Zelaya v. Lynch et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JULIO GODOY ZELAYA,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT LYNCH et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1355
Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on November 4, 2025, by filing a counseled petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake
Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter
alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that Respondents
release 	Petitioner 	from 	custody, 	enjoin 	Respondents 	from 	moving Petitioner 	outside 	the
jurisdiction of this Court pending adjudication of the petition, and award Petitioner attorney’s fees
and costs. (Id., PageID.11–12.)1 For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
1 In an order entered on November 6, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on November 12, 2025 (ECF
No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on November 18, 2025, (ECF No. 5). In Petitioner’s petition,
he requested oral argument. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) The Court concludes that the parties’
briefs sufficiently address the relevant issues and oral argument is unnecessary.
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 1
of 17

2
Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Honduras. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) On July 9, 2023, Petitioner
entered the United States at the San Ysidro port of entry in San Ysidro, California, without a valid
entry document. (Lemoncelli Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.50.) United States Border Patrol
(USBP) issued Petitioner a Form I-862 Notice to Appear, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) “for being an immigrant
who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of valid immigration and travel
documents.” (Id. ¶ 5, PageID.50–51.) At that time, USBP “paroled [Petitioner] into the United
States pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5),” which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Id.)
On March 26, 2024, Petitioner filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for
Withholding Removal. (Id. ¶ 7, PageID.51.) His application for asylum remains pending. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.5; Lemoncelli Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.52.)
On August 15, 2025, ICE encountered Petitioner near Detroit, Michigan, while Petitioner’s
adult son was driving him to scheduled eye surgery. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) ICE arrested and
detained Petitioner without bond. (Lemoncelli Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.51.)
II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 2
of 17

3
III. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents first argue that three provisions of the INA divest this Court of jurisdiction
over Petitioner’s habeas action: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9). (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.19–24.) For the following reasons, the Court concludes
that § 1252(e)(3), § 1252(g), and § 1252(b)(9) do not preclude the Court’s review of Petitioner’s
§ 2241 petition.
A. 	Section 1252(e)(3)
Section 1252(e)(3), which is titled, “Challenges on validity of the system,” states that:
[j]udicial review of determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its
implementation is available in an action instituted in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, but shall be limited to determinations of—
(i) whether such section, or any regulation issued to implement such section, is
constitutional; or
(ii) whether such a regulation, or a written policy directive, written policy
guideline, or written procedure issued by or under the authority of the Attorney
General to implement such section, is not consistent with applicable provisions
of this subchapter or is otherwise in violation of law.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
Here, Petitioner is not challenging the validity of the statutory scheme itself. Thus,
Petitioner’s present § 2241 petition is not the type of action that is contemplated by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(e)(3). Accordingly, the Court concludes that § 1252(e)(3) does not deprive the Court of
jurisdiction.
B. 	Section 1252(g)
Section 1252(g) provides:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas
corpus provision, . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by
or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 3
of 17

4
to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the scope of § 1252(g) is “narrow,” and
“[t]hat provision [only] limits review of cases ‘arising from’ decisions ‘to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). In Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., the United States Supreme Court explained that “[w]e have previously
rejected as ‘implausible’ the Government’s suggestion that § 1252(g) covers ‘all claims arising
from deportation proceedings’ or imposes ‘a general jurisdictional limitation.’” Id. (quoting Reno
v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)).
Here, Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus challenging his present confinement. This
action falls outside of the narrow scope of § 1252(g) and within the Court’s jurisdiction.
C. 	Section 1252(b)(9)
Under § 1252(b)(9),
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken
or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this
subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this
section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have
jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of Title 28 . . . or by any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such
questions of law or fact.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court held that
§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar the Supreme Court’s review of “questions of law” regarding whether
“certain statutory provisions require detention without a bond hearing.” Jennings, 582 U.S. at 292.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court explained that “the applicability of § 1252(b)(9)
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 4
of 17

5
turns on whether the legal questions that we must decide ‘aris[e] from’ the actions taken to remove
these 	aliens.” 	Id. 	at 	293. 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	rejected 	an 	“expansive 	interpretation 	of
§ 1252(b)(9),” explaining that even if “[t]he ‘questions of law and fact’ . . . could be said to ‘aris[e]
from’ actions taken to remove the aliens in the sense that the aliens’ injuries would never have
occurred if they had not been placed in detention,” this “expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9)
would lead to staggering results,” such as, for example, improperly precluding judicial review of
inhumane conditions of confinement claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Id.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that § 1252(b)(9) does not
divest the Court of jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s habeas petition.
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.24.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 5
of 17

6
1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to
determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. Here, Petitioner’s § 2241 petition presents principally legal
questions of statutory interpretation, which do not require the record that would be developed if
the Court required Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover, this Court is not
bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency interpretation of a statute. See Loper
Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024) (discussing that “courts need not and
under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an agency interpretation of the
law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 6
of 17

7
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges generally do not require exhaustion
because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) cannot review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process
challenge generally does not require exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable
procedural errors,” such as a claim “that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an
‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful
that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court
reaches that conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that
all noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention during removal proceedings. And, recently the
BIA proclaimed that all noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is simply unlikely that any
administrative review by the BIA would lead the Government to change its position, and thereby
obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. Accordingly, for the foregoing
reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 7
of 17

8
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies would likely be futile. Moreover, it is
clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. It is “unmistakable that . . . depriving
[Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And
any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Recent Detention
Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled
into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (Lemoncelli Decl. ¶¶ 4–5, ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.50–51.) Petitioner also filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding
Removal, which remains pending. (Id. ¶ 7, PageID.51.)
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further
governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply,
but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 8
of 17

9
noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of prosecution.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). 	The 	government 	may 	place 	the 	noncitizen 	into 	expedited 	removal
proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into regular
removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33 (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then,
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
However, to terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the
applicable regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which
governs the “[t]ermination of parole,”
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section, [2] upon accomplishment of
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
2 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the
parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that either circumstance applies here.
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 9
of 17

10
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may
be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public
benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025
WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below,
the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be
subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL
3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025
WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of
Petitioner’s parole has been accomplished. Petitioner fled from Honduras, seeking asylum in the
United States, and Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.5.) At that time, Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which
provides for parole into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public
benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); (Lemoncelli Decl. ¶¶ 4–5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.50–51.)
Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding Removal, which remains
pending. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 10, PageID.51, 52.) Thus, when Petitioner was recently arrested and detained,
Petitioner was still seeking asylum. (Id.) Moreover, there is nothing before the Court to suggest
that the humanitarian reason or public benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applies.
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 10
of 17

11
Indeed, Respondents make no argument about whether the requirements for termination of parole
in § 1182(d)(5)(A) and its regulations have been satisfied.
Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires
a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and
ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4
(same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025
WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298
(KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and
granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release
from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed
by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s
order to release the petitioner). But cf. Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025)
(reversing district court’s grant of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the
termination notice for previously granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a
strong likelihood of success in showing that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these
grants of parole under the [parole] program[s] on an individual basis”). Here, there is no indication
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 11
of 17

12
in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case determination regarding the revocation
of Petitioner’s parole was made. Indeed, the parties have not provided the Court with any facts that
would suggest that Petitioner’s parole was terminated before his August 15, 2025, arrest by ICE.
In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the
Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those
requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there
[wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022)
(discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own
regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends
to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))).
Respondents do not claim that they had any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than his
status as a noncitizen. Indeed, Respondents argue that any noncitizen, regardless of whether they
are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission” subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225. This Court and other courts throughout the country have
rejected this argument. Cf., e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL 3077589,
at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at
*5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 12
of 17

13
3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025
WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271, 2025
WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196,
2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem, No.
1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
(See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10–11.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that
Petitioner has received due process because “Petitioner received notice of the charges against him,
has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration judge, can request bond at that
time, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for
a short time.” (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.46.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
The Sixth Circuit held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 13
of 17

14
See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If this court
has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the claim is an
issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme Court set out
in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following three factors:
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. Here, Petitioner entered the
United States at a port of entry, and Respondents granted Petitioner parole into the United States,
determining that Petitioner was not a flight risk or danger. Respondents have now detained
Petitioner, and there is no dispute that Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding
detention, as one of the “most elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s
conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from
criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025)
(citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978
F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). There can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the
deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income
earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See
Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Clearly, there is a high risk
of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom if Petitioner does not receive an individualized
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 14
of 17

15
determination regarding the revocation of his parole. “To mitigate the risk of erroneous
deprivation, due process would require, ‘at [a] minimum, the opportunity for [Petitioner] to submit
evidence relevant to whether [the government] should revoke [his parole] before [it] make[s] a
revocation decision.’” Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 153 (W.D.N.Y. 2025)
(citation omitted).
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, Respondents have not shown
that they have a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably, continuing to
enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government, as it would
be required to continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights.3
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. (Resp., ECF
No. 4, PageID.46.)
3 Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition for the reasons set forth herein, the Court
does not, and need not, address other claims raised in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 15
of 17

16
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction”
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the predecessor to the
present immigration-related agencies,] District Director for the district where he is being
detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322
(6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has named the Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE, the
United States Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General of the United States as
Respondents. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.)4
In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the
immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the
possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas[ v. Olsen], 194 F. Supp. 2d [368,] 374
[(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often
4 Petitioner lists additional respondents in his list of parties to the action (see Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.4–5); however, because these additional respondents are not listed in the case caption of
the petition, the Court does not consider them to be named respondents in the action. (See id.,
PageID.1.)
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 16
of 17

17
transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp.
2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-
to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS
facilities, all of which are under the control of the Attorney General.”); . . . . In light
of these transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent
other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official,
such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event
of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL
1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only
one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to
another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s grant of habeas relief in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District
of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these proceedings.
The Court will, however, dismiss the Attorney General of the United States as a Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report
within three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with
this opinion and the corresponding judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the Attorney General
of the United States as a Respondent.
Dated: December 5, 2025 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-01355-HYJ-RSK ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/05/25 Page 17
of 17