Olson v. Muskegon Heights, City of et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRANDON DALE OLSON,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:26-cv-371
CITY OF MUSKEGON HEIGHTS, et al.
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently before me is the Motion to Dismiss Count 1 of Plaintiff Brandon Olson’s
complaint of Defendants City of Muskegon Heights, Muskegon Heights Police Department, and
Officer Rueda-Rodriguez. (ECF No. 35.) Olson has filed a response (ECF No. 37), and Defendants
did not reply. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the Court GRANT the
motion and dismiss this action.
I. 	Background
The Court’s March 6, 2026 Order Regarding Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 19),
limited this action to Olson’s Claim 1 against Muskegon Heights Police Officer Rueda-Rodriguez,
the City of Muskegon Heights, and the Muskegon Heights Police Department. Claim 1 asserts that
Officer Rueda-Rodriguez violated Olson’s Fourth Amendment rights by stopping his vehicle and
detaining him without probable cause. Olson asserts that the City and the Police Department are
liable on a theory of municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 38, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/08/26 Page 1
of 7

2
To review, Olson alleges that on October 5, 2025, he was traveling in the City of Muskegon
Heights “committing no crime, harming no one, and exercising the fundamental right to
locomotion,” when Officer Rueda-Rodriguez stopped his vehicle. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.3.) Olson
alleges that there was no probable cause or warrant and no lawful authority to justify the stop.
(ECF No. 1 at PageID.3.) He says that the stop “was initiated solely under color of statutory code,
not constitutional law.” (Id. at PageID.3-4.)
Olson alleges that he asked Officer Rueda-Rodriguez about the lawful basis of the stop,
but she “provided none.” (Id. at PageID.4.) This is not true, however, as the transcript from the
November 20, 2025 informal hearing that Olson attaches to his complaint shows that Officer
Rueda-Rodriguez initiated the stop after her radar indicated that Olson’s pickup truck passed her
cruiser traveling 44 miles per hour in a 30-mile per hour posted zone. (ECF No. 1-4 at PageID.48.)
She also issued Olson a traffic citation. In other words, he was stopped for speeding in violation
of Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.628.
In Count 1, Olson alleges that the stop was unlawful because there was “no crime,” “no
probable cause,” “no reasonable suspicion,” “no victim,” “no breach of the peace,” and “no lawful
authority to detain [him].” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.12.)
II. 	Motion Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s
allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citations
and footnote omitted). As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 38, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/08/26 Page 2
of 7

3
standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely
consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678–79 (internal citations omitted).
In general, when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6), a court’s review is limited to the four corners of the pleading at issue. Fed. R. Civ. P
12(d); see also Courser v. Michigan House of Representatives, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1139 (W.D.
Mich. 2019) (noting that “[i]n general, in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the court is
limited to considering only the pleadings”) (citing Rondigo, LLC v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d
673, 682 (6th Cir. 2011)). Nonetheless, it is well established that, in some circumstances, a court
may consider matters beyond the pleadings without converting the motion to one for summary
judgment under Rule 56. Examples include “any exhibits attached [to the Complaint], public
records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to
dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained
therein.” Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 38, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/08/26 Page 3
of 7

4
III. 	Discussion
A. 	The Police Department
As Olson appears to concede in his response, he may not sue the Muskegon Heights Police
Department because, under Michigan law, it is not an entity capable of being sued. See May-Shaw
v. City of Grand Rapids, No. 1:19-cv-117, 2019 WL 2265076, at *3 (W.D. Mich. May 28, 2019)
(“It is well settled in Michigan that a police department is not a legal entity capable of being sued
in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.”) (citing Boykin v. Van Buren Twp., 479 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir.
2007); Laise v. City of Utica, 970 F. Supp. 605, 608 (E.D. Mich. 1997)). Thus, the Police
Department is properly dismissed from this action.
B. 	Fourth Amendment Claim
“In order to effect a traffic stop, an officer must possess either probable cause of a civil
infraction or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 763
(6th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 748 (6th Cir. 2008) (“A police officer
legally may stop a car when he has probable cause to believe that a civil traffic violation has
occurred.”). In Michigan, speeding is a civil infraction. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 257.627(16),
257.628(9); see Wolfbauer v. City of Berkley, No. 305668, 2013 WL 1137136, at *1 (Mich. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 2013). Thus, Officer Reuda-Rodriguez was authorized to stop Olson’s vehicle only
if she had probable cause that he had committed a traffic violation. Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
“Probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief supported by less than prima facie proof
but more than mere suspicion.” Blair, 524 F.3d at 748. A police officer’s observation of a traffic
violation provides sufficient probable cause to authorize a traffic stop. See, e.g., United States v.
Street, 614 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Burton, 334 F.3d 514, 517 (6th Cir.
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 38, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/08/26 Page 4
of 7

5
2003). The relevant inquiry in determining whether an officer had probable cause to initiate a
traffic stop “is fact-dependent and will turn on what the officer knew at the time he made the stop.”
United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993). “[S]o long as the officer has probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the resulting stop is not
unlawful and does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
As the foregoing authorities establish, probable cause is a legal conclusion to be made on
the facts available to the officer at the time of the traffic stop. As Defendants note, the complaint
provides no facts to support the conclusion that Officer Rueda-Rodriguez lacked probable cause
to believe that Olson was not speeding. His allegations are conclusions, not facts, which provide
no basis to infer that Officer Rueda-Rodriguez lacked a reasonable basis for belief that Olson was
speeding. Although Olson is proceeding pro se, he is still obligated to allege facts, not just
conclusions, plausibly supporting a Fourth Amendment violation, but he fails to meet this basic
requirement.
The complaint alone is deficient, but becomes even more so when considered in
conjunction with the transcript Olson attached to the complaint—which Olson swears is “a truthful
accurate, and complete account of the November 20, 2025 Zoom proceeding involving Magistrate
[Berry].” (ECF No. 1-4 at PageID.49.) At the hearing, Officer Rueda-Rodriguez testified that her
radar indicated that Olson was traveling 44 miles per hour on a 30-mile-per-hour posted street,
which provided the basis for the stop. (Id. at PageID.48.) This was a fact within her knowledge
supporting 	probable 	cause. 	Moreover, 	as 	noted 	in 	my 	February 	9, 	2026 	Report 	and
Recommendation (ECF No. 86 at PageID.97), Magistrate Berry’s finding at the hearing that
Officer Rueda-Rodgriguez failed to meet her burden of proof under the preponderance of the
evidence standard and People v. Ferency, 133 Mich. App. 526 (1984), provides no basis to
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 38, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/08/26 Page 5
of 7

6
conclude that the traffic stop itself did not satisfy the lower threshold of probable cause, which was
not at issue in the hearing.
Accordingly, because the complaint fails to meet the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard set
forth above, it is properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).1
C. 	The City
Finally, Defendants assert that Olson’s Monell allegations against the City, like his
allegations against Olson, are merely conclusions that fail to allege a plausible claim under Section
1983. It is well established that a municipality may only be liable under Section 1983 when its
policy or custom causes the injury, regardless of the form of relief sought by the plaintiff. Los
Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 39 (2010) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). In a
municipal liability claim, the finding of a policy or custom is the initial determination to be made.
Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996). The policy or custom must be the
moving force behind the constitutional injury, and a plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the
policy to the governmental entity, and show that the injury was incurred because of the execution
of that policy. Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005); Alkire v. Irving, 330
F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003). Like other claims, municipal liability claims under Monell must
meet Twombly’s plausibility standard. See Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor, 860 F.3d 382, 388–89 (6th
Cir. 2017) (confirming that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal apply to Monell
claims); Rayfield v. City of Grand Rapids, 373 F. Supp. 3d 962, 977 (W.D. Mich. 2018)
(“Conclusory assertions [of a policy or custom] are not enough to state a Twombly plausible Monell
claim.”).
1 Officer Rueda-Rodriguez also moves for dismissal based on qualified immunity. In light of my
conclusion that the complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation, I find no need to address
qualified immunity.
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 38, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/08/26 Page 6
of 7

7
Here, Olson offers nothing more than conclusory assertions, as he fails to allege actual
facts regarding a specific policy that caused his alleged injury. He alleges that the City is
responsible “for maintaining policies, customs, and practices that directly contributed to the
violations . . . including failure to train, failure to supervise, and tolerance of constitutional
misconduct” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.3), and that the City “maintain[s] policies and practices that
allow such unlawful stops, making them responsible under Monell.” (Id. at PageID.13.) Such fact-
barren allegations fall well short of what is required to allege a Monell claim. These are simply
conclusions that do not suffice. Therefore, the Monell claim is also subject to dismissal.2
III. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that the Court grant Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 35) and dismiss this action with prejudice.
Dated: June 8, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
2 The Monell claim also fails because Olson does not allege a plausible Fourth Amendment
violation against Officer Rueda-Rodriguez. See Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir.
2014) (“There can be no liability under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation.”)
(citing Scott v. Clay Cnty., 205 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2000)); see also Przybysz v. City of Toledo,
746 F. App’x 480, 484 (6th Cir. 2018) (“As a threshold matter, there can be no municipal liability
under Monell when there is no constitutional violation”).
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 38, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/08/26 Page 7
of 7