Rodriguez Lujano v. Unknown Party #1 et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
KATHERINE RODRIGUEZ LUJANO
AS NEXT FRIEND OF
CARLOS ENRIQUE ROA SANCHEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY #1 et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1102
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Katherine Rodriguez Lujano initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on behalf of Carlos Enrique Roa Sanchez (Petitioner),
a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the
North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) 1
For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering
1 The Court will substitute Kevin Raycraft, Acting Director of the Detroit ICE Field Office, for
Respondent Unknown Party #2, and Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security, for
Respondent Unknown Party #3.
Case 1:26-cv-01102-PLM-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/21/26 Page 1
of 8

2
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.8.)
In an order entered on April 7, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on April 10, 2026. (ECF No.
4.)
II. 	Next Friend Status
As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Katherine Rodriguez Lujano
may proceed as “next friend” of Petitioner. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing
and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his
behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163
(1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he
participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real
party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend status, therefore, is
an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is
unable to prosecute the case on her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or
other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on
whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see
West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir.
1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate her dedication to the
“best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with that
Case 1:26-cv-01102-PLM-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/21/26 Page 2
of 8

3
party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety of
his status” in order to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted). Standing to
proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically to whomever
seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163.
“[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee
if the detainee himself could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must clearly
and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements”
because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise
deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most
significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not
set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device,
the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore,
495 U.S. at 163.
In this action, reviewing the pleadings and attached documents, the Court concludes that
Katherine Rodriguez Lujano has satisfied the foregoing requirements. Accordingly, the Court will
permit Katherine Rodriguez Lujano to proceed as next friend to Petitioner.
III. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.84.) Petitioner entered the United States on or about June 8, 2023, at or near Eagle Pass,
Texas, without inspection. (Id.) On June 10, 2023, a United States Border Patrol agent encountered
and arrested Petitioner and his family. (2023 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.90.) The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging
Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
Case 1:26-cv-01102-PLM-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/21/26 Page 3
of 8

4
(INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the
Attorney General.” (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.84.) DHS then released Petitioner into the United
States on his own recognizance “[i]n accordance with section 236 of the [INA],” which is codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (Order Release Recognizance, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.93.)
On February 16, 2026, ICE agents arrested Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; 2026
Form I-213, ECF No. 4-4, PageID.96.) An Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s request for a
custody redetermination, citing a lack of jurisdiction. (Immigration Judge Order, ECF No. 4-6,
PageID.102–104.)
IV. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
V. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
Case 1:26-cv-01102-PLM-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/21/26 Page 4
of 8

5
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, 	however, 	contend 	that 	Petitioner 	meets 	every 	element 	for 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).2
2 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), which was recently issued
Case 1:26-cv-01102-PLM-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/21/26 Page 5
of 8

6
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration judge,
has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a
relatively short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VII. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VIII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At this time, these non-binding cases
do not change the Court’s analysis.
Case 1:26-cv-01102-PLM-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/21/26 Page 6
of 8

7
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties
as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.3 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
3 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
Case 1:26-cv-01102-PLM-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/21/26 Page 7
of 8

8
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: 	April 21, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
Case 1:26-cv-01102-PLM-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/21/26 Page 8
of 8