Delaney #671563 v. Waltanen et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
BRASHARD DELANEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN WALTANEN et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 2:24-cv-194
Honorable Ray Kent
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by Plaintiff Brashard Delaney under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the remaining
defendants. (ECF No. 37.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion for
summary judgment. Because that will resolve all claims against all parties, the Court will dismiss
this action with prejudice.
Discussion
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at
the Ionia Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan. He is presently serving a consecutive sentence
string with an earliest release date of May 13, 2028, and a discharge date of July 15, 2037.
Plaintiff’s sentences were imposed following Plaintiff’s entry of guilty pleas to one count of assault
with intent to do great bodily harm and felony firearm in Lenawee County Circuit Court and one
count of assault of a prison employee in Baraga County Circuit Court. See MDOC Offender
Tracking Information System (OTIS), https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2/search (enter First Name
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“Brashard,” Last Name “Delaney,” select Search, select Offender Number 671563) (last visited
Oct. 6, 2026). 1
The events about which he complains occurred at the Baraga Correctional Facility
(AMF), in Baraga, Michigan, on August 30, 2024. Plaintiff sues the following AMF personnel:
Corrections Officers Michael Waltanen, Christopher Loonsfoot, Parker Wilson (identified by
Plaintiff as John Doe #1), Michael Fraki (identified by Plaintiff as John Doe #2), Brian Beck, and
Christian Hebert; Sergeant Joseph Coronado; and Prison Counselor Logan Frantti (identified by
Plaintiff as John Doe #4).
In Plaintiff’s unverified first amended complaint, he avers that, on August 30, 2024,
at approximately 9:45 a.m. he was involved in a “physical altercation” with Corrections Officer
Waltanen. (ECF No. 3, PageID.22.) As other officers ran into the unit in response to the altercation,
Plaintiff retreated approximately six feet away from Waltanen and put his hands in the air with his
back to Waltanen. Defendant Waltanen, without warning, “tasered” Plaintiff in the back. (Id.)
Defendant Waltanen then ran to Plaintiff, expressed his intention to kill Plaintiff, and then grabbed
Plaintiff by his dreadlocks and pounded Plaintiff’s head into the ground. (Id.) Defendant Waltanen
simultaneously kneed Plaintiff in the ribs as he repeatedly yelled that he would kill Plaintiff. (Id.)
Defendants Loonsfoot, Coronado, and Wilson, then joined the attack. (Id.) They
punched and kneed Plaintiff while he remained prone on his stomach on the floor. (Id.) Plaintiff
claims that he was neither resisting nor able to resist; nonetheless, to provide cover for their actions,
1 This Court takes judicial notice of the information provided by a search of the MDOC’s OTIS
website with regard to Plaintiff. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 543 F.3d 819, 824 (6th Cir.
2008); Carpenter v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr. Time Computation Unit, No. 1:13-cv-313, 2013 WL
1947249, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Mich. May 9, 2013); Ward v. Wolfenbarger, 323 F. Supp. 2d 818, 821–
22 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
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Defendants yelled, “stop resisting.” (Id.) Plaintiff was shot in the back with tasers two more times.
(Id.) Then Defendant Fraki sprayed an entire can of mace on Plaintiff’s face, eyes, and hair. (Id.)
Thereafter, Loonsfoot, Coronado, Waltanen, and Wilson placed their full body
weight on Plaintiff’s back, buttocks, and thighs until Plaintiff yelled, “I can’t breathe.” (Id.,
PageID.23.) Plaintiff temporarily blacked out. (Id.)
Plaintiff was then placed in a restraint chair and taken to unit 2 segregation by
Loonsfoot, Coronado, and Wilson. (Id., PageID.4.) All but Defendant Wilson left. (Id.) Wilson
punched Plaintiff three times in the jaw and told Plaintiff “they” were going to kill Plaintiff. (Id.)
Non-party Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor (ARUS) Walowski abruptly entered the room with
a video recorder and the beating ended. (Id.) Non-party Nurse Skinnerup removed three taser
prongs from Plaintiff’s back. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was put back in the restraint chair and led to A-wing cell
#115. (Id.) The cell was filthy, with feces clogged in the toilet, and smelled awful. (Id.) The cell
did not have soap or towels. (Id.)
Defendant Hebert made rounds in the unit. (Id.) Plaintiff advised Defendant Hebert
that Plaintiff needed soap and towels because the mace had Plaintiff’s “entire body on fire.” (Id.)
Defendant Herbert told Plaintiff that Defendant Hebert would not provide Plaintiff with anything.
(Id.)
Thirty minutes later, Defendant Beck made rounds. (Id.) Plaintiff also told
Defendant Beck that Plaintiff needed soap, towels, and a shower because of the mace. (Id.)
Defendant Beck advised Plaintiff that because of Plaintiff’s assault he was going to have to go
through “a couple days of bull s***” but, thereafter, “things will go back to normal.” (Id.,
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PageID.23–24 (asterisks added).) Plaintiff also asked Defendant Beck for food noting that Plaintiff
was diabetic. (Id., PageID.24.) Defendant Beck offered the following response: “We’ll see.” (Id.)
Plaintiff began trying to remove the mace from his hair. (Id.) Plaintiff told
Defendants Beck and Hebert that Plaintiff needed healthcare because the mace was causing asthma
attacks. (Id.) Plaintiff’s request for help was ignored. (Id.)
At 11:00 a.m., Defendants Beck and Hebert passed out lunch trays. (Id.) Defendant
Hebert advised Plaintiff that he would not be eating. (Id.) Plaintiff advised Defendant Hebert that
his blood sugar was low and that Plaintiff had to eat. (Id.) Plaintiff’s request for help was ignored.
(Id.)
Defendant Loonsfoot made a round. (Id.) Plaintiff advised Defendant Loonsfoot
that Defendant Hebert had not provided Plaintiff with food and that his blood sugar was low. (Id.,
PageID.24–25.) Plaintiff also advised Defendant Loonsfoot that Plaintiff needed soap and a
shower to clean off the mace that was causing asthma attacks. (Id., PageID.25.)
Between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., Defendant Frantti refused to feed Plaintiff dinner.
(Id.) Defendant Frantti advised Plaintiff that he was about to “ride-out” and that his new facility
would feed him. (Id.) Plaintiff complained that his blood sugar was low and he felt dizzy.
Defendant Frantti told Plaintiff to “stop assaulting officers [and] you’ll eat all your trays.” (Id.)
Plaintiff was in cell #115 from 10:00 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. without food, soap, towels,
a shower, or treatment for his asthma attacks. (Id.) At 8:30 p.m., transportation officers arrived to
transport Plaintiff to the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Michigan. (Id.)
Based on these allegations, as well as allegations against many additional
defendants from MBP, Plaintiff raised several claims. By opinion and order entered June 27, 2025,
the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims except the following: Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
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claims against Defendants Waltanen, Loonsfoot, Coronado, Wilson, and Fraki for the use of
excessive force on August 30, 2024; Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants
Hebert, Beck, Loonsfoot, and Frantti for denying Plaintiff meals, a shower, and medical care on
August 30, 2024; and Plaintiff’s state law tort claim for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress against Defendants Hebert and Beck.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed a response.
Defendants have filed a reply. After Defendants submitted their reply, Plaintiff sought leave to file
a sur-reply brief. (ECF No. 48).
Sur-reply Brief
The Court’s local rules contemplate that briefing on dispositive motions will
include an initial supporting brief, an opposing brief in response, and a reply brief. W.D.Mich.
LCivR 7.2(c). Although the Court may permit or require additional briefing, it is rarely necessary.
That is the case here. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion to file a sur-reply brief.
(ECF No. 48.)
Summary Judgment
A. 	Standard
Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment. Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it
“might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A material fact is genuinely disputed when there is “sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving
party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id. at 249 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. City
Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1961)). “Putting all of that together, Rule 56 asks ‘whether the
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evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” DeVooght v. City of
Warren, Mich., 157 F.4th 893, 899 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
Summary judgment is not an opportunity for the Court to resolve factual disputes.
Id. The Court “must shy away from weighing the evidence and instead view all the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in their favor.”
Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 999 F.3d 400, 410 (6th Cir. 2021). Nonetheless, a court need not
accept bare legal conclusions couched as factual allegations or unwarranted factual inferences in
resolving a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Yanovich v. Zimmer Austin, Inc., 255 F.
App’x 957, 969 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Even under the generous standard of review for a grant of
summary judgment, we do not ‘accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual
inferences.’”).
In Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995), the court set forth the parties’
burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment:
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case. Once the moving party has met its burden of
production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present
significant probative evidence in support of the complaint to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support
plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Copeland, 57 F.3d at 478–79 (citations omitted).
B. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies before filing this action. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a
prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first
exhaust available administrative remedies. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). A prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies, even if
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the prisoner may not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative
process. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. One reason for creating prisoner
grievance procedures under the PLRA was to create an administrative record for the court.
Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes
concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court. This
has the potential to reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to improve the
quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful administrative record.
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007).
In order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable procedural
rules. Id. at 218; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). “Compliance with prison grievance
procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” Jones, 549 U.S.
at 218.
The MDOC requires prisoners to follow a three-step process to exhaust grievances.
See MDOC Prisoner/Parolee Grievances Policy Directive (“PD”) 03.02.130 (effective September
25, 2023). 2 (ECF No. 38-2, PageID.337–344.) A prisoner must first attempt to resolve a problem
with the staff member within two business days of becoming aware of the grievable issue, unless
prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control. Id. at ¶ W. If the issue is not resolved, then
2 The Court takes judicial notice of the content of the MDOC policy directive in effect at the time
of the events alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. The MDOC’s policy directives are a proper subject
of judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). See Toth v. Grand Trunk R.R., 306 F.3d
335, 349 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Administrative regulations fall within the category of facts ‘capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.’ “); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America v. Zantop Air Transp. Corp., 394 F.2d 36, 40 (6th Cir. 1968) (noting that “a [c]ourt
may take judicial notice of the rules, regulations and orders of administrative agencies issued
pursuant to their delegated authority”). The Court notes that a new Prisoner/Parolee Grievances
policy directive was adopted on October 21, 2024. (ECF No. 47-2, PageID.419–426.) That policy
would have been in effect for part of the period at issue. There are no differences between the
policy directives that are material to the issues before the Court.
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the grievant may file a Step I grievance on the prescribed form within five business days after the
grievant attempted to resolve the issue with appropriate staff. Id. at ¶¶ W, Y, and CC. The Policy
Directive provides the following directions for completing grievance forms:
The issue should be stated briefly but concisely. Information provided is to be
limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where,
why, how). Dates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue being
grieved are to be included.
Id. at ¶ Y (emphasis in original). Within five business days after attempting to resolve a grievable
issue with appropriate staff, the prisoner must send the Step I grievance to the appropriate
grievance coordinator. Id. at ¶ CC. If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does
not receive a timely response, he must request the appropriate form and send it to the Step II
Grievance Coordinator. Id. at ¶ JJ. Finally, if a prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step II response, or
does not receive a timely response, he must send a completed Step III grievance, using the
appropriate form, to the Grievance and Appeals Section. Id. at ¶ NN.
Defendants point out that Plaintiff failed to pursue any grievance related to the
August 30, 2024, incidents at AMF through the third step of the grievance process before he filed
his complaint. Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on October 11, 2024. 3 The Court received it on
November 13, 2024. That complaint included Plaintiff’s claims arising on August 30, 2024, against
AMF Defendants Waltanen, Loonsfoot, Coronado, Wilson, and Fraki, up to the point in time when
ARUS Walowski interrupted Defendant Wilson’s abuse of Plaintiff in unit 2 segregation. Plaintiff
3 Under the prison mailbox rule, a prisoner’s court paper is deemed filed at the time he “delivered
it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276
(1988). “Under this relaxed filing standard, a pro se prisoner’s complaint is deemed filed when it
is handed over to prison officials for mailing to the court. Cases expand the understanding of this
handing-over rule with an assumption that, absent contrary evidence, a prisoner does so on the
date he or she signed the complaint.” Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal
citations omitted). Here, plaintiff signed his complaint on October 11, 2024. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.7).
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added the AMF claims that accrued after that point in his first amended complaint. Plaintiff filed
his first amended complaint on November 15, 2024. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 3, PageID.39.)
The only grievances that Plaintiff reports he filed regarding the August 30, 2024,
incidents at AMF were the following:
On September 4th, 2024, between 8-10am Plaintiff gave [MBP] R.U.M. Moyale
Step I grievance on August 30th, 2024 incident in a sealed envelope addressed to
Inspector Mike Leach. [attached to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (ECF No.
3-2, PageID.44–46)]
On September 19th, 2024 the Plaintiff gave RUM Moyale the same Step I grievance
again during legal mail rounds between 8-10 am in a sealed envelope addressed
directly to Grievance Coordinator Q. Bolton. [attached to Plaintiff’s first amended
complaint (ECF No. 3-3, PageID.47–48)]
On September 24th, 2024 the Plaintiff again gave R.U.M. Moyale/Olivier the same
grievance(s) from August 30th, 2024 incident between 8-10 am during legal mail
rounds addressed to Grievance Coordinator Q. Bolton, Director’s Office in
Lansing, and Keith Barber of the Ombudsman Office. [attached to Plaintiff’s first
amended complaint (ECF No. 3-4 to 3-6, PageID.49–55)]
On October 8th, 2024 the Plaintiff gave R.U.M. Moyale the same grievance from
8/30/24 incident during legal mail round addressed to Warden Schroeder. He also
included a grievance for failure to respond to grievances on Grievance Coordinator
Q. Bolton. The latter was . . . processed the former was not acknowledged at all.
[attached to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (ECF No. 3-7, PageID.56–57; ECF
No. 3-11, PageID.64–72]
On October 24th, 2024 Plaintiff turned in a golden rod copy of incident from
August 30th, 2024 to R.U.M. Moyale at 8-10 am legal mail rounds.
(Am. Compl., ECF No. 3, PageID.28–32; see also Delaney Decl., ECF No. 44, PageID.391–393,
¶¶ 4–16.)
Whether or not the various Step I grievances referenced above that relate to the
AMF incidents were properly filed, none of them were pursued through the three-step process
outlined in the Prisoner/Parolee Grievances Policy Directive before Plaintiff filed his initial or first
amended complaint. Plaintiff declares that the grievances must have been destroyed; but that
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appears to be rank speculation on his part. He alleges no facts indicating how he gained the
personal knowledge to support that verified declaration.
Moreover, even if the Step I grievances had been destroyed rather than processed
and responded to, the administrative grievance process contemplates that the process continues—
even in the absence of a response. Indeed, the continuation of the process is essential to ferreting
out potential procedural problems at Step I. See MDOC PD 03.02.130, ¶ JJ (“If a pre-Step II
procedural error is identified at Step II, the Step II appeal shall not be answered and the Step I
response shall be returned to Step I for an amended response to correct the procedural error. All
rights and timeframes for appeal of the amended Step I grievance shall be reset.”).4 Plaintiff, rather
than timely pursuing his Step II appeal when he did not receive a timely Step I response, persisted
in resending identical Step I grievance forms to the wrong people at the wrong facility. 5
Plaintiff is no stranger to the MDOC administrative grievance process. He has used
it many times all the way through the third step. See (Mayo Aff., ECF No. 47-5, PageID.438–440);
Nelson Aff., Delaney v. Allen, No. 2:24-cv-182 (W.D. Mich.) (ECF No. 21-3, PageID.116–123). 6
Indeed, his frequent use of the process from beginning to end essentially undercuts his claim that
it was unavailable at either AMF or MBP.
In summary, Plaintiff did not properly exhaust a grievance against Defendants
regarding the matters at issue in this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court concludes that there are no
4 A parallel provision exists for Step III. See MDOC PD 03.02.130 ¶¶ NN.
5 Defendants submitted a sworn affidavit from Pat Mayo, grievance coordinator at AMF.
Coordinator Mayo explains that under the MDOC Prisoner/Parolee Grievance PD, “a Step I
grievance must be filed at the facility where the events being grieved allegedly occurred.” (Mayo
Aff., ECF No. 47-5, PageID.438.) Plaintiff does not contest the existence of the requirement nor
does he explain why he ignored it.
6 Plaintiff makes specific references to his MBP grievances and Delaney v. Allen, No. 2:24-cv-182
(W.D. Mich.) in his supplemental declaration in this action. (Delaney Suppl. Decl., ECF No. 45.)
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genuine 	issues 	of 	material 	fact 	with 	regard to 	whether 	Plaintiff properly 	exhausted 	his
administrative remedies before filing either his initial or his first amended complaint. He did not.
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
against Defendants will be dismissed with prejudice.
State Law Claims
Dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims still leaves Plaintiff’s state-law claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Hebert and Beck. In determining
whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, “[a] district court should consider
the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those
interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.” Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994
F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad
Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).
Because Plaintiff’s federal claim against Defendants will be dismissed, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law “intentional infliction of
emotional distress” claims against Defendants Hebert and Beck. The Court will dismiss those
claims without prejudice.
Conclusion
The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion to file a sur-reply brief. For the reasons
stated above, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court will
dismiss Plaintiff’s federal § 1983 claims against the remaining Defendants with prejudice for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Hebert and Beck for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those state-law claims.
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The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the same
reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Court will enter an order and judgment consistent with this opinion.
Dated: 	October 13, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge
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