Dombrowski #512113 v. Howard

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
ALEXANDER DOMBROWSKI,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFREY HOWARD,
Respondent.
____________________________/
Case No. 2:25-cv-19
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner Alexander Dombrowski is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
at the Kinross Correctional Facility (KCF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. Following
a jury trial in the Hillsdale County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of one count of first-
degree premeditated murder, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316(1)(a), one count of
second-degree murder, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.317, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b.
On August 12, 2019, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of life for the first-
degree murder conviction and 40 to 60 years for the second-degree murder conviction, as well as
a consecutive 2-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.
On January 29, 2025, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition, raising the following two
grounds for relief:
I. The testimony at the evidentiary hearing clearly demonstrates that
[Petitioner] was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel by
counsel’s failure to investigate and failure to present a defense at trial.
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II. People v. Carpenter, 464 Mich. 223, 627 N.W.2d 276 (2001)[,] was
wrongly decided. [T]rial courts should be able to admit evidence depicting
a mental deficiency short of legal insanity or incompetence to provide
context for a defendant’s actions.
(§ 2254 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6–7.) Respondent contends that Petitioner’s grounds for relief
are meritless. (ECF No. 6.) For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed
to set forth a meritorious federal ground for habeas relief and will, therefore, deny his petition for
writ of habeas corpus.
Discussion
I. Factual Allegations
The Michigan Court of Appeals described the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions as
follows:
[Petitioner] was convicted of fatally shooting his father, Alex (“Al”) Dombrowski,
Sr., and his father’s live-in girlfriend's brother, Tim Curtiss, at his father’s
farmstead in Camden Township on August 16, 2018. Prosecution witnesses
identified [Petitioner] as the shooter. The defense did not deny that [Petitioner] was
the shooter, but argued that he was guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary
manslaughter on the basis of the strange behavior that he exhibited before, during,
and after the crimes. The jury found [Petitioner] guilty as charged.
Before trial, [Petitioner] had undergone two forensic evaluations and he was found
competent to stand trial, capable of being criminally responsible, and not legally
insane.
People v. Dombrowski, No. 352125, 2022 WL 17170186, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2022).
Jury selection for Petitioner’s trial occurred on July 16, 2019. (Trial Tr. I, ECF No. 7-3.)
Over the course of two days, the jury heard testimony from numerous witnesses. (Trial Tr. I and
II, ECF Nos. 7-3, 7-4.) On July 17, 2019, the jury returned a guilty verdict. (Trial Tr. II, ECF No.
7-4, PageID.699–700.) Petitioner appeared before the trial court for sentencing on August 12,
2019. (ECF No. 6-5.)
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After sentencing, Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, appealed his convictions and
sentences to the Michigan Court of Appeals. Petitioner subsequently moved for a remand to the
trial court for the appointment of medical experts and for a Ginther hearing1 to develop his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Dombrowski, 2022 WL 17170186, at *1. The court of
appeals granted those motions on August 14, 2020. Id.
The trial court conducted the Ginther hearing on April 6, 2022. (Ginther Hr’g Tr., ECF
No. 7-6, PageID.721.) During the hearing, the court heard testimony from Dr. Colin King, Dr.
Dominic Borgialli, Petitioner’s defense attorney Roderick Dunham, and Petitioner himself. (Id.,
PageID.722.) Following testimony and argument, the trial court noted that it would be “giving a
verbal opinion.” (Id., PageID.823.) The parties convened again on April 20, 2022, for the trial
court’s verbal opinion. (ECF No. 7-7.) The trial court concluded that counsel’s conduct was not
deficient and did not prejudice Petitioner and denied Petitioner’s motion for a new trial. (Id.,
PageID.835.)
On direct appeal, Petitioner, through counsel, raised the following grounds for relief: (1)
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (a) inadequately investigating Petitioner’s mental state;
(b) failing to present a voluntary intoxication defense; (c) failing to interview witnesses; (d)
arguing for a voluntary manslaughter instruction but failing to present any evidence to support that
theory; and (e) advising Petitioner not to testify; and (2) that People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276
(2001), which held that a diminished-capacity defense was no longer viable in Michigan, was
wrongly decided and should be revisited. See generally Dombrowski, 2022 WL 17170186. On
November 22, 2022, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed
1A hearing under People v. Ginther, 212 N.W.2d 922 (Mich. 1973), allows a criminal defendant
to proffer facts or evidence in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Ceasor
v. Ocwieja, 655 F. App’x 263, 266, 271 (6th Cir. 2016).
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his convictions and sentences. See id. at *5. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s
application for leave to appeal on March 1, 2024. See People v. Dombrowski, 2 N.W.3d 455 (Mich.
2024). This § 2254 petition followed.
II. AEDPA Standard
The AEDPA “prevent[s] federal habeas ‘retrials’” and ensures that state court convictions
are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,
693–94 (2002). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated
pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in state court unless the adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
state court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “Under these rules, [a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit
precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of
the state court’s decision.” Stermer v. Warren, 959 F.3d 704, 721 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)). This standard
is “intentionally difficult to meet.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not
consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381–82 (2000);
Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570, 578–79 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “clearly established Federal
law” does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the
merits in state court. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 37–38 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited to
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an examination of the legal landscape as it would have appeared to the Michigan state courts in
light of Supreme Court precedent at the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Miller
v. Stovall, 742 F.3d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 565 U.S. at 38).
A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to” clause if the state court
applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court’s cases, or if it
decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06). “To satisfy this high bar, a
habeas petitioner is required to ‘show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Woods, 575
U.S. at 316 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103).
Determining whether a rule application was unreasonable depends on the rule’s specificity.
Stermer, 959 F.3d at 721. “The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching
outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).
“[W]here the precise contours of the right remain unclear, state courts enjoy broad discretion in
their adjudication of a prisoner’s claims.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 424 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160
F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is
presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2011)
(en banc); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2003); Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d
652, 656 (6th Cir. 2001). This presumption of correctness is accorded to findings of state appellate
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courts, as well as the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546–547 (1981); Smith v.
Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989).
Section 2254(d) limits the facts a court may consider on habeas review. The federal court
is not free to consider any possible factual source. The reviewing court “is limited to the record
that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U.S. 170, 180 (2011). “If a review of the state court record shows that additional fact-finding was
required under clearly established federal law or that the state court’s factual determination was
unreasonable, the requirements of § 2254(d) are satisfied and the federal court can review the
underlying claim on its merits. Stermer, 959 F.3d at 721 (citing, inter alia, Brumfield v. Cain, 576
U.S. 305 (2015), and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954 (2007)).
If the petitioner “satisfies the heightened requirements of § 2254(d), or if the petitioner’s
claim was never ‘adjudicated on the merits’ by a state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),”—for example,
if he procedurally defaulted the claim—“AEDPA deference no longer applies.” Stermer, 959 F.3d
at 721. Then, the petitioner’s claim is reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d
433, 436 (6th Cir. 2003)).
III. Discussion
A. Ground I—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As his first ground for relief, Petitioner contends that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by “fail[ing] to investigate and fail[ing] to present a defense at trial.” (§ 2254 Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.6.)
1. Standard of Review
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a
two-prong test by which to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must prove: (1) that counsel’s performance
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fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the petitioner resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome. Id. at 687. A
court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must “indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689.
The petitioner bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the challenged action might
be considered sound trial strategy. Id. (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)); see
also Nagi v. United States, 90 F.3d 130, 135 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that counsel’s strategic
decisions were hard to attack). The court must determine whether, in light of the circumstances as
they existed at the time of counsel’s actions, “the identified acts or omissions were outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Even if a court
determines that counsel’s performance was outside that range, the petitioner is not entitled to relief
if counsel’s error had no effect on the judgment. Id. at 691.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized, when a federal court reviews
a state court’s application of Strickland under § 2254(d), the deferential standard of Strickland is
“doubly” deferential. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (citing Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,
123 (2009)); see also Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013); Cullen, 563 U.S. at 190; Premo v.
Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122 (2011). Scrutiny of counsel’s performance is “highly deferential”, per
Strickland, to avoid the temptation to second guess a strategy after-the-fact and to “eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Scrutiny of the state court’s scrutiny
of counsel’s performance must also be deferential, per 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In light of that double
deference, the question before the habeas court is “whether there is any reasonable argument that
counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.; Jackson v. Houk, 687 F.3d 723, 740–41
(6th Cir. 2012) (stating that the “Supreme Court has recently again underlined the difficulty of
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prevailing on a Strickland claim in the context of habeas and AEDPA” (citing Harrington, 562
U.S. at 102)).
Petitioner raised his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, and the
Michigan Court of Appeals addressed them under the following standard:
“Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law.” People v. Solloway, 316 Mich. App. 174,
187; 891 N.W.2d 255 (2016). “To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that his or her attorney’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that this
performance caused him or her prejudice.” People v. Nix, 301 Mich. App. 195, 207;
836 N.W.2d 224 (2013) (citation omitted). “To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant
must show the probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings
would have been different.” Id. The effective assistance of counsel is presumed,
and the burden is on the defendant to establish the contrary. People v. Roscoe, 303
Mich. App. 633, 644; 846 N.W.2d 402 (2014). “Reviewing courts are not only
required to give counsel the benefit of the doubt with this presumption, they are
required to ‘affirmatively entertain the range of possible’ reasons that counsel may
have had for proceeding as he or she did.” People v. Gioglio (On Remand), 296
Mich. App. 12, 22; 815 N.W.2d 589 (2012) (citation omitted), vacated in part on
other grounds, 493 Mich. 864 (2012). “[A] reviewing court must conclude that the
act or omission of the defendant’s trial counsel fell within the range of reasonable
professional conduct if, after affirmatively entertaining the range of possible
reasons for the act or omission under the facts known to the reviewing court, there
might have been a legitimate strategic reason for the act or omission.” Id. at 22–23.
The defendant has the burden of establishing the factual predicate of his ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. People v. Douglas, 496 Mich. 557, 592; 852 N.W.2d
587 (2014).
Dombrowski, 2022 WL 17170186, at *1. Although the court of appeals cited state law, the standard
is identical to the one set forth in Strickland. Moreover, Solloway identifies Strickland as the source
of the standard. See Solloway, 891 N.W.2d at 266.
The court of appeals’ application of the correct standard eliminates the possibility that the
resulting decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law. As the Supreme Court stated in
Williams v. Taylor:
The word “contrary” is commonly understood to mean “diametrically different,”
“opposite in character or nature,” or “mutually opposed.” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 495 (1976). The text of § 2254(d)(1) therefore suggests
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that the state court’s decision must be substantially different from the relevant
precedent of this Court. The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the “contrary to”
clause accurately reflects this textual meaning. A state-court decision will certainly
be contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. The Court went on to offer, as an example of something that is not
“contrary to” clearly established federal law, the following:
[A] run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule from our
cases to the facts of a prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within
§ 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause. Assume, for example, that a state-court
decision on a prisoner’s ineffective-assistance claim correctly identifies Strickland
[v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),] as the controlling legal authority and,
applying that framework, rejects the prisoner’s claim. Quite clearly, the state-court
decision would be in accord with our decision in Strickland as to the legal
prerequisites for establishing an ineffective-assistance claim, even assuming the
federal court considering the prisoner’s habeas application might reach a different
result applying the Strickland framework itself. It is difficult, however, to describe
such a run-of-the-mill state-court decision as “diametrically different” from,
“opposite in character or nature” from, or “mutually opposed” to Strickland, our
clearly established precedent. Although the state-court decision may be contrary to
the federal court’s conception of how Strickland ought to be applied in that
particular case, the decision is not “mutually opposed” to Strickland itself.
Id. at 406. Therefore, because the court of appeals applied the correct standard, Petitioner can only
overcome the deference afforded state court decisions if the determinations regarding Petitioner’s
ineffective assistance claims are unreasonable applications of Strickland or if the court of appeals’
resolutions were based on unreasonable determinations of the facts. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).
The court of appeals addressed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim under four
subparts: (1) counsel’s alleged inadequate investigation of Petitioner’s mental state; (2) counsel’s
alleged failure to present a voluntary intoxication defense; (3) counsel’s failure to interview
witnesses; and (4) counsel advising Petitioner to not testify on his own behalf. See Dombrowski,
2022 WL 17170186, at *2–5. The Court, therefore, will do the same to address Petitioner’s
ineffective assistance claim.
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2. Failure to Adequately Investigate Petitioner’s Mental State
Petitioner first contends that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate Petitioner’s
mental state. In his § 2254 petition, Petitioner suggests that despite substantial evidence regarding
his use of methamphetamine, the two psychologists who examined Petitioner before trial did not
recommend a neurological evaluation. (§ 2254 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.15.) Petitioner also
contends that both psychologists attempted to contact counsel “regarding their respective
interviews but were unsuccessful in speaking with him.” (Id.) Petitioner faults counsel for
“ma[king] no additional efforts to obtain additional testing of any kind—not even a medical
examination!” (Id.) Overall, Petitioner believes counsel should have fully investigated “the
psychological findings that [Petitioner] was not insane pursuant to Michigan law as foreclosing
mitigation evidence.” (Id., PageID.18.)
Petitioner raised this argument on direct appeal, and the court of appeals rejected it, stating:
[Petitioner] has not overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s
performance was within the range of reasonable professional conduct. Gioglio (On
Remand), 296 Mich. App. at 22. The record supports that, after investigation, trial
counsel reasonably determined that an insanity defense would not be viable. Trial
counsel contemplated the viability of an insanity defense before the preliminary
examination. As a result of trial counsel’s motion, the trial court ordered that
[Petitioner] be evaluated for criminal responsibility. The examiner concluded that
[Petitioner] was criminally responsible, and thus [Petitioner’s] mental status did not
meet the requirements for legal insanity. Trial counsel explained that, hoping for a
better outcome, he successfully acquired funds to obtain a second opinion from an
independent examiner. Trial counsel further explained that, because he knew
resources were very limited, he searched for the best expert he could. The
examination took 4-1/2 hours and the examiner reviewed the files and other reports.
The independent examiner, who had come “highly recommended,” also concluded
that [Petitioner] was criminally responsible. Thus, both forensic examiners reached
the same conclusion. [Petitioner] has not presented an appropriate offer of proof to
refute these findings, or to otherwise show that he was legally insane at the time of
the offense to support that counsel’s decision not to further pursue additional
examinations was objectively unreasonable.
Further, absent an appropriate offer of proof, [Petitioner] is unable to establish that
he was prejudiced in this regard. Defendant has effectively received a third and
fourth evaluation as a result of this Court remanding this case for the appointment
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of medical experts, both of whom examined [Petitioner] and testified at the Ginther
hearing. Both experts opined that long-term use of methamphetamine and alcohol
could negatively impact the brain and could support that [Petitioner] was mentally
ill at the time of the offenses. One expert’s diagnosis of [Petitioner] as having a
“triple diagnosis,” “[m]eaning substance abuse, substance dependency, mental
illness and brain injury” would not, standing alone, have given [Petitioner] a legal
insanity defense at trial. The second expert testified that [Petitioner] did not appear
to be cognitively impaired. While both experts believed that a brain scan would
have been useful to provide more information, the evidence was also clear that a
brain scan was not the standard of care for someone presenting with substance
abuse and schizophrenia. Thus, considering that this suggested course of action was
not the medical standard of care, and that the defense had already received
conclusions from two forensic examinations, counsel made a reasonable decision
that further investigation was not necessary. See Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich. at 52.
But even considering [Petitioner’s] assertion that he suffered from “a mental
illness,” a defendant does not establish the affirmative defense of insanity by merely
establishing that he suffered from mental illness. MCL 768.21a(1). Thus,
[Petitioner] has not established the factual predicate for his claim. Douglas, 496
Mich. at 592. Because the record discloses that the viability of an insanity defense
was investigated before trial, that there was no evidence to support that defense,
and that [Petitioner] has not demonstrated that trial counsel was ineffective for not
making further inquiries regarding his mental state, [Petitioner] has not established
that trial counsel was ineffective on this basis. Ericksen, 288 Mich. App. at 201.
Dombrowski, 2022 WL 17170186, at *2.
Michigan law provides that
[l]egal insanity is an affirmative defense requiring proof that, as a result of mental
illness or being mentally retarded as defined in the mental health code, the
defendant lacks “substantial capacity either to appreciate the nature and quality or
the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of the law.”
People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276, 280 (Mich. 2001) (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 768.21a(1)). A defendant bears the burden of “proving the defense of insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.21a(3). Mental illness alone, however,
is a necessary, but not sufficient, requirement for an insanity defense. See People v. Ramsey, 375
N.W.2d 297, 302 (Mich. 1985). Therefore, under a “continuum of mental functioning,” see id.,
“[i]nsanity by definition is an extreme of mental illness.” People v. Fultz, 314 N.W.2d 702, 704
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(Mich. Ct. App. 1991). Essentially, “the statutes provide that all insane people are mentally ill but
not all mentally ill people are insane.” See id.
Here, the court of appeals’ conclusion is entirely consistent with Strickland. The record
reflects that even after four evaluations by medical experts—two before trial and two prior to the
Ginther hearing—there was insufficient evidence that Petitioner suffered from a mental health
issue that would rise to the level of supporting an insanity defense. Furthermore, while Petitioner
faults counsel for not further investigating his mental state, including seeking a medical
examination, Petitioner fails to provide any evidence that any further investigation by counsel
would have resulted in another plausible defense related to Petitioner’s mental health. See
Richardson v. Watwood, No. , 2025 WL 1042341, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2025) (rejecting
ineffective assistance claim based upon a failure to present an insanity or other mental health
defense when two evaluations showed that the petitioner did not suffer “a mental health issues that
would support an insanity or other defense related to his mental health”). Notably, while Petitioner
appears to suggest that his substance use negatively impacted his mental health at the time of the
murders, as discussed below, counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a voluntary
intoxication defense.
3. Failure to Present Voluntary Intoxication Defense
Petitioner also faults counsel for failing to present a voluntary intoxication defense at trial.
Petitioner contends that counsel “conducted no investigation into meth psychosis.” (§ 2254 Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) He also faults counsel for “only skimm[ing] the psychological reports
generated prior to trial as the[y] contained significant information as to his client’s background
and disclosed his client’s use of alcohol or methamphetamine.” (Id.) According to Petitioner,
“[a]lthough appointed shortly after [Petitioner’s] arrest, [counsel] never requested his client be
tested for drug use.” (Id., PageID.17.) Petitioner essentially suggests that counsel should not have
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“accept[ed] at face value his client’s initial denial of alcohol and methamphetamine use.” (Id.,
PageID.18.)
The court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s argument, stating:
MCL 768.37 abolished voluntary intoxication as a defense, subject to one limited
exception. Voluntary intoxication may be a defense to “a specific intent crime” if
the defendant can establish “by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she
voluntarily consumed a legally obtained and properly used medication or other
substance and did not know and reasonably should not have known that he or she
would become intoxicated or impaired.” MCL 768.37(2). [Petitioner] has not
demonstrated that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to present a voluntary
intoxication defense. Preliminarily, given the evidence presented at the Ginther
hearing, counsel did not know that [Petitioner] had consumed alcohol or ingested
drugs. [Petitioner] admitted that he did not inform trial counsel that he had ingested
drugs or consumed alcohol. [Petitioner] also denied ingesting any drugs before the
offenses during his forensic evaluations before trial. Trial counsel testified that he
asked [Petitioner] whether he had used any drugs, including methamphetamine, and
[Petitioner] insisted that he had not. [Petitioner] made it clear that his
methamphetamine abuse was “long over with” by the incident date. Trial counsel
chose to believe [Petitioner’s] denial of drug use on the basis of counsel’s
experience with numerous clients who were methamphetamine users, and
[Petitioner] did not appear to be one. Rather, when counsel met with [Petitioner]
after his arrest, [Petitioner] was “very intelligent and very polite to me and knew
what he was doing[,] what he was saying . . . . He did not seem like he was on
drugs.” Furthermore, [Petitioner] does not argue that he did not know or reasonably
should not have known that he would become intoxicated or impaired when he
voluntarily ingested drugs. Consequently, trial counsel’s belief that [Petitioner] had
not ingested drugs was objectively reasonable, and [Petitioner] has not
demonstrated that a voluntary intoxication defense would have otherwise been
available to him.
Dombrowski, 2022 WL 17170186, at *3.
The court of appeals’ conclusion is entirely consistent with Strickland. Even if counsel
should have been aware that Petitioner had consumed alcohol or used methamphetamine,
Petitioner presents no clear and convincing evidence to overcome the court of appeals’ conclusion
that Petitioner did not know or reasonably should not have known that the voluntary use of alcohol
and methamphetamine would cause him to become intoxicated or impaired. As such, Petitioner
fails to overcome the court of appeals’ conclusion that the voluntary intoxication defense would
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not have been available for Petitioner to rely upon at trial. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective
for failing to advance a meritless defense. See Tackett v. Trierweiler, 956 F.3d 358, 375 (6th Cir.
2020). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief with respect to this assertion of ineffective
assistance.
4. Failure to Interview Witnesses
In his § 2254 petition, Petitioner contends that counsel “made no attempt to interview
J[ua]nita Dombrowski (see Affidavit of J[ua]nita Dombrowski)[,] Joe Curtiss[,] or any family
members to obtain perspective on his client’s aberrant behavior.” (§ 2254 Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.15.)
Petitioner has attached to his § 2254 petition a sworn declaration from Juanita Dombrowski
dated June 14, 2020. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.24–25.) Juanita is Petitioner’s half-sister. (Id.,
PageID.24.) Juanita stated that their parents were alcoholics, that she and Petitioner and their other
siblings were physically abused by their parents, and that she and Petitioner were “also sexually
abused by [their] parents’ friends.” (Id.) Juanita indicated that Petitioner’s behavior began to
change when their stepmother died in a car crash. (Id.) According to Juanita, Petitioner “had violent
outbursts; he threw things and destroyed property. He began to use alcohol and drugs[,] primarily
marijuana and later methamphetamine or crystal meth.” (Id.)
Juanita averred that Petitioner “frequently displayed bizarre behavior.” (Id.) When
Petitioner was high, “his eyes became glassy. He was extremely paranoid and claimed he could
hear voices in his head—voices that told him what to do. His moods would come and go and as
his moods increased, he became more and more isolated.” (Id.)
Juanita wrote that on the evening of the murders, Petitioner “looked like he was in a
trance—like some sort of zombie.” (Id.) “[N]either the Prosecutor nor [Petitioner’s] trial attorney
talked to [her] or other family members about [Petitioner] or about [their] testimony in court.” (Id.)
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Juanita believed she “could have offered some background on [Petitioner] and his behavior and
could have given the jury a more complete picture of the situation but [she] was never contacted
by anyone.” (Id.) Juanita indicates that her statement “was drafted by [Petitioner’s] appellate
attorney . . . and it accurately reflects [her] statements to [appellate counsel] in [their] telephone
conversations of May 1 and 13[,] 2020.” (Id., PageID.25.)
On direct appeal, the court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s assertions, stating:
At the Ginther hearing, trial counsel testified that he did not remember speaking
with [Petitioner’s] family members or other potential witnesses before trial. His
most important trial strategy was to “bring out” as much as he could about how
strange [Petitioner’s] behavior was at the time [of the] incident, and he sought to
accomplish this during his cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, who
were essential to the defense. The record shows that trial counsel followed this
strategy.
In opening statement, counsel encouraged the jurors to keep an open mind, stated
that there would be some mitigating circumstances that would allow the jurors to
find “a lesser verdict than first-degree murder,” and stated that “you’ve already
heard the first part about the possibly saying that the defendant was acting
paranoid.” During trial counsel’s cross-examination of several witnesses, he asked
about [Petitioner’s] odd or strange behavior before and during the offenses. Further,
the two witnesses whom defendant actually names, Joseph Curtiss (Tim’s brother)
and Juanita Dombrowski (defendant's sister), both testified at trial.
Joseph testified that, before the incident, [Petitioner] came to his house and, at one
point, [Petitioner] went on the deck and was acting “real paranoid,” wandering
throughout the home, peering out the windows, and called for his sister Juanita,
who was not there, while standing on the deck. [Petitioner] retrieved Joseph’s gun
and, in response to Joseph’s inquiry about why [Petitioner] had his gun, [Petitioner]
stated that “he was a U.S. Marshal” with “orders to kill two people”; [Petitioner]
did not identify the people who he was ordered to kill. Later, when he and Tim were
summoned to Al’s house, [Petitioner] was standing in the yard, holding a gun “like
a solider.” Juanita testified that [Petitioner] “said some strange things” to her. After
hearing that her father had been shot, she drove to the house and saw [Petitioner],
who was shirtless and standing by the mailboxes at the end of the driveway “in an
assertive stance.” Shortly thereafter, Juanita saw [Petitioner] standing outside. She
stated that he was “just staring at the house blank, like no expression; he didn’t
seem excited or agitated or he seemed empty like just staring at the house.” Juanita
further testified, on cross-examination, that [Petitioner] “looked like he was in a
trance,” had a “blank stare,” and he “looked like a zombie.”
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Additionally, at the outset of closing argument, trial counsel argued: “There’s also
a third option that the Prosecutor does not want you to do and that is voluntary
manslaughter is a lesser offense.” Trial counsel then detailed testimony from
witnesses regarding [Petitioner’s] strange behavior, and argued that his unusual
behavior supported the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. Even if trial
counsel did not interview certain witnesses before trial, the record discloses that
argument and evidence about [Petitioner’s] aberrant behavior was clearly presented
to support the trial strategy. In other words, it is not reasonably probable that the
outcome of the trial would have been different had trial counsel interviewed
witnesses before trial. Nix, 301 Mich. App. at 207. Consequently, [Petitioner]
cannot establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on this basis.
Dombrowski, 2022 WL 17170186, at *3.
The court of appeals’ conclusion is entirely consistent with Strickland. As an initial matter,
with respect to Joe Curtiss and Petitioner’s family members other than Juanita Dombrowski,
Petitioner fails to explain how Curtiss would have provided any further testimony that was
beneficial to his defense had counsel interviewed Curtiss before trial. Moreover, Petitioner fails to
provide evidence that any unnamed family members were even available to testify at his trial, and
he offers nothing but his own assertions to support the conclusion that counsel’s failure to
interview them resulted in prejudice to his defense. See Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 810 (6th
Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of an ineffective assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to call
witnesses where a petitioner did not “introduce [ ] affidavits or any other evidence establishing
what they would have said”); United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
testimony of a putative witness must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the
witness or on affidavit; [a] defendant cannot simply state that the testimony would have been
favorable, [as] self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.” (footnote
omitted)).
Likewise, Petitioner fails to provide any evidence to suggest that the outcome of his trial
would have been different had counsel interviewed Juanita Dombrowski prior to trial. As correctly
set forth by the court of appeals, Juanita testified about Petitioner’s aberrant behavior during cross-
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examination. Although Juanita suggests in her declaration that she could have provided “some
background on Petitioner and his behavior, as well as “a more complete picture of the situation,”
Petitioner fails to demonstrate that evidence regarding Petitioner’s childhood, as set forth in
Juanita’s declaration, would have been admissible during trial. Furthermore, Juanita waited until
almost a year after Petitioner had been convicted to draft this declaration with assistance from
Petitioner’s appellate counsel. If Juanita believed that Petitioner “had been wrongly convicted and
was languishing in prison, why wait?” Ashmon v. Davis, 508 F. App’x 486, 488 (6th Cir. 2012).
This declaration, created after trial, is simply not sufficiently reliable to suggest that any further
testimony from Juanita would have changed the outcome of Petitioner’s trial. See Milton v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Corr., 347 F. App’x at 528, 531–32 (11th Cir. 2009). Likewise, while Juanita states that
Petitioner’s counsel never attempted to contact her prior to trial, there is no indication that Juanita
ever tried to contact Petitioner’s attorney herself.
In light of the foregoing, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel
not interviewing certain witnesses prior to trial. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief
with respect to this assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel.
5. Advising Petitioner Not to Testify
Finally, Petitioner faults counsel for advising Petitioner not to testify “as part of ‘our trial
strategy.’” (§ 2254 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) In a sworn declaration dated May 20, 2020,
Petitioner states: “My attorney told me not to testify as he would argue manslaughter to the jury. I
did not know what to do so I agreed not to tell my story or present any witnesses.” (ECF No. 1-1,
PageID.26.)
The court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s argument on direct appeal, stating:
[Petitioner] has not demonstrated that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him
against testifying and deciding not to call him as a witness. It is undisputed that
[Petitioner] and trial counsel discussed whether [Petitioner] should testify.
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Although trial counsel did not recall what specific reasons he gave to [Petitioner],
testimony supports that there were strategic reasons for not having [Petitioner]
testify. Trial counsel testified that a crucial part of his trial strategy was to show
how “strange” [Petitioner’s] actions were at the time of the incidents. Trial
counseled reasoned that he could “make his case” by cross-examining the
prosecution’s eyewitnesses who observed [Petitioner’s] behavior that night, and
emphasizing how strange [Petitioner’s] actions were. On the basis of trial counsel’s
interactions with [Petitioner], he found [Petitioner] to be “very intelligent and very
polite,” “knew what he was doing[,] what he was saying.” Thus, calling [Petitioner]
as a witness risked harming the argument that [Petitioner] was mentally unstable.
As the trial court observed when denying [Petitioner’s] motion for a new trial, “[i]f
[trial counsel] wanted the jury to believe that his client exhibited odd behavior,
asking a well-spoken defendant to testify, would belie that behavior.” The decision
whether to call [Petitioner] as a witness was a matter of trial strategy, Russell, 297
Mich. App. at 716, for which counsel has wide discretion, People v. Heft, 299 Mich.
App. 69, 83; 829 N.W.2d 266 (2012), and [Petitioner] has not identified or offered
any evidence to overcome the strong presumption of sound strategy in counsel’s
advice that [Petitioner] not testify. That counsel’s strategy ultimately failed does
not render his performance deficient. Matuszak, 263 Mich. App. at 61.
Further, there is no indication in the record that [Petitioner] expressed a desire to
testify to counsel. Trial counsel testified that had [Petitioner] wanted to testify, he
would have put him on the stand. [Petitioner] admitted that he made the final
decision not to testify because he trusted trial counsel. Trial counsel testified that
[Petitioner] made the final decision to not testify. The record from trial supports
trial counsel’s testimony. After the prosecution rested, trial counsel stated: “I’ve
discussed it with him and I believe he wants to follow my lead that I suggested he
not testify as part of our strategy.” The trial court then questioned [Petitioner] at
length, which included the following exchange:
The court: Okay, now let[s] just give you your options, okay? I don’t care
what [trial counsel] says, okay? This is just between you and I right now,
all right? So let me just advise you of your options.
You understand you do have the right to testify and if you choose to testify
you would be subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. That’s one
option. Do you understand that?
Defendant: Yes, your Honor.
The court: Okay, your other option is that you do not have to testify and I
instructed the jury that now a number of times that you don’t have to put on
any of this; no obligation whatsoever.
Now, if You do not testify there is an instruction that I will give that they
can’t use that against you in any manner, okay, because that is your
Constitutional right. Do you understand that?
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Defendant: Yes, your Honor.
The court: That’s option Number 2.
Have you discussed these options with [trial counsel]?
Defendant: Yes, your Honor.
The court: Okay, is it your decision? I don't care about [trial counsel’s]
decision. I’m asking your decision [sic] choose not to testify?
Defendant: Yes, your Honor.
The court: Okay, and -- and you understand your two options?
Defendant: Yes, your Honor.
The court: Okay, and as a matter of trial strategy, you do not wish to testify;
is that correct?
Defendant: Yes, your Honor.
The court: Okay, and this is your decision, not [trial counsel’s]?
Defendant: Yes, your Honor.
[Petitioner] does not claim that he was ignorant of his right to testify, or that trial
counsel coerced him into not testifying. Based on the foregoing, [Petitioner] cannot
show that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify.
Dombrowski, 2022 WL 17170186, at *4–5.
In a criminal trial, the protections afforded under the Constitution for “due process of law”
provide that “no one shall be condemned in his person . . . without an opportunity of being heard
in his own defense.” Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390–91 (1898). A criminal defendant’s right
to testify on his own behalf “is a fundamental right.” United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 908
(6th Cir. 2007) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52–53 & n.10 (1987)). The right can be
waived by a defendant only if done so knowingly and intelligently. Id. (citation omitted); see
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (“Almost without exception, the requirement
of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution
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guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.”). The Supreme Court has
determined that some waivers of fundamental rights are required to be taken on the record.
However, while it remains advisable, “the trial court is neither required to sua sponte address a
silent defendant and inquire whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to
testify, nor ensure that the defendant has waived the right on the record.” United States v. Webber,
208 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993)).
To retain the right, “a defendant must ‘alert the trial court’ that he desires to testify” or that a
disagreement with defense counsel exists. Id. (quoting Pelzer v. United States, No. 96-1195, 1997
WL 12125, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1997)).
Here, the court of appeals’ determination turned principally on the resolution of factual
issues, not legal issues. As noted above, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court is
presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Davis, 658 F.3d at 531. Here, Petitioner does not
offer any new evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, to rebut the court of appeals’
findings.
The court of appeals’ conclusion is entirely consistent with clearly established federal law.
The record reflects that during jury selection, when the trial judge indicated the names of the
witnesses that could be called by the parties, the judge did not mention Petitioner as a potential
witness. (Trial Tr. I, ECF No. 7-3, PageID.331–32.) Petitioner fails to provide any evidence to
suggest that he tried to alert either counsel or the trial judge at that time that he might wish to
testify. Moreover, after the prosecution rested and the court took a short recess, the exchange set
forth above occurred between Petitioner and the trial court. (Trial Tr. II, ECF No. 7-4, PageID.658–
60.) Furthermore, the record is notably devoid of any offer of proof outlining Petitioner’s purported
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testimony. Thus, there is nothing in the record to support a claim that Petitioner's failure to testify
resulted in any prejudice to him.
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the court of appeals’
rejection of his claim that counsel was ineffective for advising Petitioner not to testify on his own
behalf is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland. Petitioner, therefore, is not
entitled to relief with respect to this assertion of ineffective assistance.
6. Summary
In sum, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the court of appeals’ rejection of his various
assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
Strickland. Petitioner, therefore, is not entitled to relief with respect to habeas ground I.
B. Ground II—People v. Carpenter
As his second ground for relief, Petitioner contends that the Michigan Supreme Court
wrongly decided People v. Carpenter, 464 Mich. 223, 627 N.W.2d 276 (2001). (§ 2254 Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.7.) According to Petitioner, “trial courts should be able to admit evidence depicting
a mental deficiency short of legal insanity or incompetence to provide context for a defendant’s
actions.” (Id.) Petitioner suggests that “courts should revisit the People v. Carpenter decision and
find that its bright-line prohibition of mental defenses less than full legal insanity
unconstitutionally infringe upon a defendant’s right to present a defense to criminal charges.” (Id.,
PageID.19.)
Petitioner’s argument that People v. Carpenter should be revisited is entirely premised
upon state law and fails to state a claim upon which habeas relief may be granted. State courts are
the final arbiters of state law, and the federal courts will not intervene in such matters. See Lewis
v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). The decision of the state courts on a state law issue is binding
on a federal court. See Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983); see also Bradshaw v. Richey,
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546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (“We have repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state law,
including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting
in habeas corpus.”). Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court’s holding in Carpenter is axiomatically
correct on habeas review, and this Court has no authority to conclude that the Michigan Supreme
Court wrongfully decided Carpenter.2
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to relief with respect
to habeas ground II.
IV. Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a
certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine
whether a certificate is warranted. Id. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth
by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467.
Consequently, this Court has examined each of Petitioner’s claims under the Slack standard. Under
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong.” Id. “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude
the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.
2 In any event, in 2013, the United States Supreme Court declined to find a due process violation
in a case where the Carpenter decision had been applied retroactively to preclude a Michigan
criminal defendant from introducing a diminished capacity defense. See generally Metrish v.
Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351 (2023).
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Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full
merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of
Petitioner’s claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court’s denial of
Petitioner’s claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate
of appealability. Moreover, although Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution and has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, the Court does not conclude that any issue Petitioner might raise on appeal
would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
Conclusion
The Court will enter a judgment denying the petition, as well as an order denying a
certificate of appealability.
Dated: November 24, 2025 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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