Tyran v. People of the State of Michigan, The

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DAVID J.W. TYRAN, JR.,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Case No. 1:26-cv-00383
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff initiated this action on February 5, 2026, and filed an application to
proceed in this Court without prepaying fees or costs—or to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP). (ECF Nos. 1, 2). The Court granted Plaintiff’s amended application to proceed
IFP (ECF Nos. 8, 10) and has reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the
undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed.
I. Background
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he “ha[s] been victimized by the citizens of
the State of Michigan,” who violated his “constitutional right to pursue happiness.”
(ECF No. 1, PageID.1). Plaintiff alleges that he “ha[s] multiple untreated spinal and
cartilage/bone fractures” and that he is “living [his] one life in severe pain due to the
actions of Michigan citizens.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.2). Plaintiff requests $50 billion in
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relief. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges multiple medical ailments, asserting that he has
been “victimized by the medical community” (ECF No. 1, PageID.5) through “extensive
x-rays” (ECF No. 1, PageID.3) and refusals to diagnose or treat him (ECF No. 1,
PageID.2-5).
II. Analysis
A claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right for relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). As the Supreme Court has
held, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” If the complaint simply pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss . . . . Determining whether a complaint
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states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Plaintiff’s allegations do not provide dates, locations, or names of individuals
or entities to sustain any viable cause of action. Plaintiff’s claims are precisely the kind
of “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed–me accusation[s]” that are facially
implausible and not viable under Twombly and Iqbal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To the extent that Plaintiff initiates this action against the state government or
its agencies, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such a suit. See Pichiorri v. Burghes,
162 F.4th 745, 752 (6th Cir. 2025) (“The Constitution grants the States sovereign
immunity from a private party’s suit against them in federal court.”); see also Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends that Defendant’s motion be granted and this action terminated.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
complaint be dismissed. For the same reasons the undersigned makes these
recommendations, the undersigned further recommends that an appeal of this matter
by Plaintiff would not be in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962).
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OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: March 12, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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