USA v. Diaz-Aguilar et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIC ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cr-091 (SRN/SGE)
ORDER & REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Raphael Coburn, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office
counsel for Plaintiff.
Glen Bruder, 9531 West 78th St., Suite 210, Eden Prairie, MN 55344, CJA
Appointment.
This case is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1 for an order and a report and
recommendation on Defendant Rodriguez’s Motion for Disclosure / Expansion of Jencks
Act Disclosure Obligation (Dkt. 89); Motion for Disclosure of Government’s Intent to use
Residual Hearsay Exception (Dkt. 90); Motion for Disclosure of Records Relating to
Canine (Dkt. 91); Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived from Motor Vehicle Search (Dkt.
92); Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived from Search of Cell Phones (Dkt. 93); and
Motion for Hearing Pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (Dkt. 94). The Court held hearings on
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August 20, 2025 (Dkt. 128) and September 4, 2025 (Dkt. 130).1 Assistant United States
Attorney Raphael Coburn appeared on behalf of the United States of America
(“Government”). Attorney Glen Bruder appeared on behalf of the Defendant, Mr.
Rodriguez, who was present at both hearings.
I. Background
Olmstead County Sheriff’s Office Investigator Brenden Rasinski started
investigating a drug trafficking organization in August or September 2024. (Tr. at 132.)
During that investigation Erick Emilio Diaz-Aguilar’s cell phones were seized and
searched, and Investigator Rasinski discovered Mr. Diaz-Aguilar communicated often with
a phone number associated with Mr. Rodriguez. (Tr. 133.) Investigator Rasinski then
searched Mr. Rodriguez’s criminal record, and discovered he was on supervised released
for a drug offense and had previously been convicted of a drug distribution offense. (Tr. at
134.) Investigator Rasinski also discovered Mr. Rodriguez’s Cash App account by viewing
publicly available profile information. (Tr. at 134-135.) Investigator Rasinski subpoenaed
the Cash App account records which revealed multiple transactions with individuals in the
Bemidji and Moorhead area. (Id.) Investigator Rasinski testified that he suspected Mr.
Rodriguez may be distributing controlled substances to people in that area based on the
Cash App transactions. (Tr. at 152.) Based on all of this information, Investigator Rasinski
1 For ease of reference, both the August and September hearing transcripts (Dkts. 135, 136)
will be cited as “Tr.” followed by the page number identified in the upper right-hand corner
of the transcript. The transcripts are currently restricted from public access, but no party
has requested any redactions, and this Report and Recommendation does not contain any
confidential information or personal identifiers.
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obtained a warrant for Mr. Rodriguez’s historical phone location data. (Gov. Ex. 17.) The
location data confirmed that Mr. Rodriguez had taken multiple short trips to Bemidji and
Moorhead—the location of the individuals transferring money to Mr. Rodriguez through
Cash App transactions. (Gov. Ex. 19; Tr. at 138.)
Investigator Rasinski next determined that Mr. Rodriguez drove a gold Grand Am,
after physically observing Mr. Rodriguez drive the vehicle and subsequently running the
vehicle through a law enforcement data base which showed it was registered to the address
on Mr. Rodriguez’s license. (Tr. at 139.) Investigator Rasinski then applied for and
obtained a tracking warrant for Mr. Rodriguez’s Grand Am. (Gov. Ex. 18, Tr. at 138.)
The tracker on the Grand Am demonstrated that Mr. Rodriguez met with Mr. Diaz-
Aguilar on November 22, 2024, three days before the stop at issue. (Tr. at 150; Gov. Ex.
19 at 47.) Then, on November 25, 2024, the day of the traffic stop, law enforcement noticed
the Grand Am had departed the Twin Cities and was heading towards the Bemidji and
Moorhead area. (Tr. at 140.) Investigator Rasinski believed that Mr. Rodriguez was
transporting bulk amounts of methamphetamine, so he contacted Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (“BCA”) agents Garrett Dietman and Dan Skoog. (Id. at 142-43.)
Investigator Rasinski briefly explained the drug trafficking investigation and Mr.
Rodriguez’s involvement to Agent Skoog, asking that the Grand Am be stopped and law
enforcement seize controlled substances and cell phones. (Id. at 143-44.)
After receiving this information, Agent Skoog called Otter Tail County Deputy and
K9 Officer Kelby Jensen and requested the Grand Am be stopped. (Id. at 91.) Agent Skoog
also contacted Minnesota Highway Patrol Trooper Kyle Hanson for assistance in stopping
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the gold Grand Am. (Id. at 16.) Agent Skoog informed Trooper Hanson of what
Investigator Rasinski had relayed to him—that law enforcement had been tracking the
Grand Am and Mr. Rodriguez and believed the vehicle contained methamphetamine. (Id.
at 16, 59-60.)
Trooper Hanson spotted the Grand Am near exit 54 on Interstate 94 and began
following it. (Id. at 17.) Trooper Hanson observed the Grand Am cross over the center line
of the highway, and weave within its lane. (Id. at 17-18; Gov. Ex. 9 at 0:53.) Trooper
Hanson then drove next to the Grand Am and observed a phone holder attached to the
windshield below the rearview mirror. (Id. at 17-20; Gov. Ex. 9 at 4:40-45.) After
observing these infractions, Trooper Hanson initiated a traffic stop. (Id. at 21.)
Once the Grand Am was stopped, Trooper Hanson approached the passenger side
of the vehicle and requested identification and proof of insurance, which took Mr.
Rodriguez around four minutes to provide. (Id. at 21; Gov. Ex. 10 at 2:40-6:43.) As Mr.
Rodriguez was looking for the documents, Trooper Hanson observed two phones in the
vehicle and noticed that Mr. Rodriguez had bloodshot and watery eyes. (Tr. at 22-23, 65.)
Trooper Hanson testified that bloodshot and watery eyes and weaving over the center line
are potential signs of intoxication. (Tr. at 14-15.) Trooper Hanson took the license and
proof of insurance back to his patrol vehicle to verify the insurance and check for
outstanding warrants—a process that took about three minutes. (Tr. at 23, 45-46; Gov. Ex.
9 at 12:40-15:16.)
As Trooper Hanson was running the information, Deputy Jensen arrived on scene
with his canine, Koa. (Tr. 23.) Trooper Hanson informed Deputy Jensen that he believed
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Mr. Rodriguez had blood shot and watery eyes and Trooper Hanson returned to the driver’s
side of the vehicle to get a better look. (Tr. at 23-24; Gov Ex. 10 at 9:40-50.) Once Trooper
Hanson confirmed that Mr. Rodriguez had bloodshot and watery eyes, he had Mr.
Rodriguez complete field sobriety tests, a process which lasted about ten minutes. (Tr. at
24; Gov. Ex. 10 at 10:03-19:00, Gov. Ex. 9 at 15:35-24:30.) During the walk-and-turn test,
Trooper Hanson observed some indicia of impairment but did not believe he had probable
cause to arrest Mr. Rodriguez for driving under the influence. (Tr. at 25.)
After the field sobriety testing, Trooper Hanson spoke with Deputy Jensen about
Mr. Rodriguez’s performance. (Gov. Ex. 10 at 19:09-20:10.) Deputy Jensen then
approached Mr. Rodriguez, asking questions about controlled substances and for consent
to search the vehicle, which Mr. Rodriguez denied. (Gov. Ex. 14B at 1:12-20 (Jensen
speaking with Rodriguez); Tr. at 94.) Upon receiving this denial, Deputy Jensen returned
to his vehicle and called Investigator Rasinski to discuss the next steps, a conversation that
lasted about five minutes. (Tr. at 28, 94-96; Gov. Ex. 15 at 13:10-18:05 (Jensen walking to
vehicle and then walking back to Rodriguez).) In the call, Investigator Rasinski told Deputy
Jensen they could use the information they had regarding the investigation to perform a
dog sniff. (Tr. 96-97.) Specifically, Investigator Rasinski indicated that the driver of the
gold Grand Am was the target of a narcotics investigation where he was suspected of
trafficking large quantities of controlled substances from the metro area to the Fargo-
Moorhead area. (Tr. 95-96.)
Based on Investigator Rasinski’s knowledge, Deputy Jensen performed a dog sniff
around Mr. Rodriguez’s vehicle with his canine, Koa. (Id. at 97; Gov. Ex. 9 at 32:40-33:56;
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Gov. Ex. 14C at 1:43-2:52.) During the approximate minute-long dog sniff, Koa alerted to
the presence of narcotics by (1) investigating odors on his own instead of following Deputy
Jensen’s hand,(2) snapping his head towards the rear wheel well, (3) “bracketing,”2 and (4)
going onto his hind legs to sniff the open window. (Id. at 100-102; Gov. Ex. 14C at 1:43-
2:52.) Additionally, according to Deputy Jensen, Koa gave two final indications for the
presence of narcotics when he briefly placed his stomach close to the ground. (Id. at 100-
05, Gov. Ex. 14C at 2:28-29, 40.) Based on Koa’s alerts and indications, Deputy Jensen
determined there was probable cause to search the vehicle for narcotics. (Id. at 106.) During
the search, Deputy Jensen found and seized approximately three pounds of suspected
methamphetamine inside a bag in the Grand Am’s trunk. (Id. at 29, 107, 123.)
Once the methamphetamine was seized, Trooper Hanson issued Mr. Rodriguez a
warning for both traffic violations and allowed Mr. Rodriguez to leave. (Tr. at 29.) After
Mr. Rodriguez left, Investigator Rasinski was notified that three pounds of
methamphetamine were seized, but no cell phones were seized. Believing the phones
contained evidence of drug trafficking, Investigator Rasinski requested law enforcement
stop Mr. Rodriguez again to seize the phones. (Tr. at 146-147.)
Trooper Hanson then contacted Trooper Ophaven, requesting he initiate a stop of
Mr. Rodriguez, explaining the need to seize the two cell phones Trooper Hanson previously
saw inside Mr. Rodriguez’s Grand Am. (Tr. at 76.) Trooper Ophaven promptly initiated
another traffic stop of Mr. Rodriguez and seized the phones. (Tr. at 77.) On November 26,
2 Deputy Jensen testified that when Koa goes ahead of him to search smells on his own,
he calls it “bracketing.” (Tr. at 102.)
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2024, the day after the stop, Investigator Rasinski applied for and obtained a warrant to
search Mr. Rodriguez’s phones for evidence of drug trafficking. (Gov. Ex. 19.)
II. Motion for Disclosure / Expansion of Jencks Act Obligation (Dkt. 89)
Mr. Rodriguez moves for a Court order compelling the Government to disclose
Jencks Act materials two weeks before trial. (Dkt. 89.) The Government objects, arguing
that it cannot be compelled to make pretrial disclosures of Jencks Act materials before a
witness has testified at trial. (Dkt. 110 at 8.) Despite the objection, the Government agrees
to disclose Jencks Act materials no later than one week before trial. (Id.)
While the Court is cognizant that disclosure of Jencks Act Materials after a witness
has testified at trial creates the prospect of unnecessary delays in trial, Mr. Rodriguez has
provided no citation to recent authority allowing a Court to require the Government to
disclose Jencks Act materials before trial. Rather, “[t]he Jencks Act does not compel the
government to produce a statement or report of a government witness until after the witness
has testified on direct examination.” United States v. Green, 151 F.3d 1111, 1115 (8th Cir.
1998); see 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Thus, the Court cannot require the Government to disclose
Jencks Act materials before trial. Id. Accordingly, Mr. Rodriguez’s Motion for Disclosure
/ Expansion of Jencks Act Obligation is denied.
III. Motion for Disclosure of Government’s Intent to use Residual Hearsay
Exception (Dkt. 90)
Mr. Rodriguez moves for an order requiring the Government to provide notice of
its intent to use evidence covered by the residual hearsay exception thirty days before trial.
(Dkt. 90.) The Government asserts it will comply with the notice requirements of Federal
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Rule of Evidence 807 and agrees to disclose the anticipated evidence three weeks before
trial. (Dkt. 110 at 9.)
Federal Rule of Evidence 807 provides that a “statement is admissible only if the
proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement—
including its substance and the declarant's name—so that the party has a fair opportunity
to meet it.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(b).3 “The notice must be provided in writing before the trial
or hearing—or in any form during the trial or hearing if the court, for good cause, excuses
a lack of earlier notice.” Id. Defendant’s motion is granted in part to the extent that the
Government shall fully comply with its obligations under Federal Rule of Evidence 807
and provide notice and the required disclosures no later than three weeks before trial
begins.
IV. Motion for Disclosure of Records Relating to Canine (Dkt. 91)
Mr. Rodriguez moves for an Order requiring the Government to produce records
relating to the training and certification of the canine involved in the traffic stop. (Dkt. 91.)
The Government agreed to provide the canine’s records. (Dkt. 110 at 9.) At the hearing,
Mr. Rodriguez informed the Court that the Government had provided the canine’s records
and agreed the motion could be denied as moot. (Tr. at 10.) Accordingly, the Court denies
Mr. Rodriguez’s motion as moot.
3 The Court notes that it appears Mr. Rodriguez is citing an old version of Federal Rule of
Evidence 807 which had required disclosure of a declarant’s address. (See Dkt. 90 at 1.)
Disclosure of a declarant’s address is no longer required by Federal Rule of Evidence 807.
See Fed. R. Evid. 807 advisory committee’s notes, 2019 Amendments (“[T]he prior
requirement that the declarant's address must be disclosed has been deleted.”)
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V. Motion for Hearing Pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (Dkt. 94)
Mr. Rodriguez requests a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978). The grounds for Mr. Rodriguez’s request were purportedly contained within his
motions to suppress evidence which allege misleading statements and material omissions
made in search warrant applications. (Dkt. 94.)
“Under Franks, a criminal defendant may request a hearing to challenge a search
warrant on the ground that the supporting affidavit contains factual misrepresentations or
omissions relevant to the probable cause determination.” United States v. Arnold, 725 F.3d
896, 898 (8th Cir. 2013). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating entitlement to
a Franks hearing through a substantial preliminary showing “(1) that the affiant ...
knowingly and intentionally made false statements or made them in reckless disregard for
the truth and (2) if the false information is excised (or the omitted information is included),
the affidavit no longer establishes probable cause.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “The
requirement of a substantial preliminary showing is not lightly met . . . .” Id. (quoting
United States v. Mathison, 157 F.3d 541, 548 (8th Cir.1998)). “It requires more than
allegations, and a defendant satisfies this standard only by making an offer of proof,
through affidavits, or other similarly reliable evidence.” United States v. Berry, No. 24-cr-
134 (PJS/TNL), 2024 WL 4895382, at *7 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171) (D. Minn. Oct.
17, 2024), R&R adopted, No. 24-cr-0134 (PJS/TNL), 2024 WL 4894789 (D. Minn. Nov.
26, 2024). Thus, Franks hearings are granted by courts in only “very limited
circumstances.” United States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1445 (8th Cir. 1995).
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The Court has reviewed the motions to suppress, and Mr. Rodriguez does not
identify any misleading statements or material omissions. Nor did Mr. Rodriguez pursue
this issue at the motion hearing or address it in his post-hearing briefing. Thus, Mr.
Rodriguez has not made the substantial preliminary showing that would entitle him to a
Franks hearing. Consequently, the Court denies his motion.
VI. Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived from Motor Vehicle Search (Dkt. 92)
Mr. Rodriguez contends that any evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle
must be suppressed because (1) the initial stop of his vehicle was pretextual and unjustified,
(2) the stop was unduly prolonged, and (3) Koa is an unreliable canine that did not clearly
indicate the presence of controlled substances. (See Dkt 92 at 1; Dkt. 141 at 6.)
A. Initial Stop Was Supported by Probable Cause and Reasonable
Suspicion
Mr. Rodriguez argues that Trooper Hanson did not have an objectively reasonable
basis “to believe that he observed any traffic offense,” because his primary goal was to find
a reason to search the vehicle for evidence of drug trafficking. (Dkt. 141 at 10.)
A traffic stop constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Thus, a traffic stop “must be supported by reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.” United States v. Hollins, 685 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir.
2012) (quotation omitted). “Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v.
Shumaker, 21 F.4th 1007, 1017 (8th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). “Probable cause exists
when a reasonable officer, confronted with the facts known to the officer at the time of the
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stop, could have believed that there was a fair probability that a violation of law had
occurred.” United States v. Holly, 983 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (quoting
United States v. Andrews, 454 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2006)). “Any traffic violation,
however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic
stop.” United States v. Adler, 590 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir. 2008)). “This is true even if the officer would have
ignored the violation but for a suspicion that greater crimes were afoot.” United States v.
Randolph, 628 F.3d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Here, Trooper Hanson had two lawful bases to stop Mr. Rodriguez’s vehicle: (1) probable
cause for traffic violations, and (2) reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking.
First, Trooper Hanson observed Mr. Rodriguez cross the centerline in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1) (Tr. at 17-18; Gov. Ex. 9 at 0:53, 4:40-45.) In Minnesota,
“a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not
be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made
with safety.” Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1). Mr. Rodriguez’s contentions that the weather
conditions justified his crossing of the centerline do not negate Trooper Hanson’s probable
cause to stop the Grand Am for a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1). To the
contrary, under Minnesota law, even if Mr. Rodriguez “was driving properly for the
conditions” it would “not negate the fact that [Trooper Hanson], a trained officer[],
observed objective facts which made him suspect.” Shull v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 398
N.W.2d 11, 14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); see also State v. Linn, No. C6-02-1176, 2002 WL
31890963, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002) (“Minimal improper driving conduct is
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still a basis for a stop. Poor road conditions and good faith do not negate that basis.”).
Trooper Hanson’s observation of Mr. Rodriguez’s vehicle crossing the centerline, alone,
provided probable cause to conduct the traffic stop. Adler, 590 F.3d at 583; Holly, 983 F.3d
at 364.
Second, Trooper Hanson observed that Mr. Rodriguez had an item affixed to his
windshield in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.71, subd. 1(a). Minnesota law prohibits having
an item “suspended between the driver and windshield” of a vehicle subject to specific
exceptions. Minn. Stat. § 169.71, subd. 1(a)(2). One exception is “global positioning
systems or navigation systems when mounted or located near the bottommost portion of
the windshield.” Minn. Stat. § 169.71, subd. 1(a)(2)(iv). Trooper Hanson testified that he
knew many people use their cell phones as a navigation system and that there is a statutory
exemption for navigation systems but believed that Minnesota law required any navigation
item or system to be at the lowest portion of the windshield to prevent obstruction of the
driver’s view. (Tr. at 38-39, 62.) Trooper Hanson testified that Mr. Rodriguez’s cell phone
holder was attached to the windshield just below the rear-view mirror so that the phone
itself was positioned in the center of the windshield, not at the bottommost portion as
required by law. (Tr. at 21.) And dash-camera video and body worn video confirm Trooper
Hanson’s description of the location of the item on the windshield. (Gov’t Ex. 9 at 4:42;
Gov’t Ex. 10 at 1:44.)
Mr. Rodriguez correctly points out a lack of case law on traffic stops involving a
navigation system placed in the center of a windshield, however, even if Trooper Hanson
were mistaken as to the required location of the navigation device, that mistake was
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objectively reasonable given the device was installed in a location that obstructed the
driver’s view. United States v. Travis, No. 14-cr-253 (DSD/SER), 2015 WL 439393, * 2
(D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2015) (“Moreover, even if Arbuckle was mistaken as to the exemptions,
those mistakes are objectively reasonable.”) (citation omitted); United States v.
Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir.1999) (discussing that officer’s stop was reasonable,
even if he were wrong, if he “objectively had a reasonable basis for believing that the driver
has breached a traffic law”) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 93 F.3d 479, 485 (8th
Cir.1996)). Accordingly, the Court determines that Trooper Hanson had probable cause to
initiate a traffic stop based on his reasonable belief that the phone holder’s location in the
center of the windshield violated Minnesota law. Adler, 590 F.3d at 583; Holly, 983 F.3d
at 364. Because Trooper Hanson had probable cause to stop Mr. Rodriguez for two separate
traffic violations, his subjective motivations that precipitated the stop are not relevant.
Randolph, 628 F.3d at 1025.
Additionally, Investigator Rasinski had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Rodriguez
was engaged in drug trafficking based on (1) Mr. Rodriguez’s phone records confirming
he communicated often with Mr. Diaz-Aguilar, (2) Mr. Rodriguez’s prior criminal record
involving methamphetamine distribution, (3) Mr. Rodriguez’s Cash App transactions
consistent with drug trafficking, and (4) the fact that Mr. Rodriguez met with Mr. Diaz-
Aguilar three days before, and was traveling towards the people he had prior Cash App
transactions with on the day of the stop.
Investigator Rasinski’s reasonable suspicion was imputed to Trooper Hanson after
he communicated details of his investigation to Agent Skoog who shared them with
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Trooper Hanson. See United States v. Thompson, 533 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The
collective knowledge of law enforcement officers conducting an investigation is sufficient
to provide reasonable suspicion, and the collective knowledge can be imputed to the
individual officer who initiated the traffic stop when there is some communication between
the officers.”); United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 2008) (“When officers
function as a search team, it is appropriate to judge probable cause upon the basis of their
combined knowledge, because we presume that the officers have shared relevant
knowledge which informs the decision to seize evidence or to detain a particular person.”)
(citation and internal quotations omitted); United States v. Rederick, 65 F.4th 961, 964, 966
(8th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 241 (2023) (finding troopers had reasonable
suspicion to stop vehicle where agent called troopers and explained the vehicle was
involved in a drug trafficking investigation and asked them “to try to establish independent
probable cause for the stop” ).
B. Stop Was Not Unreasonably Prolonged
In the challenge of the search of his vehicle, Mr. Rodriguez argues that Trooper
Hansen and Deputy Jensen unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop, rendering it
unconstitutional.
“[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop
was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350, (2015). “Whether the duration of the stop is reasonable
is determined by the seizure's ‘mission,’ and law enforcement must be ‘reasonably diligent’
in carrying out that mission.” United States v. Rederick, 65 F.4th at 966 (quoting United
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States v. Magallon, 984 F.3d 1263, 1278 (8th Cir. 2021)). “[A]n investigative stop must
cease once reasonable suspicion or probable cause dissipates.” United States v. Watts, 7
F.3d 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). However, “[a]n officer's suspicion of
criminal activity may reasonably grow over the course of a traffic stop as the circumstances
unfold and more suspicious facts are uncovered.” Magallon, 984 F.3d at 1278.
As discussed above, Trooper Hanson had probable cause to stop the vehicle based
on traffic violations and reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for drug trafficking. But
Trooper Hanson’s suspicions of criminal activity also grew during the traffic stop. Trooper
Hanson noticed that Mr. Rodriguez had two phones which he testified, in his training an
experience, can be indicative of drug trafficking. (Tr. 65); see also, e.g., United States v.
Hernandez-Mendoza, 600 F.3d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[D]rug traffickers typically carry
multiple cell phones to allow for the disposal of one or more, if necessary to avoid
detection.”); United States v. Burris, 22 F.4th 781, 785 (8th Cir. 2022) (“[T]raffickers often
use multiple phones to avoid detection and to compartmentalize different points of contact
in the drug dealing business”). Trooper Hanson also observed that Mr. Rodriguez’s eyes
were bloodshot and watery, and that combined with crossing the centerline, made him
believe that Mr. Rodriguez might be driving under the influence of something. Magallon,
984 F.3d at 1278.4 Thus, Trooper Hanson’s “mission” for the stop was not merely to
4 To the extent that Mr. Rodriguez argues there were innocent explanations for his blood
shot and watery eyes to undermine the validity of Trooper Hanson’s decision to conduct
field sobriety tests that argument is unpersuasive. (Dkt. 141 at 12 n.9.); see United States
v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 953 (8th Cir. 2007) (“When considered together, however,
otherwise innocent facts can give rise to a reasonable suspicion, especially when viewed
through the perspective of an experienced law enforcement officer.”).
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investigate the traffic violations as Mr. Rodriguez suggests. Rederick, 65 F.4th at 966.
Rather, Trooper Hanson’s mission also encompassed investigating suspected driving while
under the influence and drug trafficking. Thus, the relevant question is whether Trooper
Hanson and Deputy Jensen detained Mr. Rodriguez longer than necessary to carry out these
three “missions.” The Court determines that they did not.
The entire stop of Mr. Rodriguez lasted approximately thirty-seven minutes. (Gov.
Ex. 9 at 6:50-44:09.) During the stop, Trooper Hanson conducted ordinary traffic violation
inquiries by asking for Mr. Rodriguez’s license, proof of insurance, and returning to his
vehicle to inspect the documents and check for outstanding warrants. Rodriguez, 575 U.S.
at 355. Trooper Hanson also investigated whether Mr. Rodriguez was driving under the
influence by having him complete field sobriety testing. Then, Deputy Jensen investigated
suspected drug trafficking by asking Mr. Rodriguez if the vehicle contained narcotics,
asking for consent to search, and having canine Koa conduct a dog sniff. See Rederick, 65
F.4th at 967 (finding drug-dog sniff was part of mission of stop where troopers had
reasonable suspicion of drug activity before initiating the stop). All three investigations
were part of the “missions” of the stop. The Court concludes that thirty-seven minutes was
a reasonable duration for the three investigations. See Rederick, 65 F.4th at 966 (upholding
a 27-minute stop to investigate drugs); United States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407,
416 (8th Cir. 2017) (affirming a 23-minute stop to investigate a traffic violation and a drug
transaction); see also Magallon, 984 F.3d at 1279 (finding hour long delay to investigate
drug trafficking was not unreasonable explaining that “addressing the suspicion of drug
activity require[s] time”).
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Thus, the Court determines that the length of the stop was justified, and the evidence
derived from the search should not be suppressed.
C. Law Enforcement had Probable Cause to Search Grand Am
In his challenge to the search of his vehicle, Mr. Rodriguez also argues that canine
Koa did not provide a reliable basis to search Mr. Rodriguez’s Grand Am and that any
evidence seized must be suppressed.
“An alert or indication by a properly trained and reliable drug dog provides probable
cause…for the search of a vehicle.” Rederick, 65 F.4th at 967 (quoting United States v.
Winters, 600 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 2010)). “A drug detection dog is considered reliable
when it has been trained and certified to detect drugs.” Winters, 600 F.3d at 967 (quotation
omitted); accord Rederick, 65 F.4th at 967. “If a bona fide organization has certified a dog
after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume (subject to any
conflicting evidence offered) that the dog's alert provides probable cause to
search.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246-47 (2013). “The sufficiency of a drug dog's
alert must be construed with the same “flexible, common-sense standard” as probable
cause.” Rederick, 65 F.4th at 968 (quoting Harris, 568 U.S. at 240). Moreover, “[e]ven if
a drug dog's ‘performance record raises questions about his reliability…the issue is whether
‘the totality of the circumstances present at the scene’ provided probable cause to search.”
Winters, 600 F.3d at 968 (quoting Donnelly, 475 F.3d 955).
Here, it is undisputed that canine Koa was certified by the North American Work
Dog Association for the detection of narcotics. (Gov. Ex. 11; Tr. at 90.) Thus, the Court
can presume Koa’s alert provided probable cause subject to any conflicting evidence
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presented. Harris, 568 U.S. at 246-47. Mr. Rodriguez argues that Koa did not provide
probable cause to search because (1) Koa had completed training only two weeks before
the stop, (2) Koa deviated from training during the stop and his final indication was
“ambiguous,” and (3) Koa had a record of unreliability. (Dkt. 141 at 13-17.) These
arguments are unpersuasive.
First, Koa’s lack of field experience as a new drug canine does not alone suggest
unreliability. See States v. Jackson, 811 F.3d 1049, 1052 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding dog’s
alert provided probable cause to search even though it was the dog’s first field operation).
Second, one of Koa’s alleged deviations—jumping onto his hind legs to sniff the open
window of the car was, as Deputy Jensen testified, a significant alert because he had never
seen Koa leave his feet in training unless he was investigating a narcotics odor. (Tr. 102.)
Deputy Jensen also testified that the excess narcotics odor may have made it difficult for a
dog to pinpoint the narcotics exact location. (Tr. at 103.) And the second deviation, Koa
jumping onto Deputy Jensen, occurred only after Koa had already given a final indication
(Tr. at 105.).
It was also unnecessary for canine Koa to give only a “trained response to the odor
of narcotics rather than an untrained one.” United States v. Thin Elk, 148 F.4th 595, 600
(8th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). A drug dog’s alert is sufficient for probable cause, even
without a final indication. See United States v. Holleman, 743 F.3d 1152, 1157 (8th Cir.
2014) (“[T]he handling officer testified Henri gave two definitive “alerts” to the side of
Holleman's truck. As a result, we are not concerned about Henri's failure to give a full
indication . . . .”); Rederick, 65 F.4th at 968 (finding drug dog’s changed breathing and
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wagging tail faster sufficient alert behavior provided probable cause to search). Deputy
Jensen testified that he identified Koa’s alert to the presence of narcotics when Koa stopped
following his hand to sniff odors, snapped his head to rear wheel well, engaged in
bracketing, and jumped up to sniff inside an open window. He also testified that Koa gave
two final indications when he laid down briefly, twice, and that Koa was not required to
remain down for any amount of time. (Tr. at 103.) The Court finds the training records,
certification, Deputy Jensen’s testimony, and the other evidence in the record supports a
finding that Koa’s alerts and indications during the stop provided probable cause to search.
Third, though Mr. Rodriguez points to two instances before the stop where Koa
falsely alerted, the deployment record for the false alert on November 23, 2024 is not in
evidence. And although the evidence submitted shows that Koa falsely alerted on
November 16, 2024 (Gov. Ex. 13) the evidence also shows he performed accurately on
November 17, 2024 (Gov. Ex. 12) and on the morning of November 24, 2024. Overall, the
Court cannot discern Koa’s overall accuracy rate because the record lacks specificity on
Koa’s performances preceding the stop, such as under what circumstances false alerts
occurred, or how often. See United States v. Anderson, No. 24-CR-263 (DSD/DJF), 2025
WL 2697861 (D. Minn. Aug. 28, 2025) (rejecting defendant’s argument that drug dog’s
records demonstrated misinterpreted or false alerts where records were not submitted into
evidence and the court could not discern “whether these were limited instances or regular
occurrences”), R&R adopted, 2025 WL 2697422 (D. Minn. Sept. 22, 2025). Without
specific evidence of Koa’s overall accuracy before the stop, the Court finds Deputy
Jensen’s testimony, canine Koa’s records and certification, and the video showing Koa’s
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behavior, all support a finding that Deputy Jensen credibly identified Koa’s alerts and
indications during the stop, providing probable cause to search.
Finally, even if Mr. Rodriguez definitively demonstrated that Koa was a low-
accuracy dog, the totality of the circumstances present at the scene, combined with the
collective knowledge of Investigator Rasinski, still provided probable cause to search the
Grand Am. Winters, 600 F.3d at 968.5 At the time of the traffic stop law enforcement knew
Mr. Rodriguez was in communication with Mr. Diaz-Aguilar (a person involved with drug
distribution) based on the seizure of Mr. Diaz-Aguilar’s phones. Law enforcement was
aware of Mr. Rodriguez’s past criminal history involving drug distribution. Law
enforcement suspected that Mr. Rodriguez’s Cash App activity was consistent with drug
sales, and that Mr. Rodriguez had traveled to the locations where the individuals who had
paid Mr. Rodriguez through Cash App lived. And law enforcement knew that Mr.
Rodriguez met with Mr. Diaz-Aguilar a few days before the stop, and that Mr. Rodriguez
was traveling towards the people he had prior Cash App transactions with when he was
stopped with two cell phones in his possession. These facts imputed to Trooper Hanson,
and combined with canine Koa’s alert, established probable cause to search the Grand Am.
Rederick, 65 F.4th at 966; Winters, 600 F.3d at 968.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that law enforcement had both
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop the Grand Am, and probable cause to
5 To the extent that Rodriguez relies on Koa’s performance months after the stop at issue,
that reliance is misplaced because the “issue is whether the totality of the circumstances
present at the scene provided probable cause to search.” Winters, 600 F.3d at 968 (emphasis
added) (cleaned up). Nor has Rodriguez provided any legal authority for
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search. Therefore, the Court recommends denying the Motion to suppress evidence
obtained from the Grand Am.
VII. Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived from Search of Cell Phones (Dkt. 93)
Mr. Rodriguez argues there was no independent reason6 for the second stop of his
vehicle and the seizure of his two phones was unlawful. The Government argues that law
enforcement had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle a second time, had probable cause
to the seize the phones, and exigent circumstances supported the warrantless seizure of the
phones.
Here, the Court concludes there was probable cause to believe the Grand Am, and
specifically the phones, contained evidence of drug trafficking, justifying the second stop
of Mr. Rodriguez. Hollins, 685 F.3d at 706. The second stop was not based on a hunch,
rather it was based on the same factors which formed probable cause to search the Grand
Am during the first stop discussed above. Additionally, law enforcement’s seizure of
approximately three pounds of methamphetamine during the first stop further provided
probable cause that the vehicle and the phones contained evidence of drug trafficking. See
United States v. Barrios, No. 24-10116 (JWB), 2025 WL 1517422, at * 9 (D. Kan. May
28, 2025) (finding second stop occurring minutes after first stop was justified where facts
known before first stop and discovered before second stop amounted to reasonable
suspicion and probable cause of drug smuggling).
6 Defendant does not provide specific argument on the unlawfulness of the second stop,
only that there was “no independent reason for stopping Rodriguez’s vehicle. (Dkt. 141 at
18.)
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Mr. Rodriguez argues that the warrantless seizure of the phones during the second
stop was unlawful. The Court disagrees. “The warrantless seizure of property is per se
unreasonable unless it falls within a well-defined exception to the warrant
requirement.” United States v. Mays, 993 F.3d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 2021) (quotation
omitted). “One such exception applies when officers have probable cause to seize the
property and exigent circumstances require immediate seizure.” United States v. Shrum, 59
F.4th 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 300 (2023). “Probable cause exists
when, viewing the totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Reed, 921 F.3d
751, 757 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “[E]xigent
circumstances exist when, if the property is not seized immediately, there is a risk that the
evidence contained therein would be lost or destroyed.” Mays, 993 F.3d at 616 (citations
omitted). “The existence of exigent circumstances is an objective analysis focusing on what
a reasonable, experienced police officer would believe.” United States v. Williams, 431
F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).7
Here, law enforcement had probable cause to seize the phones. See Hernandez-
Mendoza, 600 F.3d at 977; Burris, 22 F.4th at 785. Because Mr. Rodriguez communicated
with Mr. Diaz-Aguilar on the phone, he had received money through Cash App, an
7 Mr. Rodriguez argues that because law enforcement did not testify that they subjectively
believed Mr. Rodriguez would destroy the phones, there were not exigent circumstances
warranting seizure of the phones. (Dkt. 141 at 18.) Mr. Rodriguez has provided no legal
support for this contention and in any event, whether exigent circumstances existed is an
“objective analysis.” Williams, 431 F.3d at 1118.
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application installed on the phone, and law enforcement had just seized three pounds of
methamphetamine from his Grand Am, a reasonable officer would believe that Mr.
Rodriguez would immediately delete all incriminating information on the phones such as
text messages, photographs, audio files, and applications. See United States v. Mayer, No.
19-cr-0096 (WMW/HB), 2019 WL 8370776 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2019) (finding exigent
circumstances justified warrantless seizure of phone where defendant may destroy
evidence because he was not allowed to have internet capable phone and leaned away from
officers while manipulating phone ), R&R adopted, 2020 WL 583008 (D. Minn. Feb. 6,
2020); Shrum, 59 F.4th at 972-73 (finding exigent circumstances justified warrantless
seizure of phone where reasonable officer could believe defendant would destroy evidence
after being informed of the accusation for which evidence existed on phone); United States
v. Evans, No. 1:23-cr-00117 (AGF), 2024 WL 5232987, at * 4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2024)
(finding exigent circumstances where reasonable officer could believe evidence might be
deleted from phone after defendant was aware he was accused of an offense involving
recording on phone); United States v. Wright, No. 23-cr-160 (NEB/JFD), 2025 WL 602465
(D. Minn. Feb. 25, 2025) (finding exigent circumstances justified warrantless seizure of
two phones where reasonable officer would worry that defendant would delete
incriminating information if not seized after drug dog alerted to narcotics); Mays, 993 F.3d
at 614-16 (finding exigent circumstances justified warrantless seizure of laptop where the
laptop likely was used to further the defendant's scheme, evidence of that scheme may be
on the laptop, and investigators risked losing digital evidence on the laptop without
immediate seizure).
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In sum, the Court concludes that officers had probable cause to believe evidence of
drug trafficking would be contained on the phones and it was reasonable for officers to
seize the phones without a warrant in order to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence. Therefore, the Court recommends denying Mr. Rodriguez’s motion to suppress
evidence derived from the search of the cellphones. (Dkt. 93.)
VIII. Conclusion
Based on the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Disclosure / Expansion of Jencks Act Disclosure
Obligation (Dkt. 89) is DENIED.
2. Defendant’s Motion for Disclosure of Government’s Intent to use Residual
Hearsay Exception (Dkt. 90) is GRANTED-IN-PART.
3. Defendant’s Motion for Disclosure of Records Relating to Canine (Dkt. 91) is
DENIED as moot.
4. Defendant’s Motion for Hearing Pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (Dkt. 94) is
DENIED.
Furthermore, based on the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons
stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived from Motor Vehicle Search
(Dkt. 92) be DENIED.
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2. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived from Search of Cell Phones
(Dkt. 93) be DENIED.
Dated: December 11, 2025 s/Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set
forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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