Ritchard v. Sniegowski et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHARLES RITCHARD,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:26-cv-00364
SUSAN SNIEGOWSKI, et al.,
Defendant.
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff initiated this action on February 3, 2026. (ECF No. 1). The Court
permitted Plaintiff to proceed as a pauper (ECF No. 5) and has reviewed Plaintiff’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it was frivolous,
malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s complaint be
dismissed and this action terminated.
BACKGROUND
In his complaint, Plaintiff initiated this action against nine Defendants: Judge
Susan Sniegowski; Sheriff Craig Mast; Attorney Matthew Deperno; Bree Moeggenberg;
Deputy John Does #1, #2, and #3; Rosati, Schultz, Joppich, & Amtsbuechler (RSJA Law);
and Attorney Alexandra Page. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint includes nine
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enumerated “Statements of Claim,” each of which is directed at a particular Defendant(s)
or individual(s).1 Additional facts will be provided below as to each of Plaintiff’s claims.
ANALYSIS
A claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right for relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). As the Supreme Court has
held, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” If the complaint simply pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss . . . . Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be
1 Plaintiff asserts claims against the Oceana County Board of Commissioners, who are
not named as Defendants in the complaint.
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a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).
I. Claims 1-3
In his First Statement of Claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Judge
Sniegowski issued an “[i]llegal warrant” on January 5, 2026, and “did not properly
control” Plaintiff’s “personal data” in violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq., and 18 U.S.C. § 1512. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6).
In his Second Statement of Claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Attorney
Deperno “failed to maintain [Plaintiff’s] unredacted personal data” and “conspired” with
Defendants Judge Sniegowski, Moeggenberg, and John Doe #1 “to violate [Plaintiff’s]
right of privacy” in violation of the DPPA. (Id.). These Defendants “intimated [sic] and
coerced [Plaintiff] as a federal witness” in violation of § 1512. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6-7).
In his Third Statement of Claim, Plaintiff alleges that, on January 5, 2026,
Defendant Moeggenberg “posted [Plaintiff’s] unredacted personal data on Facebook”
with Defendant John Doe #1 and “made vile comments posting on Facebook with her
friends” in violation of the DPPA and § 1512. (Id.).
“The DPPA regulates the disclosure and resale of personal information contained
in the records of state DMVs.” Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000). The DPPA
makes it unlawful for “any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information,
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from a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b),” or “to
make false representation to obtain any personal information from an individual’s motor
vehicle record.” 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a)-(b). The DPPA expressly authorizes civil actions
by persons whose information has been improperly disclosed. 18 U.S.C. § 2724.
Plaintiff fails to identify what type of “personal data” was released and fails to allege
how any of the named Defendants obtained such “personal data” from a motor vehicle
record in any way. Additionally, Section 1512 does not provide a private cause of action.
See West v. Landau, No. 25-10420, 2025 WL 1108259 at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2025)
(no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1512). Regardless, Plaintiff’s allegations
are nothing more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, [which] do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support viable claims upon
which relief may be granted, and the undersigned judicial officer recommends that these
claims be dismissed.
II. Claim 4
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 22, 2026, Defendants Sheriff Mast, Deputy John
Doe #1, and Deputy John Doe #2 “came knocking, pounding on windows, sirens blaring,
[and] lights flashing.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.7). Plaintiff further alleges that “[t]his was
not the first time.” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that “[t]hese actions” amount to “coercion of
a federal witness” and “[d]omestic [t]errorism” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. §§
241, 242, 2331, and 1512. (Id.).
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None of the criminal statutes upon which Plaintiff relies provides a private cause
of action. See United States v. Oguaju, 76 F. App’x 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003) (no private
right of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or 242); see also West, No. 25-10420, 2025 WL
1108259 at *4 (no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1512). To the extent that
Plaintiff asserts claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2331, that statute “does not define any crime;
it defines terms used in Code Chapter 113B regarding terrorism.” Cassaday v. Trump,
No. 1:22-CV-682, 2022 WL 3082464, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 2022).
A plaintiff alleging a violation of Section 1983 must claim (1) that he suffered the
deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2)
that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Simescu v.
Emmet County Dept. of Social Servs., 942 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1991). If either
element is missing, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim will not prevail. Christy v. Randlett,
932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff fails to identify the specific Constitutional
right allegedly infringed under the first element. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege
facts sufficient to support viable claims upon which relief may be granted, and these
claims should be dismissed.
III. Claim 5
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sheriff Mast stated, “[t]he FBI[,] and specifically,
Agent Weatherby[,] was not going to investigate,” demonstrating that Defendant Sheriff
Mast “was obviously in collusion with a [f]ederal [a]gency.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.7).
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Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Sheriff Mast’s statement violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242,
his due-process rights, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a conspiracy. (Id.).
A civil conspiracy claim under Section 1983 “requires (1) a single plan existed, (2)
that defendants shared in a general conspiratorial objective to deprive plaintiffs of their
constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act was committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy that caused injury to plaintiffs.” Siefert v. Hamilton Cty., 951 F.3d 753,
767-68 (6th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] claim for
civil conspiracy under § 1983 exists only where the plaintiff has established a separate
and actionable constitutional injury.” Rapp v. Dutcher, 557 F. App’x 444, 450 (6th Cir.
2014). Beyond Plaintiff’s conclusory statement, there is no allegation as to how
Defendant Sheriff Mast was “in collusion” with the FBI or Agent Weatherby, neither of
whom were identified as Defendants, in violation of Plaintiff’s due-process rights.
There is also no allegation that they agreed to deprive Plaintiff of his due-process rights.
Additionally, as stated above, Sections 241 and 242 do not provide private causes of
action. See Oguaju, 76 F. App’x at 581. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege facts
sufficient to support a viable claim upon which relief may be granted, and this claim
should be dismissed.
IV. Claim 6
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sheriff Mast, on an unspecified date, “had to call
off” Defendants Deputy John Doe #1 and Deputy John Doe #2 “to prevent damage when
they breach [sic] the door.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.7). Plaintiff did “not believe they had
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a search warrant” and asserts that “this entire event was an illegal search and seizure
action violating the Fourth Amendment,” as well as Sections 1512 and 2331. (ECF
No. 1, PageID.7-8).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are nothing more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, [which] do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, as stated above, neither Section 1512
nor Section 2331 provide a private cause of action. See West, No. 25-10420, 2025 WL
1108259 at *4 (no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1512); see also Cassaday,
No. 1:22-CV-682, 2022 WL 3082464, at *1 n.1 (“8 U.S.C. § 2331 does not define any
crime; it defines terms used in Code Chapter 113B regarding terrorism.”). Accordingly,
Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support a viable claim upon which relief may be
granted, and this claim should be dismissed.
V. Claim 7
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 10, 2026, unidentified deputies “visit[ed]”
Plaintiff at 5:05 a.m., seemingly at his home, causing dogs to bark and Plaintiff and his
wife “to be concerned for [their] safety and health.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.8). Plaintiff
asserts that these actions amount to “intimidation and coercion” under Sections 1512
and 2331. (Id.). Again, neither of these statutory provisions provide a private cause of
action. See West, No. 25-10420, 2025 WL 1108259 at *4 (no private cause of action
under 18 U.S.C. § 1512); see also Cassaday, No. 1:22-CV-682, 2022 WL 3082464, at *1
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n.1 (“8 U.S.C. § 2331 does not define any crime; it defines terms used in Code Chapter
113B regarding terrorism.”).
VI. Claim 8
Plaintiff alleges that the Oceana County Board of Commissioners “controls every
department and costs within the legal system creating a [c]onstitutional [v]iolation of
the separation of powers.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.8). Plaintiff asserts that these actions
violate Sections 241, 242, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a conspiracy. (Id.).
A civil conspiracy claim under Section 1983 “requires (1) a single plan existed, (2)
that defendants shared in a general conspiratorial objective to deprive plaintiffs of their
constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act was committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy that caused injury to plaintiffs.” Siefert, 951 F.3d at 767-68 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “[A] claim for civil conspiracy under § 1983 exists only
where the plaintiff has established a separate and actionable constitutional
injury.” Rapp, 557 F. App’x at 450. Beyond Plaintiff’s conclusory statements, there are
no allegations as to how the Board, who was not identified as a Defendant, was “in
collusion” or with whom it was “in collusion,” in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. Additionally, as stated above, Sections 241 and 242 do not provide private
causes of action. See Oguaju, 76 F. App’x at 581. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege
facts sufficient to support a viable claim upon which relief may be granted, and this claim
should be dismissed.
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VII. Claim 9
Plaintiff claims that Defendants RSJA Law and Attorney Page “distributed
[Plaintiff’s] personal information without redaction” and “exposed [Plaintiff] to
additional stress as a federal witness” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the DPPA, and
Sections 241, 242, and 1512. (ECF No. 1, PageID.8-9). It is well-settled that retained
or appointed attorneys performing traditional functions as defense counsel do not act
“under color of state law” and are not state actors subject to suit under § 1983. Elrod v.
Michigan Supreme Court, 104 F. App’x 506, 508 (6th Cir.2004). Because Defendants
RSJA Law and Attorney Page are not state actors, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against them
fails and should be dismissed.
Further, and as stated above, none of the criminal statutes that Plaintiff asserts
provide a private cause of action. See Oguaju, 76 F. App’x at 581 (no private right of
action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or 242); see also West, No. 25-10420, 2025 WL 1108259 at
*4 (no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1512). As for the DPPA claim, Plaintiff
fails to identify what type of “personal data” Defendants RSJA Law and Attorney Page
“distributed” and fails to allege that either Defendant obtained such “personal data” from
a motor vehicle record in any way. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient
to support a viable claim upon which relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
complaint be dismissed and this action terminated. For the same reasons the
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undersigned makes these recommendations, the undersigned further recommends
that an appeal of this matter by Plaintiff would not be in good faith. Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated:March 2, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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