USA v. Moore

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
EUGENE DARIUS MOORE,
Defendant.
Case. No. 25-CR-315 (LMP/JFD)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for resolution of
pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1.
This matter is before the Court on three pretrial motions by Eugene Darius Moore: A
Motion to Suppress Evidence from a warrantless search of Mr. Moore’s vehicle (Dkt. No.
20); a Motion to Suppress Evidence from a search, conducted pursuant to warrant, of Mr.
Moore’s apartment (Dkt. No. 21); and a Motion for Discovery (Dkt. No. 22). Mr. Moore
is charged by indictment (Dkt. No. 1) with one count of possession of methamphetamine
and fentanyl with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(A); two counts of possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8); and one count of possessing a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
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The Court held a motions hearing on December 22, 2025. Assistant United States
Attorney Lauren O. Roso represented the United States,1 and Attorney Brian N. Toder
represented Mr. Moore. (See Minute Entry, Dkt. No. 28.) Counsel for the United States
submitted seven exhibits, including Surveillance Photographs (Gov. Ex. 1); Certificates
Earned by narcotics detection dog Bolo (Gov. Ex. 2); Experience and Reliability Reports
for Bolo (Gov. Ex. 3); body-worn camera (“BWC”) footage from Minnesota State Trooper
Kyle Koeberl (Gov. Ex. 4); the search warrants and accompanying affidavits for Mr.
Moore’s apartment (Gov. Exs. 5–6); and the warrant and accompanying affidavit for the
data and footage related to two video-enabled Ring doorbells at Mr. Moore’s apartment
(Gov. Ex. 7). Mr. Moore submitted Trooper Koeberl’s dash-mounted camera footage (Def.
Ex. 1.). The United States called as witnesses Crow Wing County Sheriff’s Office
Investigator Justin Athman and Minnesota State Trooper Kyle Koeberl. (See Hr’g Tr. 2,
Dkt. No. 30.) Mr. Moore submitted his post-hearing brief on January 20, 2026 (Dkt. No.
31) and a Notice of Supplemental Authority on February 12, 2026 (Dkt. No. 37.) The
United States submitted its post-hearing brief on February 27, 2026 (Dkt. No. 40). Upon
receipt of the brief of the United States the Court took the motions under advisement.
The 	Court 	recommends 	denial 	of 	Mr. 	Moore’s 	two 	motions 	that 	seek 	the
suppression of evidence, because it finds that the warrantless search of Mr. Moore’s van
was justified under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause,
but even if it was not, Trooper Koeberl acted on the collective knowledge of a law
1 The United States is now represented in this case by AUSA Mary Riverso, who was
substituted as counsel for former AUSA Lauren Roso on February 3, 2026.
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enforcement investigative team of which the trooper was a member. Mr. Moore challenges
the search of his residence because the search warrant application depended upon the
discovery of narcotics in the warrantless search of Mr. Moore’s van, a search that is
challenged in Mr. Moore’s first suppression motion. The Court finds that the warranted
search of Mr. Moore’s apartment was constitutional because, contrary to Mr. Moore’s
claim that probable cause for the residence search warrant is derived entirely from the
vehicle search, in fact ample probable cause for the residence search warrant exists
independently of Trooper Koeberl’s discovery of methamphetamine in Mr. Moore’s van.
But even if probable cause in the residence search warrant was wholly derivative of the
vehicle search, the vehicle search was constitutional and therefore the apartment search is
not fruit of a poisonous tree. The Court therefore recommends denying Mr. Moore’s
suppression motion as to the warranted search of Mr. Moore’s residence. The attorneys
indicated at the motions hearing that the discovery motion had been resolved, so the Court
recommends denying that motion as moot. There was no briefing or argument from either
party on Mr. Moore’s challenge to the seizure of the Ring doorbells (Def.’s Mot. to
Suppress 2, Dkt. No. 21) pursuant to the initial premises search warrant (Gov. Ex. 5), nor
did Mr. Moore challenge the subsequent seizure of the video footage in the doorbell
cameras pursuant to the warrant that is in evidence as Gov. Ex. 7. The Court considers Mr.
Moore’s challenges to the seizure of the Ring video footage and data to have been waived,
but even if they were not, the Court would recommend denying the motion to suppress the
Ring camera video footage.
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BACKGROUND
A grand jury in the State and District of Minnesota indicted Mr. Moore on August
8, 2025. The United States alleges that Mr. Moore trafficked fentanyl and other illegal
drugs from Chicago, Illinois to the Twin Cities area for further distribution across greater
Minnesota. (Gov.’s Post-Hr’g Br. 2–3, Dkt. No. 40.) These charges stem from evidence
recovered in two searches: 1) methamphetamine found in Mr. Moore’s vehicle upon being
stopped and searched, without a warrant, by Minnesota State Trooper Kyle Koeberl on
May 8, 2025; and 2) fentanyl and a firearm found in his apartment, which officers searched
pursuant to a warrant after Mr. Moore’s arrest. (Id. at 6.) Mr. Moore seeks to suppress
evidence from those two searches because he alleges that Trooper Koeberl’s search of his
vehicle on May 8, 2025 violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and any evidence found at the apartment should be suppressed as
fruit of that search.
I. 	Factual Background
A. Underlying Investigation
The charges against Mr. Moore result from a longer-term investigation of drug
distribution activity in Central Minnesota. (See Hr’g Tr. 11:7–12, Dkt. No. 30.) That
investigation was led by Crow Wing County Sheriff’s Office Investigator Justin Athman,
who also serves as investigator on the Lakes Area Drug Investigation Division (“LADID”),
a multi-jurisdictional 	task force comprised 	of county, 	municipal, and 	tribal 	police
departments that investigates crimes related to controlled substances in the area. (Id. at
8:18–9:7.) Investigator Athman, in the course of his responsibilities with LADID, received
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information from a cooperating defendant in Central Minnesota about a source of fentanyl
from the Twin Cities. This tip was shortly afterwards corroborated by a second cooperating
defendant. (Id. at 11:19–12:3.) The first cooperating defendant identified his source by
name. (Id. at 12:4–8.) That person will be referred to as “Individual 1” in this Report and
Recommendation.2 The second cooperating defendant, also presumably purchasing drugs
from Individual 1, reported that Individual 1 purchased his supply from someone in the
Twin Cities area, who had several vehicles and supplied Individual 1 through roadside or
curbside transactions in the Twin Cities. (Id. at 12:18–23.) The second cooperating
defendant also provided police with a phone number purportedly belonging to Individual
1’s supplier. (Id.)
The information from the two cooperating defendants caused LADID to focus their
investigation on Individual 1, which included physical and electronic surveillance of
Individual 1, both in the Central Minnesota area and, with the assistance of local law
enforcement, in the Twin Cities. (Hr’g Tr. 13:10–22, Dkt. No. 30.) In early February of
2024, Investigator Athman traveled to Minneapolis to conduct physical surveillance on
Individual 1, where he witnessed and recorded a meeting between Individual 1 and another
person under circumstances that Investigator Athman, based on his training and experience,
found indicative of drug dealing. That person turned out to be Mr. Moore. (Id. at 14:16–
25.) Photographs taken by Investigator Athman of that meeting were submitted by the
2 The person’s name is known to the Court, but because the person has not been charged
in this case, nor in any other federal case, nor in Minnesota state court, the name is not
being given in this Report and Recommendation.
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United States as Gov. Ex. 1, which Investigator Athman testified show Individual 1 getting
out of the passenger side of a white Audi SUV and getting into the passenger side of a
black GMC SUV, before the GMC drove away from the scene. (See id., at 16:11–17:12;
Gov. Ex. 1.) This physical surveillance of Individual 1 and the white Audi caused
Investigator Athman to suspect that the driver of the white Audi was Individual 1’s source
of the drugs he suspected Individual 1 to be re-selling in Central Minnesota. (Id. at 19:6–
10.) Some time later, the Minneapolis Police Department, in concert with LADID, stopped
the white Audi. Mr. Moore was driving the white Audi. (Id. 17:15–18:3.)
This information led Investigator Athman to expand the scope of the investigation
to include Mr. Moore. (Hr’g Tr. 19:8–15, Dkt. No. 30.) The investigators applied for, were
granted, and then executed search warrants to track the location of two phones (one
assigned a Minnesota area code (the “Minnesota phone”) and another assigned a Chicago
area code (the “Chicago phone”)) and several vehicles associated with Mr. Moore. (Id. at
19:13–22.) Returns from the Minnesota phone warrant showed that phone was sometimes
located near Individual 1’s phone (the location of which law enforcement was also tracking
(Gov. Ex. 5 at 3)) and that the Minnesota phone and Individual 1’s phone were in
communication with each other. This information led Investigator Athman to conclude that
Mr. Moore and Individual 1 were meeting for drug transactions. (Id. at 20:25–21:12.)
Throughout the investigation, Investigator Athman and his colleagues witnessed multiple
short-term encounters in Minneapolis between Individual 1 and Mr. Moore, which
Investigator Athman testified was behavior consistent with drug transactions. (Id. at 24:4–
13.) Law enforcement also identified a downtown Minneapolis apartment as Mr. Moore’s
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residence, even though the apartment was rented in a different name. (See id. at 21:19–
22:25.)
Finally, phone and vehicle tracking data, gathered pursuant to warrants, showed that
Mr. Moore made multiple trips between the Twin Cities and Chicago in the spring of 2025,
during which he either drove or flew from the Twin Cities to Chicago, then drove back to
the Twin Cities after only a short time in Chicago. (See Hr’g Tr. 24:21–26:2, Dkt. No. 30.)
The last of these trips was in early May of 2025. On May 6 or 7, Investigator Athman
learned that Mr. Moore had flown to Chicago, which was later confirmed by physical
surveillance in the Chicago area by the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). (Id. at
26:4–23.) The DEA agents identified Mr. Moore as driving an “older van … a GMC,
roughly mid-‘90s.” (Id. at 26:20–25.) Using phone location data, Investigator Athman
learned on May 8 that Mr. Moore had left Chicago in the early morning hours that day.
Investigator Athman suspected Mr. Moore was on his way back to the Twin Cities in the
mid-90’s GMC van with illegal drugs purchased in Chicago, which he would resell for
distribution in Minnesota. (Id. at 27:4–25.) Investigator Athman contacted the Minnesota
State Patrol and other agencies assisting with the investigation in an attempt to surveil Mr.
Moore on his drive back to Minnesota, with the goal of eventually finding a reason to stop
the van and search it for drugs. (Id. at 27:15–20.)
B. May 8, 2025: Mr. Moore’s Stop and Arrest
While Mr. Moore was driving back to Minnesota, Investigator Athman met with
Minnesota State Patrol Trooper and canine handler Kyle Koeberl, and told Trooper Koeberl
about “the overarching investigation, concerns related to the investigation, and the
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suspicions that likely Mr. Moore was transporting … a quantity of controlled substances
… to the Minneapolis metropolitan area.” (Hr’g Tr. 28:7–13, Dkt. No. 30.) Investigator
Athman agreed that he told Trooper Koeberl that he was “investigating Mr. Moore as a
potential source of supply who was potentially picking up narcotics in Chicago, bringing
them back to Minnesota, and then further distributing them in Central Minnesota.” (Id. at
28:19–23.) Investigator Athman asked Trooper Koeberl to stop Mr. Moore after Mr. Moore
passed him, instructing him to identify a reason other than the narcotics investigation to
stop and search Mr. Moore’s vehicle, so that if no drugs were found in the car, the stop
would not reveal to Mr. Moore the existence of the investigation and the investigators’
knowledge of Mr. Moore’s drug trafficking.
Trooper Koeberl, who testified after Investigator Athman and who was sequestered
during that testimony, confirmed that he had discussed the investigation with Investigator
Athman when they met. He said that the two met in-person during the mid-morning of May
8 at the weigh station on Interstate 94 just west of the Minnesota/Wisconsin border. (See
id. at 65:22–24; 66:10–11). He said that Investigator Athman provided him with “their ops
plan [and] with their rundown of reasonable suspicion that Moore was trafficking narcotics
from Chicago back to Minnesota.” (Id. at 66:1–3.) After the meeting, Trooper Koeberl
waited at the weigh station until other officers surveilling Mr. Moore’s van in Wisconsin
notified him that Mr. Moore was close. When he saw Mr. Moore’s GMC van pass by,
Trooper Koeberl began following him. Trooper Koeberl’s recording devices, one dash-
mounted camera (the footage from which is in evidence as Def. Ex. 1) and one body-worn
camera (the footage from which is in evidence as Gov. Ex. 4), began recording sometime
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after Trooper Koeberl began following Mr. Moore’s van. Throughout the BWC recording,
Trooper Koeberl can be heard narrating events.
That footage shows Trooper Koeberl driving to the left and slightly behind Mr.
Moore’s van before ultimately pulling behind the van and signaling it to pull over. (Def.
Ex. 1, 0:00–1:45.) When the van stopped, Trooper Koeberl approached the driver’s door
of the van and engaged Mr. Moore in conversation, saying that he pulled him over for
having excessive window tint and suspended objects that blocked the windshield. Trooper
Koeberl also asked Mr. Moore about his recent travel. (Gov. Ex. 4, 2:15–3:30.) Trooper
Koeberl asked Mr. Moore for his license, and, noticing that Mr. Moore said he lived in
Minnesota 	but 	provided 	an 	Illinois 	license 	with 	a 	Commercial 	Driver’s 	License
endorsement, talked to Mr. Moore about the need for him to update his license in
Minnesota. When asked about his travel, Mr. Moore said he was returning to Minnesota
from Knapp, Wisconsin, where he had intended to purchase a part for his truck. (Id. at
3:15–5:30.) Trooper Koeberl then returned to his squad and ran Mr. Moore’s information
through various police databases, including a network of license plate readers, to check the
veracity of Mr. Moore’s story and discuss the situation with another trooper, who had
arrived after Trooper Koeberl had stopped Mr. Moore. (Id. at 7:10–8:50.) All this took
roughly fifteen minutes, and the BWC footage shows that this time was largely spent on
hold with the private company that manages the license plate reader system or waiting for
representatives of that company to find the information Trooper Koeberl had requested.
(Id. at 7:10–22:30.) Trooper Koeberl was told that the license plate on Mr. Moore’s van
had been picked up by a license plate reader two hours east of Knapp—inconsistent with
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Mr. Moore’s westward travel having begun in Knapp—and that his van had also been seen
over the preceding few days in and around Chicago. (Hr’g Tr. 73:1–15, Dkt. No. 30.)
After learning this, Trooper Koeberl returned to Mr. Moore, and asked him to get
out of his car, purportedly to talk to him about the warning he would issue regarding the
suspended objects, excessive tint, and the need to update his license in Minnesota. (Gov.
Ex. 4, 22:35–24:25.) After discussing the warning, he asked Mr. Moore if he would keep
talking to him about his travels, to which Mr. Moore consented. (Id. at 24:26–25:38.)
Trooper Koeberl identified some inconsistencies in Mr. Moore’s description of his travels,
including that his vehicle had been located in the Chicago area earlier that morning,
undermining his story that he had driven to and was returning from Knapp, Wisconsin.
Trooper Koeberl then asked Mr. Moore whether he had anything illegal in his car, listing
specific types of drugs. (Id. at 25:45–26:10.) Mr. Moore provided a verbal negative
response to each except “methamphetamine,” to which he only shook his head. (Id.)
Trooper Koeberl then asked Mr. Moore if he could search the van, saying he suspected the
van contained illegal drugs. (Id. at 26:30–26:52.) After initially seeming open to the search,
Mr. Moore appears to have denied consent after Trooper Koeberl told him he was not
compelled to give it. (Id. at 26:53–27:05.)
After Mr. Moore denied consent to search, Trooper Koeberl patted him down for
weapons and asked him to stand with two other troopers on scene, while he executed a
preliminary dog sniff around the van for illegal drugs. (Gov. Ex. 4, 27:25–30:00.) Trooper
Koeberl completed multiple passes around the outside of the van with the dog, named Bolo.
In the first two passes, Bolo exhibited no major behavior changes, (id. at 30:16–31:00), but
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on subsequent passes, his breathing intensified around the rear passenger door seal, and he
ultimately chose to focus on that area, searching up and down the door seal before
ultimately sitting and staring at the point where the front and rear passenger doors met. (Id.
at 31:00–32:13.) Trooper Koeberl then returned Bolo to his squad and notified Mr. Moore
and the other troopers that he planned to do a more extensive search of the inside of the
van, also providing Mr. Moore an explanation of his Miranda rights. (Id. at 32:24–33:30.)
The troopers then placed Mr. Moore in the back of the other trooper’s vehicle and
began searching the interior of the van, originally using Bolo again, in an attempt to narrow
their search. (Gov. Ex. 4, 33:30–43:23.) After some time running Bolo through the vehicle,
Trooper Koeberl brought him back to his squad, and the troopers searched the van on their
own. (Id. at 43:25–49:30.) Eventually, after noticing that two laundry detergent containers3
were lighter than they ought to have been, Trooper Koeberl opened them and found what
appeared to be bags of illegal drugs hidden inside. (Id. at 49:55–53:02.) The troopers then
placed Mr. Moore under arrest. (Id. at 53:12–56:30.)
II. 	Legal Standards
The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated…” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The exclusionary rule 	generally prohibits
admission of evidence seized during an unlawful search,” United States v. Escudero, 100
3 At the hearing, Trooper Koeberl testified that drugs are often hidden in or transported
with containers of laundry detergent or other strong-smelling products in an effort to avoid
detection by drug-sniffing dogs. (See Hr’g Tr. 69:19–70:23.)
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F.4th 964, 968 (8th Cir. 2024). “The exclusionary rule extends to evidence later discovered
and found to be derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” United States v.
Tuton, 893 F.3d 562, 568 (8th Cir. 2018). To survive a suppression motion, where “the
defendant establishes a nexus between a constitutional violation and the discovery of
evidence sought to be excluded, the government must show the challenged evidence did
not arise by exploitation of that illegality.” Id.
A. Traffic Stops
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ by the
Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles
that fall short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). “A traffic stop is a seizure, so it must be supported
by reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” United States v. Maurstad, 35 F. 4th 1139,
1143 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Hollins, 685 F. 3d, 703, 705-06 (8th Cir.
2012)).
“Reasonable suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.”
United States v. Mosley, 878 F.3d 246, 251 (8th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). Reasonable
suspicion exists, and will justify a “a brief investigative traffic stop,” when an officer has
“a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020) (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)). Because reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding”
standard than probable cause, it can be satisfied “with information that is different in
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quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause.” Id. (quoting Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). Reasonable suspicion “depends on the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [people], not
legal technicians, act.” Id. (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 402 (2014)).
While reasonable suspicion will suffice to justify an investigatory stop of a motor
vehicle, the officer can only take the further step of searching the vehicle if there is probable
cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle.
“Probable cause exists, when, given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person
could believe there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be
found in a particular place.” United States v. Keck, 2 F.4th 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 2021)
(quoting United States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 418 (8th Cir. 2017)). Probable
cause can be established by the issuance of a judicial search warrant. If a search is
conducted without the authority of a judicially authorized search warrant, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that the search falls into one of several well-recognized
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338
(2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). “When the United States
seeks to introduce evidence that was seized during a warrantless search, it bears the burden
of showing the need for an exemption from the warrant requirement and that its conduct
fell within the bounds of the exception.” United States v. Riedesel, 987 F.2d 1383, 1388
(8th Cir. 1993).
One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile
exception. Under that exception, if law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe
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that a motor vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity or contraband, they may conduct
a complete search of “every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object
of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); see also United States v.
Payton, No. 23-CR-192 (KMM/DLM), 2024 WL 1343121, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2024).
“Any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.”
United States v. Hollins, 685 F. 3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 2012). This standard is an objective
one; an officer’s subjective state of mind “is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.”
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 812–813 (1996)); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 770 (2001)) (holding probable
cause exists when circumstances, viewed objectively, would justify officer’s actions). In
other words, a stop or a search is justified if, viewed objectively, there is reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, as the case may be. This is true even if the officer’s subjective
intent is to make the stop as a pretext for another investigation. United States v. Linkous,
285 F. 3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2002). The duration of a traffic stop premised on reasonable
suspicion can be no longer than needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made.
A stop that exceeds this limit “violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable
seizures,” and becomes unlawful unless law enforcement has reasonable suspicion to
continue the detention. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 351 (2015).
B. Collective Knowledge Doctrine
If 	officers 	are 	sharing 	communications 	about 	a 	criminal 	investigation, 	then
reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause may be based on the collective
knowledge of all the officers working on that case. United States v. Warfield, No. CR 06-
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50(2) (DSD/JJG), 2006 WL 8425316, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 14, 2006), R&R adopted, 2006
WL 1472727 (D. Minn. May 24, 2006); United States v. Williams, 429 F.3d 767, 772 (8th
Cir. 2005). If the police have conducted a lengthy investigation, and a new officer is
brought onto the team to execute a search or arrest, the new member may rely on the
collective knowledge of the investigative team to justify an unwarranted roadside search
or seizure if there is “some degree of communication” between an existing member of the
investigative team and the new officer. Williams, 429 F. 3d at 772.
DISCUSSION
The chief substantive issue before the Court is the constitutionality of Trooper
Koeberl’s stop, dog sniff, and search of Mr. Moore’s vehicle on May 8, 2025. Though Mr.
Moore seeks suppression of the drugs and firearm found in his apartment, that evidence is
challenged as fruit of the May 8 roadside search because the evidence obtained from the
roadside search was used in the affidavit in support of the warrant application for the
apartment search. Mr. Moore argues that the constitutionality of the apartment search rises
or falls on the constitutionality of the search of Mr. Moore’s van. The Court finds the stop
and search of the van was constitutionally justified both on the basis of Trooper Koeberl’s
independent observations and on the basis of the collective knowledge doctrine. Those
analyses are taken up in turn.
I. 	Trooper Koeberl’s Independent Observations
When Trooper Koeberl caught up to Mr. Moore’s van on I-94, the trooper was able
to see that the van’s window tint was darker than allowed by state law and that there was
an object dangling from the rearview mirror, which is also a violation of Minnesota law.
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(Hr’g Tr. 66:23–67:1, Dkt. No. 30.) Because any traffic violation, no matter how minor,
will justify a traffic stop, Trooper Koeberl’s initial stop of Mr. Moore was constitutional.
While Mr. Moore argues that Trooper Koeberl did not actually make these observations
because his dash cam footage (Def. Ex. 1) does not show the squad pulling level with the
van, 	the 	Court 	found 	Trooper 	Koeberl’s 	testimony 	credible, 	and 	also 	indirectly
corroborated by later BWC footage of the window tint and the objects hanging from the
rearview mirror. (Gov. Ex. 4 at 2:20 – 2:35.)4
The more formidable defense argument is that Trooper Koeberl impermissibly
extended a stop for overly-tinted windows and objects hanging from the rearview mirror—
violations for which Trooper Koeberl ultimately issued only a warning (Hr’g Tr. at 75:14–
18)—into a prolonged stop that included questioning about commercial driver licenses, a
delay while data from license plate readers was obtained and then analyzed, and a walk-
around by a narcotics detection dog. The Court finds that the extension of the stop was
permissible. Trooper Koeberl testified that immediately upon approaching Mr. Moore’s
vehicle, he noticed the smell of laundry detergent, which he knew from his training and
experience to be a masking agent, so called because it is intended to mask the smell of
illegal narcotics from detection dogs. (Id. at 69:19–70:18.) Trooper Koeberl also saw a
4 While the dash cam video shows Trooper Koeberl well behind Mr. Moore’s van, the video
begins after Trooper Koeberl began following Mr. Moore, meaning that it was possible
that he pulled further alongside Mr. Moore’s van and could observe these things before he
turned on the camera. After the video begins, Trooper Koeberl can be heard to say that he
saw suspended objects and heavy tint on the front windows. The only evidence of what
Trooper Koeberl saw before the video begins is his testimony, and the Court has identified
no reason to question the reliability of his testimony.
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“Black Ice” brand air freshener, which he knew, again from his training and experience, to
also be commonly used to mask the scent of narcotics. (Id.)
At this point, Trooper Koeberl asked Mr. Moore for his driver’s license and talked
with him about where he was coming from and going to. This would be permissible in any
traffic stop, and certainly one in which an officer recognized the scent of masking agent
and saw Black Ice. “[A] reasonable investigation during a traffic stop ‘may include asking
for the driver’s license and registration . . . and asking the driver about his destination and
purpose.” United States v. Riley, 684 F. 3d 758, 764 (8th Cir. 2012). It then developed that
Mr. Moore claimed a Minnesota residence, but proffered an Illinois commercial driver’s
license. When Mr. Moore stated that he was coming from Knapp, Wisconsin, the totality
of the circumstances justified Trooper Koeberl in prolonging the stop by about fifteen
minutes so he could access and analyze data from a network of license plate readers. That
data heightened Trooper Koeberl’s suspicions. As noted above, he found that the license
plate on Mr. Moore’s van had been picked up by a license plate reader east of Knapp and
that the van had also been seen over the preceding few days in the Chicago area. (Hr’g Tr.
73:1–15, Dkt. No. 30.) With all of this, Trooper Koeberl was well justified in running a
trained and certified narcotics detection dog around Mr. Moore’s van, and, when the dog
alerted, in searching the van. That search led to the discovery of methamphetamine.
Mr. Moore tries to cast doubt on whether Bolo’s alert could be taken for probable
cause. While conceding that the dog did well in detecting drugs under controlled
circumstances, Mr. Moore points out that when working real cases the dog’s success rate
fell to 54%, or in Mr. Moore’s words, “not a whole lot better than a coin toss.” (Def. Br. 8,
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Dkt. No. 31.) The law, however, is clear; an alert by a certified narcotics detection dog
such as Bolo, even standing alone, provides probable cause to search. United States v.
Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873,
875–76 (8th Cir.1999)). This Court will decline the defense’s invitation to look behind the
fact of certification and inquire whether that certification was improvidently granted.5 If
54% is not enough for the certification to be valid, will 55% suffice? 60%? The defense
provides no caselaw support for undertaking such an inquiry, nor did the defense provide
any expert testimony to guide the Court in how to distinguish between a validly and an
invalidly bestowed certification. In any event, such an inquiry would not only be legally
unsupportable, it would also be pointless. The dog’s alert should not be considered in
isolation. The question is not whether Bolo’s alert alone constituted probable cause (even
though, under the governing caselaw, it did), but whether Trooper Koeberl, under the
totality of the circumstances, possessed probable cause to search Mr. Moore’s van. Given
the smell of masking agent, the presence of Black Ice, the lack of knowledge of commercial
driving license laws, the false story about coming from Knapp and not Chicago—all
capped off by Bolo’s alert—the Court finds that there was a “fair probability” of finding
narcotics in Mr. Moore’s van.
Finally, Mr. Moore argues that a review of the BWC footage will show that Bolo
did not, in fact, find the drugs when he was deployed in the van, which provides proof that
5 The testimony at the motion hearing about Bolo’s training and certification was
exhaustive, both in length and comprehensiveness. (See generally, Hr’g Tr. 37–62; Gov.
Exs. 2-3.) Suffice it to say that the Court has no reason to doubt that Bolo was “really”
certified.
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he was unreliable. Upon review of the BWC video and the extensive documentation of the
dog’s training record, (see Gov. Exs. 2–3), the Court finds these arguments unconvincing,
both because the interior dog sniff is constitutionally irrelevant and because Trooper
Koeberl’s testimony in the hearing, explaining the mechanics of narcotics-related drug
sniffs, and the BWC footage shows that Mr. Moore has not met his burden of showing that
Bolo was unreliable. While Bolo’s first two passes around the van did not show much
change in behavior, (Gov. Ex. 4, 30:09–30:59), he clearly changed direction and revisited
the passenger side door seal on the third pass, a change that Trooper Koeberl noted, in real
time, as significant. (Id. at 31:00–31:15.) On the next pass, Bolo spent even more time at
that location and exhibited what Trooper Koeberl described as “alert behavior[—]a change
in posture and increased respirations.” (Id. at 31:20–32:10; Hr’g Tr. 78:25–79:1; 82:5–24,
Dkt. No. 30.) Ultimately, Bolo gave a positive indication for the odor of narcotics in that
same area. (Hr’g Tr. 83:11–84:9.) The positive dog sniff provided probable cause for a
more in-depth search of the interior of the van, during which Trooper Koeberl and his
colleagues found narcotics hidden in what appeared to be laundry detergent.
As for the dog sniff inside the van, there is a factual dispute as to whether Bolo
actually indicated that he had detected the odor of narcotics. Mr. Moore argues that he did
not, describing the BWC footage as showing that Bolo “showed no interest in” the
detergent boxes, “[e]ven when Trooper Koeberl used his hands to direct [Bolo] to the
detergent boxes.” (Def.’s Br. 9, Dkt. No. 31.) The United States says that Bolo did alert
inside the vehicle, citing Trooper Koeberl’s testimony. (Gov.’s Br. 6, Dkt. No. 40.) At the
hearing, Trooper Koeberl said, “[i]nside the vehicle, which we didn't get into, he showed
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alert behavior and then indicated to the right of where the drugs were found.” (Hr’g Tr.
87:12–15.) Asked to clarify, Trooper Koeberl said, “[O]dor is a strange thing. It all depends
on temperature, hot/cold, wind direction, speed. So where odor pools, I can't control. But
the dog will just go to what he believes is the strongest source of odor. If he can find that,
he may indicate.” (Id. at 87:18–22.)
Ultimately, 	Mr. 	Moore 	points 	the 	Court 	to 	the 	BWC 	footage 	to 	make 	the
determination. (Def.’s Br. 11, Dkt. No. 31 (“[T]he best evidence of that is not by statistics,
but by simply watching the video.”).) The BWC footage does not provide the clearest
picture into this question. The van is full of objects that Bolo had to navigate, and there
was no space inside it for him to fully sit down and stare at a specific place such that it can
be said that he did or did not indicate the presence of narcotic odor. The nature of the
interior search meant that it is hard to discern, especially by viewers, such as the Court,
who are not trained dog handlers, whether a specific movement from Bolo is alert behavior
or a step over or around an item in the van.
Mr. Moore’s argument invites the Court down a rabbit hole, which the Court
declines. The law in the Eighth Circuit is clear: a trained dog’s alert on the outside of a car
gives the police probable cause to search the inside of the car. United States v. Holleman,
743 F.3d 1152, 1156 (8th Cir. 2014). Bolo alerted on the outside of the car. Bolo has
extensive training and certification. (See Gov. Exs. 2–3.) That Trooper Koeberl brought
Bolo out again, to narrow the interior search that he planned to conduct regardless of Bolo’s
response, is of no constitutional relevance. In the roadside search, Bolo was used for two
distinct purposes, first as a tool to determine whether there was probable cause to search
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the inside of the vehicle, and second, as a tool to make the interior search easier on the
troopers conducting the search. Here, Bolo’s performance in pursuit of the second purpose
has no bearing on the validity of the conclusions drawn from his performance in pursuit of
the first.
Even if the Court found that a determination of whether Bolo indicated inside the
van was helpful, it is not outcome-determinative here. The Eighth Circuit has held that a
drug sniffing dog is “presumptively reliable at detecting illicit drugs … if the dog has
satisfactorily completed a bona fide certification or training program.” United States v.
Collier, 116 F.4th 756, 761 (8th Cir. 2024). The burden is on Mr. Moore to show that the
certification or training program is inadequate or the circumstances surrounding the alert
undermine the case for probable cause. Id. He has not done so. There are colorable
arguments on both sides as to the specific question of whether Bolo indicated inside the
van. The Court is not convinced one way or the other, but even if Bolo did not indicate
inside the van, the Court does not find that non-indication sufficient to overcome the
presumption of reliability established in Collier. Given the conflicting evidence on whether
Bolo actually indicated during the interior search, the fact that he correctly identified the
odor of narcotics outside the vehicle, Bolo’s training and certification history, and the
multiple 	other 	sources 	of 	probable 	cause 	identified 	throughout 	this 	Report 	&
Recommendation, the Court finds that there was probable cause to search Mr. Moore’s
van.
Probable cause was present, and the search, though conducted without a judicial
warrant, was constitutional under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
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warrant clause. The Court recommends that the motion to suppress the fruits of Trooper
Koeberl’s search be denied.
II. 	Collective Knowledge and “Whisper Stops”
Even if the methamphetamine found in Trooper Koeberl’s search should be
suppressed when evaluating that search only on the basis of Trooper Koeberl’s independent
observations, the search is justified under the collective knowledge doctrine.
Investigators in this case had probable cause to believe that there were drugs in Mr.
Moore’s van when he left Chicago in the early morning hours of May 8, 2025, and any
officer in contact with Investigator Athman or other members of the investigative team
about their investigation would have been justified in stopping and searching his car. The
law on the collective knowledge doctrine in the Eighth Circuit is well-settled: all that is
required to bring a new officer into the fold of an investigation so that they may rely on the
collective knowledge of the investigative team in making an unwarranted roadside search
or seizure is “some degree of communication” between an existing member of the
investigative team and the new officer. United States v. Williams, 429 F.3d 767, 772 (8th
Cir. 2005). That standard was met here, where the lead investigator (Investigator Athman)
met with the searching officer (Trooper Koeberl) in person and provided the searching
officer with several important details about the investigation, including “the overarching
investigation, concerns related to the investigation, and the suspicions that likely Mr.
Moore was transporting … a quantity of controlled substances … to the Minneapolis
metropolitan area.” (Hr’g Tr. 28:7–13, Dkt. No. 30.)
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Because the knowledge gained from the investigation could be imputed to Trooper
Koeberl, and that investigation had collected substantial evidence that Mr. Moore was
distributing controlled substances in the Central Minnesota region, Trooper Koeberl had
probable cause to stop and search Mr. Moore’s van, even without reason to believe he had
committed traffic violations, and even without conducting a dog sniff on the car. However,
for thoroughness, the Court addresses the parties’ arguments.
A. 	“Whisper Stops” Generally
The parties spend much of their briefing discussing the fact that Investigator
Athman asked Trooper Koeberl to identify a reason to stop and search Mr. Moore’s car
independent of the underlying drug trafficking investigation. Mr. Moore argues that this
so-called “whisper stop” technique means that the stop, its extension, and the subsequent
search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. In analyzing the caselaw and understanding the investigative value of a “whisper
stop,” the Court does not concur.
Though not explained thoroughly by the parties, the Court understands that the
purpose of the “whisper stop” technique in this case and many others like it was to protect
the integrity of the investigation from becoming apparent to Mr. Moore, not to identify
reasonable suspicion to make a stop or probable cause to conduct a search for later judicial
review. It was to have a plausible explanation to give to Mr. Moore about why he was
stopped and searched. There is no evidence to show that Mr. Moore was aware on May 8
of the months-long investigation into drug distribution by him and Individual 1. If Trooper
Koeberl had told him that he was being stopped and searched because he was suspected of
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trafficking drugs and no drugs were found, Trooper Koeberl would not have been able to
arrest Mr. Moore, and Mr. Moore likely would have taken actions that would hinder further
investigation, like disposing of his phones, obtaining other vehicles, or notifying Individual
1. By telling Mr. Moore the stop and search were related to infractions personally witnessed
by Trooper Koeberl, the investigation was protected until Mr. Moore was in custody for
drug possession. A “whisper stop” is a police operational technique, not a rule of
constitutional law. There is no constitutional significance to the fact that Trooper Koeberl
was instructed to (and did) provide Mr. Moore with a false reason why he chose to pull Mr.
Moore over and search his vehicle, nor are the police under any obligation to disclose to
investigative subjects the true reason they choose to use particular investigative tools. See
e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969); United States v. Laurita, 821 F.3d 1020,
1025–26 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Williams, 429 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2005).
This conclusion comports with past decisions in this District and courts across the
country directly addressing the question of so-called “whisper” or “wall” stops. In United
States v. Gaston, District Judge John R. Tunheim held that “‘whisper’ or ‘wall-off’ stop[s]
… are often used when officers have investigative information that they do not wish to
reveal to a suspect.” No. 19-CR-211 (JRT/BRT), 2021 WL 1263453, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr.
5, 2021). In Gaston, as here, “[n]one of the officers testified that they thought probable
cause was lacking.” Id. at *5. In both cases, the lead investigator “testified that he wanted
the Minnesota State Patrol [trooper] to establish [his] own probable cause ‘if possible’ and
that this type of stop is common when officers wish to keep investigative information from
a suspect during an investigation.” Id. See also United States v. Chavez-Torres, No. 22-
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CR-150 (DWF/TNL), 2023 WL 5003801, at *10 (D. Minn. May 22, 2023) R&R adopted,
2023 WL 4741199 (D. Minn. July 25, 2023); United States v. Alonzo, No. 15-CR-165
(JRT/LIB), 2016 WL 1531522 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2016). Multiple circuit courts have held
whisper stops to be a valid investigatory technique where other constitutional protections
are upheld. See United States v. Balser, 70 F.4th 613, 621 (1st Cir. 2023); United States v.
Sanchez, 839 F. App'x 388, 391 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Hawley, 660 F. App'x
702, 704 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2016); United States v. Magallon-Lopez, 817 F.3d 671, 675 (9th
Cir. 2016).
This case is similar to United States v. Alonzo, No. 15-CR-165 (JRT/LIB), 2016 WL
1531522 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2016). There, a DEA Task Force Officer asked a Minnesota
State Trooper to conduct a “wall stop” of the defendant after the DEA Officer saw the
defendant and others under investigation for drug trafficking load bags into three vehicles,
in the manner the subjects had previously trafficked drugs. Id. at *1. In that case, the DEA
officer told the trooper that “the Jeep was involved in a DEA narcotics investigation and
was suspected of carrying illegal narcotics.” Id. at *2. That trooper then contacted a second
trooper and asked the second trooper to do a “wall” stop on one of the defendants. Id. The
second trooper caught up with the vehicle, saw that the rear passenger was not wearing a
seatbelt, and stopped the vehicle on that purported basis. Id. The second trooper extended
the stop until the first trooper arrived with his narcotics-sniffing dog, which ultimately
located heroin, prescription pills, a firearm, and a digital scale. Id. at *3. The stop by the
second trooper and the extension of that stop to allow the dog sniff by the first trooper were
upheld.
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Here, as in the cases discussed above, the Court sees no reason to find that a whisper
stop is per se invalid. The issues that must be addressed are whether Trooper Koeberl,
either through his own observations or through information shared with him by Investigator
Athman, had 1) reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Mr. Moore and 2) probable cause
to search Mr. Moore’s van. The Court has already found that Trooper Koeberl’s
independent observations justified each step of the stop and search of Mr. Moore’s van.
The Court now finds that the knowledge imputed to Trooper Koeberl by Investigator
Athman in their discussion also provided Trooper Koeberl with reasonable articulable
suspicion and probable cause for first the stop and then the search.
B. 	The Initial Stop
In Alonzo, the court found that the initial traffic stop was validly initiated based on
the trooper’s testimony that he saw the rear passenger without a seatbelt, even though the
defendant argued that there was no way he could have seen the seatbelt. Alonzo, at *5.
Because the court found the trooper’s testimony at the motion hearing to be credible, it
concluded that the initial stop was valid because Minnesota law allowed police to make a
traffic stop based on an officer’s belief that an occupant was not wearing a seatbelt. Id. The
court next addressed the argument that the troopers unreasonably prolonged the stop
beyond the time necessary to investigate the seatbelt violation. On that issue, the court
agreed that once the trooper “checked [the driver’s] license and registration and issued the
written warning, the traffic-related mission of the seizure was complete, and the traffic
violation alone could not support prolonging the stop for the canine sniff search.” Id.
However, the court did not order that the evidence recovered from the stop be suppressed
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because the DEA officer had “reasonable and articulable suspicion that the [vehicle] was
transporting heroin,” (id.), which was imputed to the troopers under the collective
knowledge doctrine, allowing them to extend the stop for the canine sniff search. Id. at *6.
As in Alonzo, there is some dispute about what Trooper Koeberl actually saw before
his initial stop of Mr. Moore. Trooper Koeberl testified that he thought that the window
tint on Mr. Moore’s van was excessively dark and that there were multiple obstructions
dangling from parts of the cabin, both in violation of Minnesota traffic laws. (Hr’g Tr.
66:23–67:1, Dkt. No. 30 (Koeberl: “I was able to pull up next to the vehicle. I was able to
verify that the window tint was dark, and I could see there were suspended objects from
the mirror.”) In his brief, Mr. Moore argues that this recollection was “questionable”
because the dash cam “reveals that Trooper Koeberl never did ‘pull up to the vehicle’.”
(Def.’s Br. 5, Dkt. No. 31.) While the Court has found Trooper Koeberl’s testimony on
these points credible, the Court’s application of the collective knowledge doctrine makes
this credibility finding unnecessary because the collective knowledge doctrine imputes the
knowledge of the underlying narcotics investigation to Trooper Koeberl.
C. 	The Extension of the Stop and the Dog Sniff
The Court also comes to the same conclusion as Alonzo as to the issue of whether
Trooper Koeberl unconstitutionally extended the stop. First (and for the moment, setting
aside that Trooper Koeberl smelled masking agent and saw dangling Black Ice immediately
upon walking up to Mr. Moore’s window), Trooper Koeberl certainly extended the stop
beyond what was necessary to simply investigate the window tint and dangling-objects
offenses. As in Alonzo, the traffic-related mission of the seizure was complete after Trooper
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Koeberl had enough time to check Mr. Moore’s license and issue a citation or warning.
This likely could have been done in a matter of a few minutes. In fact, the BWC footage
shows that Trooper Koeberl returned Mr. Moore’s license with a warning and a discussion
about the need for Mr. Moore to update his license information roughly 15 minutes after
the initial stop. (Gov. Ex. 4 at 22:46–24:25.)
Even though the stop was extended beyond what was necessary to investigate the
traffic violations, the Court finds that the extension was constitutionally proper under the
collective knowledge doctrine, as did the court in Alonzo. Investigator Athman was actively
involved in the Moore investigation and certainly had reasonable articulable suspicion to
believe that Mr. Moore was trafficking drugs when the stop was made, from the extensive
information gained from the investigation discussed above. Knowledge of that information
was imputed to Trooper Koeberl when Investigator Athman and Trooper Koeberl met at
the weigh station, where Investigator Athman gave Trooper Koeberl “their ops plan [and]
their rundown of reasonable suspicion that Moore was trafficking narcotics from Chicago
back to Minnesota.” (Hr’g Tr. at 66:1–3, Dkt. No. 30.) This, as discussed above, clears the
low bar of “some degree of communication” that legitimates application of the collective
knowledge doctrine discussed in Williams, 429 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 2005), and Gillette,
245 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2001). As in Alonzo, after that communication took place,
Trooper Koeberl “became part of the search team and thus had an imputed reasonable
suspicion of narcotics trafficking that was constitutionally sufficient, on its own, to warrant
prolonging the stop.” Alonzo 2016 WL 1531522, at *6.
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D. 	Initial Consent to Continued Conversation
Mr. Moore also consented to a brief extension of the stop when he continued to
interact with Trooper Koeberl after he was issued the traffic warning. At the 24:25 mark in
the BWC footage, the stop as to the traffic violations was complete. Trooper Koeberl had
returned Mr. Moore’s license and given him a written warning for those violations. (Gov.
Ex. 4 at 24:25.) Trooper Koeberl then asked Mr. Moore if he had “a few extra minutes to
chat” with him, to which Mr. Moore consented, saying “no problem.” (Id. at 24:28.) Mr.
Moore’s willingness to continue talking to Trooper Koeberl constituted consent to extend
the traffic stop for that conversation because the Court finds that Mr. Moore’s lack of any
objection at all to continue the conversation and his calm demeanor showed that a
reasonable officer would believe that he consented to an extension of the stop. See United
States v. Quintero-Felix, 714 F.3d 563, 568 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Munoz, 590
F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 2010).
E. 	Dog Sniff of the Van
Generally, a police dog sniff of a vehicle is not considered a search and requires
neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion for its justification under the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. Pulido-Ayala, 892 F.3d 315, 318 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting
United States v. Williams, 429 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 2005). However, the extension of a
stop to conduct a dog sniff on a vehicle requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
beyond the traffic violation originally justifying the stop. Rodriguez v. United States, 575
U.S. 348, 358 (2015). Assuming that Mr. Moore did not consent to the dog sniff and
revoked his consent to prolonging the stop after Trooper Koeberl asked to search the van,
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Trooper 	Koeberl’s 	conversation 	with 	Investigator 	Athman 	gave 	Trooper 	Koeberl
independent reasonable suspicion that the van was being used to traffic narcotics. This
information justified prolonging the stop for the dog sniff. See Alonzo 2016 WL 1531522,
at *6.
F. 	The Roadside Search
The search of Mr. Moore’s van was supported by probable cause, as required by the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See United States
v. Dunn, 928 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Fladten, 230 F.3d
1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).) As discussed above, that probable cause comes from Trooper
Koeberl’s knowledge, both his actual knowledge and the knowledge imputed to him
through his conversation with Investigator Athman, of the entire investigation into Mr.
Moore’s alleged drug trafficking. This includes those elements to which Investigator
Athman testified at the Motion Hearing and Trooper Koeberl’s observations of Bolo’s alert,
indicating that the vehicle may have been emitting the odor of narcotics. As discussed
earlier in this Report and Recommendation, an alert by a certified narcotics detection dog,
standing alone, gives an officer probable cause to believe that there are drugs present.
Ultimately, even if Trooper Koeberl had stopped Mr. Moore, immediately detained
him, and searched the van, the drugs found from that search would not be suppressible on
Fourth Amendment grounds because the underlying investigation and the conversation
with Investigator Athman provided Trooper Koeberl with probable cause for the search.
The additional measures taken by Trooper Koeberl were constitutionally unnecessary but
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were made to protect the integrity of the investigation. Mr. Moore’s Motion to Suppress
Evidence from the roadside search (Dkt. No. 20) should be denied.
III. 	Search Warrant Fruits are Not Suppressible
Mr. Moore argues that, because the evidence found during the search of his van was
obtained unconstitutionally and that evidence was used in the affidavit in support of a
search warrant for his apartment, any evidence derived from that warrant or the two follow-
on warrants (one for a firearm and one for the Ring doorbells’ video footage) must be
suppressed. (See Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 21.) Because the Court concludes that the roadside
search of his van did not violate Mr. Moore’s constitutional rights, there is no basis to
suppress the evidence derived from subsequent search warrants that relied on that evidence.
On this basis, Mr. Moore’s Motion to Suppress Evidence from the search of his apartment
(Dkt. No. 21) should be denied.
Even if the roadside stop and search were constitutionally infirm, however, the
warrants should still be found valid. The affidavits in support of the applications for all
three warrants—the original warrant to search Moore’s residence (Gov. Ex. 5), the follow-
on warrant authorizing seizure of a firearm found during the execution of the first warrant
(Gov. Ex. 6), and another follow-on warrant authorizing seizure of video footage from two
Ring surveillance cameras seized during the execution of the original warrant (Gov. Ex.
7)—describe facts sufficient to establish probable cause, even in the absence of Trooper
Koeberl’s discovery of methamphetamine. The affidavits walk through the investigation,
in detail, a narrative familiar from the one the Court gave earlier in this Report and
Recommendation: the two cooperating defendants, the provision by one of them of
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Individual 1’s phone number, the surveillance in Minneapolis that led to the discovery of
the white Audi driven by Mr. Moore, the apparent drug deals conducted in Minneapolis,
the identification of Mr. Moore as the driver of the white Audi, and Mr. Moore’s trips to
Chicago that were captured on tracking warrants placed on Mr. Moore’s vehicle and phone.
All of this would be enough to establish the required “fair probability” to believe that Mr.
Moore was in the business of dealing in illegal narcotics. And since the law recognizes that
it is reasonable to conclude that drug dealers who demonstrate “a continuous course of drug
trafficking activity” keep items of evidentiary value at their residence, (see United States
v. Ross, 487 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 2007)), this in turn would be enough for a warrant
to search Mr. Moore’s residence.
IV. 	Good Faith Execution of Follow-On Search Warrants
Mr. Moore’s Motion to Suppress evidence from the warrants issued after the
roadside van search should also be denied on the additional ground that the officers who
executed those warrants did so in good faith reliance on a judge’s determination that the
warrant applications established probable cause to search the places to be searched for the
evidence specified in the warrant. To be clear, the Court finds no reason to doubt the
constitutionality of those three search warrants. But if it did, there is no reason that the
good faith doctrine would not apply to the apartment search warrants (Gov. Exs. 5–6) and
the warrant for the Ring camera data (Gov. Ex. 7). Further, Mr. Moore made no substantive
arguments about the admissibility of the evidence seized from the warrants beyond his
argument that such evidence was fruit of an unconstitutional roadside search. The Court
considers any additional arguments that Mr. Moore could have made to have been waived,
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but for the sake of thoroughness, finds that the good faith exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement provides an additional, independent reason to deny Mr.
Moore’s motion as to the evidence seized pursuant to these warrants, even if such evidence
is properly considered the “fruit” of the roadside van search.
A search conducted under the authority of a judicially issued warrant is presumed
to be reasonable. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (“There is, of course, a
presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant.”);
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (“Because a search warrant provides the
detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, … we have expressed a strong preference for
warrants. … The preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according
‘great deference’ to a magistrate's determination.”) (cleaned up). A search pursuant to a
judicially issued warrant “will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness” because
“a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement
officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (citing
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823, n. 32 (1982)).
Even if a Court finds that a judge issued a warrant that was not supported by
probable cause, evidence found in a search conducted pursuant to that warrant should not
be suppressed if the police executed the warrant in good faith. In Leon, the Supreme Court
held that the exclusionary rule did not apply when the police obtain evidence by acting in
“objectively reasonable reliance” on a search warrant. 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984); see also
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). The
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, and where the police have
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relied, 	not 	on 	their 	own 	assessment 	of 	the 	evidence, 	but 	on 	the 	probable 	cause
determination of a neutral and disinterested judge, there is no police misconduct, and thus,
nothing to deter through application of the exclusionary rule. Herring, 555 U.S. at 142;
Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
The Leon good faith exception is not boundless; it will not apply in the following
four scenarios:
(1) the supporting affidavit or testimony includes a false statement made
knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth to
mislead the issuing judge; (2) the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial
role in issuing the warrant; (3) the affidavit in support of the warrant is so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable; or (4) the warrant is so facially deficient that no police
officer could reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.
United States v. Ortiz-Cervantes, 868 F.3d 695, 702–03 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing United
States v. Proell, 485 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 2007)). A court may find that the good faith
exception applies even where the police personnel who executed the warrant are the same
individuals who applied for the warrant. United States v. Mayweather, 993 F.3d 1035, 1043
n.8 (8th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e do not vary our analysis when the officer who applies for a
search warrant also executes the warrant.”) (citing United States v. Carpenter, 341 F.3d
666, 669–670 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2008)).
Generally, the preference for warrants and the great deference to be accorded to an
issuing judge’s determination mean that a criminal defendant bears the burden of proving
that a warrant is so lacking in support that its evidentiary fruits must be suppressed. See
United States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1443 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Garcia,
785 F.2d 214, 222 (8th Cir. 1986). “Under traditional search and seizure law, the burden
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is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that
[the search technique] was unlawfully employed.” United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319,
326 (8th Cir. 1976).
Neither party addressed the warrants in any significant detail in their briefing, which
is understandable given that the key issue in this case is the constitutionality of the roadside
search. In fact, Mr. Moore’s post-hearing brief did not address his motion to suppress the
evidence from the search warrant at all. (See Def.’s Br., Dkt. No. 31.) Mr. Moore apparently
knew that the only way he could reasonably seek the suppression of the evidence collected
under the authority of the later-issued warrants was by successfully challenging the
constitutionality of the roadside search. Nevertheless, the good faith exception applies here,
and Mr. Moore has failed to meet his burden of showing that it does not. He presented no
argument that any of the four reasons articulated in Ortiz-Cervantes for the non-
applicability of the good faith exception to the warrant requirement apply, and the Court
can identify none. There is simply no evidence in the record that would support a finding
that (1) the warrant affidavits included a false statement; (2) the issuing judge wholly
abandoned his judicial role in issuing the warrant; (3) the affidavit in support of the warrant
was lacking in indicia of probable cause; or (4) the warrant was facially deficient in any
way. United States v. Ortiz-Cervantes, 868 F.3d 695, 702–03 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing United
States v. Proell, 485 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, even if the challenged
warrants were invalid, the officers who executed them did so in good faith, and the
evidence found in their execution need not be suppressed.
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V. 	The Ring Cameras Were Within the Scope of the Initial Warrant.
In his Motion to Suppress the evidentiary fruits of the search warrants, Mr. Moore
claims that “Notwithstanding the illegality of the searches and seizures of the apartment,
the seizure of the Ring video data inside Mr. Moore’s apartment and its subsequent
analysis was illegal as it was not within the scope of the warrant.” (Def.’s Mot. 2, Dkt.
No. 21.)
The Court understands Mr. Moore to be claiming that the particularity clause of the
Fourth 	Amendment 	was 	violated. 	That 	clause 	requires 	warrants 	to 	“particularly
describe[e] 	the 	things 	to 	be 	seized.” 	U.S. 	Const., 	amend. 	IV. 	“The 	particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment has a manifest purpose—to prevent general
searches.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 963 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part). “General warrants, of course, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” Andresen
v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479 (1976). The problem posed by a general warrant “is not
that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). The Fourth Amendment
proscribes general searches by requiring a “particular description” of the things to be
seized. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467. The particularity requirement “makes general searches
… impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.”
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192, 196 (1927)).
Mr. Moore’s reference to “the warrant” is ambiguous because there are two search
warrants that bear on the seizure of the video data inside the Ring cameras. First, there is
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the initial warrant that authorized law enforcement to search Mr. Moore’s apartment and
that included among the items to be seized “Electronic devices, including but not limited
to, cellular telephones and tablets, capable of electronic communication.” (Gov. Ex. 5.)
Second, there is a Ring camera-only warrant (Gov. Ex. 7) authorizing law enforcement to
seize (from Ring, not from Mr. Moore or his apartment), various items of data kept by
Ring that relate to Mr. Moore’s account. For example, the warrant calls for Ring to
produce the subscriber’s name, address, and email address; the types of services used by
the subscriber; the identifying numbers of the Ring cameras and the date the account was
activated; and, at issue here, “all audio and video recordings captured by any Ring device
associated with the above described account, such as live and/or stored video and audio
recordings, live audio streams, images, comments, data collected from the surrounding
environment, (such as motion, events, temperature and ambient light).” (Gov. Ex. 7 at 12.)
Mr. Moore’s claim that the Ring camera footage was outside the scope of the
warrant was the last word of argument on this point from either party. (The prosecution
acknowledged that Ring cameras had been seized, but did not argue the suppression point.
(Gov.’s Post-Hr’g Br., Dkt. No. 40 at 7.)) Because neither party briefed the issue or argued
the issue at the hearing, the Court considers the issue waived. On its own review, the Court
finds that the record in this case supports the conclusion that Ring cameras are “Electronic
devices ... capable of electronic communication” under the apartment search warrant
(Gov. Ex. 5).
Before turning to the initial warrant, and its authorization of law enforcement’s
seizure of devices “capable of electronic communication,” the potential claim being made
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that the Ring footage is outside the scope of the Ring-only warrant must be analyzed. If a
claim is being made that the video footage is not within the scope of the Ring-only
warrant—and again, it is not clear whether such a claim is being made—it fails. The Ring-
only warrant is devoted to Ring data and nothing else. The footage is obviously within the
Ring-only warrant’s scope.
As to the first warrant, the only way the Court can read the defense challenge is that
the warrant’s specification of the things to be seized does not include Ring cameras
because Ring cameras are not “capable of electronic communication,” and that therefore
the seizure of the Ring cameras exceeded the warrant’s scope. If that is the argument, it
fails, because Ring cameras can be used for electronic communication. As the affidavit in
support of the application for the Ring-only warrant states:
Your Affiant is aware Ring is a home security and smart home company
owned 	by 	Amazon. 	Ring 	manufactures 	home 	security 	products 	that
incorporate outdoor surveillance cameras, known to contain a high-definition
camera, a motion sensor, and a microphone and speaker for two-way audio
communication. The product integrates with an associated mobile app,
which allows users to view real-time audio from the camera, receive
notifications 	when 	activated, 	and 	communicate 	with 	visitors 	via 	the
integrated speaker and microphone. The product is also capable of operating
as a surveillance camera, and can automatically trigger recordings when
activated, or when its motion sensors are activated. With a subscription, users
are able to store their videos to a cloud server owned by Ring.
(Gov. Ex. 7 at 9 (emphasis added).) As the italicized language indicates, and as the
italicized and underlined word “communicates” makes crystal clear, Ring cameras are
capable of electronic communication. They are therefore within the scope of the initial
apartment search warrant (Gov. Ex. 5.) The particularity requirement was honored and the
motion to suppress the Ring video footage should be denied.
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VI. 	United States v. Johnson is Inapplicable.
Finally, Mr. Moore cites a recent case from the Eighth Circuit with a similar fact
pattern, United States v. Johnson, 166 F.4th 1116 (8th Cir. 2026), to support his argument
that Trooper Koeberl unconstitutionally extended his stop to conduct the dog sniff. (See
Not. of Supp. Auth., Dkt. No. 37); In Johnson, the Eighth Circuit held that evidence
discovered in a roadside vehicle search after a drug-sniffing dog indicated for narcotics
odor should have been suppressed because the police officer unlawfully extended a traffic
stop beyond what was necessary to write a ticket for the observed traffic violations.
Johnson, 166 F.4th at 1119. While the facts relating to the officers’ purported reasons for
initial stop in that case closely align with those here, (i.e., excessive window tint), the two
cases address different legal issues that require the opposite conclusion here.
First and most importantly, Johnson does not address the collective knowledge
doctrine at all. All the Circuit court said in Johnson was that “the South Dakota Division
of Criminal Investigation asked Officer Stevens to pull over a car that was leaving a
surveilled apartment building.” Johnson, 166 F.4th at 1117. There was no discussion of the
reason why that agency requested the stop or even if the agency told the officer that they
suspected the defendant of a crime. Here, the evidence is that Investigator Athman
communicated with Trooper Koeberl about the investigation, and passed information about
the investigation to him, allowing Trooper Koeberl to legitimately rely on the collective
knowledge of the investigative team as probable cause to search the vehicle.
Second, in Johnson, the United States relied on the community caretaking function,
discussed in United States v. Soderman, 983 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 2020), to rationalize the
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extension of the stop. Citing Soderman, the United States’ argument in Johnson was that it
was not unreasonable to extend the stop because the officer’s “discovery that [Johnson's]
license had been suspended justifiably extended the lawful scope of the traffic stop because
of [his] legal inability to remove the vehicle from the scene and the consequential need for
a licensed driver or a tow truck to do so.” Johnson, 166 F.4th at 1119. This is not a
community caretaking case. If it were, perhaps Johnson would be informative, but the
United States does not make a community caretaking argument in the case at bar.
Third, the evidence in this case shows that, even if Trooper Koeberl could not rely
on the collective knowledge of the investigation as probable cause to search the vehicle,
his observations and discussion with Mr. Moore at his window provided probable cause
making the extension reasonable, which was absent in Johnson. In that case, the interaction
at the vehicle seemed to be short and warranted only one sentence in the opinion: “The
driver, Alex Johnson, told Officer Stevens that his license was suspended, and Officer
Stevens had Johnson get out and join him in his patrol car.” Johnson, 166 F.4th at 1117.
Here, Trooper Koeberl engaged Mr. Moore in more extensive conversation on his first
interaction with Mr. Moore, during which he gained information sufficient to support
continuing the stop, including noticing the strong smell of laundry detergent and air
fresheners and receiving an unconvincing story about Mr. Moore’s travels. As discussed
above, those factors, along with Trooper Koeberl’s training and experience gave him
probable cause to continue the stop and conduct the dog sniff around the car.
In short, in Johnson the Eighth Circuit found that the traffic stop was unreasonably
prolonged because there was no justifiable reason for the officer to continue the stop
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beyond the time required to write the defendant a ticket for driving on a suspended license
and a warning for excessive window tint, so the evidence seized from his car should have
been suppressed. Here, the Court finds that the traffic stop was prolonged beyond what was
necessary to address the traffic citations, but in this case that prolongation was reasonable
because Trooper Koeberl had probable cause to believe that Mr. Moore was trafficking
narcotics.
RECOMMENDATION
Therefore, based on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY
RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Mr. Moore’s Motion to Suppress Evidence from his vehicle (Dkt. No. 20) be
DENIED;
2. 	Mr. Moore’s Motion to Suppress Evidence from his apartment (Dkt. No. 21) and
the two Ring cameras be DENIED; and
3. 	Mr. Moore’s Motion for Discovery (Dkt. No. 22) be DENIED as moot.
Date: March 27, 2026 	s/ John F. Docherty
JOHN F. DOCHERTY
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
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objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days
after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the
objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the
word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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