Krebsbach v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
GARY KREBSBACH,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Defendant.
Case No. 24‐CV‐2241 (PJS/SGE)
ORDER
Justice Ericson Lindell, GREENSTEIN SELLERS PLLC, for plaintiff.
Lindsey A. Streicher and Scott G. Williams, HAWS‐KM, P.A., for
defendant.
Plaintiff Gary Krebsbach brought this breach‐of‐contract action against
defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”) seeking to recover
benefits under a homeowner’s insurance policy after sustaining hail damage to his roof.
Both parties have moved for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 39, 46. For the reasons that
follow, the Court grants State Farm’s motion and denies Krebsbach’s.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Policy
Krebsbach owns a large home in Arden Hills, Minnesota with a complex, cedar‐
shake roof. See Krebsbach Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 48. The roof was damaged by a hailstorm
on May 19, 2022. Krebsbach Decl. ¶ 3–5; Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 1‐1. At the time, the
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home was insured under a homeowner’s policy issued by State Farm. Streicher Decl.
Ex. A at SF0440, ECF No. 42‐1 (“Policy”).1
The Policy’s loss‐settlement provisions are at the center of this dispute.
Following a covered loss, State Farm must first pay the actual cash value (“ACV”) of the
damaged property, minus any deductible. Policy at SF0473. The ACV is defined as
“the value of the damaged part of the property at the time of loss, calculated as the
estimated cost to repair or replace such property, less a deduction to account for pre‐
loss depreciation.” Id. at SF0498. Typically, a policyholder will use the ACV payment
as seed money to fund repairs and then seek reimbursement from State Farm once
repairs are completed. At that point, State Farm must indemnify the homeowner for
what he actually paid to repair or replace the damaged property—what is known as the
“replacement cost value” or RCV. See id. at SF0473 (“[Insurer] will pay the covered
additional amount [the insured] actually and necessarily spend[s] to repair or replace
the damaged part of the property[.]”). 2
1Both parties submitted copies of the Policy with their motions. See Streicher
Decl. Ex. A; Krebsbach Decl. Ex. A. To avoid confusion, the Court cites to the Bates‐
stamped pages of the Policy attached as Exhibit A to the August 7, 2025, declaration of
Lindsey A. Streicher.
2The Court previously explained how the “typical replacement‐cost policy”
functions in Selective Insurance Company of South Carolina v. Sela, 455 F. Supp. 3d 841, 844
(D. Minn. 2020). The ACV reflects the amount an “insurer must pay no matter what,”
while the RCV reflects a conditional payment that an “insurer must pay only if the
(continued...)
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Critically for this case, State Farm’s obligation to make the second payment—i.e.,
the RCV payment—is expressly conditioned on the policyholder doing two things:
First, the insured must “complete the actual repair or replacement of the damaged part
of the property within two years after the date of loss.” Id. Second, the insured must
“notify [State Farm] within 30 days after the work has been completed.” Id. Unless and
until the policyholder satisfies both conditions, State Farm is obligated to “pay only the
actual cash value of the damaged property.” Id.
The Policy also describes an appraisal process that the parties must follow if they
“fail to agree on the amount of loss.” Id. at SF0476. As relevant here, the appraisal
provision provides:
You must comply with SECTION I — CONDITIONS, Your
Duties After Loss before making a demand for appraisal.
At least 10 days before demanding appraisal, the party
seeking appraisal must provide the other party with written,
itemized documentation of a specific dispute as to the
amount of the loss, identifying separately each item being
disputed.
a. 	Each party will select a competent, disinterested
appraiser and notify the other party of the appraiser’s
identity within 20 days of receipt of the written
demand for appraisal.
2(...continued)
insured repairs or replaces the property.” Id.
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Id.; see also id. at SF0475–76 (“Your Duties After Loss”) (obligating the insured to
“submit to [State Farm], within 60 days after the loss, [a] signed, sworn proof of loss”
setting forth, among other things, “detailed estimates for repair of the damage” and “an
inventory of damaged . . . personal property”).
B. The Loss
As noted, Krebsbach’s home was damaged by hail on May 19, 2022. Krebsbach
Decl. ¶ 3–5; Compl. ¶ 9. The parties dispute when Krebsbach first notified State Farm
of his loss. Krebsbach says that he notified his State Farm agent sometime during the
summer of 2022 after noticing that cedar shakes were falling from his roof. Krebsbach
Decl. ¶ 5. State Farm, for its part, says that Krebsbach did not report the loss until
October 6, 2022. Def.’s Reply at 2, ECF No. 52; Streicher Decl. Ex. B (claim log listing
October 6, 2022, as the “Date Reported”).3
3The record is unclear about the exact date—or even the exact month—of
Krebsbach’s initial report. Compare Pl.’s Mem. at 2 (“In September 2022, Krebsbach
informed State Farm of the hail damage to his roof.”); id. at 3 (stating that the loss was
reported “within the first few months” after the storm); Krebsbach Decl. ¶ 5 (stating the
loss was reported “[i]n the summer of 2022”); with Def.’s Reply at 2 (characterizing
Krebsbach’s assertion that “State Farm did not inspect the property ‘until several
months’” after the claim was reported as “patently false”) (emphasis omitted). For
purposes of ruling on State Farm’s summary‐judgment motion, the Court assumes that
Krebsbach reported the loss sometime in the summer of 2022, as he claims. See, e.g.,
Coffey v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 987 F.3d 808, 811–12 (8th Cir. 2021) (“Summary
judgment may be appropriate where the parties dispute facts, so long as the court
assumes as true the facts alleged by the nonmoving party for the purposes of the
motion.”).
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On October 13, 2022, State Farm sent an adjuster to inspect the roof. Pl.’s Mem.
at 3, ECF No. 45. The adjuster estimated the ACV as $3,721.77, which represented an
estimated RCV of $4,165.70 minus an estimated $443.93 for depreciation. See Streicher
Decl. Ex. C at SF0263. Because the ACV did not exceed the $11,743.00 deductible, State
Farm advised Krebsbach that it would not issue a payment on his claim. Streicher Decl.
Ex. E at SF0019. State Farm also reminded Krebsbach that he could recover the RCV
once he completed repairs and noted that he should contact his claim specialist if he
“obtain[ed] an estimate that exceed[ed] the estimate” prepared by State Farm. Id.
Dissatisfied with State Farm’s estimate, Krebsbach asked State Farm to send a
different adjuster to perform a second inspection. Pl.’s Mem. at 3–4; Krebsbach Decl.
¶¶ 11–13. 4 That second inspection took place in late October 2022, but Krebsbach was
again dissatisfied because, he contends, the adjuster “did not inspect the entire roof”
and the adjuster’s estimate (which matched the first adjuster’s estimate) failed to take
into account hail damage to the cedar shakes. See Krebsbach Decl. ¶¶ 6–7 (noting State
4There is some dispute as to whether and when any subsequent inspections took
place. Compare Krebsbach Decl. ¶¶ 11–13 (stating a total of three inspections occurred
where “the same findings were reported”), with Def.’s Mem. at 7 (denying that any
additional inspections occurred, but noting that the dispute “is not material, as these
inspections or rejections of inspections took place in fall of 2022 and also did not yield
any change in State Farm’s position”). This dispute is immaterial, however, because
State Farm never altered its position at any point during the claims‐handling process.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted [to preclude summary judgment].”).
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Farm’s initial estimate “only included damage to the roof vents, rain caps and gutter
downspouts”), ¶ 12 (noting that “the same inspector came out again and reported the
same findings”).
Around the same time, Krebsbach engaged Bison Builders (“Bison”) to inspect
the roof and to prepare an estimate. Krebsbach Decl. ¶¶ 9–10; Bergland Decl. ¶¶ 3–7.
Bison’s estimate, submitted to State Farm on November 1, 2022, valued the repairs that
had to be done to the roof at $211,871.39. Bergland Decl. Ex. B at SF0330. Within a few
days, State Farm rejected Bison’s estimate and confirmed that it continued to estimate
the ACV as $3,721.77 and the RCV as $4,165.70. Streicher Decl. Ex. D at SF0322
(explaining that Bison’s photos “depict[ed] damage resulting from wear, tear and
deterioration,” a cause of loss not covered by the Policy); see also Bergland Decl.
¶¶ 10–11, Ex. C.
As of early November 2022, then, the parties knew that there was a very large
gap between State Farm’s estimate and Krebsbach’s. Oddly, though, aside from brief
correspondence between Bison and State Farm in April 2023,5 nothing happened for the
next 15 months. Krebsbach says that shakes continued falling from his roof throughout
the summer and fall of 2023, yet Krebsbach did nothing until February 2024, when he
5On April 19, 2023, Bison resubmitted to State Farm the photographs and
estimate from November 2022. Streicher Decl. Ex. I at SF0270; Bergland Decl. ¶¶ 12–13,
Ex. D. Because it did not receive any new information, State Farm maintained its
position. Streicher Decl. Ex. K at SF0320.
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engaged a new contractor. Krebsbach Decl. ¶¶ 15–17. The new contractor, Classic
Construction, submitted its repair estimate to State Farm on April 8, 2024, in an amount
exceeding $1.4 million—which was more than six times Bison’s estimate and more than
336 times State Farm’s. Streicher Decl. Ex. L at KREBSBACH000040. State Farm
rejected the estimate on April 18, 2024, and Krebsbach formally demanded appraisal the
next day—one month before his two‐year period to complete repairs expired. Hagen
Decl. ¶ 5; Krebsbach Decl. ¶¶ 18–20, Ex. D. After State Farm failed to promptly respond
to his appraisal demand, Krebsbach retained counsel on May 15, and Krebsbach filed
this lawsuit the following day. Krebsbach Decl. ¶¶ 21–23; see also Policy at SF0476.
On May 23, 2023, State Farm notified Krebsbach that, before it would move
forward with an appraisal, Krebsbach would have to file a sworn proof of loss. Ex. O at
SF0036. Krebsbach submitted a sworn proof of loss later that day, and the following
day (May 24, 2023), State Farm notified Krebsbach that it had appointed John Foster as
its appraiser. Id.; Streicher Decl. Ex. N at SF0026. The appraisal went forward on July
25, 2024, with a three‐appraiser panel determining that the ACV was $164,690.00 and
the RCV was $426,543.31. Streicher Decl. Ex. P at SF0533. Two days later, State Farm
issued a payment to Krebsbach in the amount of $152,947.00, which represented the
ACV determined by the panel ($164,690.00) minus Krebsbach’s deductible ($11,743.00).
Krebsbach Decl. ¶ 28; Streicher Decl. Ex. Q at SF0531.
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Again, under the Policy, Krebsbach was not entitled to recover RCV benefits
unless he “complete[d] the actual repair or replacement of the damaged part of the
property within two years after the date of loss.” Policy at SF0498. Despite the fact that
more than two years had passed since the date of loss (May 19, 2022), and despite the
fact that State Farm notified Krebsbach that he had “$0” remaining for “Replacement
Cost Benefits,” Krebsbach submitted to State Farm a contract for repair work reflecting
the RCV determined by the appraisal. Streicher Decl. Ex. Q at SF0531, Ex. S at SF0418;
Krebsbach Decl. ¶¶ 30–31, Ex. I. A State Farm claim specialist notified Krebsbach’s
attorney that no RCV benefits would be paid even if Krebsbach completed the repairs
because “the two year period established in the policy to recover the replacement value
for a claim” had expired. Streicher Decl. Ex. T at SF0400–403.
The only question for this Court, then, is whether State Farm is required to pay
RCV benefits to Krebsbach. Both parties move for summary judgment on that issue.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute over a fact is “material” only if its resolution
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v.
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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a dispute over a fact is “genuine” only
if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id. When ruling on a summary‐judgment motion, the Court views the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in
his favor. Wobig v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 40 F.4th 843, 847 (8th Cir. 2022).
Minnesota substantive law governs this diversity action. See, e.g., Corn Plus Coop.
v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 516 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 2008). This Court is, of course, bound by the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decisions regarding Minnesota law. C.S. McCrossan Inc. v.
Fed. Ins. Co., 932 F.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 2019). But “[i]f the Minnesota Supreme Court
has not spoken on a particular issue,” the Court “may consider relevant state precedent,
analogous decisions, considered dicta, and any other reliable data” in its “attempt to
predict how the Minnesota Supreme Court would decide [the] issue.” Id. (quotation
omitted) (cleaned up).
B. Breach of Contract
Krebsbach argues that State Farm breached the insurance contract when it
refused to pay RCV benefits. To recover for breach of contract under Minnesota law,
Krebsbach must prove: “(1) formation of a contract, (2) performance by plaintiff of any
conditions precedent to his right to demand performance by the defendant, and
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(3) breach of the contract by defendant.” Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828,
833 (Minn. 2011).
State Farm argues that Krebsbach is not entitled to recover RCV benefits because
he failed to perform a condition precedent—specifically, the condition requiring him to
complete repairs within two years of the date of loss. A condition precedent is “a
contract term that calls for the performance of some act or the happening of some event
after the contract is entered into, and upon the performance or happening of which the
promisor’s obligation is made to depend.” Capistrant v. Lifetouch Nat’l Sch. Studios, Inc.,
916 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted) (cleaned up). When a condition
precedent is neither satisfied nor excused, the party who was obligated to perform the
condition cannot enforce the contract. Id. at 27; see also Crossroads Church of Prior Lake
MN v. Cnty. of Dakota, 800 N.W.2d 608, 615 (Minn. 2011) (“[U]nfulfilled conditions
prevent enforcement of a contract.”).
Krebsbach concedes that the obligation to complete repairs within two years of
the date of loss was a condition precedent to his recovery of RCV benefits and that he
failed to perform that condition. But Krebsbach argues that his performance of the
condition should be excused. The failure to perform a condition precedent may be
excused if performance was “hindered or rendered impossible by the other party,”
Zobel & Dahl Constr. v. Crotty, 356 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Minn. 1984), or if the other party
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commits an earlier, material breach, Home Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh,
658 N.W.2d 522, 534 (Minn. 2003). Krebsbach argues that he should be excused from
satisfying the two‐year repair condition because (1) State Farm breached the Policy by
undervaluing his claim, and (2) State Farm hindered his performance by delaying the
claim‐handling process. The Court examines each argument in turn.
1. Condition Excused by Preceding Breach Undervaluing Loss
“Under Minnesota law, a material breach by one party may excuse the
performance of another.” M.M. Silta, Inc. v. Cleveland Cliffs, Inc., 572 F.3d 532, 537 (8th
Cir. 2009). Krebsbach contends that State Farm materially breached the Policy by failing
to “adjust all losses . . . and to pay for the storm damage to his property,” thereby
excusing his compliance with the two‐year repair condition. Pl.’s Mem. at 8–9 (quoting
Policy at SF0477).
The Court disagrees. An insurer breaches an insurance contract when it “refuses
to pay or unreasonably delays payment of an undisputed amount.” Olson v. Rugloski, 277
N.W.2d 385, 387 (Minn. 1979) (emphasis added). This is not such a case. At all times,
State Farm acknowledged that it was obligated to pay to repair the damage caused by
the hailstorm.6 The parties simply disagreed about the amount of that (covered) loss.
6To the extent that Krebsbach suggests that State Farm’s disagreement with his
estimates was a denial of coverage, his suggestion is unsupported by the record. State
Farm’s position that certain claimed damage to the cedar shakes resulted from ordinary
(continued...)
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Courts routinely reject efforts to repackage valuation disputes (which are an
ordinary and anticipated feature of claim processing) as coverage disputes (which may
give rise to a breach‐of‐contract claim). Where an insurer wrongfully denies coverage,
courts are more willing to excuse an insured’s noncompliance with a repair deadline
because the insured’s performance may be “impossible, or at least unduly risky”
without advance payment of the ACV or an insurer’s commitment to pay for the
repairs. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 362 F. Supp. 3d 265, 269 (E.D. Pa.
6(...continued)
wear and tear—and therefore fell outside the scope of the Policy’s coverage—reflected a
disagreement about the amount of loss caused by the hailstorm, not a disagreement
about whether any such loss was covered. See Streicher Decl. Ex. D at SF0322; Quade v.
Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that assessing the “‘amount of
loss’ necessarily includes a determination of the cause of the loss, and the amount it
would cost to repair that loss”); Martinique Props., LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London Subscribing to Pol’y No. W1551E160301, 567 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1107 (D. Neb. 2021)
(“A dispute over the value of property or amount of loss is distinct from a dispute over
whether the insurance policy covers the damage in the first place.”).
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2019).7 But where, as here, the insurer acknowledges coverage and disputes only the
amount of the covered loss, courts tend to strictly enforce repair deadlines.8
This case falls squarely into the latter category. Again, State Farm never denied
that it was obligated to pay for whatever damage had been caused by the hailstorm.
The parties simply disagreed about the extent of that damage. This was a valuation
dispute—a type of dispute that is so common that the Policy provided an appraisal
process for resolving it. Policy at SF0476 (detailing an appraisal mechanism to be
invoked if the parties “fail to agree on the amount of loss”).9 Accordingly, Krebsbach
7See, e.g., id. at 269–70 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (observing that, when coverage is denied,
an insured faces an “‘unsavory’ choice” between undertaking costly repairs without
assurance of reimbursement or limiting his recovery to the ACV if the insurer is later
found liable on the claim); New Oil Christian Ctr. v. GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., No. 22‐CV‐
2136 (MJD/ECW), 2025 WL 642914, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2025) (permitting the insured
to recover the RCV awarded at appraisal when the insurer “repeatedly denied any
coverage for over a year”).
8See, e.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 362 F.Supp.3d at 269–70; Kaw Drive, LLC v. State Auto
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1034–35 (D. Kan. 2022) (rejecting the
argument that “the actual cash value payment must be ‘adequate’ to trigger the
insured’s duty to complete repairs or replacements”); Olga Despotis Tr. v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co., 867 F.3d 1054, 1064 (8th Cir. 2017) (applying Missouri law and holding that an
insured’s “assertions of general dissatisfaction in the manner with which [an insurer]
handled its claim” did not constitute a breach that could excuse compliance with a time‐
limited repair condition).
9See also PSS Props., LLC v. North Star Mut. Ins. Co., 999 N.W.2d 902, 905–06
(Minn. Ct. App. 2023) (concluding that an appraisal award exceeding the insurer’s
estimate does not amount to a determination that the insurer breached the policy);
Selective Ins. Co. of S.C. v. Sela, 413 F. Supp. 3d 861, 864 (D. Minn. 2019) (“Policyholders
(continued...)
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cannot rely on the dispute over the valuation of his claim to excuse his noncompliance
with the two‐year repair condition.
2. Condition Excused by Delays Hindering Performance
Krebsbach separately contends that “State Farm’s actions in delaying the claim
process” hindered his ability to complete repairs within two years. Krebsbach Decl.
¶ 135. Every contract in Minnesota contains an “implied condition that each party will
not unjustifiably hinder the other from performing.” Zobel & Dahl Constr., 356 N.W.2d
at 45. “Similarly, . . . [a] party to a contract cannot take advantage of the failure of a
condition precedent when the party itself has frustrated performance of that condition.”
In re Hennepin Cnty. 1986 Recycling Bond Litig., 540 N.W.2d 494, 502 (Minn. 1995).
That principle has limits, however. An insurer’s conduct “can be such as to estop
that [insurer] from asserting a time limitation contained in an insurance policy” only
when it “would be ‘unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable to allow the defense to be
9(...continued)
have been making claims—and insurers have been denying claims—since Minnesota
became a state in 1858.”); In re State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 872 F.3d 567, 573 (8th Cir. 2017)
(concluding, in the class‐certification context, that “State Farm’s method of determining
estimated ‘actual cash value’ does not breach its replacement cost contract”); Manitou
Vill. Chalet Townhomes v. Harleysville Ins. Co., No. 12‐CV‐0386 (JNE/FLN), 2013 WL
1881056, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL
1881605 (D. Minn. May 6, 2013) (concluding that insurer had not “breached any
contractual or other legal duty to its insured” when it did not deny coverage,
“proceeded with the appraisal process set forth in their policy,” and “paid the
remaining [ACV] amount owed within five days” of the appraisal award’s finalization).
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interposed.’” L & H Transport, Inc. v. Drew Agency, Inc., 403 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn.
1987) (quoting 18A G. Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d § 75:195 (1983)).
a. Initial Inspection and Rejection of Estimates
Krebsbach alleges that State Farm “dragged its feet at all stages of the claim” by
failing to properly inspect his roof in 2022 and by rejecting the contractor estimates
submitted in 2022, 2023, and 2024. Pl.’s Mem. at 14, 9–10. As an initial matter, the
Court is quite certain that the Minnesota Supreme Court would not hold that an insurer
must approve its insured’s preferred estimate or contractor—no matter the amount of
the estimate, and no matter the skill, experience, or reputation of the contractor. Courts
in Minnesota have been loathe to hold that the parties to an insurance contract have any
duties beyond those imposed by the language of the contract itself. See, e.g., Selective
Ins. Co. of S.C. v. Sela, 413 F. Supp. 3d 861, 864 (D. Minn. 2019) (rejecting the argument
that “every contract of insurance . . . imposes a broad duty on insurers to act
‘reasonably’ or ‘properly’ in handling claims”).
More fundamentally, though, any delays attributable to State Farm are dwarfed
by the delays attributable to Krebsbach. By November 2022, Krebsbach knew that the
estimates of State Farm’s assessors and Krebsbach’s contractor were miles apart. Yet
during the next 15 months or so, Krebsbach took no meaningful steps toward resolving
that dispute or repairing his roof. Despite the fact that, according to Krebsbach, he
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spent much of 2023 watching cedar shakes fall off his roof, Krebsbach sat on his hands.
Not until April 19, 2024, did Krebsbach ask for an appraisal.
As far as the record reflects, absolutely nothing prevented Krebsbach from
asking for an appraisal as early as November 2022 instead of waiting until April 2024,
one month before the expiration of his two‐year repair deadline. No reasonable jury
could find that Krebsbach was prevented from meeting the two‐year deadline because
of delays caused by State Far.
b. Response to Appraisal Demand
Krebsbach also makes much of State Farm’s failure to identify its appraiser
within 20 days of his written demand for appraisal, which, again, he made on April 19,
2024. This argument fails for a threshold reason: Krebsbach has not shown that State
Farm’s response was tardy in the first place. The Policy provides that Krebsbach must
comply with all “Duties After Loss”—including submitting a “signed, sworn proof of
loss”—before making a demand for appraisal. Policy at SF0475–76. Yet State Farm
asserts that Krebsbach did not submit a “signed, sworn proof of loss” until May 23,
2024, over a month after Krebsbach demanded appraisal, and nothing in the record
contradicts State Farm’s assertion. Streicher Decl. Ex. N at SF0026. So State Farm’s 20‐
day deadline to identify an appraiser began running on May 23, not April 19.
Moreover, instead of waiting until June 12, 2024 to identify its appraiser—as it had the
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right to do—State Farm identified its appraiser the next day. Krebsbach therefore cannot
show that State Farm’s response to his appraisal demand was delayed.
The Court notes that, even if Krebsbach was correct and State Farm’s 20‐day
deadline began to run on April 19, 2024, State Farm would have had the right to wait
until May 9, 2024 to identify its appraiser. May 9 was just 10 days before expiration of
Krebsbach’s two‐year repair deadline. No reasonable jury could find that, had State
Farm identified an appraiser on May 9, the appraisal could have been completed,
Krebsbach could have retained a contractor, and the contractor could have completed
almost a half million dollars in repairs to a complicated cedar‐shake roof within 10 days.
Moreover, the Policy itself contemplates that the appraisal process will take some
time—and the Policy does not toll the two‐year repair deadline while the appraisal is
taking place. Policy at SF0476–77; see also Colby Lake Fourth Ass’n v. Hiscox Ins. Co., No.
A23‐0201, 2023 WL 6387234, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2023) (“The policy language
does not contemplate events, such as an appraisal, that would change the [repair‐or‐
replacement] requirements under the policy.”).
In sum, Krebsbach has not shown that any delays caused by State Farm made it
impossible—or even slightly more difficult—for Krebsbach to complete the repairs
within two years of the date of loss. Krebsbach missed the deadline because he sat on
his hands for 15 months, not because of any delay attributable to State Farm.
Enforcement of the two‐year condition is therefore neither unjust nor inequitable.
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Because Krebsbach failed to perform that condition precedent, and because his failure is
not excused, he is not entitled to any additional recovery from State Farm.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 39] is GRANTED.
2. 	Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 46] is DENIED.
3. 	Plaintiff’s complaint [ECF No. 1‐1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
AND ON THE MERITS.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 25, 2026 	/s/ Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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CASE 0:24-cv-02241-PJS-SGE Doc. 61 Filed 03/25/26 Page 18 of 18