Lara v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
MAURICIO MORA LARA,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1332
Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner Mauricio Mora Lara initiated this action on October 31, 2025, by filing a
counseled petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.)
Petitioner is presently detained by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
at the North Lake Processing Center (North Lake) in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: accept jurisdiction over this matter; order Respondents not to transfer Petitioner
out of the Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these proceedings; declare that
Respondents’ detention of Petitioner violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as
well as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to schedule a bond hearing for Petitioner within five (5) days
and accept jurisdiction to issue a bond order; and to award attorneys’ fees and costs for this action.
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.17–18.)
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In an order (ECF No. 3) entered on November 3, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to
show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
by Petitioner should not be granted. Respondents filed their response (ECF No. 4), Petitioner filed
his reply (ECF No. 5) and Respondents filed a corrected response (ECF No. 6) on November 6,
2025. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) He entered the United States
in 2000 (id.) “without being inspected and admitted or paroled by immigration officials”
(Wachowski Declaration, ECF No. 6-1, ¶4, PageID.86). He resides in Elgin, Illinois with his wife
and three children, all of whom are United States citizens. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
Petitioner is the beneficiary of an approved I-130 Petition for Alien Relative, submitted by
his wife on his behalf. (Id.) Petitioner also has an approved I-601A waiver of inadmissibility with
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). (Id.) At the time of his detention,
Petitioner was awaiting an interview to receive his green card. (Id.)1
1 The relevance of the forms referenced in the petition and the process required before Petitioner
could apply for an immigrant visa were aptly summarized by the district court in Soto v. Miller,
No. 1:23-CV-03016-EFS, 2023 WL 8850747, (E.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 2023):
To obtain an immigrant visa based on a close family relationship with a U.S. citizen
or LPR is a multi-step process. The first step under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) is for the relative, who is a U.S. citizen or LPR, to file a Petition for
Alien Relative—using Form I-130—with USCIS on behalf of his or her noncitizen
family member to classify that noncitizen as an immigrant relative. . .
If the “immigrant relative” desires to continue to reside in the United States with
their U.S. citizen/LPR family member during the immigration process, the next step
in the immigration process can involve the immigrant relative applying for an I-
601A Provisional Unlawful Presence Waiver. The filing of the I-601A application
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On October 26, 2025, ICE encountered and arrested Petitioner near Elgin, Illinois.
(Wachowski Declaration ¶ 5, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.87.) ICE issued Petitioner a Form I-862,
Notice to Appear, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), alleging that Petitioner “is an immigrant who is
present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled.” (Id. ¶ 6, PageID.88.) The
NTA has not yet been accepted, and Petitioner is not currently in removal proceedings. (Id. ¶ 9,
PageID.88.) Petitioner has not been given a bond determination hearing. (Id. ¶ 7, PageID.89; Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.10.)
II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). The primary habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, confers upon the
is a necessary step in the immigration process because, by remaining in the United
States, the noncitizen is at odds with other immigration laws. A noncitizen who has
been unlawfully in the United States for more than 180 days is deemed inadmissible
for immigration benefits for a specified period of time following their departure or
removal from the United States—and as discussed below, they must depart the
United States as part of the process to obtain an immigrant visa. So, noncitizens
who remain in the United States with their U.S. citizen/LPR family member for 180
days or more must seek relief from being deemed inadmissible by filing an I-601A
application with USCIS. To establish eligibility for an I-601A waiver, the
noncitizen “immigrant relative” must show that they are “the spouse or son or
daughter of a United States citizen or” LPR and that refusing them entry “would
result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent” of
the noncitizen. The USCIS has “sole discretion” to determine whether to grant an
I-601A application for a waiver.
If USCIS grants the I-601A application, the immigration-benefits process moves to
the next step, which involves filing an Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration
Application, DS-260, with the State Department.
Id. at *1–2 (footnotes omitted).
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federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” This includes challenges by non-citizens in
immigration related matters. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001)
III. 	Exhaustion
Respondents first contend that this Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas
corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 6,
PageID.64–67.) Specifically, Respondents argue that Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing.
(Id., PageID.64.) They claim that “[s]hould he request and the court grant a hearing, he would have
the right to appeal any unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).” (Id.)
Petitioner contends that exhaustion is not required and that “[a]ny appeal to the BIA is futile.”
(Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.53.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This discretion is referred to as “prudential”
exhaustion, Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019), and such a court-
made exhaustion rule must comply with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson,
725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet
decided “whether courts should impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s
habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention.” See Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-
12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)).
However, courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United
States v. California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983),” to determine whether prudential
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exhaustion should be required. See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL
2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). Thus,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by and is not required to give deference to any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (noting
that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an
agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner here,
generally do not require exhaustion because the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of
Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that
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conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that
§ 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all aliens who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest
and detention. Notably, the BIA recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the
United States unlawfully and was later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216,
229 (BIA 2025). It is simply unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA would lead to the
Government changing its position and precluding judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4. A
court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is fit for
resolution and delay means hardship.” See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529
U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of
administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
Here, there is no question that, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent
decision in Yajure Hurtado, requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies and request
a bond hearing would be futile. Even if Petitioner were to request and be denied bond, appeals of
bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.” See Rodriguez v.
Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239. 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025). It is possible that a determination from
the BIA as to whether Petitioner is entitled to bond would come before any final decision regarding
removal. Nevertheless, it is unmistakable “depriving [Petitioner] of [his] liberty while awaiting a
BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. Any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner]
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is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5. And, as discussed
above, in approving Petitioner’s I-601A waiver, USCIS has determined that Petitioner’s family
would suffer “extreme hardship” without Petitioner’s presence. Finally, the question of whether
Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing is a purely legal question fit for resolution before this Court.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that prudential exhaustion is warranted,
the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the
Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) According to Petitioner, noncitizens “who were present in the United States for
a number of years prior to being taken into detention” are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
(Id., PageID.8.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner “unambiguously meets every
element for detention under § 1225(b)(2),” and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were
ambiguous, its structure and history support the agency’s interpretation of the statute.” (Resp.,
ECF No. 6, PageID.67.) To address the parties’ arguments, the Court must examine the two
primary statutory provisions at play: 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and § 1226.
Section 1225(b)(2)(a) provides that
in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(a).
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Section 1226(a), on the other hand, “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 289 (2018). It states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c)2 and pending such decision, the Attorney
General
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved
by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the
Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
In sum, both provisions govern the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings;
the critical difference is that § 1225 provides for mandatory detention, while § 1226 allows for the
release of the noncitizen on conditional parole or bond. For the following reasons, the Court finds
that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226.
Respondents contend that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1225 because he is an
applicant for admission, seeking admission, and who is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to
be admitted. (Resp., ECF No. 6, PageID.67.) Respondents further argue that any “unadmitted”
noncitizen is an “‘applicant[] for admission’ regardless of their proximity to the border, the length
of time they have been present in the United States, or whether they ever had the subjective intent
to properly apply for admission.” (Id., PageID.68.) They explain that the INA defines “admission”
2 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.” (Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).) Petitioner claims
that § 1226(a) “applies by default to all persons pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is
to be removed from the United States.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.12 (quotations omitted; alteration
in original).)
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Corey v. United
States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009); see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022
(noting how courts “must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written”). When engaging
in statutory interpretation, the Court’s “inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as
well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Binno v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 346 (6th Cir. 2016)). However, ambiguity is not
determined by examining provisions in isolation. “[T]he ‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain
words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S.
473, 486 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)).
“The words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012). This Court must also
“use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enter.,
603 U.S. at 400. Examining the statute as a whole, in line with the guiding principles of statutory
construction, this Court agrees with the numerous other courts in the country that have concluded
that Respondents’ interpretation of the statute is simply much too broad.
Respondents contend that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1225 because he is an
applicant for admission. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.24.) As explained above, § 1225 defines an
“applicant for admission” as any noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been
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admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .).”
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Therefore, based on a plain reading of this limited phrase, any noncitizen
who has not been legally allowed to enter is treated under § 1225 as an “applicant for admission.”
However, although the terms of § 1225 may seem unambiguous when viewed in isolation,
context matters. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (emphasizing the importance of
context even when a statutory term is unambiguous). As noted above, § 1225(b)(2) provides that
“in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” Id.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Respondents’ reading of § 1225 would render the remaining
qualifier of “an alien seeking admission” entirely unnecessary. “That is, rather than stating that
mandatory detention is required for any ‘applicant for admission, if the examining immigration
officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted,’ the statute would instead provide for mandatory detention for any ‘applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking admission is
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 CIV.
5937 	(DEH), 	2025 	WL 	2371588, 	at 	*6 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	13, 	2025) 	(quoting 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)). “It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that a ‘statute ought, upon
the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). Given Congress’ decision to use different terms—
“applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission”—the Court will presume that Congress
intended to mean different things. See Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024) (“In a
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given statute, . . . different terms usually have different meanings.”). Therefore, in examining the
text of § 1225, the Court must also examine the meaning of the phrase: seeking admission. The
question remains: is a noncitizen who already entered the United States unlawfully but seeks to
stay “seeking admission”?
The 	plain, 	ordinary 	meaning 	of 	“seeking” 	means 	“asking 	for.” 	Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seeking (last visited Nov. 6, 2025). It is
a present participle, which “necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez v.
Hyde, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025). The term
“admission” is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). However, “entry,” is not
defined in the INA. See generally id. § 1101. The dictionary defines “entry” as “the right or
privilege 	of 	entering” 	or 	“the 	act 	of 	entering.” 	Merriam-Webster 	Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entry (last visited Nov. 6, 2025). “Entry” has long
been understood to mean “a crossing into the territorial limits of the United States.” Hing Sum v.
Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Matter of Pierre, 14 I & N Dec. 467,
468 (BIA 1973)).
However, Petitioner is not actively seeking to lawfully cross into the territorial limits of
the United States because he already entered the United States over two decades ago, in 2000. (See
Pet., PageID.1.) As Lopez Benitez noted:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then
proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be
described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be
described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered
to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
(or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered
unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the
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United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [petitioner],
because he has already been residing in the United States for more than two years.
2025 WL 2371588, at *7. See also Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (“[S]eeking
admission’ implies action – something that is currently occurring, and in this instance, would most
logically occur at the border upon inspection.”).
Indeed, § 1225 is titled, “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” A title, such as this “is especially valuable
[where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.” Yates, 574 U.S. at
552 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). Congress’ decision to include the word “arriving,” as well
as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such as “stowaways” and as
“crewmen” evidences an intent to address noncitizens coming to the United States—whether on
one side of the border or the other—and who are presently “seeking admission” into the United
States. Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing to Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110,
118 (2023)). The Supreme Court has recognized this distinction: that § 1225 applies to noncitizens
when they arrive at the border or when they enter illegally and are caught very close to the border,
and § 1226 applies to noncitizens who successfully have entered the United States—whether
legally or illegally. See, e.g. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (“In sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes
the [g]overnment to detain certain [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country under
§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the [g]overnment to detain certain [noncitizens]
already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under § 1226(a) and (c).”
(emphasis added)).
Furthermore, Respondents’ interpretation urges this Court to turn a blind eye to the
remainder of the statutory scheme. Courts are instructed to “construe statutes, not isolated
provisions.” King, 576 U.S. at 486. Whereas § 1225 governs the treatment of “arriving aliens,”
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§ 1226 is much broader, referring to all other aliens not lawfully present but not arriving. To read
§ 1226 otherwise would ignore recent amendments to § 1226 and render Congress’ recent actions
entirely superfluous, a result that this Court has long been instructed to avoid. See TRW Inc., 534
U.S. at 31.
Just this year, Congress enacted the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No.119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025),
which amended § 1226 to prescribe a subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary
bond analysis. Specifically, the Act added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those
noncitizens who are inadmissible under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who
have been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).
Notably, § 1182(a)(6)(A) refers to “[a]n alien present in the United States without being admitted
or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the
Attorney General . . .”, in other words, someone like Petitioner. If all individuals like Petitioner,
“present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,” were already subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225, then there would have been no need for Congress to amend the
INA to provide for mandatory detention of individuals who were “present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled” and who were arrested, charged with, or committed certain
crimes. Quite simply, were the Court to agree with Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and
1226, the Court would be nullifying Congress’s intent and rendering § 1226(c)(1)(E) entirely
superfluous.
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Considering the foregoing, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A),
governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already
present within the United States at the time that they were apprehended.3
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
The Supreme Court has held that “[o]nce an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance
changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including
aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 682. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Id. at
690. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See
A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025). This includes noncitizens, like Petitioner. See id.; see
also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990); Chavez-Acosta v. Garland,
No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 236837, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2023).
Granted, if this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the Government’s due process argument might hold true. However, as set forth
above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) clearly
sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision.
The statute explicitly allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested noncitizen or
release the noncitizen with either “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C.
3 Petitioner cites dozens of cases from the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits that have all reached the same result. (Reply, ECF No. 5,
PageID.58–59.)
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§ 1226(a)(1), (2). This discretionary framework “requires a bond hearing to make an individualized
custody determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020) (applying the Matthews v.
Eldridge test in the context of immigration). Matthews v. Eldridge requires a court to consider the
following three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
1. 	Private Interest
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most
elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. The Court
may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is held in
conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, No. 25-CV-
01151 (JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 1459154 at *7 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v.
Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)).
Respondents do not claim that the conditions of Petitioner’s confinement at North Lake
differ in any material way from criminal incarceration. Detained away from his family and
community, Petitioner is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss
of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most
fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 2025 WL 1459154 at *7.
Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he is married to a United States citizen and the father
of three United States citizen children, and serves as the primary financial support for his family.
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(Pet., PageID.1.) Since arriving in the United States and prior to his detention, Petitioner had been
consistently gainfully employed and was detained while in the course of his work as a landscaper.
(Id., PageID.4.) Therefore, the “private interest” factor strongly weighs in favor of Petitioner.
2. 	Risk of Error
Likewise, the second Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor, Clearly, there is a high
risk of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom should he not receive an individualized
bond hearing at which the immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk
and/or a danger to the community.
3. 	Respondents’ Competing Interests and Burdens of Additional or
Substitute Procedures
Lastly, the Court recognizes that the Government “does, indeed, have a legitimate interest
in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and preventing harms to the
community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL 2607924, at *12 (D. Mass.
Sept. 9, 2025). Respondents have not shown a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued
detention, particularly where Petitioner was previously approved for a Provisional Unlawful
Presence Waiver. (See Pet., PageID.4.) Notably, continuing to enforce Petitioner’s detention would
likely impose more costs upon the Government, as it would be required to continue funding and
overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Matthews v. Eldridge factors weighs in Petitioner’s
favor. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory
detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights.
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V. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit Field Office Director, Petitioner’s immediate custodian,
is the only proper Respondent. (Resp., ECF No. 6, PageID.83.) They request that the Court dismiss
the remaining named Respondents because they are not Petitioner’s custodians within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 2243. (Id.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Circuit Ct.
of Ky., 410 U.S. 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of [§] 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has “conclude[d] that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the INS District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the
respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003).
Here, Petitioner has named Detroit ICE Field Office of ICE Kevin Raycraft as a Respondent and
Petitioner’s immediate custodian. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
In Roman, the Sixth Circuit stated that while it “conclude[d] that the immediate custodian
rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, [there is] the possibility of exceptions to
this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court went on to note:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas [v. Olsen, 194 F.Supp.2d 368, 374
(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often
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transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp.
2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-
to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS
facilities, 	all 	of 	which 	are 	under 	the 	control 	of 	the 	Attorney 	General.”);
Rosenbloom, supra, at 549. In light of these transfers, one court reasoned that an
alien may properly name a respondent other than his immediate custodian because
a petition naming a higher level official, such as the Attorney General, could be
adjudicated without interruption in the event of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte v.
Comm’r, No. 00 CIV 2412 (RWS), 2000 WL 1617999, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30,
2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only one’s immediate custodian would be
dismissed when the alien was transferred to another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
Considering the foregoing, the Court recognizes the need to ensure that Respondents
maintain authority to enforce this Court’s grant of habeas relief and directive that Petitioner receive
a bond hearing or, alternatively, be released in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the
Western District of Michigan. The Court, therefore, will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a
Respondent to these proceedings.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter an order and judgment conditionally
granting Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.)
The Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and accompanying order
and judgment or, in the alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody.
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The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within six business days of the
date of this Court’s opinion and accompanying order and judgment to certify compliance with this
opinion. The status report shall include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted
or denied, and if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: November 13, 2025 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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