Joseph v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
HAMED JOSEPH,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-0672
HON. ROBERT J. JONKER
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1). For the following reasons, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was born in what is now South Sudan. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) He was
admitted to the United States as a refugee on June 21, 2000. (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.65.) At
that time, he was classified as a native and citizen of Sudan. (Id.) However, it appears that
Petitioner does not currently hold citizenship to South Sudan or any other country. (Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.6.) On January 13, 2005, Petitioner adjusted his immigration status in the United States
to that of a lawful permanent resident. (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.65.)
Since that time, Petitioner has been arrested for and convicted of a variety of crimes. On
July 21, 2006, Petitioner was convicted of Resisting and Obstructing a Police Officer. (Id.) On
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August 24, 2006, he was convicted of Resisting and Assaulting a Police Officer. (Id.) And on
March 20, 2007, Petitioner was convicted of two crimes: Assault with Intent to Commit Second
Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct and Receiving and Concealing Stolen Property. (Id.)
One result of these convictions is that Petitioner was repeatedly incarcerated; another result
is that his immigration status was adjusted. (Id. at PageID.65–66.) Following his convictions for
Assault with Intent to Commit Second Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct and Receiving and
Concealing Stolen Property, the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Detroit Field Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) arrested Petitioner and served
him with a Notice to Appear (NTA). The NTA charged Petitioner with removability under §
237(a)(2)(A)(ii)—for convictions of crimes of moral turpitude—and § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)—for a
conviction of an aggravated felony—of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). On March
24, 2009, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner to be removed to Sudan. (Resp., ECF No. 5,
PageID.65.) Petitioner waived his right to appeal and the order became final. (Id.) After Petitioner
was released from the Richard Handlon Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, ICE took him
into custody. (Id.)
In 2010, ERO submitted a passport application and contacted the Sudanese government
multiple times to arrange Petitioner’s removal. (Id. at PageID.66). When the Sudanese
government was unresponsive, ICE considered whether continued detention of Petitioner was
warranted. (Decision to Continue Detention, ECF No. 5-8, PageID.109.) On October 19, 2010,
an ICE official determined that continued detention was warranted, and Petitioner was instructed
to continue to take action to try to help achieve his removal. (Id.) When Petitioner was still not
removed by January 26, 2011, ERO decided to release him on an order of supervision that required
Petitioner to wear an ankle monitor. (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID66).
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Following his release on supervision, Petitioner was again arrested for and convicted of a
number of different crimes. On February 14, 2011, Petitioner was convicted of Use of Marijuana.
(Id. at PageID.66). On January 10, 2014, Petitioner was convicted of Disorderly Person—Jostling.
(Id.) On March 17, 2014, Petitioner was convicted of Domestic Violence. (Id.) On December 28,
2015, Petitioner was arrested for Assault by Strangulation. (Id.) On August 30, 2016, Petitioner
was arrested for Larceny. (Id.) And on November 29, 2021, he was again arrested for Larceny.
(Id.). Following most of these arrests or convictions, ERO would typically re-detain Petitioner for
some length of time and then re-release him on conditions of supervised release. (Id.)
On June 3, 2025, ERO re-arrested Petitioner and again began the process of trying to
remove him. (Id. at PageID.67). On June 6, 2025, ERO submitted a travel document request to
the Embassy of Sudan. (Id.) On July 24, 2025, the Embassy of Sudan denied the travel document
request and asked that Petitioner provide information on family members that reside in Sudan.
(Id.) On August 6, 2025, ERO contacted Petitioner’s brother to obtain such information. (Id.) On
September 1, 2025, ERO conducted a 90-day Post Order Custody Review. (Id.) Due to
Petitioner’s criminal history, including violent crimes, ERO decided to continue Petitioner’s
detention because he was a flight risk and threat to public safety. (Id.) Four days later, ERO
informed Petitioner that he needed to provide proof of his citizenship and travel documents or
request a family member to contact the Embassy of Sudan to obtain such materials. (Id.) The
Sudanese embassy again denied Petitioner a travel document. (Id.) On November 22, 2025, ERO
headquarters (ERO HQ) conducted a second Post Order Custody Review and decided to further
detain Petitioner because the panel did not believe he met the criteria for release as set forth in 8
C.F.R. § 241.4(e). (Id.) ERO served Petitioner with the Decision to Continue Detention on
December 4, 2025. (Id.)
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Because the Sudanese embassy continually denied Petitioner travel documents, ERO began
work to remove Petitioner to a third country on December 17, 2025. (Id.) Respondents state that
ERO has followed up with its headquarters on February 13, 2026, and March 4, 2026, on the status
of the third-country removal, but they allege that no response has yet been received. (Id.)
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, among other things, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.20–22). In an order entered on March 5, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to
show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3). Respondents filed their response (ECF
No. 5) on March 26, 2026.
HABEAS CORPUS LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-related matters. See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91,
94 (2025).
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal. As a result,
Petitioner’s present detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. However, Petitioner contends that
his detention is unlawful and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In
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response, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s continued detention for purposes of removal is
authorized by Zadvydas.
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) further provides:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title,
removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or
unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal
period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court considered whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) authorizes
indefinite detention when no other country is willing to take a person who has been ordered
removed. 533 U.S. at 682. In answering that question, the Court noted that the purpose of the
statute was to assure the “alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. Therefore, the
Court concluded that for post-removal-order detention to be authorized by the statute, the removal
itself must be reasonably foreseeable. Id. The Court indicated that this inquiry would vary from
case to case and that there was no specific point in time at which the detention became
constitutionally impermissible. Id. Still, to assist the lower courts in making the difficult judgment
calls about when the detention was no longer authorized by the statute, the Court designated six
months as a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Id. at 701. Even after six months
has passed, though, the Court made clear that the alien may continue to be held unless the alien
“provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Id.
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Under this framework, it is the petitioner’s burden to come forward with evidence showing
that removal is not significantly likely to occur sometime soon. Id. Only after the petitioner has
come forward with such evidence does the burden flip to the respondents, who must then show
evidence that the removal is, in fact, reasonably foreseeable. See Abdalla v. Johnson, No.
16-14422, 2017 WL 345731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2017) (rejecting Petitioner’s claim that
detention of more than a year violated Zadvydas when the petitioner “provide[d] no evidence” that
removal was unlikely to occur in the near future).
Here, Petitioner has pointed to the fact that respondents have repeatedly tried—and
failed—to obtain travel documents for Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.14.) Even assuming
for the sake of argument that such evidence is sufficient to allow the petitioner to satisfy his burden
under Zadvydas, the government has responded by showing that ICE Headquarters is actively
attempting to remove Petitioner to a third country. (Szukhent Decl. ¶ 27, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.78)
Thus, at this point in time, Petitioner is not in the state of “indefinite, perhaps permanent,
detention” that the Court in Zadvydas said would violate the constitution. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
699; see also Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that a detention of
over two years was constitutionally permissible because the removal was likely to occur once
Petitioner’s appeals were concluded).
The Court recognizes that continued detention may, over time, come to resemble the kind
of indefinite confinement that Zadvydas may not permit. “[A]s the period of prior postremoval
confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely [has] to shrink.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Courts applying this principle recognize that even where the
Government continues to pursue removal in good faith, the passage of time can eventually erode
the reasonableness of continued detention. See Martinez, 968 F.3d at 565 (explaining that
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prolonged detention may become unreasonable if the petitioner later demonstrates that removal is
no longer likely).
Here, however, the Court is not yet faced with that situation. An immigration official has
testified that the government remains in active discussions with a third country to coordinate
Petitioner’s removal. Although nearly two months have passed since ICE Headquarters provided
that update, such a length of time is not unreasonably long for negotiating and coordinating
removal to a third country. See Abdalla, 2017 WL 345731, at *4 (finding continued detention
reasonable where the Government anticipated progress in the near future and no country had
declined repatriation). At this point, it seems to the Court that Petitioner’s removal remains
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Accordingly, the petition will be denied
without prejudice. Should the Government’s efforts to secure removal ultimately stall or fail to
bear fruit, Petitioner remains free to file a new petition asserting that continued detention is no
longer reasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment dismissing Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: April 6, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
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