Becerra Sandoval v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JESUS DAVID BECERRA SANDOVAL,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1172
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated
this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF
No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
B ACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (2023 Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF
No. 5-1, PageID.68.) Petitioner entered the United States on or about July 22, 2023, at or near
Eagle Pass, Texas, without inspection. (Id.) After Petitioner entered the United States, Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered Petitioner. (Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2,
PageID.56.) Thereafter, DHS issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with
inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because
Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a
valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (NTA, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.68.) Petitioner
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was then paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).1 (2025 NTA, ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.51; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 4.) Petitioner subsequently filed a Form I-589 Application
for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, which remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4;
Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.65; ECF No. 8, PageID.75) Petitioner has no criminal history. (Form
I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.56.)
On March 30, 2026, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner when Petitioner
accompanied his girlfriend to her ICE check-in appointment. (Id., PageID.55; Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.4.) Petitioner is scheduled for a master hearing on June 15, 2026. (Notice of Internet-Based
Hearing, ECF No. 8-1, PageID.77)
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, originally filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks
the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering
Respondents to release Petitioner from custody. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7). Respondents filed
their response to Petitioner’s § 2241 petition on April 16, 2026. (ECF No. 4.) Petitioner filed his
reply on April 21, 2026, (ECF No. 5.).
On May 7, 2026, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing to address
legal and factual questions regarding the status of petitioner’s parole. (ECF No. 6). Petitioner
responded on May 14, 2026. (ECF No. 10). Respondents responded on May 21, 2026. (ECF No.
8). Because the record suggests that Petitioner’s parole either expired or was properly revoked
1 The phrase “parole into the United States,” as distinct from “conditional parole” under § 1226,
specifically refers to parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which “allows the executive to
permit certain aliens ‘on a case-by-case basis’ to enter or remain in this country only for ‘urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.’” Cruz-Miguel v. Holder, 650 F.3d 189, 198
(2d Cir. 2011).
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before he was detained on March 30,2 the Court will apply the same §§ 1225 and 1226 analysis
that it has applied in hundreds of recent immigration detention proceedings. See Mujica-Pena v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-684, ECF No. 10, PageID.149 (W.D. Mich. April 6, 2026).
H ABEAS CORPUS L EGAL S TANDARD
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers upon the federal courts the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
I. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Based on the facts presented by the parties and the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Nos. 25-1965, 1969, 1978, 1982, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th
2 More specifically, the record indicates that Petitioner’s was paroled into the United States for a 1-year
period. In a notice issued to Petitioner on March 30, 2026 (the same day he was he was detained by ICE),
ICE informed petitioner that "[o]n August 2, 2023, you were paroled into the United States . . . valid for
one year." (ECF No. 8-2, PageID.79). Moreover, in a Notice to Appear issued to Petitioner in July 2025—
roughly a year before Petitioner was detained—DHS informed him that his "parole status” was “terminated
or expired.” (ECF No. 4-1, PageID.51). If Petitioner’s parole expired by its terms before he was detained
by ICE, as the record suggests, then this is not a parole revocation case, and the Section 1225 and Section
1226 analysis applies to his claim. See Moran Cifuentes, No. 1:26-cv-1172, ECF No. 12, PageID.44 (W.D.
Mich. May 21, 2026). But even if Petitioner’s parole did not expire by its terms, DHS’s parole revocation
letter from March 30 indicated that DHS properly revoked his parole before it detained him. In the letter,
the government informed that it determined, after reviewing the "specific facts of your case," that
“discretionary parole is no longer warranted” because “[n]either humanitarian reason nor public benefits
warrant you continued parole." (ECF No. 8-2, PageID.79). That kind of determination is all the applicable
regulations require. See Villasmil Ojeda v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-716, ECF No. 6, PageID.90-91 (W.D.
Mich. April 17, 2026). And the letter was issued the same date as the detention, which suggests that ICE
made the determination beforehand. So the record indicates that ICE properly revoked Petitioner’s parole
before detaining him.
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Cir. May 11, 2026), the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs Petitioner’s
detention.3
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Lopez-Campos, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained:
Noncitizens who have “passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed
in due process of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
212 (1953); see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). Thus,
noncitizens within the interior of the United States are entitled to the protections of
the Due Process Clause, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “It is well
established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in
[removal] proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Consequently, the government may not
deny “notice” or “an opportunity to be heard” to a noncitizen “who has entered the
country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its
population, although alleged to be illegally here.” Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–01.
Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at *11. The Sixth Circuit therefore upheld the lower courts’
determinations the government’s detention of the Lopez-Campos petitioners “without bond under
§ 1226(a) was a deprivation of liberty that violated [their] due process rights.” Id. at *13.
Petitioner is likewise detained under § 1226(a) and has been denied an individualized bond
hearing. Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory
detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights. See id.; see also Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651,
at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL
3 Additionally, for the same reasons set forth in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610,
2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), the Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that
Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225 due to his manner of entry into the United States.
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3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025
WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
II. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
III. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents.
The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper
Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Attorney General as a Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court will order
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Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five
business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties as soon
as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.4 The Court will also order Respondents to file a
status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: 	May 22, 2026 	/s/
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
4 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
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