Chehaydi v. Raycraft

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ATEF CHEHAYDI,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT,
Respondent.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1519
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated
this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF
No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current detention and asks the
Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering
Respondent to release Petitioner or ordering Respondent to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the
requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8.)1 In an order entered on May 11, 2026,
1 In addition to filing his § 2241 petition, Petitioner filed a motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 3.)
There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in habeas proceedings. Cobas v. Burgess, 306
F.3d 441, 444 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1987)); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(a)(2)(B) (indicating that a federal court has the discretion to appoint counsel in a habeas
proceeding where “the interests of justice so require”). As set forth herein, the Court will
conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, and the Court finds no basis for the appointment
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the Court directed Respondent to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas
corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 5.)
Respondent filed a response on May 14, 2026. (ECF No. 6.) Petitioner filed a reply on May 29,
2026. (ECF No. 7.)
II. Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Lebanon. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 6-1,
PageID.192.) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) permitted Petitioner to enter the
United States in March of 2023,2 and Petitioner has remained in the United States since that time.
(Id.; 2023 Form I-213, ECF No. 6-2, PageID.196.)
On June 6, 2025, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered and
arrested Petitioner. (2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 6-4, PageID.201.) On January 4, 2026, the Detroit
Immigration Court granted DHS’s motion to pretermit Petitioner’s pending application for asylum
and withholding of removal and ordered that Petitioner be removed to Lebanon. (Order
Immigration Judge, ECF No. 6-5, PageID.202; Removal Order, ECF No. 6-6, PageID.205.)
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA,) and that appeal remains
pending. (Appeal Receipt, ECF No. 6-7, PageID.207; Resp., ECF No. 6, PageID.186.) Because
Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, Petitioner’s order of removal is not
“administratively final” for purposes of the INA.3 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)(B),
1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).
of counsel to assist Petitioner in this matter at this time. Therefore, Petitioner’s motion to appoint
counsel (ECF No. 3) is denied.
2 Petitioner was paroled into the United States for a period of one year. (Form I-94, ECF No. 6-3,
PageID.198.) Petitioner does not contend that he remained paroled at the time that he was arrested
by DHS. (See generally Pet., ECF No. 1.)
3 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
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Respondent has not provided Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge as contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).4
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers upon the federal courts the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discussing that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order
(or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a
court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included ‘administratively’ before the word
‘final’ in the first provision.”). Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, § 1231
does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The
parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”).
4 The materials submitted by the parties do not suggest that Petitioner is subject to a final order of
removal or that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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IV. Merits Discussion
A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Based on the facts presented by the parties, and the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Nos. 25-1965, 1969, 1978, 1982, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th
Cir. May 11, 2026), the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs Petitioner’s
detention.5
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Lopez-Campos, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained:
Noncitizens who have “passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed
in due process of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
212 (1953); see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). Thus,
noncitizens within the interior of the United States are entitled to the protections of
the Due Process Clause, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “It is well
established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in
[removal] proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Consequently, the government may not
deny “notice” or “an opportunity to be heard” to a noncitizen “who has entered the
country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its
population, although alleged to be illegally here.” Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–01.
Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at *11. The Sixth Circuit therefore upheld the lower courts’
determinations the government’s detention of the Lopez-Campos petitioners “without bond under
§ 1226(a) was a deprivation of liberty that violated [their] due process rights.” Id. at *13.
5 Additionally, for the same reasons set forth in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610,
2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), the Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that
Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225 due to his manner of entry into the United States.
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Petitioner is likewise detained under § 1226(a) and has been denied an individualized bond
hearing. Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory
detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights. See id.; see also Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651,
at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL
3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025
WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
V. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court will order
Respondent to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five
business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties as soon
as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.6 The Court will also order Respondent to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
6 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
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and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: June 3, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
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