Walker v. Calhoun County 10th District Court, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MAURICE WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
10TH DISTRICT COURT, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
Hon. Jane M. Beckering
Case No. 1:26-cv-1087
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before me again pursuant to the Court’s May 4, 2026 Order (ECF No. 9)
dismissing the prior report and recommendation as moot and returning the matter to me to consider
whether Plaintiff’s amended complaint affects my prior recommendations that the Court: (1)
dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims against the 10th District Court and his official capacity claims
against the John/Jane Doe Defendants without prejudice on the basis that such claims are barred
in this Court by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) dismiss all of Plaintiff’s individual capacity damage
claims against the John/Jane Doe Defendants with prejudice on the basis that these Defendants are
absolutely immune from liability for damages; and (3) dismiss the official capacity claims for
injunctive relief. (ECF No. 4 at PageID.21.) Having reviewed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 8), I adhere to most of my prior recommendations and add some new ones.
The First Amended Complaint retains the 10th District Court and John/Jane Doe Court
Administrators and Clerks in both their individual and official capacities as Defendants and asserts
many of the same factual allegations as the original complaint. However, the amended pleading
adds a new Defendant, 10th District Court Judge Michelle L. Richardson, and new allegations
asserting that acts of the Clerks/Administrators of which Plaintiff complains were retaliation for
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Plaintiff’s filings against Judge Richardson. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on November
10, 2025, he filed a motion to recuse Judge Richardson in Case No. 2025-25-08381 and that in late
November 2025 he filed a formal judicial misconduct grievance against Judge Richardson with
the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission. (ECF No. 8 at PageID.49.) Plaintiff further alleges that
on January 13, 2026, Judge Richardson held a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion to recuse and denied
the motion. (Id. at PageID.50.) Plaintiff alleges that, since the hearing, no hearings have been
scheduled, and no orders or judgments have issued in the case. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that soon after
he filed his judicial misconduct complaint, and Judge Richardson conducted the hearing, he began
experiencing issues with his pending case and a new case filing. He alleges that on “information
and belief, Judge Richardson, having been served with or otherwise made aware of the JTC
grievance and the motion to recuse, communicated her displeasure with Plaintiff to court staff
under her supervision and influence.” (Id. at PageID.52.) Although Plaintiff does not specifically
allege as much, he implies that Judge Richardson explicitly or implicitly instructed court staff to
obstruct or hinder Plaintiff’s court-related activities.
A. 10th District Court
As fully explained in the April 13, 2026 Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 4 at
PageID.17–18), Plaintiff’s claims against the 10th District Court and the John/Jane Doe
Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, those claims,
for both damages and injunctive relief, are subject to dismissal without prejudice. See Williams v.
Parikh, No. 24-3059, 2024 WL 5355086, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 4, 2025) (noting that the Ex parte
Young exception to sovereign immunity “‘does not normally permit federal courts to issue
injunctions against state-court judges or clerks’” (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595
U.S. 30, 39 (2021)).
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B. John/Jane Doe Defendants Individual Capacity Claims
For the reasons set forth in the April 13, 2026 Report and Recommendation, I recommend
that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s individual capacity damage claims against the John/Jane Doe
Defendants on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity. In addition, although I initially concluded that
Section 1983’s prohibition on injunctive relief barred only Plaintiff’s request for official capacity
injunctive relief against the John/Jane Doe Defendants, I now conclude that it also bars Plaintiff’s
request for injunctive relief against them in their individual capacities. See Bey v. Ferdinand, No.
1:24-CV-6684, 2025 WL 1505041, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2025) (dismissing claims for
injunctive relief against judges and a chief clerk in their individual capacities); Sherrod Estate v.
Madden, No. 1:24-cv-65, 2024 WL 5183205, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2024), adopted by 2025
WL 1399787 (S.D. Ohio May 14, 2025) (“All claims for injunctive relief under § 1983 against
Judge Dinkelacker in his individual capacity should . . . be dismissed with prejudice.”) (citing
Ward v. City of Norwalk, 640 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016)). Thus, only Plaintiff’s claims for
declaratory relief should be allowed to proceed against the John/Jane Doe Defendants.
C. Judge Richardson
As for Judge Richardson, I recommend that the Court conclude that she is entitled to
absolute judicial immunity as to damages. It is well established that a judge is absolutely immune
from suit seeking monetary relief, so long as the judge was performing judicial functions. See
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991). “[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just
from ultimate assessment of damages.” Id. at 11. A judge is not immune (1) where the judge’s
alleged actions were not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, or (2) where the actions, although
judicial in nature, were taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Id. at 11–12. “[T]he scope
of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.
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A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action [s]he took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of h[er] authority; rather, [s]he will be subject to liability only when
[s]he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–
57 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871)). “Whether an act is judicial depends
on the nature and function of the act, not the act itself.” Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1116
(6th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13). The analysis
involves two considerations: “(1) looking to the nature of the act itself, whether the act is a
‘function normally performed by a judge’ and (2) regarding the expectations of the parties, whether
the parties ‘dealt with the judge in h[er] judicial capacity.’” Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12).
The Sixth Circuit has held that an act “may constitute a judicial act if it relates to a general function
normally performed by a judge,” “even if the particular act is not a function normally performed
by a judge[.]” Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 621 (6th Cir. 2004) (italics in original). In short,
“[a]cts arising from, or related to, individual cases before a judge are generally judicial acts taken
in the scope of a judge’s judicial capacity.” Brown v. Martino, No. 24-13092, 2025 WL 1372821,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 12, 2025) (citing DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 784 (6th
Cir. 1999)).
While Plaintiff’s factual allegations tying Judge Richardson to the acts or inaction relating
to his case(s) are nonexistent, or speculative at best, or even unsubstantial under Apple v. Glenn,
183 F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 1988), the Court can conclude that Judge Richardson is entitled to judicial
immunity for all of the acts Plaintiff alleges as all of them relate to a general judicial function and
arise out of, or relate to, Plaintiff’s case before Judge Richardson. Therefore, I recommend that
Plaintiff’s damage claims against Judge Richardson be dismissed. In addition, for the reasons set
forth above, I recommend that the claims against her for injunctive relief be dismissed.
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Conclusion
In sum, I recommend that all claims against the 10th District Court and the John/Jane Doe
Defendants be dismissed with prejudice on the basis of sovereign immunity. I also recommend
that Plaintiff’s claims for damages and injunctive relief against the John/Jane Doe Defendants and
Judge Richardson be dismissed with prejudice. If the Court adopts these recommendations, only
Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief will remain. Finally, departing from my initial report and
recommendation, I recommend that the Court not stay the case pending identification of the Doe
Defendants but allow the action to proceed in normal fashion.
Date: May 18, 2026 /s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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