Vera Curillo v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
WILSON VERA CURILLO,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1340
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner Wilson Vera Curillo initiated this action on November 1, 2025, by filing a
counseled petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.)
Petitioner is presently detained by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
at the North Lake Processing Center (North Lake) in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: accept jurisdiction over this matter; order Respondents not to transfer Petitioner
out of the Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these proceedings; declare that
Respondents’ detention of Petitioner violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as
well as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to schedule a bond hearing for Petitioner within five (5) days
and accept jurisdiction to issue a bond order; and to award attorneys’ fees and costs for this action.
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.17.)
In an Order (ECF No. 3) entered on November 4, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to
show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
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by Petitioner should not be granted. Respondents filed their response (ECF No. 4) on November
7, 2025. Petitioner filed a reply (ECF No. 5) on November 11, 2025. For the following reasons,
the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Ecuador. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) He entered the
United States in or around 2001 “without being inspected and admitted or paroled by immigration
officials” (De Leon Declaration, ECF No. 4-1, ¶ 4, PageID.53). Petitioner has one child who is a
United States citizen and who Petitioner helps support. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 3.)
On October 21, 2025, United States Border Patrol (USBP) encountered and arrested
Petitioner in Chicago, Illinois. (De Leon Decl., ECF No. 4-1, ¶ 5, PageID.53.) That day, ICE
placed Petitioner into removal proceedings by issuing and filing a Form I-862, Notice to Appear,
charging Petitioner with inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner “is present in the United States
without having been admitted or paroled, and . . . because he does not have valid immigration
documents.” (De Leon Declaration, ECF No. 4-1, ¶ 6, PageID.53–54.)
Petitioner has not been given a bond determination hearing. (Id., ¶ 8, PageID.55–56.) On
October 22, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion for a bond redetermination hearing in the Detroit
Immigration Court; however, the immigration judge denied bond for lack of jurisdiction. (Id., ¶ 8,
PageID.54; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). The primary habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, confers upon the
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federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” This includes challenges by non-citizens in
immigration related matters. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
III. 	Exhaustion
Respondents first contend that this Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas
corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 4,
PageID.26–29.) They claim that “Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before the
immigration court” and that, “should he request a bond hearing, he would have the right to appeal
an unfavorable decision to the BIA.” (Id., PageID.26.) Petitioner contends that exhaustion is not
required and that “[a]ny appeal to the BIA is futile.” (Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.56–60.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145
(1992)). This discretion is referred to as “prudential” exhaustion, Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan,
937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must
comply with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention.” See Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1621,
2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)). However, courts within the Sixth Circuit
“have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v. California Care Corp., 709 F.2d
1241 (9th Cir. 1983),” to determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. See Lopez-
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Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025).
Under this three-factor test, courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)). 	Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that
prudential exhaustion should not be required in Petitioner’s case for the reasons below.
First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241 petition is whether 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination relies upon a purely legal
question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that would be developed should
the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover, this Court is not
bound by and is not required to give deference to any agency interpretation of a statute. See Loper
Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (noting that “courts need not and under the
[Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply
because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner, which
are not premised on “correctable procedural errors,” generally do not require exhaustion because
the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need
for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact that the Government
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has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all aliens who have resided within
the United States prior to their arrest and detention. Notably, the BIA recently proclaimed that any
individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was later detained is no longer
eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is unlikely that any administrative review
by the BIA would lead the Government to change its position and thereby obviate the need for
judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court
concludes that prudential exhaustion is not required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4. A
court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is ‘fit’
for resolution and delay means hardship.” See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529
U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of
administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
Here, there is no question that, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent
decision in Yajure Hurtado, requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies and request
a bond hearing would be futile. The average processing time for a bond appeal in 2024 exceeded
200 days. See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025). And there is
nothing that requires the BIA to act promptly. It is unmistakable that “depriving [Petitioner] of
[his] liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And any delay
results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025
WL 2496379, at *5. Additionally, the question of whether Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing
is a purely legal question fit for resolution by this Court.
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In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that prudential exhaustion is warranted,
the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the
Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) According to Petitioner, noncitizens who “were present in the United States for
a number of years prior to being taken into detention” are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
(Id., PageID.8.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner is “an applicant for admission” and,
therefore, is detained under § 1225. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.29–31.) To address the parties’
arguments, the Court must examine the two primary statutory provisions at play: 8 U.S.C. § 1225
and § 1226.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides:
in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Section 1226(a), on the other hand, “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 289 (2018). It states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
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Except as provided in subsection (c) 1 and pending such decision, the Attorney
General
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved
by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the
Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
In sum, both provisions govern the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings;
the critical difference is that § 1225 provides for mandatory detention, while § 1226 allows for the
release of the noncitizen on conditional parole or bond. For the following reasons, the Court finds
that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted); see Corey v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009);
see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting how courts “must give effect
to the clear meaning of statutes as written”). When engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court’s
“inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In
re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Binno v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 826
F.3d 338, 346 (6th Cir. 2016)). However, ambiguity is not determined by examining provisions in
isolation. “[T]he ‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident
when placed in context.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)). “The words of a statute must be read in
1 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land
Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (citation omitted). This Court must also “use every tool at
[its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enter., 603 U.S. at 400.
Examining the statute as a whole, in line with the guiding principles of statutory construction, this
Court agrees with the numerous other courts in the country that have concluded that Respondents’
interpretation of the statute is much too broad.
As explained above, § 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as any noncitizen
“present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States
(whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .).” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Therefore, based on a
plain reading of this limited phrase, any noncitizen who has not been legally allowed to enter is
treated under § 1225 as an “applicant for admission.”
However, although the terms of § 1225 may seem unambiguous when viewed in isolation,
context matters. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (emphasizing the importance of
context even when a statutory term is unambiguous). As noted above, § 1225(b)(2) provides that
“in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” Id.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Respondents’ reading of § 1225 would render the remaining
qualifier of “an alien seeking admission” entirely unnecessary.
That is, rather than stating that mandatory detention is required for any “applicant
for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” the statute
would instead provide for mandatory detention for any “applicant for admission, if
the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
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Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 CIV. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2025) (strikethrough text in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). “It is ‘a cardinal
principle of statutory construction’ that a ‘statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that,
if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174
(2001)). Given Congress’ decision to use different terms—“applicant for admission” and “alien
seeking admission”—the Court will presume that Congress intended to mean different things. See
Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024) (“In a given statute, . . . different terms usually
have different meanings.”) Therefore, in examining the text of § 1225, the Court must also
examine the meaning of the phrase: seeking admission. The question remains: is a noncitizen who
already entered the United States unlawfully but seeks to stay “seeking admission”?
The 	plain, 	ordinary 	meaning 	of 	“seeking” 	means 	“asking 	for.” 	Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seeking (last visited Nov. 6, 2025). It is
a present participle, which “necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez v.
Hyde, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025). The term
“admission” is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). However, “entry,” is not
defined in the INA. See generally id. § 1101. The dictionary defines “entry” as “the right or
privilege 	of 	entering” 	or 	“the 	act 	of 	entering.” 	Merriam-Webster 	Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entry (last visited Nov. 6, 2025). “Entry” has long
been understood to mean “a crossing into the territorial limits of the United States.” Hing Sum v.
Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Matter of Pierre, 14 I & N Dec. 467,
468 (BIA 1973)).
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However, Petitioner is not actively seeking to lawfully cross into the territorial limits of
the United States because he already entered the United States over two decades ago, in 2001. (See
Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.). As Lopez Benitez noted:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then
proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be
described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be
described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered
to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
(or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered
unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the
United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [petitioner],
because he has already been residing in the United States for more than two years.
Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *7; see also Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6
(“[S]eeking admission’ implies action – something that is currently occurring, and in this instance,
would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.”).
Indeed, § 1225 is titled: “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” A title such as this “is especially valuable
[where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.” Yates, 574 U.S. at
552 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). Congress’ decision to include the word “arriving,” as well
as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such as “stowaways” and as
“crewmen” evidences an intent to address noncitizens coming to the United States—whether on
one side of the border or the other—and who are presently “seeking admission” into the United
States. Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 118
(2023)). The Supreme Court has recognized this distinction: that § 1225 applies to noncitizens
when they arrive at the border or when they enter illegally and are caught very close to the border,
and § 1226 applies to noncitizens who successfully have entered the United States—whether
legally or illegally. See, e.g., Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (“In sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes
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the [g]overnment to detain certain [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country under
§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the [g]overnment to detain certain [noncitizens]
already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under § 1226(a) and (c).”
(emphasis added)).
Furthermore, Respondents’ interpretation urges this Court to turn a blind eye to the
remainder of the statutory scheme. Courts are instructed to “construe statutes, not isolated
provisions.” King, 576 U.S. at 486. Whereas § 1225 governs the treatment of “arriving aliens,”
§ 1226 is much broader, referring to all other aliens not lawfully present but not arriving. To read
§ 1226 otherwise would ignore recent amendments to § 1226 and render Congress’ recent
enactments superfluous, a result this Court is instructed to avoid. See TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 31.
Just this year, Congress enacted the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025),
which amended § 1226 to prescribe a subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary
bond analysis. Specifically, the Act added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those
noncitizens who are inadmissible under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who
have been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).
Notably, § 1182(a)(6)(A) refers to “[a]n alien present in the United States without being admitted
or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the
Attorney General . . .”, in other words, someone like Petitioner. If all individuals like Petitioner,
“present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,” were already subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225, then there would have been no need for Congress to amend the
INA to provide for mandatory detention of individuals who were “present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled” and who were arrested, charged with, or committed certain
crimes. If the Court accepted Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, the Court would
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be rendering § 1226(c)(1)(E) entirely superfluous. See Corey, 556 U.S. at 314 (“A statute should
be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.”).
Considering the foregoing, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A),
governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already
present within the United States without being admitted or paroled at the time that they were
apprehended. 2
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) Respondents counter
Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received due process because he “received
notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration
judge, can request bond at that time, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and
has been detained by ICE for a short time.” (Resp. ECF No. 4, PageID.25, 49.)
The Supreme Court has held that “[o]nce an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance
changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including
aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 682. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Id. at
690. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See
A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). This includes noncitizens, like Petitioner. See
2 This Court is far from the first federal district court to reach this conclusion. Petitioner cites
dozens of cases reaching the same result. (See Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.62–64.)
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id.; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990); Chavez-Acosta v.
Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2023).
If this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), then the Government’s due process argument might carry more weight. However,
as set forth above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is
governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section
1226(a) sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that
provision. The statute explicitly allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested
noncitizen or release the noncitizen with either “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), (2). This discretionary framework “requires a bond hearing to make an
individualized custody determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020) (applying the Matthews v.
Eldridge test in the context of immigration). Matthews v. Eldridge requires a court to consider the
following three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
1. 	Private Interest
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most
elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. The Court
may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is held in
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conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, No. 25-CV-
01151 (JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 1459154 at *7 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v.
Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)).
Respondents do not claim that the conditions of Petitioner’s confinement at North Lake
differ in any material way from criminal incarceration. Detained away from his family and
community, Petitioner is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss
of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most
fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 2025 WL 1459154 at *7.
Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he is the father of a United States citizen child, who he
helps to support. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 3.) At the time that he was arrested, Petitioner was
employed, walking to work. (Id., PageID.4.) Therefore the “private interest” factor strongly weighs
in favor of Petitioner.
2. 	Risk of Error
Likewise, the second Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. There is a high risk of
erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom should he not receive an individualized bond
hearing at which the immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk and/or a
danger to the community. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
3. 	Respondents’ Competing Interests and Burdens of Additional or
Substitute Procedures
Finally, the Court recognizes that the Government “does, indeed, have a legitimate interest
in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and preventing harms to the
community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924, at *12 (D. Mass.
Sept. 9, 2025). Respondents have not established a significant interest in potentially “detaining
someone who [could convince] a neutral adjudicator, following a hearing and assessment of the
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evidence, that his ongoing detention is not warranted.” See id. Furthermore, Respondents have not
established that an individualized hearing would pose “administrative or financial costs” in this
case—“[t]o the contrary,” Respondents’ position “requires the government to continue funding
and overseeing [Petitioner’s] detention[.]” See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Matthews v. Eldridge factors weighs in Petitioner’s
favor. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory
detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will Order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and accompanying Judgment or, in
the 	alternative, 	immediately 	release 	Petitioner 	from 	custody. 	The 	Court 	will 	also 	Order
Respondents to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and
accompanying judgment to certify compliance with this Opinion. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
November 20, 2025 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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