Perez-Jasso v. Lynch et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
EDUARDO PEREZ-JASSO,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT LYNCH et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1345
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on November 3, 2025, by filing a counseled petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake
Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: to accept jurisdiction over this action; to issue a writ of habeas corpus directing
Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from immigration detention, or in the alternative,
to order the Petitioner be provided a prompt, individualized custody hearing before a neutral
adjudicator, at which the government bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing
evidence that continued detention is necessary to ensure his appearance or to protect the
community; to enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner absent lawful statutory authority
and constitutionally sufficient procedures; to declare that Petitioner is not subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and is entitled to custody review under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
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and, to award attorneys’ fees and costs for this action. (Id., PageID.19.)1 For the following reasons,
the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States in or about 1990.
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; see also Ellis Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.71.) ICE officials
arrested and detained Petitioner on October 19, 2025, in Rolling Meadows, Illinois. (Ellis Decl.
¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.71) Petitioner avers that he “was outside a local market near his
residence” when ICE officers arrested him. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
ICE issued Petitioner a Form I-862, Notice to Appear, which charged Petitioner with
inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for
being a noncitizen “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived
in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” (Ellis
Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.72.) Petitioner has requested a custody redetermination hearing
before an immigration judge. (Id. ¶ 8.) At the time of Respondents’ response, that hearing had not
yet been scheduled. (Id.) Petitioner is scheduled to appear before the Detroit Immigration Court
for a hearing on January 21, 2026. (Id.)
1 In an order entered on November 7, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on November 12, 2025, (ECF
No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on November 17, 2025, (ECF No. 5).
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II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
III. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents first argue that three provisions of the INA divest this Court of jurisdiction
over Petitioner’s habeas action: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9). (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.39–43.) For the following reasons, the Court concludes
that § 1252(e)(3), § 1252(g), and § 1252(b)(9) do not preclude the Court’s review of Petitioner’s
§ 2241 petition.
A. 	Section 1252(e)(3)
Section 1252(e)(3), which is titled, “Challenges on validity of the system,” states that:
[j]udicial review of determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its
implementation is available in an action instituted in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, but shall be limited to determinations of—
(i) whether such section, or any regulation issued to implement such section, is
constitutional; or
(ii) whether such a regulation, or a written policy directive, written policy
guideline, or written procedure issued by or under the authority of the Attorney
General to implement such section, is not consistent with applicable provisions
of this subchapter or is otherwise in violation of law.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
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Here, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his detention without a bond hearing;
Petitioner is not challenging the validity of the statutory scheme itself. Indeed, Petitioner does not
appear to dispute that § 1225(b)(2) requires detention of noncitizens detained under that
subsection. Instead, Petitioner argues that Respondents lack statutory authority to detain him under
§ 1225(b)(2) because that statute does not apply to his circumstances. Petitioner’s present § 2241
petition is not the type of action that is contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3). Accordingly, the
Court concludes that § 1252(e)(3) does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
B. 	Section 1252(g)
Section 1252(g) provides:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas
corpus provision, . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by
or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General
to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the scope of § 1252(g) is “narrow,” and
“[t]hat provision [only] limits review of cases ‘arising from’ decisions ‘to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). In Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., the United States Supreme Court explained that “[w]e have previously
rejected as ‘implausible’ the Government’s suggestion that § 1252(g) covers ‘all claims arising
from deportation proceedings’ or imposes ‘a general jurisdictional limitation.’” Id. (quoting Reno
v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)).
Here, contrary to Respondents’ assertions, Petitioner’s action requesting a writ of habeas
corpus ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing does not seek review of a discretionary
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decision to “commence proceedings,” “adjudicate” a case, or “execute” a removal order. Instead,
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus challenging his continued confinement without bond. This
action falls outside of the narrow scope of § 1252(g) and within the Court’s jurisdiction.
C. 	Section 1252(b)(9)
Under § 1252(b)(9),
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken
or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this
subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this
section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have
jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of Title 28 . . . or by any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such
questions of law or fact.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court held that
§ 1252(b)(9) did not bar the Supreme Court’s review of “questions of law” regarding whether
“certain statutory provisions require detention without a bond hearing.” Jennings, 582 U.S. at 292.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court explained that “the applicability of § 1252(b)(9)
turns on whether the legal questions that we must decide ‘aris[e] from’ the actions taken to remove
these 	aliens.” 	Id. 	at 	293. 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	rejected 	an 	“expansive 	interpretation 	of
§ 1252(b)(9),” explaining that even if “[t]he ‘questions of law and fact’ . . . could be said to ‘aris[e]
from’ actions taken to remove the aliens in the sense that the aliens’ injuries would never have
occurred if they had not been placed in detention,” this “expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9)
would lead to staggering results,” such as, for example, improperly precluding judicial review of
inhumane conditions of confinement claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Id.
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Here, Petitioner is challenging his entitlement to a bond hearing, and for the reasons set
forth above, the Court concludes that § 1252(b)(9) does not divest the Court of jurisdiction to
consider Petitioner’s habeas petition.
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.44.)
Respondents further argue that, if the immigration judge rules against Petitioner, can then appeal
any unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Id.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
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402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to
determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024)
(discussing that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not
defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner, which
are not premised on “correctable procedural errors,” generally do not require exhaustion because
the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require
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exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable procedural errors,” such as a claim
“that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an ‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to
review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody
would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact
that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all noncitizens
who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest and detention. Notably, the BIA
recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was
later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is simply
unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA of that denial would lead the Government to
change its position, and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies and request a bond hearing would likely
be futile. Moreover, it is clear that delay would result in hardship for the Petitioner. First, Petitioner
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must await the bond hearing before an immigration judge. There is no evidence in the record as to
how long Petitioner would have to wait until such a hearing, if any, were scheduled. Petitioner’s
request would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado. Then, Petitioner
would have the opportunity to appeal any unfavorable decision to the BIA. Appeals of bond denials
“typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.” Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp.
3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citation omitted). It is “unmistakable that . . . depriving
[Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And
any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (See
Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9–12, 14–15.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every
element for detention under § 1225(b)(2) based on the statute’s “text, structure, and history.”
(Resp., ECF No. 4 PageID.60.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
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clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And, § 1226(a) states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
Id. § 1226(a). The plain language of these provisions indicates that both § 1225 and § 1226 govern
the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. The difference is that § 1225 provides
for mandatory detention and § 1226 allows for the release of the noncitizen on conditional parole
or bond. As explained below, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs
Petitioner’s detention.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted); see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009);
see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “must give effect
to the clear meaning of statutes as written” (citation omitted)). “When interpreting a statute, the
inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In
re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). But, “the ‘meaning—
or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.’”
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (citation omitted). And, “the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-
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Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (citation omitted). The Court must also “use every tool
at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024).
As set forth above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention “of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States” See id. § 1225(a)(1).
The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See id. § 1101(a)(13).
The word “entry,” is not defined in the INA, see generally id. § 1101, but the dictionary definition
of “entry” is “the right or privilege of entering” or “the act of entering.” Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entry (last visited Nov. 24, 2025).
“Entry” has long been understood to mean “a crossing into the territorial limits of the United
States.” Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Matter of Pierre,
14 I&N Dec. 467, 468 (BIA 1973)). Further, the phrase “seeking admission” is also undefined in
the statute. The dictionary definition of “seeking” is “ask[ing] for,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seeking (last visited Nov. 24, 2025), and the word
“seeking” “necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp.
3d 211, 218 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citations omitted).
Respondents argue that any noncitizen who has not been lawfully admitted, regardless of
whether they are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission”
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. However, that reading of § 1225 would render the
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qualifier “seeking admission” in the statute entirely unnecessary. “It is ‘a cardinal principle of
statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citations omitted). Given Congress’s decision to use different
terms in § 1225—i.e., “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission”—the Court will
presume that Congress intended these phrases to mean different things. See Pulsifer v. United
States, 144 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2024) (“In a given statute, . . . different terms usually have different
meanings.” (citation omitted)).
Here, Petitioner is not actively seeking to lawfully cross into the territorial limits of the
United States because he already entered the United States more than three decades ago. (See Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) As the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
explained when addressing this issue:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then
proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be
described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be
described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered
to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
(or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered
unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the
United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [the petitioner],
because he has already been residing in the United States for several years.
Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2025); see Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 29, 2025) (“[S]eeking admission’ . . . implies action – something that is currently occurring,
and in this instance, would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.”).
In comparison to § 1225, “[s]ection 1226(a) is less specific.” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025). Section 1226 provides that
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“[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Looking at both § 1225 and § 1226, even if the statutory text appears unambiguous when viewed
in isolation, “courts are to interpret the words of a statute in context.” Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101
(citation omitted); see Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (“The plainness or
ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but
as well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
Section 1225 	is 	titled: 	“Inspection 	by 	immigration 	officers; 	expedited 	removal 	of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A title such as this “is
especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.”
Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring). Additionally, Congress’s decision to include the
word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such
as “stowaways” and “crewmen,” in § 1225 evidences an intent to address noncitizens arriving “at
a border or port of entry.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2)(3). In
contrast, § 1226 is titled: “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. “That Congress
separated removal of arriving aliens[, as set forth in § 1225,] from its more general section for
‘Apprehension and detention of aliens,’ [as set forth in] § 1226, implies that Congress enacted
§ 1225 for a specific, limited purpose.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing Dubin v.
United States, 143 S. Ct. 1557, 1567–68 (2023)).
Further, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court
explained that § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s
borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to
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enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. The United States Supreme Court
stated that, in contrast, “[s]ection 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining
. . . aliens [already living within the United States] pending their removal.” Id. at 288. Thus, in
Jennings, the United States Supreme Court differentiated between noncitizens initially arriving to
the United States who are governed by § 1225, and noncitizens already present in the country who
are governed by § 1226. See id. at 288–89.
The broader language of the statute, as recently amended, further supports the Court’s
conclusion. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe
a subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act
added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible
under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged
with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). If the Court accepted
Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, then § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered entirely
superfluous. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (“[W]e follow the cardinal rule that statutory language
must be read in context [since] a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it. . . . [And,] [t]he
rule against superfluities complements the principle that courts are to interpret the words of a
statute in context.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, for the above-discussed reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States
and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested.2
2 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in a number of other habeas corpus actions
filed by immigration detainees. See, e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL
3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL
3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025
WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232,
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B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.15–16.) Petitioner contends that Respondents have not
demonstrated that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger (Id., PageID.15.) Petitioner also contends
that he should have the opportunity to have a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge and that
by issuing its decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, the BIA has taken nearly all bond authority
away from Immigration Judges. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that
Petitioner has received due process because:
Petitioner received notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may
attend hearings with an immigration judge, can request bond at that time, has the
right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for
a short time. Petitioner is scheduled for a master calendar hearing.
(Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.66.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271,
2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v.
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez
v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025). And, this Court
is far from the first federal District Court to reach this conclusion.
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Respondents contend that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time. (See Resp.
ECF No. 4, PageID.66.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own supporting
evidence—there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing has been
scheduled. 	Respondents 	claim 	further 	“that 	statutory 	provisions 	denying 	bond 	during
administrative removal proceedings do not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (Id., PageID.65
(citation omitted).)
If 	the 	Court 	agreed 	with 	Respondents 	that 	Petitioner’s 	detention is 	governed 	by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), then the Government’s due process argument might carry more weight. However,
as set forth above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is
governed 	by 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Instead, 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	is 	governed 	by 	§ 1226(a).
Section 1226(a) clearly sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien
subject to that provision. The statute allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested
alien, or release the alien on “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions 	prescribed 	by, 	the 	Attorney 	General,” 	or 	“conditional 	parole.” 	See 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)(1)–(2). 	This 	discretionary 	framework 	“requires 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	make 	an
individualized custody determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit held discussed that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration
detention. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If
this court has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the
claim is an issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme
Court set out in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following
three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of
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erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)
(citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e.,
“whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See
Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). There
can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss
of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most
fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. An individualized bond
hearing ensures that an immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk or a
danger to the community, reducing the risk that Petitioner will suffer an “erroneous deprivation”
of his rights. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, Respondents have not
established a significant interest in “detaining someone who [could convince] a neutral adjudicator,
following a hearing and assessment of the evidence, that his ongoing detention is not warranted.”
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See id. Furthermore, Respondents have not established that an individualized hearing would
impose 	significant 	“administrative 	or 	financial 	costs” 	in 	this 	case—“[t]o 	the 	contrary,”
Respondents’ position “requires the government to continue funding and overseeing [Petitioner’s]
detention[.]” See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.3
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. (Resp., ECF
No. 4, PageID.68.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction”
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
3 Petitioner also contends that, to the extent that Respondents’ position is accepted and judicial
review of his detention is denied, their position violates the Suspension Clause of the United States
Constitution. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID. 16–18.) Because the Court will conditionally grant
Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, concluding that Petitioner’s detention violates both the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the INA, Petitioner has not been denied judicial review.
Therefore, the Court does not, and need not, address Petitioner’s Suspension Clause argument.
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The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the predecessor to the
present immigration-related agencies,] District Director for the district where he is being
detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322
(6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has named the North Lake Processing Center Warden, the Director
of the Detroit Field Office of ICE, the Lake County Sheriff, the Acting Executive Associate
Director of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, the Acting Director of ICE, a Deputy
Director of ICE, the United States Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General of the
United States, and the President of the United States as Respondents. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.)
In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the
immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the
possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas[ v. Olsen], 194 F. Supp. 2d [368,] 374
[(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often
transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp.
2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-
to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS
facilities, all of which are under the control of the Attorney General.”); . . . . In light
of these transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent
other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official,
such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event
of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL
1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only
one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to
another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
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In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s conditional grant of habeas relief—i.e., the Court’s directive that Petitioner receive a bond
hearing or, alternatively, be released—in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these
proceedings. The Court will, however, dismiss the Lake County Sheriff, the Acting Executive
Associate Director of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, the Acting Director of ICE, a
Deputy Director of ICE, the Attorney General of the United States, and the President of the United
States as Respondents.
VII. 	Petitioner’s Request for Limiting Order
In Petitioner’s petition, he asks the Court “to enjoin Respondents from re-detaining
Petitioner absent lawful statutory authority and constitutionally sufficient procedures. (Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.19.) As set forth herein, the Court will conditionally grant Petitoner’s § 2241
petition and order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing within five business days
or to immediately release Petitioner from custody. However, the Court declines to enter the
limiting order sought by Petitioner. Any potential, future detention is not a proper subject for the
present § 2241 action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
[detainee] unless— . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” (emphasis added)).
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
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report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will dismiss Lake County Sheriff Richard Martin, Acting
Executive Associate Director of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Marcus Charles,
Acting Director of ICE Todd M. Lyons, Deputy Director of ICE Madison Sheason, Attorney
General of the United States Pam Bondi, and President of the United States Donald J. Trump as
Respondents.
Dated: 	December 2, 2025 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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