Hinds #637787 v. Thomas et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
CRUZ HINDS, #637787, 	Case No. 2:24-cv-144
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
Chief U.S. District Judge
v.
UNKNOWN THOMAS, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, ECF No. 33, Plaintiff’s response in opposition, ECF No. 51, and
Defendants’ reply, ECF No. 54.
Plaintiff – state prisoner Cruz Hinds – filed a verified civil complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments while he was incarcerated at Baraga Correctional
Facility (AMF) in Baraga, Michigan. 	ECF No. 1. 	More specifically, Hinds asserts
that during a cell extraction, two unidentified Emergency Response Team (ERT)
members choked him, that Corrections Officer (CO) Thomas punched him, and that
Nurse Haapala grossly ignored the resulting injury. 	Id., PageID.2-3.
On April 21, 2025, CO Thomas and Nurse Haapala filed a motion for summary
judgment. 	ECF No. 33. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, there remains a genuine
issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 1
of 21

2
However, in the opinion of the undersigned, there are no genuine disputes of material
fact as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation, Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference, and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. 	Accordingly, it is
respectfully recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
II. 	Factual Allegations
In his verified complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on January 1, 2024, Plaintiff
was extracted from his cell and placed in a restraint chair.1 	ECF No. 1, PageID.2.
Plaintiff asserts that while he was bound to the chair, two unidentified ERT members
chocked him while CO Thomas punched him in the face. 	Id. 	Plaintiff says that CO
Thomas broke/fractured Plaintiff’s nose. 	Id. 	Plaintiff alleges that when he was
escorted back to his cell, his chest and boxer briefs were covered in blood. 	Id.
Next, Plaintiff says that Nurse Haapala looked at his nose within an hour of
the alleged assault. 	Id., PageID.3. 	Plaintiff asserts that Nurse Haapala “grossly
ignored the plaintiff’s injury and refused to treat the serious fractured nose.” 	Id.
Plaintiff says he received an emergency X-ray 29 days after the alleged assault. 	Id.
Plaintiff asserts that his nose healed untreated. 	Id.
1 	For context, Defendants note in their motion that Plaintiff was extracted from
his cell for throwing feces from a cup on a Corrections Officer. 	Plaintiff agrees with
these factual assertions in his response. 	ECF No. 52, PageID.314
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 2
of 21

3
III. 	Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply
As an initial matter, Hinds filed a sur-reply without prior approval by the
Court on October 3, 2025. 	ECF No. 56. 	The following day, Defendants filed a
motion to strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply. 	ECF No. 57.
In general, sur-replies are not allowed without first obtaining permission from
the Court. 	W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(c). 	This Court’s Local Civil Rules allow for a
response to a dispositive motion and then a reply to the response. 	Id. 	“The court
may permit or require further briefing.” 	Id. 	This Court has noted that “[i]t is well-
established that parties do not have a right to file a sur-reply brief, whether under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Civil Rules of our district, and both
this court and other federal courts rarely grant leave to file a surreply.” 	Aslani v.
Sparrow Health Sys., No. 1:08-CV-298, 2009 WL 3711602, at *22 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 3,
2009) (footnote omitted). 	The Court may grant leave to file a sur-reply to afford a
party an opportunity to address new issues raised for the first time in the reply.
Eldridge v. Cardif Life Ins. Co., 266 F.R.D. 173, 175 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
In this case, the Court granted Hinds’s request for additional time to respond
to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 	ECF No. 50. 	Subsequently, Hinds
filed a response to Defendants’ motion and Defendants filed a reply. 	ECF No. 51 &
54. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, Defendants did not raise any new issues in
their reply. 	While the undersigned recognizes Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court has
also already afforded Plaintiff additional time to file his response. 	Accordingly, the
undersigned grants Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply and does not
consider the sur-reply in the below analysis.
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 3
of 21

4
IV. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). 	The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan,
421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251−52 (1986)). 	The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion. 	Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.
2005).
V. 	Analysis
a. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force
Hinds maintains that CO Thomas and the unidentified ERT defendants used
excessive force when they choked and punched him during a cell extraction. 	CO
Thomas argues that video surveillance of the incident shows Hinds was neither
choked nor punched during the extraction.
The Eighth Amendment embodies a constitutional limitation on the power of
the states to punish those convicted of a crime. 	Punishment may not be “barbarous”,
nor 	may 	it 	contravene 	society’s 	“evolving 	standards 	of 	decency.” 	Rhodes 	v.
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 4
of 21

5
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 	The
Eighth Amendment also prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not
physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 	Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are
those that are “totally without penological justification.” 	Id.
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must satisfy both an
objective and a subjective component. 	Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994);
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-300 (1991). 	“The objective component requires
the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” 	Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383
(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). 	“The subjective component focuses
on the state of mind of the prison officials.” 	Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d at 383.
While all Eighth Amendment claims involve an objective and a subjective
component, the objective component is contextual and therefore varies depending on
the claim asserted. 	Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). 	The degree of
harm 	necessary 	to 	satisfy 	the 	objective 	component 	depends 	on 	“contemporary
standards of decency.” 	Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
The essential inquiry for an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force is
“whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley v. Albers,
475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). 	In making this inquiry, courts are guided by “factors
[such] as the need for application of force, the relationship between the need and the
amount of force that was used [and] the extent of injury inflicted.” Id. at 320-21.
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 5
of 21

6
In this case, Hinds alleges in his complaint that two ERT members choked him
while CO Thomas punched him and fractured or broke his nose. 	ECF No, 1,
PageID.2. 	In his deposition, Hinds states that these alleged events occurred after
he was extracted from his cell and taken upstairs to the medical clinic. 	ECF No. 34-
3, PageID.168. 	Hinds contends in his deposition that the assault occurred directly
outside 	of 	the 	medical 	clinic. 	Id., 	PageID.172. 	Defendants 	provide 	video
surveillance of the area outside of the medical clinic. 	Exhibit D. 	Defendants assert
that this video shows that no assault occurred.
Upon review of the video, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the video
surveillance does not show the entire incident of the cell extraction through the
alleged assault. 	Furthermore, the video depicts multiple ERT members blocking the
camera’s view of Hinds in the transport chair. 	In the opinion of the undersigned,
the video is insufficient to combat the genuine issue of material fact between Hinds’s
version of events and Defendants’. 	Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully
recommends 	that 	the 	Court 	deny 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment
regarding Hinds’s excessive force claim.
b. First Amendment Retaliation
In the “Relief Sought” section of Hinds’s Complaint, he states “[t]he retaliation
claim is solely over plaintiff threatening to file a grievance after C/O Thomas punched
and broke/fractured his nose.” 	ECF No. 1, PageID.5. 	CO Thomas argues that
Hinds’s First Amendment claim fails as a matter of law because he was not engaged
in protected conduct, nor did he suffer an adverse action. 	ECF No. 34, PageID.142.
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 6
of 21

7
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights
violates the Constitution. 	Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999)
(en banc). 	In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must
establish that: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was
taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in
that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the
protected conduct. 	Id. 	Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise
of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged
retaliatory conduct. 	Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). 	The
Sixth Circuit has also employed a burden-shifting approach:
Once the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing that his protected
conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant. 	If the defendant can show that he
would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected
activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment.
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399.
The Sixth Circuit has explained that “protected conduct includes a prisoner’s
‘undisputed First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials on his
own behalf.’” 	Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (2010) (quoting Herron v. Harrison,
203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir.2000)). 	This right extends to grievances that are, in
accordance with MDOC policy, raised with staff prior to submitting a formal, written
grievance. 	Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 265-66 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining that it
would be “unfair and illogical” to require prisoners to attempt informal resolution of
a grievable issue, and then limit the recognition of protected conduct to filing formal,
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 7
of 21

8
written 	grievances); 	MDOC 	PD 	03.02.130(Q) 	(requiring 	a 	prisoner 	to 	attempt
resolution of the grievable issue prior to filing a Step I grievance). 	“If the grievances
are frivolous, however, this right is not protected.” 	Id. 	Prisoners “cannot exercise
that right in a manner that violates legitimate prison regulations or penological
objectives.” 	Smith, 250 F.3d at 1037. 	“‘Abusive or manipulative use of a grievance
system [is] not ... protected conduct,’ and prison officials may take action in response
to the prisoner’s improper use of the grievance process as long as the response aligns
with a legitimate penological goal.” 	Griffin v. Berghuis, 563 F. App’x 411, 416 (6th
Cir. 2014) (quoting King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 699 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Generally, an action is deemed adverse when it increases the restrictions
placed on a prisoner, or decreases the privileges that prisoner enjoys. 	Maben, 887
F.3d at 266 (citing Hill v. Lapin, 630 F. 3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2004)). 	To determine
whether a misconduct ticket constitutes an adverse action, courts look to “both the
punishment [the prisoner] could have faced and the punishment he did face.” 	Id.
(citing Scott v. Churchill, 377 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2004)).
While evidence of temporal proximity may not be enough on its own to survive
summary judgment on a retaliation claim, the Sixth Circuit does construe such
proximity as a factor in support of a causal connection. Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d
1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 2001).
Here, the order of Plaintiff’s allegations does not support a retaliation claim.
Hinds states that his retaliation claim is based on his threat to file a grievance after
CO 	Thomas 	allegedly 	punched 	him. 	Hinds 	does 	not 	assert 	he 	suffered 	any
retaliatory conduct because of his threat to file a grievance. 	Hinds has a First
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 8
of 21

9
Amendment right to access the grievance system but he does not state that he
experienced any barriers to exercising that right. 	Accordingly, in the opinion of the
undersigned, there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding Hinds’s First
Amendment retaliation claim against CO Thomas and undersigned respectfully
recommends that the Court dismiss Hinds’s First Amendment claim.
c. 	Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
Hinds alleges that “Nurse Haapala refused Plaintiff health care treatment
after examining serious injury to the Plaintiff’s nose.” 	ECF No. 1, PageID.4. 	Nurse
Haapala argues that Hinds cannot establish that Nurse Haapala was aware of any
serious medical need. 	ECF No. 34, PageID.146-47.
The 	Eighth 	Amendment 	prohibits 	the 	infliction 	of 	cruel 	and 	unusual
punishment against those convicted of crimes. 	U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 	The
Eighth 	Amendment 	obligates 	prison 	authorities 	to 	provide 	medical 	care 	to
incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with
contemporary standards of decency. 	Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 102, 103-04 (1976).
The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent
to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. 	Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273
F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a
subjective 	component. 	Farmer, 	511 	U.S. 	at 	834. 	To 	satisfy 	the 	objective
component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently
serious. 	Id. 	In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. 	Id. 	The objective component
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 9
of 21

10
of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s
need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” 	Blackmore v. Kalamazoo
Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). 	If the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on
“the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction
is seemingly minor or non-obvious,” id. at 898, the plaintiff must “place verifying
medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in
medical treatment.” 	Napier v. Madison Cty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have
“a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” 	Brown v. Bargery,
207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). 	Deliberate
indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835,
but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of
causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” 	Id. 	Under Farmer, “the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 	Id. at
837. 	The subjective component was recently summarized in Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894
F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2018). 	The court of appeals stated the following:
A doctor’s errors in medical judgment or other negligent behavior do not
suffice to establish deliberate indifference. 	Instead, the plaintiff must
show that each defendant acted with a mental state “equivalent to
criminal 	recklessness.” 	This 	showing 	requires 	proof 	that 	each
defendant “subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial
risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he
then disregarded that risk” by failing to take reasonable measures to
abate it.
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 10
of 21

11
A plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove subjective
recklessness: A jury is entitled to “conclude that a prison official knew
of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” And
if a risk is well-documented and circumstances suggest that the official
has been exposed to information so that he must have known of the risk,
the 	evidence 	is 	sufficient 	for 	a 	jury 	to 	find 	that 	the 	official 	had
knowledge.
But the plaintiff also must present enough evidence from which a jury
could conclude that each defendant “so recklessly ignored the risk that
he was deliberately indifferent to it.” 	A doctor is not liable under the
Eighth Amendment if he or she provides reasonable treatment, even if
the outcome of the treatment is insufficient or even harmful. 	A doctor,
after all, is bound by the Hippocratic Oath, not applicable to the jailor,
and the physician’s job is to treat illness, not punish the prisoner.
Accordingly, when a claimant challenges the adequacy of an inmate's
treatment, 	“this 	Court 	is 	deferential 	to 	the judgments 	of 	medical
professionals.” 	That is not to say that a doctor is immune from a
deliberate-indifference 	claim 	simply 	because 	he 	provided 	“some
treatment for the inmates’ medical needs.” But there is a high bar that
a plaintiff must clear to prove an Eighth Amendment medical-needs
claim: The doctor must have “consciously expos[ed] the patient to an
excessive risk of *739 serious harm.”
Id. 738–39 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical
treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 	Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 	As
the Supreme Court explained:
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said
to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be
repugnant to the conscience of mankind. 	Thus, a complaint that a
physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the
Eighth 	Amendment. 	Medical 	malpractice 	does 	not 	become 	a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. 	In
order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.
Id. at 105-06 (quotations omitted).
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 11
of 21

12
Differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel
regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a
deliberate indifference claim. 	Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 154-55 (6th Cir.
1995); Ward v. Smith, No. 95-6666, 1996 WL 627724, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1996).
This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and
considerable suffering. 	Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2
(6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997).
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a
complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner
received inadequate medical treatment.” 	Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5
(6th Cir. 1976). 	If “a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute
is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second
guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort
law.” 	Id.; Rouster v. Saginaw Cty., 749 F.3d 437, 448 (6th Cir. 2014); Perez v.
Oakland Cty., 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); Kellerman v. Simpson, 258 F. App’x
720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006);
Edmonds v. Horton, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Crall, 8 F. App’x
439, 440 (6th Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998).
“Where the claimant received treatment for his condition, as here, he must show that
his treatment was ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’”
Mitchell 553 F. App’x at 605 (quoting Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th
Cir. 2011)). 	He must demonstrate that the care he received was “so grossly
incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 12
of 21

13
to fundamental fairness.” Miller v. Calhoun Cty., 408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)).
Here, Hinds admits that he was seen by Nurse Haapala within the same hour
as the alleged assault. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.3. 	Hinds’s verified complaint includes
the following allegations against Haapala:
ECF No. 1, PageID.4.
In his deposition, Hinds said that his complaint against Nurse Haapala was
that she refused to provide him with a tissue or to clean him up. 	ECF No. 52-1,
PageID.366.
Hinds’s medical record from January 1 and 2, 2024, indicates that he did
receive care. 	The record includes documentation from three clinical encounters with
Nurse Haapala following the January 1, 2024, incident. 	First, at 1:22PM, Nurse
Haapala examined Hinds after chemical agent exposure and noted the following
regarding his nose:
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 13
of 21

14
ECF No. 34-4, PageID.181. 	Nurse Haapala’s report on this “clinical encounter” also
notes that she completed a physical examination of Hinds, recording his temperature,
pulse, respiration rate, blood pressure and blood oxygen. 	Id., PageID.182.
Less than an hour later, she made the following administrative note after a
second encounter with Hinds:
Id., PageID.184.
Then, on January 2, 2024, Nurse Haapala documented another attempt to
examine Hinds. 	Nurse Haapala noted the following in Hinds’s medical record:
Id., PageID.185.
Hinds has not challenged the veracity of these medical records, which indicate
that Hinds was not seriously injured. 	Thus he has failed to establish a genuine issue
of material fact with respect to the objective component of a deliberate indifference
claim. 	However, even assuming Hinds suffered a sufficiently serious injury, there
is no genuine issue of material fact as to the subjective component. 	The record does
not establish that Nurse Haapala had a culpable state of mind to satisfy the
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 14
of 21

15
subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim. 	In fact, the record before
the Court demonstrates that Haapala completed an examination of Hinds, recording
his vital signs and finding that he was not seriously injured. 	ECF No. 52-1,
PageID.181-183. 	But thereafter, Hinds refused attempts at additional care by
Nurse Haapala. 	Id., PageID.184, 185. 	Hinds disagrees with the adequacy of the
care he initially received and then he refused care entirely. 	Based on this record,
the undersigned concludes that Hinds has failed to establish a genuine issue of
material facts as to his deliberate indifference claim against Nurse Haapala.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismiss Hinds’s Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim against Nurse Haapala.
d. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Hinds asserts that CO Thomas and the unidentified ERT members violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection during the cell extraction and
alleged assault. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.4. 	Defendants argue that Hinds’s claim is
merely conclusory. 	ECF No. 34, PageID.148.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 	U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 	To state
an equal protection claim, a plaintiff “must adequately plead that the government
treated the plaintiff ‘disparately as compared to similarly situated persons and that
such disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class,
or has no rational basis.” 	Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 15
of 21

16
365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011). 	The Supreme Court has also recognized what is referred
to as a “class-of-one” equal protection claim in which the plaintiff does not allege
membership in a particular class or group but instead alleges that he “has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.” 	Davis v. Prison Health Services, 679
F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2012).
Here, Hinds asserts in his Complaint that Defendants violated his right to
equal protection without further explanation. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.3-4. 	In the
undersigned’s opinion, Hind’s allegations are conclusory and fail to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. 	See Steed v. Harry, No. 1:17-CV-540, 2017 WL
3205764, at *6 (W.D. Mich. July 28, 2017) (“[V]ague, conclusory allegations of
discrimination are not enough to state an equal protection claim.”); Chapman v. City
of Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1986) (“It is not enough for a complaint under
§ 1983 to contain mere conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct by persons
acting under color of state law.”)
Therefore, in the opinion of the undersigned, there are no genuine issues of
material 	fact 	regarding 	Hinds’s 	equal 	protection 	claim. 	Accordingly, 	the
undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant Defendants’ motion for
summary 	judgment 	as 	it 	pertains 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	equal
protection claim.
VI. 	Qualified Immunity
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 16
of 21

17
Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of the complaint against
them based upon qualified immunity. 	“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity,
‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a defendant raises the qualified
immunity 	defense, 	the 	burden 	shifts 	to 	the 	plaintiff 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	the
defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable official
would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’” 	Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)).
The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. 	Martin v. City of Broadview Heights,
712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First, the court must “determine if the facts
alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 	Id. 	(citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the court asks if the right at issue was
“‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such that a reasonable officer would
have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A
court may address these steps in any order. 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if either step of the analysis
is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir.
2016).
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 17
of 21

18
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78 (2017)
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To 	be 	clearly 	established, 	a 	legal 	principle 	must 	have 	a
sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must
be “settled law,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116
L.Ed.2d 	589 	(1991) 	(per 	curiam), 	which 	means 	it 	is 	dictated 	by
“controlling authority” or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive
authority,’ ” al–Kidd, supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It
is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The
precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would
interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.
See Reichle, 566 U.S., at 666, 132 S.Ct. 2088. Otherwise, the rule is not
one that “every reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct.
2088 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 18
of 21

19
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63−64 (2018).
In the qualified immunity context, if the facts alleged and evidence produced,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to
find that the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right, dismissal by
summary judgment is inappropriate. 	Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 947 (6th Cir.
2020) (citing Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Here, because it is the opinion of the undersigned that there are no genuine
issues of material fact regarding Nurse Haapala and it is the undersigned’s opinion
that Nurse Haapala did not violate Plaintiffs’ rights, it is also the undersigned’s
opinion that Nurse Haapala is entitled to qualified immunity in her individual
capacities. 	See Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Under the
doctrine 	of 	qualified 	immunity, 	‘government 	officials 	performing 	discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.’” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982))). 	However, in the opinion of the undersigned, there are genuine issues
of material facts remaining regarding Plaintiff’s excessive force claims against CO
Thomas. 	As such, it is the opinion of the undersigned that CO Thomas is not entitled
to qualified immunity in his individual capacities.
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 19
of 21

20
VII. 	The Unserved Defendants
In his complaint, Hinds alleges Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims
against two unidentified “ERT members.” 	ECF No. 1, PageID.4. 	Since Hinds has
failed to identify these Defendants, they have not been served with a summons and
complaint.
In 	the 	opinion 	of 	the 	undersigned, 	the 	unserved 	Defendants 	should 	be
dismissed without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 	Rule 4(m) provides that the
Court must, after providing Plaintiff with notice, either dismiss or order service
within a specified time frame against a Defendant who has not been served within 90
days after the complaint was filed. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 	Hinds is hereby notified
that the undersigned recommends dismissal of the unserved Defendants pursuant to
Rule 4(m).
VIII. 	Recommendation
As set forth above, in the opinion of the undersigned, there remains a genuine
issue of material fact as to Hinds’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against
CO Thomas. 	Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding the excessive force claim
against CO Thomas.
However, in the opinion of the undersigned, there are no genuine issues of
material fact regarding Hinds’s First Amendment retaliation, Eighth Amendment
deliberate 	indifference, 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	equal 	protection 	claims.
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants’ motion
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 20
of 21

21
for summary judgment regarding these claims and dismiss Nurse Haapala from the
case.
Additionally, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court dismiss
the unserved Defendants from the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
If the Court accepts this recommendation, only Hinds’s excessive force claim
against CO Thomas will remain.
Dated: 	February 4, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within
fourteen days of service of this notice on you. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b). 	All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any
further right of appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Case 2:24-cv-00144-HYJ-MV ECF No. 61, PageID.<pageID> Filed 02/04/26 Page 21
of 21