Pie v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
BASILIO TITONE PIE,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1564
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner Basilio Titone Pie initiated this action on November 25, 2025, by filing a
counseled combined petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint
for emergency injunctive relief. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center
located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: to accept jurisdiction over this action; to order Respondents not to transfer
Petitioner out of the Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these proceedings; to
declare that Respondents’ actions to detain Petitioner violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); to issue a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to schedule a bond hearing within five days
for Petitioner’s removal proceedings and accept jurisdiction to issue a bond order; and, to award
attorneys’ fees and costs for this action. (Id., PageID.32.)1 For the following reasons, the Court
1 In his petition, Petitioner sought either an initial temporary restraining order compelling
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to ensure Petitioner’s due process rights, or alternatively,
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will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. The Court will also grant Petitioner’s motion to supplement with supplemental authority.
(ECF No. 4.)
Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3;
Notice to Appear, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.103.) Petitioner entered the United States in 2022 “without
inspection.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) After Petitioner entered the United States, ICE issued
Petitioner a Notice to Appear (NTA) on May 25, 2022, charging him with removability pursuant
to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA as a noncitizen “present in the United States without being admitted
or paroled, or who has arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by
the Attorney General.” (Notice to Appear, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.103.) Petitioner was also charged
with inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act
as an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession
of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other
valid entry document required by the Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other
suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality as required under
the regulations issued by the Attorney General under section 211(a) of the Act.
(Id.)
Petitioner asked the Court to order Respondents to show cause, within three days, why the petition
should not be granted. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) In an order entered on November 26, 2025,
the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas
corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) On
December 3, 2025, Respondents filed their response (ECF No. 5), and Petitioner filed his reply
(ECF No. 6). As to Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order, because the Court will
conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, as set forth herein, the Court does not, and need
not, separately address Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order.
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On March 27, 2024, an immigration judge serving the New York-Broadway Immigration
Court found that Petitioner was removable. (Immigration Judge Order, ECF No. 5-2, PageID.107.)
The immigration judge denied Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture. (Id.) Petitioner filed an appeal to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, Petitioner’s order of removal is not
“administratively 	final” 	for 	purposes 	of 	the 	INA. 	See 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 1101(a)(47)(B),
1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).2 ICE took Petitioner into custody in October of 2025. (Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.2.)
2 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (finding that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)));
see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed
[and affirmed] the [removal] order (or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is
free to remove the alien unless a court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included
‘administratively’ before the word ‘final’ in the first provision.”). Here, Petitioner appealed the
removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and that appeal remains pending. See
Automated Case Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (enter “240730334” for the A-
Number, select “Dominican Republic” for the Nationality, and select Submit) (last visited Dec. 3,
2025). Therefore, § 1231 does not apply. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001)
(recognizing that § 1226 is “applicable to certain detention-related decisions in [the] period
preceding entry of final removal order” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); Johnson, 594
U.S. at 533 (“The parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal
period’ begins.”).
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II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
III. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before the immigration court and, therefore,
has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.82.) Respondents
further argue that Petitioner should request a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any
unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Id.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
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Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to
determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination is
principally a legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that would
be developed if the Court required Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover,
this Court is not bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency interpretation of a
statute. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024) (discussing that
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“courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an agency
interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner, which
are not premised on “correctable procedural errors,” generally do not require exhaustion because
the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require
exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable procedural errors,” such as a claim
“that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an ‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to
review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody
would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact
that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all noncitizens
who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest and detention. Notably, the BIA
recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was
later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is simply
unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA of that denial would lead the Government to
change its position, and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
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“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies and request a bond hearing would likely
be futile. Moreover, it is clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. There is no evidence
in the record as to how long Petitioner would have to wait for a bond hearing to be scheduled.
Petitioner’s request would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado.
Then, Petitioner would have the opportunity to appeal any unfavorable decision to the BIA.
Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.” Rodriguez
v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025). It is “unmistakable that . . . depriving
[Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And
any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (See
Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.31–32.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every
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element for detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were
ambiguous, its structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation of the statute.” (Resp.,
ECF No. 5, PageID.85.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And, § 1226(a) states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c)[3] and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
Id. § 1226(a). The plain language of these provisions indicates that both § 1225 and § 1226 govern
the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. The difference is that § 1225 provides
for mandatory detention and § 1226 allows for the release of the noncitizen on conditional parole
or bond. As explained below, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs
Petitioner’s detention.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004); see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009); see also Kentucky
3 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The parties do not contend that Petitioner has been convicted of any crime
listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).
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v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “must give effect to the clear
meaning of statutes as written”). “When interpreting a statute, the inquiry ‘begins with the statutory
text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th
940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022). But “the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only
become evident when placed in context.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (cleaned up).
And “the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012). The Court
must also “use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright
Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024).
As set forth above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention “of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States” See id. § 1225(a)(1).
The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See id. § 1101(a)(13).
The word “entry,” is not defined in the INA, see generally id. § 1101, but the dictionary definition
of “entry” is “the right or privilege of entering” or “the act of entering.” Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, 	https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entry 	(last 	visited 	Dec. 	3, 	2025).
“Entry” has long been understood to mean “a crossing into the territorial limits of the United
States.” Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Matter of Pierre,
14 I & N Dec. 467, 468 (B.I.A. 1973)). Further, the phrase “seeking admission” is also undefined
in the statute. The dictionary definition of “seeking” is “ask[ing] for,” Merriam-Webster
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Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seeking (last visited Dec. 3, 2025), and
the word “seeking” “necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792
F. Supp. 3d 211, 218 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citations omitted).
Respondents argue that any noncitizen who has not been lawfully admitted, regardless of
whether they are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission”
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. However, that reading of § 1225 would render the
qualifier “seeking admission” in the statute entirely unnecessary. “It is ‘a cardinal principle of
statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citations omitted). Given Congress’s decision to use different
terms in § 1225—i.e., “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission”—the Court will
presume that Congress intended these phrases to mean different things. See Pulsifer v. United
States, 144 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2024) (“In a given statute, . . . different terms usually have different
meanings.”).
Here, Petitioner is not actively seeking to lawfully cross into the territorial limits of the
United States because he already entered the United States approximately three years ago, in 2022.
(See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) As the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York explained when addressing this issue:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then
proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be
described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be
described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered
to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
(or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered
unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the
United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [the petitioner],
because he has already been residing in the United States for several years.
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Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2025); see Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 29, 2025) (“[S]eeking admission’ . . . implies action – something that is currently occurring,
and in this instance, would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.”).
In comparison to § 1225, “[s]ection 1226(a) is less specific.” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025). Section 1226 provides that
“[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Looking at both § 1225 and § 1226, even if the statutory text appears unambiguous when viewed
in isolation, “courts are to interpret the words of a statute in context.” Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101; see
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory
language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”
(alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
Section 1225 	is 	titled: 	“Inspection 	by 	immigration 	officers; 	expedited 	removal 	of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A title such as this “is
especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.”
Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring). Additionally, Congress’s decision to include the
word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such
as “stowaways” and “crewmen,” in § 1225 evidences an intent to address noncitizens arriving “at
a border or port of entry.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2)(3). In
contrast, § 1226 is titled “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” “That Congress separated
removal of arriving aliens[, as set forth in § 1225,] from its more general section for ‘Apprehension
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and detention of aliens,’ [as set forth in] § 1226, implies that Congress enacted § 1225 for a
specific, limited purpose.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing Dubin v. United States,
143 S. Ct. 1557, 1567–68 (2023)).
Further, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court
explained that § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s
borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to
enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. The United States Supreme Court
stated 	that, 	in 	contrast, 	“[s]ection 1226 	generally 	governs 	the 	process 	of 	arresting 	and
detaining . . . aliens [already living within the United States] pending their removal.” Id. at 288.
Thus, in Jennings, the United States Supreme Court differentiated between noncitizens initially
arriving to the United States who are governed by § 1225, and noncitizens already present in the
country who are governed by § 1226. See id. at 288–89.
The broader language of the statute, as recently amended, further supports the Court’s
conclusion. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe
a subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act
added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible
under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged
with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). If the Court accepted
Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, then § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered entirely
superfluous. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (“[W]e follow the cardinal rule that statutory language
must be read in context [since] a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it. . . . [And,] [t]he
rule against superfluities complements the principle that courts are to interpret the words of a
statute in context.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
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Accordingly, for the above-discussed reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States
and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested.4
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.30–31.) Petitioner contends that “Respondents have not
demonstrated that Petitioner needs to be detained.” (Id., PageID.30 (citation omitted).) Petitioner
also contends that he “should have the opportunity to have a bond hearing before an Immigration
Judge,” and that “[b]y issuing its decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, the BIA has taken nearly
all bond authority away from Immigration Judges.” (Id., PageID.31.) Respondents counter
Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received due process because “Petitioner
received notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an
immigration judge, can request bond at that time, has the right to appeal the denial of any request
for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a short time.” (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.99.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
4 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in a number of other habeas corpus actions
filed by immigration detainees. See, e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL
3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL
3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025
WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232,
2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271,
2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v.
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez
v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025). This Court is
far from the first federal district court to reach this conclusion.
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Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Respondents contend that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time. (See Resp.
ECF No. 5, PageID.99.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own supporting
evidence—there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing has been
scheduled. 	Respondents 	claim 	further 	“that 	statutory 	provisions 	denying 	bond 	during
administrative removal proceedings do not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (Id., PageID.97
(citation omitted).)
If 	the Court 	agreed 	with 	Respondents 	that 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	is 	governed 	by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), then the Government’s due process argument might carry more weight. However,
as set forth above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is
governed 	by 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Instead, 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	is 	governed 	by 	§ 1226(a).
Section 1226(a) clearly sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien
subject to that provision. The statute allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested
alien, or release the alien on “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions 	prescribed 	by, 	the 	Attorney 	General,” 	or 	“conditional 	parole.” 	See 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)(1)–(2). 	This 	discretionary 	framework 	“requires 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	make 	an
individualized custody determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If this court
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has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the claim is an
issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme Court set out
in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following three factors:
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)
(citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e.,
“whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See
Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); and then citing Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d
Cir. 2020)). Here, Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he lives in Chicago, Illinois, and that
he is “the primary financial support for his family.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) There can be no
doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact
with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the
lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. An individualized bond
hearing ensures that an immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk or a
danger to the community, reducing the risk that Petitioner will suffer an “erroneous deprivation”
of his rights. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
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Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025). However, Respondents have not established a significant
interest in “detaining someone who [could convince] a neutral adjudicator, following a hearing
and assessment of the evidence, that his ongoing detention is not warranted.” See id. Furthermore,
Respondents have not established that an individualized hearing would impose significant
“administrative or financial costs” in this case—“[t]o the contrary,” Respondents’ position
“requires the government to continue funding and overseeing [Petitioner’s] detention.” See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
V. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of the United States Secretary of Homeland Security as
a Respondent. (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.100.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction”
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
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The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the predecessor to the
present immigration-related agencies,] District Director for the district where he is being
detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322
(6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has named the Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE and the
United States Secretary of Homeland Security as Respondents. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 3.)
In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the
immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the
possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas[ v. Olsen], 194 F. Supp. 2d [368,] 374
[(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often
transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp.
2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-
to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS
facilities, all of which are under the control of the Attorney General.”); . . . . In light
of these transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent
other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official,
such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event
of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL
1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only
one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to
another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s conditional grant of habeas relief—i.e., the Court’s directive that Petitioner receive a bond
hearing or, alternatively, be released—in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
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District of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these
proceedings.
VI. 	Motion to Supplement
As noted above, Petitioner has filed a motion to supplement. (Mot., ECF No. 4.) Petitioner
states that he “files this Motion to Provide Supplemental Authority to the . . . Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus in light of recent case law which directly affects and impacts Petitioner’s case.”
(Id., PageID.39 (capitalization in original retained).) Petitioner identifies the specific case as
“Lazaro Maldonado Bautista et al v. Ernesto Santacruz, et al, 25-cv-01873, Central District Court,
California, November 25, 2025,” (id.), in which the United States District Court for the Central
District of California recently granted a class certification motion certifying a “bond eligible class”
for certain “noncitizens in the United States without lawful status.” (ECF No. 4-1, PageID.42.)
Petitioner then attaches two orders from the Central District of California case to his motion. (ECF
Nos. 4-1, 4-2.) Petitioner states that he “believe[s] that the case directly applies to the Petitioner’s
case and seek[s] leave of the court to supplement the record.” (Mot., ECF No. 4, PageID.40.)
Respondents assert that the Court should deny Petitioner’s motion “because the Bautista
decisions do not constitute a final judgment and therefore have no preclusive or precedential effect
in this case.” (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.99.) Respondents contend that because of this, there is
“no basis for reopening or supplementing briefing in this case.” (Id., PageID.100.) However,
besides seeking leave of Court to supplement the record with these two orders from the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, Petitioner does not ask for any further
relief, such as reopening briefing, in this Court. Under these circumstances, the Court will grant
Petitioner’s motion to supplement, in that Petitioner will be permitted to supplement the record
with the Central District of California orders that he attached to his motion.
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Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial. The Court will also enter an order granting Petitioner’s motion to
supplement with supplemental authority. (ECF No. 4.)
Dated: December 5, 2025 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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