Godoy Bermudez v. Lynch et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
BENI GODOY BERMUDEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT LYNCH et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1357
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on November 4, 2025, by filing a counseled petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake
Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: to accept jurisdiction over this action; to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner or promptly schedule
a bond hearing; to declare that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is the appropriate statutory provision that
governs Petitioner detention and eligibility for bond; and to award attorneys’ fees and costs for
this action. (Id., PageID.11–12.) 1 For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
1 The Court entered an Order entered on November 5, 2025, that directed Respondents to show
cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by
Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on
November 10, 2025, (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on November 13, 2025, (ECF
No. 5). In Petitioner’s petition, he requested oral argument. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) The
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Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1; Wanogho Decl.
¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.47.) On July 9, 2023, Petitioner entered the United States at San Ysidro,
California, Port of Entry. (See Wanogho Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.47.) At that time, United
States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued Petitioner “a Form I-862, Notice to Appear
(NTA),” which charged Petitioner with inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) “for being an immigrant who, at the time of application
for admission, is not in possession of valid unexpired immigration or travel document[s],” and
CBP “paroled him into the United States pending immigration removal proceedings.” (Id.,
PageID.47–48.)
“On July 10, 2023, the NTA was filed with the Detroit Immigration Court, thereby
commencing removal proceedings.” (Id. ¶ 5, PageID.48.) On March 25, 2024, Petitioner “filed a
Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding from Removal, and a master calendar
hearing was scheduled on the non-detained docket for October 22, 2024.” (Id. ¶ 6.) The Detroit
Immigration initially rescheduled Petitioner’s master calendar hearing to January 14, 2025, and
then rescheduled it to June 24, 2025. (Id. ¶ 7.)
Petitioner “has work authorization and [the above-noted] pending asylum application.”
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) On August 15, 2025, while Petitioner was “driving his father to a
scheduled 	eye 	surgery 	appointment,” 	ICE 	Enforcement 	and 	Removal 	Operations 	(ERO)
“encountered and arrested” Petitioner in Detroit, Michigan. (Id.; Wanogho Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 4-1,
Court concludes that the parties’ briefs sufficiently address the relevant issues and oral argument
is unnecessary.
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PageID.48.) “ICE ERO redetermined [Petitioner’s] custody status and arrested [him] and served
him with a Form I-200, Warrant of Arrest.” (Wanogho Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.48.)
Respondents contend that Petitioner is now “detained without bond pursuant to INA § 235 because
[Petitioner] is an applicant for admission who is seeking admission, and he is not clearly and
beyond doubt entitled to admission.” (Id. ¶ 10.) A hearing regarding Petitioner’s Form I-589,
Application for Asylum and for Withholding from Removal, is scheduled for December 4, 2025,
in the Detroit Immigration Court. (Id. ¶ 12, PageID.49.)
II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
III. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents first argue that three provisions of the INA divest this Court of jurisdiction
over Petitioner’s habeas action: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9). (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.19–25.) For the following reasons, the Court concludes
that § 1252(e)(3), § 1252(g), and § 1252(b)(9) do not preclude the Court’s review of Petitioner’s
§ 2241 petition.
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A. 	Section 1252(e)(3)
Section 1252(e)(3), which is titled, “Challenges on validity of the system,” states that:
[j]udicial review of determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its
implementation is available in an action instituted in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, but shall be limited to determinations of—
(i) whether such section, or any regulation issued to implement such section, is
constitutional; or
(ii) whether such a regulation, or a written policy directive, written policy
guideline, or written procedure issued by or under the authority of the Attorney
General to implement such section, is not consistent with applicable provisions
of this subchapter or is otherwise in violation of law.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
Here, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his detention without a bond hearing;
Petitioner is not challenging the validity of the statutory scheme itself. Indeed, Petitioner does not
appear to dispute that § 1225(b)(2) requires detention of noncitizens detained under that
subsection. Instead, Petitioner argues that Respondents lack statutory authority to detain him under
§ 1225(b)(2) because that statute does not apply to his circumstances. Petitioner’s present § 2241
petition is not the type of action that is contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3). Accordingly, the
Court concludes that § 1252(e)(3) does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
B. 	Section 1252(g)
Section 1252(g) provides:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas
corpus provision, . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by
or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General
to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the scope of § 1252(g) is “narrow,” and
“[t]hat provision [only] limits review of cases ‘arising from’ decisions ‘to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). In Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., the United States Supreme Court explained that “[w]e have previously
rejected as ‘implausible’ the Government’s suggestion that § 1252(g) covers ‘all claims arising
from deportation proceedings’ or imposes ‘a general jurisdictional limitation.’” Id. (quoting Reno
v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)).
Here, contrary to Respondents’ assertions, Petitioner’s action requesting a writ of habeas
corpus ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing does not seek review of a discretionary
decision to “commence proceedings,” “adjudicate” a case, or “execute” a removal order. Instead,
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus challenging his continued confinement without bond. This
action falls outside of the narrow scope of § 1252(g) and within the Court’s jurisdiction.
C. 	Section 1252(b)(9)
Under § 1252(b)(9),
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken
or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this
subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this
section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have
jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of Title 28 . . . or by any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such
questions of law or fact.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court held that
§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar the Supreme Court’s review of “questions of law” regarding whether
“certain statutory provisions require detention without a bond hearing.” Jennings, 582 U.S. at 292.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court explained that “the applicability of § 1252(b)(9)
turns on whether the legal questions that we must decide ‘aris[e] from’ the actions taken to remove
these aliens.” Id. at 293. The Supreme Court rejected an “expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9),”
explaining that even if “[t]he ‘questions of law and fact’ . . . could be said to ‘aris[e] from’ actions
taken to remove the aliens in the sense that the aliens’ injuries would never have occurred if they
had not been placed in detention,” this “expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) would lead to
staggering results,” such as, for example, improperly precluding judicial review of inhumane
conditions of confinement claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). Id.
Here, Petitioner is challenging his entitlement to a bond hearing, and for the reasons set
forth above, the Court concludes that § 1252(b)(9) does not divest the Court of jurisdiction to
consider Petitioner’s habeas petition.
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before the immigration court and, therefore,
has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.25.) Respondents
further argue that Petitioner should request a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any
unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Id.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
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with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to
determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
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would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024)
(discussing that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not
defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner, which
are not premised on “correctable procedural errors,” generally do not require exhaustion because
the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require
exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable procedural errors,” such as a claim
“that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an ‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to
review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody
would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact
that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all noncitizens
who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest and detention. Notably, the BIA
recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was
later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is simply
unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA of that denial would lead the Government to
change its position, and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
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Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies and request a bond hearing would likely
be futile. Moreover, it is clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. First, as noted
above, Petitioner would need to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge. There is no
evidence in the record as to how long Petitioner would have to wait until such a hearing, if any,
were scheduled. Petitioner’s request would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in
Yajure Hurtado. Then, Petitioner would have the opportunity to appeal any unfavorable decision
to the BIA. Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.”
Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citation omitted). It is
“unmistakable that . . . depriving [Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision
certainly equates to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid
. . . – detention.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every
element for detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were
ambiguous, its structure and history support the agency’s interpretation of the statute.” (Resp.,
ECF No. 7, PageID.28.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “. . . in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And, § 1226(a) states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c)[ 2 ] and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
Id. § 1226(a). The plain language of these provisions indicates that both § 1225 and § 1226 govern
the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. The difference is that § 1225 provides
2 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The parties do not contend that Petitioner has been convicted of any crime
listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).
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for mandatory detention and § 1226 allows for the release of the noncitizen on conditional parole
or bond. As explained below, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs
Petitioner’s detention.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted); see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009);
see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “must give effect
to the clear meaning of statutes as written” (citation omitted)). “When interpreting a statute, the
inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In
re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted)). But, “the
‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
context.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (citation omitted). And, “the words of a
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”
Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (citation omitted). The Court must also
“use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enter.
v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024).
As set forth above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention “of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” See id.
§ 1225(a)(1). The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien
into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See id.
§ 1101(a)(13). Section 1226(a) is less specific,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025
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WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025), and states that “[o]n a warrant issued by the
Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien
is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
“[T]he statutory text does not provide a definitive answer as to what it means to be present
without admittance where, as here, the individual has already entered and spent [a significant
amount of time] living in the United States.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5. And, even
if the statutory text appears unambiguous when viewed in isolation, “courts are to interpret the
words of a statute in context.” Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted); see Yates v. United States,
574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (“Whether a statutory term is unambiguous, however, does not turn
solely on dictionary definitions of its component words. Rather, ‘[t]he plainness or ambiguity of
statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’”
(alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
Section 	1225 	is 	titled “Inspection 	by 	immigration 	officers; 	expedited 	removal 	of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A title such as this “is
especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.”
Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring). Additionally, Congress’s decision to include the
word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such
as “stowaways” and “crewmen,” in § 1225 evidences an intent to address noncitizens arriving “at
a border or port of entry.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2)(3). In
contrast, § 1226 is titled, “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. “That Congress
separated removal of arriving aliens[, as set forth in § 1225,] from its more general section for
‘Apprehension and detention of aliens,’ [as set forth in] § 1226, implies that Congress enacted
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§ 1225 for a specific, limited purpose.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing Dubin v.
United States, 143 S. Ct. 1557, 1567–68 (2023)).
Further, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court
discussed that § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s
borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to
enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. The United States Supreme Court
stated that, in contrast, “[s]ection 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining
. . . aliens [already living within the United States] pending their removal.” Id. at 288. Thus, in
Jennings, the United States Supreme Court differentiated between noncitizens initially arriving to
the United States who are governed by § 1225, and noncitizens already present in the country who
are governed by § 1226. See id. at 288–89.
The broader language of the statute, as recently amended, further supports the Court’s
conclusion. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe
a subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act
added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible
under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged
with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). If the Court accepted
Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered entirely
superfluous. See Corey, 556 U.S. at 314 (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to
all its provisions.”).
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Accordingly, for the above-discussed reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States
and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested. 3
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10–11.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by
stating that Petitioner has received due process because: “Petitioner has received notice of the
charges against him, has access to counsel, has attended hearings with an immigration judge, may
request bond, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by
ICE for less than three weeks[ 4 ].” (Resp., ECF No. 7, PageID.42.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
3 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in a number of other habeas corpus actions
filed by immigration detainees. See, e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL
3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL
3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025
WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232,
2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271,
2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v.
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez
v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025). And, this Court
is far from the first federal District Court to reach this conclusion.
4 Petitioner was arrested on August 15, 2025. (Wanogho Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.48.)
Therefore, Petitioner has been detained for significantly more than three weeks.
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1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Respondents contend that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time. (See Resp.
ECF No. 4, PageID.42.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own supporting
evidence—there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing has been
scheduled. 	Respondents 	claim 	further 	“that 	statutory 	provisions 	denying 	bond 	during
administrative removal proceedings do not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (Id., PageID.40
(citation omitted).)
If this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), then the Government’s due process argument might carry more weight. However,
as set forth above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is
governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section
1226(a) clearly sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to
that provision. The statute allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien, or
release the alien on “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions
prescribed by, the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). This
discretionary 	framework 	“requires 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	make 	an 	individualized 	custody
determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has discussed that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration
detention. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If
this court has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the
claim is an issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme
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Court set out in Mathews v. Eldridge. . . .”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following
three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor weighs strongly in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)
(citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e.,
“whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See
Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here,
Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he resides with his family in Michigan and “has work
authorization.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) There can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many
of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of
income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.”
See Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. An individualized bond
hearing ensures that an immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk or a
danger to the community, reducing the risk that Petitioner will suffer an “erroneous deprivation”
of his rights. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
Under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does, indeed,
have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
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preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, given the record available
to the Court, Respondents have not established a significant interest in potentially “detaining
someone who [could convince] a neutral adjudicator, following a hearing and assessment of the
evidence, that his ongoing detention is not warranted.” See id. Furthermore, Respondents have not
established that an individualized hearing would pose “administrative or financial costs” in this
case—“[t]o the contrary,” Respondents’ position “requires the government to continue funding
and overseeing [Petitioner’s] detention[.]” See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of the other named Respondents. (Resp., ECF No. 4,
PageID.43–44.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction”
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
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The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was the agency’s
prior name,] District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the respondent to his
habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner
has named the Field Office Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE, the United States Secretary
of Homeland Security, and the United States Attorney General as Respondents. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.1.) 5
In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the
immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the
possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas[ v. Olsen], 194 F. Supp. 2d [368,] 374
[(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often
transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp.
2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-
to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS
facilities, all of which are under the control of the Attorney General.”); . . . . In light
of these transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent
other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official,
such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event
of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL
1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only
one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to
another local district).
5 Petitioner lists additional respondents in his list of parties to the action (see Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.4–5); however, because these additional respondents are not listed in the case caption of
the petition, the Court does not consider them to be named respondents in the action. (See id.,
PageID.1.)
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Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s conditional grant of habeas relief—i.e., the Court’s directive that Petitioner receive a bond
hearing or, alternatively, be released—in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these
proceedings. The Court will, however, dismiss the Attorney General of the United States as a
Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify
compliance with this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will dismiss Attorney General of the United States Pamela
Bondi as a Respondent.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
November 24, 2025 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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