Torres Ortiz v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
KEVIN NOE TORRES ORTIZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-124
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan,
initiated this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court will further deny
Petitioner’s emergency motion to stay removal and immediate release (ECF No. 6).
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.29–30.)
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In an order entered on January 15, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on January 21, 2026,
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on January 24, 2026, (ECF No. 5). On January 28, 2026,
Petitioner filed a motion titled “expedited consideration requested for stay of removal and
immediate release of Petitioner” (ECF No. 6).
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Notice and
Order 	of 	Expedited 	Removal, 	ECF 	No. 	4-1, 	PageID.48.) 	He 	entered 	the 	United 	States
approximately 8 years ago. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
On December 3, 2025, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.2.) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Notice and Order of
Expedited Removal, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “not in possession of a
valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, ECF
No. 4-1, PageID.48.) On January 16, 2026, an immigration judge found that Petitioner “has
established a significant possibility of eligibility for asylum . . .[or] . . . withholding of removal.”
(Immigration Judge Order, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.53.) The immigration judge nonetheless affirmed
the “negative credible fear determination” made by DHS and returned the case to DHS for removal.
(Id., PageID.53–54.)
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
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writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should appeal his order of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions for expedited removal set forth in 8
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U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner is subject to expedited
removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) as an “arriving alien.”1
“The Arriving Aliens Provision imposes expedited removal and detention on any
noncitizen who is inadmissible due to lack of entry documents or fraud or willful misrepresentation
on an admission application and ‘who is arriving in the United States.’” Rodriguez-Acurio v.
Almodovar, No. 2:25-cv-6065 (NJC), 2025 WL 3314420, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). However, for the same reasons set forth in detail in
Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026),
Petitioner is not an “arriving alien” subject to mandatory detention and expedited removal under
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Accordingly, Petitioner’s detention commencing on December 3, 2025, is not
governed by § 1225(b)(1).
The Court further concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such
as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States
when apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each
of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638,
at *4–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL
1 	Respondents 	do 	not 	argue 	that 	Petitioner 	is 	subject 	to 	expedited 	removal 	under
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). However, if they had, their argument would fail. Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)
allows the Attorney General to invoke expedited removal for “certain other aliens” who have not
been “physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior
to 	the 	date 	of 	the 	determination 	of 	inadmissibility 	under 	this 	subparagraph.” 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Petitioner states that he arrived in the United States approximately 8 years
prior and Respondents have presented no evidence otherwise. Accordingly, Petitioner is not
subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii).
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3562577, at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner “is detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), which mandates detention.” (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.45.)
As discussed above, the Court has already rejected Respondents’ argument that Petitioner
is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1), or even under § 1225(b)(2). The Court
concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention framework violates
Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
constitutional analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. 	Pending Motion, Other Claims, and Other Forms of Relief
On January 28, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion titled “expedited consideration requested
for stay of removal and immediate release of Petitioner” (ECF No. 6). To the extent that Petitioner
seeks a stay of his removal proceedings generally, the Court lacks jurisdiction to issue such an
order. Enacted in 1996, § 1252 governs “judicial review” of orders of removal. Subsection (g)
provides:
[e]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas
corpus provision, ... no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by
or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General
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to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Because a general request for a stay of removal would concern a decision or
action by the Attorney General to “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders,” the Court finds that § 1252(g) precludes the Court’s jurisdiction over such claims. The
Court will, therefore, deny Petitioner’s request for a stay of his removal proceedings for lack of
jurisdiction to the extent that it seeks a stay of removal generally
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition
and will deny the remaining relief requested in Petitioner’s emergency motion for a stay of removal
and immediate release.
VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
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for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, and the Executive Office
for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.2 The Court will also order Respondents to file a
status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will
dismiss the United States Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General,
and the Executive Office for Immigration Review as Respondents. The Court will deny
Petitioner’s motion titled “expedited consideration requested for stay of removal and immediate
release of Petitioner” (ECF No. 6).
Dated: February 2, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer.
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