Carvajal v. Raycraft et al

1:25-cv-01938Miwd29 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
OMAR BAUTISTA CARVAJAL,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1938
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan,
initiated this action by filing a counseled petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or to conduct a
bond hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.25–26.)
In an order entered on January 5, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on January 7, 2026,
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on January 12, 2026, (ECF No. 5).
II. Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Colombia. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6; Notice to Appear
(NTA), ECF No. 1-1, PageID.29.) Petitioner entered the United States in May 2022 without being
“admitted or paroled.” (NTA, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.29.) Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
agents encountered Petitioner on May 6, 2022. (Id.) DHS then permitted Petitioner to enter the
United States. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.11.)
Thereafter, Petitioner filed an asylum application with the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services. (Id.) On October 4, 2025, Petitioner “was on his way to an English class”
when ICE detained him. (Id.) At that time, ICE issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging
Petitioner with inadmissibility under §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the United States without
being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by the Attorney General,” and “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in
possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (NTA, ECF No. 1-1,
PageID.29, 32.)
“On December 15, 2025, the immigration court denied Petitioner’s request for asylum as
prohibited under the Asylum Cooperative Agreement with Honduras, and it ordered Petitioner
removed” to Honduras.1 (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.54–55; Order Immigration Judge, ECF
No. 4-2.) Petitioner appealed the December 15, 2025, order of removal to the BIA, and the appeal
1 Petitioner is from Colombia; however, he was ordered removed to Honduras. (See Order
Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-2.)
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remains pending. (BIA Filing Receipt, ECF No. 5-4.) Because Petitioner’s appeal remains
pending, Petitioner’s order of removal is not “administratively final” for purposes of the INA.2 See
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)(B), 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
2 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (finding that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)));
see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed
[and affirmed] the [removal] order (or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is
free to remove the alien unless a court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included
‘administratively’ before the word ‘final’ in the first provision.”). Because the order of removal is
not administratively final, § 1231 does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention.
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (recognizing that § 1226 is “applicable to certain
detention-related decisions in [the] period preceding entry of final removal order” (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted)); Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The parties agree that § 1226 governs the
detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”).
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IV. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. Merits Discussion
A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every element for detention under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
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Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings with an
immigration judge, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for a short period time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes
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that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the Detroit ICE Field Office Director and the United
States Secretary of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Department of Homeland Security as a Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.3 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
3 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer.
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conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will
dismiss the United States Department of Homeland Security as a Respondent.
Dated: January 29, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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