USA v. Chanthavong

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Respondent-Plaintiff,
v.
Ijeoma Miriam Chanthavong,
Petitioner-Defendant.
Criminal No. 22-210 (DWF)
Civil No. 26-1285 (DWF)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on three pro se motions filed by Petitioner-
Defendant Ijeoma Miriam Chanthavong: a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(Doc. No. 77), a motion to appoint counsel (Doc. No. 86), and a motion to reopen case
(Doc. No. 87). The United States of America opposes the motions. (Doc. No. 82.) For
the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully denies the motions.
BACKGROUND
Chanthavong pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to commit international
money laundering on October 20, 2022. (Doc. Nos. 1, 10.) On April 19, 2023, the Court
sentenced Chanthavong to three years of probation. (Doc. No. 39.) Judgment was
entered on April 20, 2023. (Id.) Jean M. Brandl represented Chanthavong from the
beginning of this matter through sentencing, as well as at one final probation revocation
hearing in 2023. (See Doc. Nos. 3, 38, 51, 58.) Chanthavong is still on probation. Her
term is up in one day.
CASE 0:22-cr-00210-DWF Doc. 89 Filed 04/17/26 Page 1 of 8

2
Chanthavong moves to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. No. 77.) Specifically, she claims that Brandl
(1) failed to advise her on the immigration consequences of her guilty plea, (2) pressured
her to plead guilty, (3) discouraged proceeding to trial based on racial bias and fear,
(4) refused to investigate or develop evidence of coercion, duress, and lack of intent, and
(5) abdicated her duties during plea negotiations. (Id. at 1.) Chanthavong also requests
that her case be reopened and claims that she did not have complete information before
pleading guilty. (Doc. No. 87.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Vacate Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
A. 	Analysis
A federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentence on
grounds that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States,” “the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,” “the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,” or their sentence “is
otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). If the court finds such a
defect in sentencing, “the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as
may appear appropriate.” Id. § 2255(b).
A one-year statute of limitations applies to § 2255 motions. Id. § 2255(f). That
period runs from the latest of the following:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
CASE 0:22-cr-00210-DWF Doc. 89 Filed 04/17/26 Page 2 of 8

3
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by
such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
Id. Here, Chanthavong did not appeal her judgment of conviction, so it became final on
May 4, 2023, fourteen days after it was entered. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A).
Chanthavong filed her § 2255 motion on February 10, 2026, nearly three years after her
judgment of conviction became final. So, her motion is untimely under § 2255(f)(1).
Chanthavong argues that her motion is not time-barred because § 2255(f)(4)
extends the limitations period. (Doc. No. 77 at 3.) The Court disagrees. Chanthavong
would have known of the facts supporting her claims at the time of her guilty plea, a date
before her judgment of conviction became final. And, if she did not, those facts could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence at the time of her guilty plea.
Chanthavong would have known that Brandl was pressuring her to plead guilty, that
Brandl had made comments about racially biased juries, that Brandl had refused to
further investigate coercion and duress defenses, and that Brandl had abdicated her duties
during plea negotiations. She alleges no “new” facts on these issues.
As for the immigration consequences claim, Chanthavong argues that she did not
discover that her conviction constituted an aggravated felony carrying serious
CASE 0:22-cr-00210-DWF Doc. 89 Filed 04/17/26 Page 3 of 8

4
immigration consequences until she was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) in December 2025 and subsequently served with a final removal
order. (Id. at 1-2.) Alternatively, she seems to suggest that she could not have known of
the immigration consequences at the time of her guilty plea because she was given
incorrect information or the true consequences were otherwise concealed from her. (Doc.
No. 88 at 5.) These assertions are clearly contradicted by the record. Furthermore, her
arguments misinterpret the meaning of “fact” under § 2255(f)(4).
Where a noncitizen defendant makes a § 2255 claim regarding immigration
consequences, the relevant “fact” that triggers the one-year limitations period is when the
defendant knew or would have known through the exercise of due diligence that they face
potential immigration consequences. See, e.g., United States v. Saaga, No. 14-cr-20017,
2020 WL 1034626, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 14, 2020), report and recommendation
adopted, 2020 WL 1031031 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 3, 2020). If that defendant knows before
their guilty plea “that there are potential immigration consequences, the duty of due
diligence arises at the time of the guilty plea.” Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson,
No. 10-40, 2016 WL 825972, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2016)). Moreover, § 2255(f)(4)
“concerns the discovery of facts rather than such facts’ legal significance.” Nyemah v.
United States, No. 24-cv-4057, 2024 WL 2974244, at *4 (D.S.D. June 13, 2024) (citing
Martin v. Fayram, 849 F.3d 691, 697 (8th Cir. 2017)).
Chanthavong’s plea agreement plainly shows that she was aware of the potential
immigration consequences at the time of her guilty plea. The relevant paragraph states:
CASE 0:22-cr-00210-DWF Doc. 89 Filed 04/17/26 Page 4 of 8

5
Immigration Consequences. 	The defendant understands that pleading
guilty may have consequences with respect to her immigration status,
including removal or deportation. 	The defendant understands that no one,
including her attorney, the Assistant United States Attorney or the District
Court, can predict to a certainty the effect of her conviction on her
immigration status. Regardless of any immigration consequences that may
follow from her guilty plea, even automatic removal or deportation from the
United States, the defendant still wishes to plead guilty as set forth in this
agreement.
(Doc. No. 12 ¶ 17.) The paragraph refers directly to “automatic removal or deportation.”
(Id.) Chanthavong does not dispute the legitimacy of her plea agreement. Rather, she
disputes the legal impact of the language it contains. Chanthavong knowingly signed this
agreement, and the Court covered its contents, including the immigration consequences
paragraph, at the change of plea hearing. Specifically, the Court told Chanthavong that
there could be removal or deportation proceedings following her guilty plea and asked
her if she understood that. She said that she did. Therefore, Chanthavong cannot claim
now that she was unaware of the potential consequences of her guilty plea until she was
apprehended by ICE and served with a final order of removal. Moreover, knowledge of
potential consequences triggers the statute, not the legal certainty of her removal.
Chanthavong relied on a case from the Second Circuit to argue that “[d]iscovery
occurs when the defendant learns the actual, operative consequences, not when
boilerplate language exists.” (Doc. No. 77 at 3 (citing Wims v. United States, 225 F.3d
186, 190 (2d Cir. 2000)).) That case does not discuss operative consequences and
boilerplate language. Instead, it focuses on a situation where defense counsel did not
timely file an appeal that the defendant asked them to file, and the defendant did not
discover that failure until later on. Wims, 225 F.3d at 188. Wims does not apply here.
CASE 0:22-cr-00210-DWF Doc. 89 Filed 04/17/26 Page 5 of 8

6
Chanthavong also argues that the Court should apply equitable tolling. (Doc.
No. 77 at 4.) A defendant is entitled to equitable tolling only if they show (1) that they
have been pursuing their rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
prevented timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); see also
Chachanko v. United States, 935 F.3d 627, 629 (8th Cir. 2019) (relying on Holland test in
the § 2255 setting). Chanthavong has not shown or alleged that there was an
extraordinary circumstance that prevented her from filing earlier. Therefore, the Court
will not equitably toll the statute of limitations.
In conclusion, the relevant date for calculating the statute of limitations is the date
that Chanthavong’s judgment of conviction became final, which is May 4, 2023.
Chanthavong did not bring her § 2255 motion before May 4, 2023, so her motion is time-
barred and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
B. 	Evidentiary Hearing
A § 2255 motion can be dismissed without a hearing when: (1) the defendant’s
allegations, if accepted as true, would not entitle them to relief; or (2) the allegations
cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, are inherently
incredible, or are conclusions, rather than statements of fact. Delgado v. United States,
162 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1998). Here, Chanthavong’s allegations are contradicted by
the record.
C. 	Certificate of Appealability
A defendant cannot appeal a final order denying a motion under § 2255 without a
certificate of appealability (“COA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); Fed. R. App.
CASE 0:22-cr-00210-DWF Doc. 89 Filed 04/17/26 Page 6 of 8

7
P. 22(b)(1). A court cannot grant a COA unless the applicant has made “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A substantial
showing requires showing that an issue is “debatable among reasonable jurists, a court
could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings.” Cox v.
Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997). Here, no issue raised is debatable among
reasonable jurists. Therefore, no COA shall be issued.
II. 	Other Motions
Chanthavong filed two additional motions. First, she moves to appoint counsel.
(Doc. No. 86.) First, “there is no general right to counsel in post-conviction habeas
proceedings for criminal defendants.” United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451, 455 (8th
Cir. 1999); see Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 245-46 (2019). The Court denies her
motion to appoint counsel. Second, Chanthavong moves to reopen her case. (Doc.
No. 87.) She asks that the Court reopen it so she may share her story and discuss her
personal circumstances following her conviction. (Id.) She does not cite any legal
authority to support reopening her case. The Court does not have the authority to reopen
her case without a reason, such as a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Chanthavong has not alleged any viable grounds under that statute, or any other statute.
The Court denies her motion to reopen.
CONCLUSION
Chanthavong’s § 2255 motion is untimely, so it must be dismissed without
prejudice. The Court also denies her motion to appoint counsel and her motion to reopen
the case. The Court sympathizes with the difficulties of Chanthavong’s situation
CASE 0:22-cr-00210-DWF Doc. 89 Filed 04/17/26 Page 7 of 8

8
following the issuance of the final removal order. Unfortunately, this was always a
potential consequence of her guilty plea in this case, as acknowledged at the change of
plea hearing, and there is nothing more this Court can do. Any remedies regarding the
final removal order must come through the usual immigration court proceedings.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1. 	Petitioner-Defendant Ijeoma Miriam Chanthavong’s pro se motion to
vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. No. [77]) is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
2. 	No evidentiary hearing is required in this matter.
3. 	No Certificate of Appealability will be issued to Petitioner-Defendant.
4. 	Petitioner-Defendant Ijeoma Miriam Chanthavong’s pro se motion to
appoint counsel (Doc. No. [86]) is DENIED.
5. 	Petitioner-Defendant Ijeoma Miriam Chanthavong’s pro se motion to
reopen case (Doc. No. [87]) is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: April 17, 2026 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
CASE 0:22-cr-00210-DWF Doc. 89 Filed 04/17/26 Page 8 of 8