that Mr. Perez-Mejia’s waiver was
knowing or voluntary. For starters, the Government did not submit a
translation of the exchange between Officer Monterroso and Mr. Perez-Mejia,
as captured on the body camera videos. Nor did the Government call Officer
Monterroso to provide firsthand testimony about what was said. Instead, the
Government called Detective Kopitski, who testified: “I’m not fluent in
Spanish, so when [Officer Monterroso] gave the information to the defendant,
I wasn’t sure if everything was clear.” (Tr. at 26:4–6.) Detective Kopitski
continued, “I did ask – I made a statement that he was free to answer or not
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answer any questions, and he understood that. I was told that he understood
the Miranda warning.” (Id. at 26:6–9.)
This testimony, without more, cannot satisfy the Government’s burden
to show that Mr. Perez-Mejia understood either the rights he was giving up
or the consequences of waiving his rights. In fact, the Government concedes
“it is unclear what question[s] w[ere] asked” prior to the invocation of rights.
(Dkt. No. 33 at 5.) At the hearing, the Government appropriately objected to
defense counsel’s attempts to question Detective Kopitski about Officer
Monterroso’s Spanish statements. (Tr. at 33:15–22.)
Even assuming the Government correctly speculated about the content
of the Spanish statements, I have serious concerns about whether the officers
“scrupulously honored” Mr. Perez-Mejia’s invocation of his right to remain
silent. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975); see also (Dkt. No. 32 at
19–21). “Officers must stop questioning if a suspect clearly and consistently
expresses a desire to remain silent.” United States v. Jones, 842 F.3d 1077,
1083 (8th Cir. 2016). Mr. Perez-Mejia very clearly says “no” twice in response
to Officer Monterroso’s apparent request to question him. Cf. United States
v. Rambo, 365 F.3d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 2004) (“There is no nuance nor context
to vary the unequivocal meaning of Rambo’s single word, monosyllabic
response. His response, “No,” could only mean an invocation of his right to
remain silent.”); see also United States v. Martinez-Rubio, 18-cr-4037-LTS,
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2019 WL 6341642, at *13 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 27, 2019) (finding suspect’s
response of “Well, no,” to be unambiguous invocation of right to remain
silent).
Absent any competent, credible record evidence about the content of the
Spanish statements given to Mr. Perez-Mejia and the uncertainty about how
scrupulously the officers honored Mr. Perez-Mejia’s declinations to answer
questions, I recommend the statements made at the station be suppressed
because they were not knowingly and voluntarily made.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, and upon careful consideration of the entire
record, including the hearing transcript, exhibits, and parties’ briefing, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. The Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained as a Result of a
Warrantless Seizure (Dkt. No. 24) be DENIED.
2. The Motion to Suppress Statements, Admissions, and Answers (Dkt.
No. 25) be DENIED as moot in part and GRANTED in part.
Date: February 9, 2026 s/Elsa M. Bullard
ELSA M. BULLARD
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or
judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations
within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a
copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses
must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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