Kubengana v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
SARIVE KUBENGANA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1704
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 2.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
Petitioner initiated this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan. (Pet., ECF No. 2.) In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness
of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, order Respondents to release Petitioner
or order Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Id.,
PageID.16–17.) The Eastern District of Michigan then transferred the action to this Court. (ECF
No. 4.)
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In an Order entered on June 2, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 8.) Respondents filed their response on June 5, 2026. (ECF No. 9.)
II. 	Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). (Pet.,
ECF No. 2, PageID.4, 6.) Petitioner entered the United States in 2017 when he was admitted as a
refugee. (Id., PageID.7; Shaver Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 9-1, Page 2.)
On November 8, 2019, Petitioner was convicted of first degree criminal sexual conduct
and sentenced to a term of 646 days to five years in prison. (Pet., ECF No. 2, PageID.7–8; Shaver
Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 9-1, Page 3.) On June 10, 2024, Petitioner was arrested in Ohio. (Shaver Decl.
¶ 12, ECF No. 9-1, PageID.3.) On September 23, 2024, ICE agents detained Petitioner pursuant to
an immigration detainer that was placed on Petitioner while he was in jail in Ohio. (Id. ¶ 13.)
On September 15, 2025, an Immigration Judge at the Cleveland Immigration Court ordered
that Petitioner be removed from the United States to the DRC, or alternatively, to Uganda. (Id.
¶ 22, Page 4.) Both parties waived the right to appeal that order. (Id.)
On January 9, 2026, ICE submitted a travel document request to the DRC government. (Id.
¶ 27.) On May 29, 2026, ICE sent an email to the DRC Embassy requesting an update on the travel
document request but received no response. (Id. ¶ 33, Page 5.)
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the 	United 	States.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2241. 	This 	includes 	challenges 	by 	non-citizens 	in
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immigration-related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R.
P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Merits Discussion
The parties agree that because Petitioner has a final order of removal, Petitioner’s present
detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. (See Pet., ECF No. 2, PageID.13–14; Resp., ECF No. 9,
Page 5.) However, Petitioner contends that his current detention is unlawful and violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10–14.) In response,
Respondents argue that Petitioner’s continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) remains lawful
and does not implicate the constitutional concerns identified in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
701 (2001).1 (See Resp., ECF No. 4, Page 5–9.)
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Here, as noted above, Petitioner’s order of
removal became final in 2025. The 90-day removal period following the order expired well before
Petitioner filed the present action. See id. § 1231(a)(1) (“The [90-day] removal period begins on
. . . [t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.”).
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that following the removal period, the
Government may continue to detain the noncitizen for a “presumptively reasonable period” of
time, which the Supreme Court concluded equaled a total of six months in detention. See Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 701. Following that six-month period, “once [a noncitizen] provides good reason to
1 Although Respondents indicate that Petitioner has past criminal convictions, Respondents do not
assert that they are currently detaining Petitioner under any mandatory detention provisions due to
Petitioner’s past criminal convictions.
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believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.2 “[O]nce [a
noncitizen’s] removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer
authorized by statute.” Id. at 699.
In this case, Petitioner’s order of removal became administratively final when it was
entered on September 15, 2025, and Petitioner waived his right to appeal. (Shaver Decl. ¶ 22, ECF
No. 9-1, Page 4.) Petitioner has been in ICE custody since that order of removal was entered, more
than nine months ago. (Pet., ECF No. 2, PageID.4.)
Petitioner argues that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable. (Id., PageID.5.) In
response, Respondents assert that Petitioner has failed to show that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and contend that ICE is “actively
working to remove Petitioner.” (Resp., ECF No. 9, Page 7, 8.) In support of that contention,
Respondents state that they requested travel documents from the government of the DRC on
January 9, 2026, and attempted to contact the Embassy of the DRC on May 29, 2026, to request
an update. (Id., Page 8–9.) Although ICE requested travel documents from the government of the
DRC on January 9, 2026, and requested a status update from the DRC Embassy on May 29, 2026,
there is no indication in the record presently before the Court that ICE has received any response
from the government of the DRC. (Shaver Decl. ¶¶ 27, 28, ECF No. 9-1, Page 4, 5.)
2 The Court notes that the Supreme Court recently held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the
“Government to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which
the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573,
576 (2022). The Court, however, did not reach Arteaga-Martinez’s constitutional or Zadvydas
claims, concluding that such claims were not properly before the Court. See id. at 583–84.
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Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that the fact that the government has been
unable to acquire a travel document to effect Petitioner’s removal for the past nine months, despite
making an attempt to do so five months ago, provides “good reason” to believe that “there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
Because Petitioner has met his burden, Respondents must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut
that showing. Id. Respondents assert that “ICE is actively working to remove Petitioner,” citing
the aforementioned efforts on January 9, 2026, and May 29, 2026. (Resp., ECF No. 9, Page 8–9.)
But Respondents provide no information about any timeline for the receipt of Petitioner’s travel
documents. Under these circumstances, Respondents have failed to respond with sufficient
evidence to rebut Petitioner’s showing that there is a “good reason to believe” that Petitioner will
not be removed in the “reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. The Court,
therefore, will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does
not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action. They seek the dismissal of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes
that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Raycraft, 	No. 	1:25-cv-1669, 	2025 	WL 	3562651, 	at *8–9 	(W.D. 	Mich. 	Dec. 	12, 	2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
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at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding habeas relief
will bind at least one Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred
outside the area under the authority of the ICE Detroit Field Office, the Court will retain all of the
remaining Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 2.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from detention, subject to any conditions of release that
existed prior to Petitioner’s present detention. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within five days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify compliance
with this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment.
Dated: 	June 23, 2026 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
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