Roche #612820 v. Ricklard et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
TERRELL ROCHE,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN RICKLARD et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 2:25-cv-275
Honorable Ray Kent
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters
in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.4.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a
putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros.,
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Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under
longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a
named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in
that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s
claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the
proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette
Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying
these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants Osterman and
Hoult for failure to state a claim. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, the
following claims against remaining Defendant Ricklard: (1) Plaintiff’s official capacity claims;
and (2) any § 1983 claims regarding violations of MDOC policy. Plaintiff’s personal capacity
Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendant Ricklard remains in the case.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. The events
about which he complains occurred there. Plaintiff sues the following MBP personnel in their
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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official and personal capacities: Assistant Deputy Warden Unknown Hoult, ARUS/Prison
Counselor Unknown Ricklard, and Resident Unit Manager Unknown Osterman. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.2.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to MBP on September 5, 2025. (Id., PageID.3.)
Immediately after getting off the bus, Plaintiff asked to be placed in protective custody “due to a
bounty being placed on [his] person by the Almighty Vice Lord Nation and Almighty People’s
Nation, due to [Plaintiff] being an informant on [his] criminal cases [and] leaving the gang in
2018.” (Id.) Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation while “the MBP administration
conducted an investigation.” (Id.)
Plaintiff eventually received a copy of the investigative report. (Id.) The report “stated that
MBP staff knew of recent assaults on [Plaintiff’s] person at previous MDOC facilities [and his]
placement in protection.” (Id.) Plaintiff, however, was forced to go to general population. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, he was threatened with receiving disobeying a direct order misconduct
tickets if he did not leave administrative segregation. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that receipt of such
misconduct tickets would have kept him “in a high security level [and] hinder[ed] [his] chance for
parole,” and that he had a parole hearing scheduled for October 13, 2025. (Id.)
Before leaving administrative segregation, Plaintiff sent a kite to the “D-Block ARUS” and
“begged him not to force” Plaintiff to go to general population. (Id.) The ARUS responded “stating
either give more info of top gang leaders or go face the consequences of being a snitch, whatever
happens, happens!” (Id.)
Plaintiff submitted a grievance while in general population, which was denied at Step I.
(Id.) Plaintiff appealed to Step II, and while waiting for that response, the “big yard” was opened
on October 20, 2025. (Id.) On that date, Plaintiff was using the phone to talk to his family and an
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“inmate snuck up behind [him and] began to assault [Plaintiff].” (Id.) The inmate took Plaintiff to
the ground, stomped Plaintiff on his ribs and head, and got on top of Plaintiff to “continuously”
punch him. (Id.) Plaintiff had to receive X-rays of his rib cage and elbow. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that
due to the assault, he has experienced nightmares and increased depression and anxiety. (Id.)
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff raises Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims, as
well as claims regarding violations of MDOC policy. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks the following relief:
(1) verbal and written apologies from all staff involved in denying him protection; (2) a transfer
from MBP and placement in a facility with a “real” protective custody unit; (3) payment of any
medical bills that result from the assault; and (4) compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages.
(Id., PageID.4.)
II. 	Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
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misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A. 	Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff has named Defendants in both their official and personal capacities. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.2.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit
against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and
their departments, such as the MDOC, are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in
the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity, or Congress has expressly abrogated
Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24
F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has
not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir.
1986). And, regardless, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who
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may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617
(2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66); Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013).
Here, Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.4.) However, as noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under
§ 1983 for money damages. See, e.g., Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617. Similarly, Plaintiff may not seek
monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“We hold
that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.”).
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Although damages
claims against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed, an official capacity action
seeking prospective injunctive or declaratory relief is not treated as an action against the state.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–
60 (1908)). The Ex parte Young doctrine “rests on the premise—less delicately called a ‘fiction’—
that when a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating
federal law, he is not the State for sovereign immunity purposes.” Virginia Ofc. for Prot. and
Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011) (internal citation omitted.”) The Supreme Court has
cautioned that, “Ex parte Young can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a
‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not suggest that any of the Defendants are engaged in
ongoing violations of federal law. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations concern discrete events that
occurred in September and October of 2025. Plaintiff, therefore, does not seek relief that is
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properly characterized as prospective. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims against Defendants in their entirety.
B. 	Personal Capacity Claims
1. 	Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claims
Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to
protect him from the assault that occurred after Plaintiff was moved to general population.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to
punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981). The
Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148
F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations
of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison
confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant
experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. “Routine discomfort is ‘part
of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). As a consequence, “extreme deprivations
are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id.
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he
faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th
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Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying
deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims). The deliberate-indifference
standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling,
509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the
subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.” Id. at 837. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act
with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of
recklessly disregarding that risk.” Id. at 836. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial
risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the
risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844.
Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 833. Thus, prison staff are obliged “to take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984). In
particular, because officials have “stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of self-
protection[,]” “officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. To establish a violation of this right, a plaintiff must show
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his or her risk of injury. Walker v. Norris, 917
F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990); McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 880–81 (6th Cir. 1988). While a
prisoner does not need to prove that he has been the victim of an actual attack to bring a personal
safety claim, he must at least establish that he reasonably fears such an attack. Thompson v. Cnty.
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of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242–43 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff has the minimal burden of
“showing a sufficient inferential connection” between the alleged violation and inmate violence to
“justify a reasonable fear for personal safety.”).
a. 	Defendants Hoult and Osterman
Plaintiff has named Assistant Deputy Warden Hoult and Resident Unit Manager Unknown
Osterman as Defendants in this matter. Plaintiff, however, does not mention Defendants Hoult and
Osterman within the factual allegations of his complaint or otherwise identify any actions that may
be attributed to Defendants Hoult and Osterman.
It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular
defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, to state a claim, a plaintiff must make
sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit “has
consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations
of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant
did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir.
2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Where
a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject
to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v.
Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims where the
complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were
personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery,
No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal
involvement against each defendant) (citing Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th
Cir. 1998)); Rodriguez v. Jabe, 904 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those
individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them
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which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.”). Furthermore, while
Plaintiff references the “MBP Administration,” a “[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed
‘Defendants’ [or Administration] does not support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is
liable . . . .” Boxill v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Heyne v. Metro. Nashville
Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011)). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hoult
and Osterman fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and are subject to dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
To the extent that Plaintiff has named Hoult and Osterman because of their positions as
Assistant Deputy Warden and Resident Unit Manager, the Court notes that government officials
may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). The acts of one’s
subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act.
See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899
(6th Cir. 2002); Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability
may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to
act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300
(6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active
conduct by a supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending
individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
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incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee,
199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that
the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300);
see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995
F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts suggesting that Defendants Hoult and Osterman
encouraged or condoned the conduct of Defendant Ricklard, or authorized, approved, or
knowingly acquiesced in that conduct. As noted above, Plaintiff fails to set forth any allegations
at all regarding conduct that can be attributed to Defendants Hoult and Osterman. Thus, Plaintiff
has not alleged that Defendants Hoult and Osterman “either encouraged the specific incident[s] of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in [them].” Peatross, 818 F.3d at 242
(quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hoult and
Osterman will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
b. 	Defendant Ricklard
Plaintiff alleges that prior to leaving administrative segregation, he sent a kite to the D-
Block ARUS and begged not to be forced to go to general population. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.3.) Although Plaintiff does not mention Defendant Ricklard by name in the body of the
complaint, the Court presumes that Defendant Ricklard was the D-Block ARUS given that Plaintiff
has referred to Ricklard as an ARUS/Prison Counselor. (Id., PageID.2.) In his kite, Plaintiff
expressed fear of being assaulted given the “bounty” placed on him by gangs. (Id.) In response,
Plaintiff was told that he either had to give information regarding top gang leaders or “go face the
consequences of being a snitch, whatever happens, happens!” (Id.) Subsequently, after Plaintiff
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was moved to general population, he was assaulted by another inmate. (Id.) Although Plaintiff has
by no means proven his claim, at this point in the litigation, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendant Ricklard.
2. 	Violations of MDOC Policy
Plaintiff also mentions that Defendants’ actions violated MDOC policy. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.3.)
As an initial matter, claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivations of rights
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 924 (1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v.
Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendants violated the MDOC's policies fail to state a claim
under § 1983.
Additionally, “[w]ithout a protected liberty or property interest, there can be no federal
procedural due process claim.” Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972)). Courts routinely
have recognized that a prisoner does not enjoy any federally protected liberty or property interest
in state procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983); Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d
577, 581 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007); Brody v. City of Mason, 250 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus,
Plaintiff’s allegation that violated MDOC policy fails to raise a cognizable federal claim.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims regarding alleged violations of MDOC policy will
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Conclusion
The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Having conducted the
review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendants Osterman and Hoult will be
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dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, the following claims against
remaining Defendant Ricklard: (1) Plaintiff’s official capacity claims; and (2) any § 1983 claims
regarding violations of MDOC policy. Plaintiff’s personal capacity Eighth Amendment failure to
protect claim against Defendant Ricklard remains in the case.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	December 2, 2025 	/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge
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