USA v. Alowonle et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Victor Collins (5),
Defendant.
Case No. 24-cr-293 (PJS/DTS)
ORDER AND REPORT &
RECOMMENDATION
INTRODUCTION
The Government charges fourteen defendants with Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy. Those defendants have filed more than sixty
pretrial 	motions. 	This 	Order 	and 	Report 	& 	Recommendation 	addresses 	three 	of
Defendant Victor Collins’s five pretrial motions. For the reasons stated below, the Court
recommends Collins’s motion to dismiss be denied, denies his motion for severance, and
denies his motion for the release of Brady material.
FACTS
I. 	The Superseding Indictment
The Government filed the Indictment in October 2024, Indictment, Dkt. No. 1, and
the 	operative 	Superseding 	Indictment 	in 	August 	2025, 	Superseding 	Indictment,
Dkt. No. 313. In Count 1 of the Superseding Indictment, the Government charges all
fourteen defendants with RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Id. at 2.
According to the Superseding Indictment, the fourteen defendants “were members and
associates of the Lows, a criminal organization whose members and associates engaged
in acts of violence to include murder, attempted murder, narcotics distribution, and
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 1 of 12

2
firearms trafficking.” Id. The Superseding Indictment identifies 93 overt acts allegedly
committed in furtherance of the RICO conspiracy. Id. ¶ 7.
Of the Superseding Indictment’s 22 additional counts, Collins is charged in Counts
6, 7, 16, and 17. In Count 6, the Government charges Collins with using, carrying, or
possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence resulting in death in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), (j)(1) and (2). Superseding Indictment 26–27. Count 7 charges
Collins with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846. Id. at 28. In Count 16, the Government charges Collins with
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.
Id. at 34. Finally, Count 17 charges Collins with possession of a firearm in furtherance of
drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Id.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Void for Vagueness
Collins 	moves 	to 	dismiss 	Count 	1 	of 	the 	Superseding 	Indictment—RICO
conspiracy—as unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Collins’s Mot. Dismiss 5–7,
Dkt. No. 373. The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he
Government violates this guarantee by taking away someone's life, liberty, or property
under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct
it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United
States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015). A criminal statute is thus unconstitutionally vague when
the statute (1) fails to adequately provide notice of the proscribed conduct; or (2) lends
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 2 of 12

3
itself to arbitrary enforcement. United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir.
2002).
Collins’s motion is premature. As a court in this District explained in a similar RICO
case, “[t]he claim that [18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)] is unconstitutionally vague as applied . . .
requires development of a factual record[.]” United States v. Johnson, No. 23-cr-160,
2024 WL 5432928, at *25 (D. Minn. Sept. 23, 2024), R. & R. adopted as modified by 2024
WL 5432672 (D. Minn. Dec. 3, 2024), and R. & R. adopted in part sub nom. United States
v. Wright, 2025 WL 602465 (D. Minn. Feb. 25, 2025). That is because demonstrating that
a statute, as applied, failed to adequately warn a defendant of the prohibited conduct,
requires factual development of the defendant’s conduct. United States v. Raniere, 384
F. Supp. 3d 282, 320 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Turner,
842 F.3d 602, 604 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding that a trial on the merits was necessary to
decide a defendant’s as-applied void-for-vagueness challenge). Here, Collins takes issue
with the RICO statute’s enterprise requirement. Collins’s Mot. Dismiss 6–7. According to
Collins, “[t]he subjective interpretation of ‘enterprise’ here as constituting any group of
young black men in one part of North Minneapolis who have been charged with robbery,
assault, murder, or distribution of narcotics renders the statute void as applied to the facts
of this case.” Id. at 7. The Government disputes Collins’s characterization of the at-issue
enterprise, 	contending 	that 	“[t]he 	Superseding 	Indictment 	adequately 	alleged 	the
structure, membership, and purpose of the Lows criminal enterprise.” Gov.’s Resp. Mot.
Dismiss, Dkt. No. 404. Because developing a factual record regarding the nature of the
Lows enterprise will help resolve Collins’s as-applied challenge, the Court recommends
denying the motion without prejudice as premature.
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 3 of 12

4
II. 	Selective Prosecution
Collins moves to dismiss for selective prosecution. Collins’s Mot. Dismiss 2–5.
Prosecutors hold broad discretion when making decisions about who and what crimes to
prosecute. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979); United States v.
Chappell, 779 F.3d 872, 879 (8th Cir. 2015). In deciding to prosecute a defendant, the
Government may consider a wide variety of factors including strength of the case against
a defendant, extent of involvement in a crime, resources required to successfully
prosecute a defendant, deterrent effect of the prosecution, and penalties available if
convicted. See United States v. Schullo, 390 F. Supp. 1067, 1068 (D. Minn. 1975); United
States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 1976); Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 124.
Nonetheless, the Government violates a defendant’s equal-protection rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment when it selectively prosecutes them for
an impermissible reason. United States v. Leathers, 354 F.3d 955, 963 (8th Cir. 2004).
To prevail on a selective prosecution claim, a defendant must prove that “(1) he was
singled out for prosecution while others similarly situated were not prosecuted for similar
conduct, and (2) the decision to prosecute him was based on an impermissible motive
such as race, religion, or an attempt by the defendant to secure other constitutional
rights.” United States v. Rodriguez, 581 F.3d 775, 815 (8th Cir. 2009). In other words, a
defendant must show that the prosecution “had a discriminatory effect and that it was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465
(1996). Because courts “presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official
duties,” Chappell, 779 F.3d at 880 (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464), Collins bears the
“heavy” burden of establishing a selective prosecution claim. Ojala, 544 F.2d at 943.
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 4 of 12

5
The thrust of Collins’s argument is that he “is being prosecuted under RICO
because he is black.” Collins’s Mot. Dismiss 2. First, he argues that “[t]he Department of
Justice has already determined that Minneapolis Police Department, largely responsible
for the investigations leading to this indictment, has denied the black community in
Minneapolis equal protection of law.” Id. at 3. For support, he points to a 2023 report
summarizing the results of a Department of Justice civil rights investigation into the
Minneapolis Police Department. Id. Second, Collins contends that “[t]he prosecution here
reflects the national trend to use a statute designed to eliminate the mafia to further assist
in the destruction of the black community.” Id. at 4. Collins cites a scholarly article for the
proposition that most defendants prosecuted under RICO are affiliated with a minority
group. Id. at 3–4.
This evidence is not enough. Selective prosecution is a constitutional constraint on
prosecutorial 	discretion. 	Accordingly, 	the 	allegedly 	discriminatory 	practices 	of 	the
Minneapolis Police Department do nothing to demonstrate that the United States
Attorney’s Office decided to selectively prosecute Collins because of his race. Johnson,
2024 WL 5432928, at *24 (“To the extent Defendants rely on the DOJ Report, the
prosecutors in this case are not members of the Minneapolis Police Department and are
not the subject of the report.”). That the Minneapolis Police Department was responsible
for investigating the incidents underlying the Superseding Indictment does not bridge this
gap without some further link between the Minneapolis Police Department’s role in this
case and the Government’s charging decision.
Collins’s reliance on a scholarly article fares no better. “Law review articles and
studies do not suffice unless they, for example, ‘identify individuals who were not [Black]
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 5 of 12

6
and could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were charged,
but were not so prosecuted.’” Johnson, 2024 WL 5432928, at *24 (quoting United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996)). That is because a selective prosecution claim
requires a defendant to show that “people similarly situated to [the defendant] were not
prosecuted[.]” United States v. Peterson, 652 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Hirsch, 360 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 2004)). Collins makes no effort to
provide the required comparator evidence. He has not overcome the presumption of
regularity nor met his heavy burden to do so. Therefore, the Court recommends Collins’s
motion to dismiss for selective prosecution be denied.
III. 	Brady Materials
Collins moves for the disclosure of specific information under Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963). Collins’s Brady Mot., Dkt. No. 374. Collins requests 29 categories of
information, including, for example, “[e]very case, instance, report, summary, and email
and memorandum confirming the MPD bias that the DOJ agrees has existed during the
relevant times of the RICO enterprise.” Id. at 2.1 According to Collins, this “information is
crucial to his Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for selective prosecution and violation of
his right to equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 1–2.
In a criminal case, the Government’s discovery obligations are rooted in “[Federal]
Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 16 and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.” United States v. Ivers, No. 22-cr-341, 2023 WL
2182327, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 23, 2023). The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
requires the Government “to disclose any evidence favorable to the defendant and that
1 The list of numbered item goes up to 30 but skips 25. See Collins’s Brady Mot. 5.
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 6 of 12

7
is ‘material either to guilt or to punishment.’” United States v. Primm, 63 F.4th 1186, 1192
(8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). Under Brady and its
progeny, “[t]his duty extends not only to evidence of which a prosecutor is aware, but also
to materially ‘favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf
in the case, including the police.’” United States v. Robinson, 809 F.3d 991, 996 (8th Cir.
2016) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)).
Because 	Collins’s 	motion 	seeks 	evidence 	largely 	to 	support 	his 	selective
prosecution motion, there is a readily apparent problem with it. “[T]he justifications for a
rigorous standard of proof for the elements of [a selective-prosecution claim] require a
correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of it.” United States v. Armstrong,
517 U.S. 456, 457 (1996). For that reason, before obtaining discovery to support his
selective-prosecution claim, Collins must “produce at least some credible showing of
differential treatment of similarly situated members of other races or a protected class.”
United States v. Hirsch, 360 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 2004); see also United States v.
Peterson, 652 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2011) (requiring credible evidence). As explained
above, the DOJ report and scholarly article are not credible evidence supporting a claim
of selective prosecution. Supra, Part II. This alone is sufficient reason to deny Collins’s
motion for discovery to support his selective-prosecution claim.
Moreover, Brady only requires the disclosure of material evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jeanpierre, 636 F.3d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 2011). “Evidence is material only
if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Jeanpierre, 636
F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 2011). Even assuming that discovery sought solely to support a
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 7 of 12

8
selective prosecution claim can ever be material in the relevant sense,2 most of Collins’s
discovery requests relate to the Minneapolis Police Department. See, e.g., Collins’s Brady
Mot. 	2 	(requesting 	“[e]very 	instance 	where 	a 	Taser 	was 	employed 	by 	the 	MPD
unnecessarily”). In essence, Collins seeks evidence to demonstrate that the Minneapolis
Police Department uses excessive force and discriminates against African Americans.
That is not relevant, let alone material, to Collins’s selective prosecution claim, much less
to his guilt or punishment. See Supra, Part II.
Three of Collins’s requests do not appear to relate to his selective prosecution
claim and therefore merit separate attention. First, Collins requests “[t]he criminal history
of each witness the government plans to call at trial.” Collins’s Brady Mot. 5. Second, he
requests “[t]he written or oral agreements between the government and its witnesses for
promises of benefit, cash, less jail time, protection, and the like.” Id. Third, he requests,
“[e]very PSR for every government witnesses [sic] who will be testifying.” Id. In general,
the three requested categories of materials can constitute Brady material. See White v.
Pugh, 698 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1076–77 (D. Minn. 2023) (criminal history); United States v.
Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 930 (8th Cir. 2014) (“We have determined that witness motivations,
like the payment of money as an incentive to change testimony, fall within the Brady
disclosure requirement.”); United States v. Garcia, 562 F.3d 947, 952–53 (8th Cir. 2009)
2 There is reason to question this assumption. In Brady, the Court held “that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment[.]”
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Court is skeptical that the evidence Collins requests relates
to his guilt or punishment. Indeed, “several courts have determined that Brady does not
compel the disclosure of information in connection with a defendant's claim of selective
enforcement.” United States v. Jones, No. 2:19-cr-00201, 2020 WL 3128905, at *4 n.3
(D. Me. June 12, 2020) (collecting cases).
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 8 of 12

9
(noting that presentence reports can contain Brady/Giglio information). But the requests
are both moot and premature. They are moot because the Court has already ordered the
Government to produce all Brady material in its possession. Dkt. No. 365 at 4. They may
be premature because the Government has yet to disclose its trial witnesses. Of course,
“[a] federal criminal defendant generally has no right to know about government witnesses
prior to trial,” United States v. Polk, 715 F.3d 238, 249 (8th Cir. 2013), and the
Government need not decide who it will call as witnesses this far in advance of trial.
Therefore, the request for impeachment evidence of the Government’s trial witnesses is
premature. The Court denies Collins’s motion for release of Brady material.
IV. 	Severance
Collins moves to sever his trial from that of his codefendants pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a). Collins’s Severance Mot., Dkt. No. 375. Rule 14(a)
provides that “[i]f the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information,
or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court
may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief
that justice requires.” Despite the authority vested by Rule 14(a), “there is a strong
presumption against severing trials.” United States v. Kramer, 768 F.3d 766, 770 (8th Cir.
2014). That is because “[t]rying codefendants together not only conserves scarce time
and resources, but also ‘gives the jury the best perspective on all of the evidence and
therefore increases the likelihood of a correct outcome.’” United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d
752, 765 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1528 (8th Cir.
1995)). “The district court must balance the interests of judicial economy against the risk
of prejudice when deciding whether to grant a motion to sever.” United States v. Wetsch,
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 9 of 12

10
No. 12-cr-45, 2013 WL 1490222, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 10, 2013). A defendant may show
prejudice by demonstrating that his defense is incompatible with a codefendant’s defense,
or that the jury will be unable to properly compartmentalize the evidence. United States
v. Weckman, 982 F.3d 1167, 1172–73 (8th Cir. 2020).
Collins’s main concern is spillover evidence. According to Collins, “[p]rejudice from
a spillover in a multi-defendant trial featuring multiple murders and other violent acts is
obvious.” Collins’s Severance Mot. 2. Collins contends that evidence at trial “will likely
involve statements or admissions by co-defendants made outside [his] presence,” along
with “[o]ther evidence that is irrelevant or inadmissible against Mr. Collins[.]” Id. Collins
claims this spillover evidence “will prejudice the jury against him, deprive him of a fair and
impartial trial, and deny him of his due process rights.” Id. The Court is not persuaded.
As an initial matter, Collins’s motion does not provide details to substantiate his
concerns. He does not identify, for example, specific statements or evidence that he
claims will prejudice the jury against him. Nor is it even clear at this time which defendants
will be tried together. Simply put, Collins’s speculative concerns of prejudice are
insufficient to overcome the strong presumption against severing trials, especially in a
conspiracy case. See United States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 844 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t will
be the rare case, if ever, where a district court should sever the trial of alleged
coconspirators.”).
Moreover, the admission of spillover evidence does not necessarily require
severance; rather, the question is whether the jury will be able to compartmentalize the
evidence. See United States v. Noe, 411 F.3d 878, 886–87 (8th Cir. 2005). When such
evidence is introduced, jury instructions are ordinarily sufficient to cure any resulting
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 10 of 12

11
prejudice. See United States v. Sherman, 81 F.4th 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he district
court went to great lengths to instruct the jury that the challenged testimony was to be
considered only against Smith. We are convinced that the district court’s repeated limiting
instructions sufficiently cured whatever risk of prejudice existed.”); see also United States
v. Sanchez-Garcia, 685 F.3d 745, 754 (8th Cir. 2012) (“The risk of prejudice in a joint trial
is best addressed by jury instructions.”); United States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829, 838 (8th
Cir. 2006) (“Where multiple defendants are tried together, the risk of undue prejudice is
best cured through cautionary instructions to the jury.”). Collins does not explain why jury
instructions will not adequately address the risk of prejudice here.
Moreover, the benefits of trying Collins with his codefendants are readily apparent.
To prove the existence of a RICO conspiracy, the Government will need to prove: (1) the
existence of an enterprise; (2) the enterprise had some effect on interstate commerce;
(3) the defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (4) two or more
persons agreed to participate in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity; and (5) the defendant voluntarily and intentionally joined in the
agreement. See Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 6.18.1962B
(2024). Proving the existence of a RICO enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity
will require substantial common proof. Requiring the Government to repeatedly prove the
existence of the same enterprise and conspiracy would be incredibly inefficient. And
although there are 22 additional counts charged in the Superseding Indictment, the
Government alleges these additional crimes were committed in furtherance of the RICO
conspiracy. See, e.g., Superseding Indictment 26–27 (alleging that Collins murdered
Victim R “for the purpose of gaining entrance to and maintaining and increasing position
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 11 of 12

12
in the Lows”). In short, this is a case where a joint trial will conserve judicial resources,
provide the jury the best perspective of the evidence, and decrease the likelihood of
inconsistent verdicts.3 Collins’s motion for severance is denied.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. 	Defendant 	Victor 	Collins’s 	Motion 	for 	Disclosure 	of 	Brady 	Materials
(Dkt. No. 374) is DENIED; and
2. 	Defendant Victor Collins’s Motion for Severance (Dkt. No. 375) is DENIED.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS that: Defendant Victor
Collins’s Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment (Dkt. No. 373) be DENIED.
Dated: February 26, 2026 	s/ David T. Schultz__________
DAVID T. SCHULTZ
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All
objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set for in LR 72.2(c).
3 Although it is unlikely that all fourteen defendants will be tried together, Chief Judge
Schiltz will decide trial groups (if necessary) in the ordinary course.
CASE 0:24-cr-00293-PJS-DTS Doc. 631 Filed 02/26/26 Page 12 of 12