Alcivar Lorenzo et al v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
INGRID ISIS ALCIVAR LORENZO,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-77
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Ingrid Isis Alcivar Lorenzo initiated this action on January 9, 2026, by filing a pro se
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on behalf of her mother, Francisca
Lorenzo, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained
at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan. (Pet., ECF No.
1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In her § 2241 petition, Ms. Alcivar Lorenzo challenges the lawfulness of Ms. Lorenzo’s
current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering Respondents to
conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
In an Order entered on January 15, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on January 21, 2026.
(ECF No. 4.)
II. 	Next Friend Status
As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Ms. Alcivar Lorenzo may
proceed as “next friend” of Ms. Lorenzo. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing
and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in [her]
behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163
(1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not [herself] become a party to the habeas corpus action in which
[she] participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the
real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend status, therefore,
is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties
may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is
unable to prosecute the case on her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or
other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on
whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see
West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir.
1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate her dedication to the
“best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with that
party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety of
his [or her] status” in order to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted). Standing
to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically to
whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163.
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“[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee
if the detainee [herself] could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir.
1989) (citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must
clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements”
because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise
deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most
significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not
set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device,
the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore,
495 U.S. at 163.
In this action, the Court concludes that the petition and attached documents adequately
demonstrate that the justice system is inaccessible to Ms. Lorenzo, who is detained in an ICE
detention facility with limited English proficiency. (See ECF No. 1-2, PageID.15.) Moreover, Ms.
Alcivar Lorenzo, the daughter of Ms. Lorenzo, has demonstrated both a significant relationship
with Ms. Lorenzo, and that she is truly dedicated to acting in Ms. Lorenzo’ best interests. Ms.
Alcivar Lorenzo has attached to her petition documents indicating Ms. Alcivar Lorenzo’s
unyielding pursuit of relief on behalf of Ms. Lorenzo through the various avenues available.
Accordingly, the Court will permit Ms. Alcivar Lorenzo to proceed as next friend to Ms. Lorenzo.
III. 	Factual Background
Ms. Lorenzo is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Employment Authorization, ECF No. 1-
10, PageID.45; Mitchell Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.187.) She entered the United States at an
unknown date, time, and place without being “admitted or paroled.” (Mitchell Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No.
4-1, PageID.187.)
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Since her entry into the United States, United States Border Patrol encountered and
removed Ms. Lorenzo on several occasions pursuant to an order of expedited removal. (Id., ¶¶ 5–
8, PageID.187–88.) Ms. Lorenzo returned to the United States each time. 1 On August 20, 2014,
United States Border Patrol encountered Ms. Lorenzo near Calexico, California, and issued her a
Form I-871 Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order. (Id., ¶ 9, PageID.188.) When ICE
agents again encountered Petitioner in Seatle, Washington on November 10, 2014, Petitioner was
found to have a reasonable fear of returning to Mexico. (Id., ¶¶ 10, 12, PageID.189). Therefore,
while an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed, the immigration judge withheld removal
to Mexico. (Id., ¶ 14; Order of Withholding, ECF No. 1-17, PageID.64.) On January 27, 2015,
Petitioner was released from detention on an order of supervision. (Notice and Order of Release,
ECF No. 1-12, PageID.53–55.) She has remained in the United States since that time.
Prior to her detention, Ms. Lorenzo lived in Michigan with her three children, two of whom
are minor United States citizens. (Birth Certificate I, ECF No. 1-8, PageID.40–41; Birth Certificate
II, ECF No. 1-9, PageID.42–43.) Ms. Lorenzo holds valid employment authorization (Employment
Authorization, ECF No. 1-10, PageID.45), owns her own home (Home Ownership Records, ECF
No. 1-25, PageID.116–144), and has paid taxes while working within the United States (Tax
Records, ECF No. 1-24, PageID.84–115).
On December 10, 2025, the Van Buren County Sheriff’s Department arrested Petitioner on
charges of assault and battery. (Id., ¶ 16, PageID.190.) The case remains pending. (Id.) On
December 11, 2025, ICE agents encountered Petitioner at the Van Buren County Jail, detained her,
1 Respondents note that Petitioner was convicted of violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325, improper entry by
alien. (Id., ¶ 15.) However, Respondents do not contend Petitioner has been convicted of any crime
listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) so as to implicate 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) regarding the detention
of “criminal aliens.”
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and transferred her to North Lake Processing Center. (Id., ¶ 17.) The Department of Homeland
Security has placed Petitioner in expedited removal proceedings based upon Petitioner’s 2014
removal order. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.180.)
IV. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
V. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted her administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner has not appealed her order of expedited removal.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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VI. 	Merits Discussion
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Ms.
Lorenzo is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions. Respondents, however,
contend that Ms. Lorenzo is subject to expedited removal under Ms. Lorenzo’s prior order of
expedited removal, which they claim was last reinstated in 2014. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.180.)
The Court has not been provided with that order.
According to the INA,
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally
after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of
removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not
subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply
for any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall be removed under the prior
order at any time after the reentry.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). However, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 provides an “[e]xception for withholding of
removal:”
If an alien whose prior order of removal has been reinstated under this section
expresses a fear of returning to the country designated in that order, the alien shall
be immediately referred to an asylum officer for an interview to determine whether
the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture pursuant to § 208.31 of this
chapter.
Id. Immigration authorities did not continue to detain Ms. Lorenzo; instead, Ms. Lorenzo was
released on an order of supervision. Therefore, this case is not about the government’s authority
to detain Ms. Lorenzo pursuant to a final order of expedited removal in the first place; this case
concerns ICE’s authority to re-detain her following release on an order of supervision. See Nguyen
v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 149 (D. Mass. 2025).
Ordinarily, when an individual is issued a final order of removal as Ms. Lorenzo has here,
that person must be removed from the country within 90 days. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Except
for situations where the person is “detained or confined” in a case other than the “immigration
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process,” or where a court orders a stay of removal, the 90-day removal period begins when the
removal order becomes administratively final. Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Under § 1231(a)(6), the
government is permitted to continue to detain individuals who are deemed “inadmissible” beyond
the removal period, or it may release them under specified terms of supervision. Id. § 1231(a)(6).
However, once that time passes and after “removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued
detention is no longer authorized by statute,” and the noncitizen must be released. Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–700 (2001); see 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (“If the alien does not leave or
is not removed within the [90-day] removal period, the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to
supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.”).
Consistent with § 1231(a)(6), Ms. Lorenzo was released from detention with an order of
supervision, requiring that Ms. Lorenzo attend a yearly check-in with ICE. There is no evidence
before the Court that Ms. Lorenzo failed to comply with that requirement.
The government has promulgated regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations
concerning the release of noncitizens who are subject to a final removal order. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.4; 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. These regulations—specifically, §§ 241.4 and 241.13—also govern
the revocation of such noncitizens’ release. The agency must comply with the applicable
regulatory and statutory requirements. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347
U.S. 260, 268 (1954), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as recognized in Dept. of
Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 135 (2020) (“[A]s long as the regulations
remain operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep” those regulations.).
As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
“The Supreme Court has long recognized that a federal agency is obliged to abide
by the regulations it promulgates. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545 (1959);
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260,
267 (1954). An agency’s failure to follow its own regulations ‘tends to cause unjust
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discrimination and deny adequate notice’ and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process. Where a prescribed procedure
is intended to protect the interests of a party before the agency, ‘even though
generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be
scrupulously observed.’ Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
also Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 Harv. L.Rev. 629,
630 (1974) (observing that agency violations of regulations promulgated to provide
parties with procedural safeguards generally have been invalidated by courts).”
Wilson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. United
States Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.1998)).
8 C.F.R. § 241.4 generally governs the continued detention of noncitizens under a final
order of removal. Section 241.4(l)(2) provides:
The Executive Associate Commissioner shall have authority, in the exercise of
discretion, to revoke release and return to Service custody an alien previously
approved for release under the procedures in this section. A district director may
also revoke release of an alien when, in the district director’s opinion, revocation is
in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the
case to the Executive Associate Commissioner. Release may be revoked in the
exercise of discretion when, in the opinion of the revoking official:
(i) The purposes of release have been served;
(ii) The alien violates any condition of release;
(iii) It is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence removal
proceedings against an alien; or
(iv) The conduct of the alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that
release would no longer be appropriate.
8 C.F.R. § 241.4.
Section 241.13 governs the detention of noncitizens under a final order of removal where
“there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 241.13(b). If
the noncitizen was released pursuant to § 241.13, release may be revoked if, “on account of
changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the
[noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 241.13(i)(2).
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Based on the information before the Court, there is nothing to suggest that the purpose of
Ms. Lorenzo’s release has been accomplished or that release would no longer be appropriate under
§ 241.4. There is also nothing to suggest that Ms. Lorenzo violated the terms of her release. And,
although Respondents contend that they are exploring removal of Petitioner to a country other than
Mexico, there is nothing to suggest that, when ICE agents arrested Petitioner, the government had
determined that there was a significant likelihood that Petitioner would be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future. Indeed, Respondents do not identify any such “third country,” or
suggest a timeframe for Ms. Lorenzo’s “potential removal.” (See Mitchell Decl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 4-
1, PageID.77.) There is in fact no evidence before the Court that Respondents made any attempt
to comply with the regulations governing revocation of the decision to release Petitioner.
Further, the regulations governing release provide that, upon revocation of release, the
noncitizen “will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release,” and will be given
“an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien
an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.4(l)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). “The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of
any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined
warrant revocation and further denial of release.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). Courts examining the
requirements for revocation of release following a final order of removal have consistently held
that the procedural requirements of notice and an interview are required for revocation of a
noncitizen’s 	release. 	Constantinovici 	v. 	Bondi, 	No. 	3:25-cv-02405-RBM-AHG, 	2025 	WL
2898985, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (collecting cases; citations omitted). This Court agrees.
Here, Petitioner represents that Ms. Lorenzo was not provided with notice of revocation or
the reason(s) for the revocation and was not given an opportunity to respond. Respondents do not
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contend otherwise. Therefore, “even if the government has the discretion to revoke [Petitioner’s]
supervision, [her] constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated by [her] re-detention.”
Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2025).
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation omitted). The Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to Fifth
Amendment due process protections for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis
in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651,
at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL
3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025
WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025)
8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13, described in detail above, were intended “to provide due
process protections to [noncitizens] following the removal period as they are considered for
continued detention, release, and then possible revocation of release.” Santamaria Orellana v.
Baker, Civil Action No. 25-1788-TDC, 2025 WL 2444087, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2025). “The
opportunity to contest detention through an informal interview is not some ticky-tacky procedural
requirement; it strikes at the heart of what due process demands.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-
22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Niz-Chavez v. Garland,
593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021) (“At one level, today’s dispute may seem semantic, focused on a single
word, a small one at that. But words are how the law constrains power.”)). In its most elemental
formulation, “the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)
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(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Petitioner was not provided with that
opportunity.
The Court, therefore, agrees with courts around the country in concluding that the failure
to provide Petitioner with notice of revocation and an informal interview promptly after her
detention with a meaningful opportunity to contest the reasons for revocation in accordance with
8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13 violates Petitioner’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment
and requires release. See, e.g., Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 166 (W.D.N.Y. 2025);
Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387–88 (D. Mass. 2017); M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-CV-
01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *10–12 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025); Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp.
3d 766, 774 (D. Minn. 2025); Zhu v. Genalo, 798 F. Supp. 3d 400, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2025);
Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 704; Grigorian, 2025 WL 2604573, at *9; Ghafouri v. Noem, No.
3:25-CV-02675-RBM-BLM, 2025 WL 3085726, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025); Liu v. Carter,
No. 25-3036-JWL, 2025 WL 1696526, at *3 (D. Kan. June 17, 2025).
VII. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VIII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court will
dismiss the United States Department of Homeland Security as a Respondent for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Raycraft, 	No. 	1:25-cv-1669, 	2025 	WL 	3562651, 	at *8–9 	(W.D. 	Mich. 	Dec. 	12, 	2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
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12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s 	order 	of 	supervision. 	Additionally, 	the 	Court 	will 	enjoin 	Respondents 	from
re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due
process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within
three days of the issuance of the Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify compliance with this
opinion and the corresponding Judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the United States
Department of Homeland Security as a Respondent.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
February 10, 2026 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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