Greer v. Braman et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SHANEIKA GREER, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-01487
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Robert J. Jonker
U.S. District Judge
v.
MELINDA BRAMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. 	ECF No. 12.
This lawsuit was filed by Shaneika Greer, as personal representative of the
estate of Everett James Greer. 	ECF No. 1. 	Everett James Greer died of a fentanyl
overdose while confined within the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at
the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility (MTU). 	Plaintiff sues Defendants
MDOC Director Washington, MTU Warden Braman, MTU Assistant Deputy Warden
(ADW) Sutton, MTU Inspector Stewart, and John Does (1-10). 	Plaintiff alleges that
Everett James Greer’s accidental overdose was predictable due to the “recurring
smuggling and overdose incidents” at the prison, and Defendants violated Everett
James Greer’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from harm. 	Id.,
PageID.2.
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Defendants move to dismiss the complaint. 	For the reasons set forth below,
it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss
the complaint.
II. 	Factual allegations
Plaintiff alleges that in 2019, the MDOC recognized the “opioid epidemic as a
catastrophic and growing threat” by announcing a statewide plane to cut opioid
deaths by half in five years. 	Id., PageID.6. 	Plaintiff says that multiple men were
arrested for using a drone to smuggle contraband into MTU in 2017. 	Id., PageID.7.
Further, Plaintiff alleges that:
MDOC’s publicly available official Critical Incidents Report for 2023
documents 	at 	least 	nineteen 	(19) 	drug 	overdose 	incidents 	among
prisoners, at least five (5) overdoses reported in 2022, and in 2020, there
were publicly available news reports of “bad drugs” causing thirteen (13)
inmates to fall ill at once - at Handlon (MTU) alone.
Id. 	Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were on notice of the need for “effective
contraband interdiction” at MTU. 	Id., PageID.8.
On February 15, 2024, Everett James Greer died in his prison cell due to an
accidental fentanyl overdose. 	Id., PageID.9. 	Plaintiff asserts that Defendants
failed to keep fentanyl out of the prison, and failed to implement and enforce
reasonable protective measure to mitigate the known risks. 	Id. 	Thereafter, in
January of 2025, two more prisoner, non-fatal drug overdoses occurred at MTU. 	Id.,
PageID.10.
Plaintiff claims that despite Defendants’ knowledge of these critical incidents,
measures such as lockdowns, targeted sweeps, K-9 deployments, ion scanners,
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staff/vendor screening surges, and follow-up intelligence were not implemented at
MTU. 	Id., PageID.11. 	Plaintiff says that due to Defendants’ failures, Everett
James Greer died in his prison cell from an accidental fentanyl overdose. 	Id.,
PageID.13.
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent by
failing to protect Plaintiff from a “foreseeable fatal drug overdose” in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. 	Id., PageID.12-14. 	Plaintiff states that “risk of fatal opioid
overdose inside [MTU] was substantial and obvious.” 	Id., PageID.14. According to
Plaintiff, the risk was obvious because MTU had a history of security vulnerabilities,
the MDOC had recognized a state-wide opioid problem, MTU had tracked drug
overdose issues, and there were “recurrent overdose indications at MTU in temporal
proximity to Mr. Greer’s death” and two incidents eleven months later in January of
2025. 	Id., PageID.15.
Plaintiff alleges that Warden Braman was responsible for the overall operation
and safety and security of MTU. 	Plaintiff alleges that ADW Sutton was responsible
for custody and operations including protecting prisoners from harm. 	Inspector
Stewart was required to know about drug presence and overdose incidents at MTU.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that John Does (1-10) were assigned to maintain security
and to conduct searches to monitor and investigate for drug incidents. 	Ultimately,
Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants failed in their responsibilities to prevent drugs
from entering the prison and their inaction was the direct and proximate cause of
Everett James Greer’s death. 	Id., PageID.17.
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In Count II, Plaintiff asserts supervisory liability in violation of the Eighth
Amendment against Defendants Warden Braman, ADW Sutton, and Inspector
Stewart in their individual capacities. Id., PageID.18. 	Plaintiff alleges that these
Defendants failed to “supervise, train, direct, or correct subordinates where obvious
risks are known and recurring.” 	Id. 	Despite understanding the risks of opioids in
the prison, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “knowingly acquiesced in practices that
left opioids accessible in Mr. Greer’s housing area” and failed to take corrective
measures. 	Id., PageID.19-20. 	Plaintiff says that Defendants failed to supervise
and direct employees to conduct searches, maintain reliable search documentation,
and to escalate interdiction where opioids were present or an overdose had occurred.
Id., PageID.20. 	Plaintiff says that Defendants failed to train staff on overdose
prevention and response protocols, and tolerated or acquiesced in practices that
allowed drugs to enter Everett James Greer’s housing area. 	Id., PageID.21.
Plaintiff says Defendants’ supervisory failures caused Everett James Greer’s death
by failing to prevent his fentanyl overdose. Id.
In Count III, Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief against MDOC
Director Washington and Warden Braman “to eliminate ongoing unconstitutional
conditions” 	by 	requiring 	reasonable 	prevention 	measures 	such 	as 	training,
interdiction and searches, targeted sweeps, deployment of K-9, and ion scanner
resources, better screening, auditing and tracking protocols, and the implementation
of professional correctional standards. 	Id., PageID.22-23.
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In Count IV, Plaintiff asserts violations under Michigan law, specifically under
the Wrongful Death Statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2922, or, in the alternative,
gross negligence against Defendants Warden Braman, ADW Sutton, Inspector
Stewart, and John Does (1-10). 	Id., PageID.25-27.
III. 	Motion to Dismiss
The Federal Rules provide that a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Put differently, if plaintiffs
do “not nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their
complaint must be dismissed.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a claim has facial plausibility, a court must construe
the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff, 	accept 	the 	factual
allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Those
factual allegations “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 	League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
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citations omitted). “When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may
consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items
appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion so
long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained
therein.” 	Id.
IV. 	Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to
prevent Mr. Greer from obtaining fentanyl inside MTU. 	In its prohibition of “cruel
and unusual punishments,” the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison
officials, directing that they must “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety
of the inmates.” 	Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). To establish liability under the Eighth
Amendment for a claim based on a failure to prevent harm to a prisoner, a plaintiff
must show that the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial
risk of serious harm facing the plaintiff. 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766–67 (6th Cir.
2011); Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d
1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr. 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). 	Deliberate
indifference is a higher standard than negligence and requires that “the official knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
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serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837;
see also Bishop, 636 F.3d at 766–67. 	The Court stated:
We hold instead that a prison official cannot be found liable under the
Eighth 	Amendment 	for 	denying 	an 	inmate 	humane 	conditions 	of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . . 	But an official’s
failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but
did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be
condemned as infliction of punishment.
Id. at 837. 	Thus, to support a claim that a prison official failed to protect a prisoner,
two conditions must be satisfied: the inmate must show (1) that a substantial risk of
harm was present, and (2) that the defendants, having knowledge of that risk,
possessed a culpable state of mind. 	Reedy v. West, 988 F.3d 907, 914 (6th Cir. 2021)
(“An official is deliberately indifferent if he or she ‘knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.’”)
To support an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must establish “something
more than a lack of ordinary due care, inadvertence, or error; the conduct must
instead be ‘obdurate’ or ‘wanton’--exhibiting recklessness or callous neglect.” 	Id. at
165. 	See also Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1992); Walker v. Norris,
917 F.2d 1449 (6th Cir. 1990); McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 881 (6th Cir. 1988).
An error of judgment does not subject a prison official to liability. 	Jeffers v. Heavrin,
10 F.3d 380, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) (errors of judgment are shielded by qualified
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immunity).
Defendants 	argue 	that 	Plaintiff 	failed 	to 	assert 	a 	plausible 	Eighth
Amendment claim by alleging factual allegations that can establish the objective
component of a serious risk of harm based upon “unfettered access to drugs” at MTU.
ECF No. 13, PageID.71 (citing Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F. 4th 452 (6th Cir. 2022)).
In Zakora, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Plaintiff stated a claim for relief for
failure to protect from a drug overdose by alleging “the widespread presence of drugs
that resulted in two prior overdoses in Zakora’s small C-Unit in the days immediately
preceding his own death.” 	Zakora, at 471. 	In Caraway v. CoreCivic of Tenn., LLC,
98 F 4th 679 (6th Cir. 2024), the Sixth Circuit further explained the limitation of the
holding in Zakora:
Three alleged facts drove that conclusion. First, the complaint contained
detailed 	allegations 	about 	the 	“widespread 	presence 	of 	drugs” 	at
Zakora’s facility. See id. at 470. Second, in the two days before Zakora’s
overdose, two other inmates in his twelve-to-sixteen-inmate unit had
also 	overdosed. 	Id. 	at 	461, 	471. 	Third, 	prison 	officials 	failed 	to
investigate those overdoses. Id. at 461–62, 472. Taken together, those
factual allegations permitted the reasonable inference that Zakora had
“unfettered access to deadly drugs” in prison, creating an objectively
excessive risk of overdose. Id. at 472. Thus, we concluded, the complaint
met its failure-to-protect claim’s objective component.
That conclusion was a limited one; we were careful to highlight the
egregiousness of Zakora’s circumstances. “[S]imple exposure to drugs,”
we explained, does not satisfy the objective prong. Id. Zakora’s estate
would’ve “ha[d] no claim” if his was a “run-of-the-mill drug-overdose
case.” Id. at 473. What set Zakora’s case apart was the environment
presenting “unfettered access” to deadly narcotics. Id. at 472.
Caraway v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC, 98 F.4th 679, 684 (6th Cir. 2024).
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Here, Plaintiff has alleged that 19 drug overdoses occurred at MTU during
2023, the year prior to Mr. Greer’s death, and two overdoses occurred after Mr.
Greer’s overdose in 2024. 	Further, Plaintiff alleges that there were 5 drug overdoses
in 2022, and that there were reports of bad drugs causing 13 inmates to become ill in
2020. 	Although, Plaintiff alleges that in 2017, drugs were dropped into the prison
using drones, Plaintiff concedes that the individuals involved were arrested. 	In
Caraway, the Sixth Circuit did not decide whether allegations that the prison was
“plagued by rampant drugs” plausibly alleged the widespread presence of drugs
inside the prison. Id. 	Here, Plaintiff alleges only isolated drug overdose events that
occurred well before Greer’s overdose death in February of 2024. In the opinion of the
undersigned, Plaintiff failed to allege facts that could reasonably infer the widespread
presence of drugs at MTU. 	Even if Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to permit a
reasonable inference of the widespread presence of drugs at MTU, like Caraway, the
other factors fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
In Zakora, the Plaintiff alleged two overdoses had occurred in the small cell
block where Zakora was housed, just two days earlier. 	That was enough to allege an
objective risk of serious harm. 	Zakora, at 472. “There’s no doubt that back-to-back
overdoes in a twelve-to-sixteen person unit is a serious problem.” 	Caraway, at 684.
Here, there are no similar allegations. 	Instead, Plaintiff alleges general allegations
of overdose, without any details, that are either too remote in time, and/or without
specific facts regarding location to Greer’s prison unit. 	Plaintiff’s allegations of drug
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use occurred prison wide.1 	“[T]he mere allegation that inmates have overdosed—
even at an increased—doesn’t come close to showing the kind of excessive, one-for-
every-eight risk Zakora faced.” 	Caraway, at 684.2
Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants failed to respond by increasing
security and searches, bringing in drug sniffing dogs, or by taking other measures, is
insufficient to state a plausible claim. 	Plaintiff has not asserted in the complaint
that drug overdoses occurred immediately prior to Greer’s death that could show a
“close-in-time” failure by Defendants. 	Id. at 685. 	In the opinion of the undersigned,
Plaintiff has failed to allege that Greer “faced an excessive risk of harm from
unfettered access to drugs.” Id.
Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that could plausibly state a claim
for relief under the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. 	The
subjective component requires Plaintiff to allege facts permitting a reasonable
inference that the Defendants “(1) had notice of the risk that inmates would overdose
based on their unfettered access to drugs and (2) failed to reasonably respond to that
risk.” 	Id. at 686. 	Plaintiff makes allegations that Defendants should have known
about the drug overdoses in 2023 and were more generally aware of a Michigan
Department of Corrections drug overdose problem as early as 2019. 	Plaintiff makes
1 	MTU holds over 1100 prisoners and was designed to hold 1297 prisoners.
https://www.michigan.gov/corrections/-/media/Project/Websites/corrections
2 	Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the facts alleged in this case are not similar
to the facts alleged in Estate of Leeper v. CoreCivic, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 3d. 797 (M.D.
Tenn. 2025). 	There, Plaintiff alleged as many as 20 overdoses a day at the prison,
and that the Warden had known about the Assistant Warden’s drug smuggling
operation but did nothing to stop it. 	Id. at 810.
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no plausible allegations that could establish that Defendants had notice of a risk
based on “unfettered access to drugs” at MTU. 	As the Sixth Circuit explained, to
state such a claim a Plaintiff must offer facts “such as how the defendants obtained
that knowledge, when they obtained it, or what that knowledge entailed.” 	Id.
Plaintiff has fallen far short of providing any of these factual allegations in the
complaint. 	Finally, without sufficient factual allegations establishing a reasonable
inference of a notice of a risk of harm to inmates at MTU, such as Greer, Plaintiff’s
allegations that Defendants failed to reasonably respond, falls short.
V. 	Supervisor Liability
Plaintiff asserts supervisory liability in violation of the Eighth Amendment
against Defendants Warden Braman, ADW Sutton, and Inspector Stewart. 	Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants failed to properly train staff and take measures to prevent
drugs from entering Greer’s housing unit.
For a state actor to be held personally liable under § 1983, they must have been
personally involved in the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. 	Miller v. Calhoun Cnty.,
408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. Schroeder, 99 F. App’x 707, 713-714
(6th Cir. 2004). 	In other words, claims against public officials in their personal
capacity “must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based
upon ‘a mere failure to act.’” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir.1998)). 	Plaintiff cannot sue
Defendant — or any other supervisory actor — under § 1983 under a theory of
respondeat 	superior. 	Instead, 	Plaintiff 	must 	show 	that 	Defendant 	“at 	least
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implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional
conduct of the offending subordinate.” 	Garza v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 972 F.3d 853,
865 (6th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (first quoting Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416,
421 (6th Cir. 1984); and then citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Plaintiff makes allegations that could support a theory that Warden Braman,
ADW Sutton, and Inspector Stewart had knowledge of the risk of harm at MTU and
failed to take steps to abate the risk. 	Zakora, at 476. However, Plaintiff makes only
general allegations that drugs were present at MTU over several years prior to
Greer’s death. 	The complaint fails to assert allegations that show that each
Defendant was aware of a drug smuggling operation at MTU and failed to investigate
further, or to take other reasonable steps to abate the risk. 	In fact, the complaint
alleges that when drones were used to smuggle drugs into the facility several years
before Greer’s death, arrests were made in response to the threat. 	This undercuts
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that Defendants took no actions in face of an alleged
growing opioid threat at MTU. 	Similarly, Plaintiff makes conclusory assertions that
Defendants failed to train staff to prevent drugs from entering the prison. 	Again,
Plaintiff makes no allegations that could show an obvious need for more or different
training. 	Estate of Leeper, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 813.
In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff has failed to plead a plausible claim
of relief under a theory of supervisory liability.
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VII. 	Qualified Immunity
Defendants 	argue 	that 	they 	are 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity 	because
Plaintiff has failed to plead a violation of clearly established law. 	“Under the
doctrine 	of 	qualified 	immunity, 	‘government 	officials 	performing 	discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.’” 	Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538
(6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a
defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that
every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d]
that right.’” 	Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. 	Martin v. City of Broadview Heights,
712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First, the court must “determine if the facts
alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 	Id. 	(citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the court asks if the right at issue was
“‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such that a reasonable officer would
have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A
court may address these steps in any order. 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if either step of the analysis
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is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir.
2016).
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78 (2017)
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear
foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be “settled law,”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589
(1991) (per curiam), which means it is dictated by “controlling authority”
or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’ ” al–Kidd,
supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It is not enough that
the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be
clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish
the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply. See Reichle, 566 U.S., at
666, 	132 	S.Ct. 	2088. 	Otherwise, 	the 	rule 	is 	not 	one 	that 	“every
reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
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clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63−64 (2018).
In the opinion of the undersigned, Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts allowing a reasonable inference
that Defendants violated clearly established law. 	For the reasons stated, the
allegations in the complaint fail to show unfettered access to drugs at MTU, or that
Defendants were aware of a serious risk harm to inmates at MTU and ignored that
risk by failing to take corrective actions.
VII. 	Declaratory and Injunctive relief
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to require MDOC Director
Washington and MTU Warden to implement periodic prison unit sweeps, K-9
deployment 	and 	ion-scanners, 	enhanced 	security 	measures, 	investigation 	and
abatement procedures, overdose prevention measures, critical incident reporting
involving drug overdoses, training, and requiring an independent audit to verify the
effectiveness of these measures.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing and that dismissal under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is appropriate. 	A motion to dismiss based on Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 12(b)(1) addresses whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear the dispute. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (holding that a court “must dismiss the complaint in its entirety”
when it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a matter). 	When challenged by a
motion filed under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject
matter jurisdiction. 	E.E.O.C. v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School, 597 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may take the form
of a facial challenge, which tests the sufficiency of the pleading, or a factual challenge,
which contests the factual predicate for jurisdiction. 	See RMI Titanium Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mortensen v.
First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 890–91 (3d Cir. 1977)). 	In a facial
attack, the court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint, similar to the
standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 	Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922
F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). 	In a factual attack, the allegations in the complaint
are 	not 	afforded 	a 	presumption 	of 	truthfulness 	and 	the 	district 	court 	weighs
competing evidence to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. 	Id.
For a plaintiff to invoke federal jurisdiction to bring suit in the federal courts,
she must demonstrate standing. 	Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–
62 (1992); Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2004). 	Standing is central to
the “case-or-controversy” requirement associated with Article III of the Constitution.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). 	Plaintiff has the burden of
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demonstrating that she (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision. 	Id.
Traceability requires “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of” and that the conduct not be a result of “the independent action of some
third party.” 	Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 	(internal quotation marks omitted). 	And for
an injury to be redressable, it must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 	Id. at 561 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Plaintiff argues that she is not seeking injunctive or declaratory relief specific
to Greer but instead that the relief requested is “aimed at ongoing practices” to
protect other prisoners within the MDOC and MTU. 	ECF No. 16, PageID.125.
However, 	a 	prisoner 	“is 	limited 	to 	asserting 	alleged 	violations 	of 	his 	own
constitutional rights and, absent a request for class certification, lacks standing to
assert the constitutional rights of other prisoners.” 	Song v. Parker, No. 22-5199,
2023 WL 7103180, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 2023) (citing Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d
371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989)). 	In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff lacks standing
to move for injunctive or declaratory relief to protect other prisoners. 	Therefore, it
is 	recommended 	that 	the 	Court 	dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	request 	for 	injunctive 	and
declaratory relief.
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VIII. 	Wrongful Death/Gross Negligence
Plaintiff brings a state law claim under Michigan’s wrongful death statute or,
alternatively, 	a 	gross 	negligence 	claim. 	In 	determining 	whether 	to 	retain
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, “[a] district court should consider the
interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and
balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.” 	Landefeld v.
Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). 	Ordinarily, when a
district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of
supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court
will dismiss the remaining state-law claims. 	Id. 	Dismissal, however, remains
“purely discretionary.” 	Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639
(2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny's Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d
843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012).
In 	the 	analysis 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	concluded 	that 	the 	Plaintiffs’
Constitutional 	claims 	against 	Defendants 	fail 	to 	meet 	the 	12(b) 	standard.
Without 	Plaintiffs’ 	federal 	claims 	in 	the 	suit, 	the 	balance 	of 	the 	relevant
considerations 	would 	therefore 	weigh 	against 	the 	exercise 	of 	supplemental
jurisdiction. 	As such, the undersigned would respectfully recommend that the Court
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims.
IX. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants’
motion to dismiss the complaint.
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NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	June 16, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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