Juarez Mendez v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
SELVIN WILFREDO JUAREZ MENDEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1323
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on October 29, 2025, by filing a counseled petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake
Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan. Petitioner challenges the
lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court, inter alia, to declare that Respondents’
actions to detain Petitioner violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
Immigration and Nationality Act, to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner or promptly schedule a bond hearing for
Petitioner’s removal proceedings, and to award attorneys’ fees and costs for this action.1 (Id.,
1 Petitioner also asked the Court to order Respondents not to transfer Petitioner out of the Western District of Michigan
during the pendency of these proceedings, to stay Petitioner’s removal until completion of these proceedings, and to
“[o]rder Respondents to produce forthwith Petitioner’s A-file and custody records (including any custody
determinations, Form I-286, and any documents relied upon to deny bond jurisdiction).” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.23.)
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner’s requests for the Court to order
certain actions during the pendency of these proceedings will be moot. As to Petitoner’s request for the production of
his immigration records in this action, the Court concludes that the requested materials are not necessary to resolve
the legal questions presented in the present § 2241 petition. Rules 6(a), 7, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
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PageID.22–23.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.2
Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Guatemala. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; Ellis Decl. ¶ 4,
ECF No. 6-1, PageID.473.) Petitioner has resided in the United States since 2004, and Petitioner
entered the United States without inspection. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9; Ellis Decl. ¶ 4, ECF
No. 6-1, PageID.473.) On August 24, 2025, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)
“encountered and arrested” Petitioner “as he was leaving his home in Washington, D.C.” (Ellis
Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.473; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9.) ERO issued Petitioner “a Form
I-862, Notice to Appear (NTA),” which charged Petitioner with inadmissibility pursuant to
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) “because he is an immigrant
who is present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, or who arrived at a
time or place not designated by the Attorney General,” and pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the
INA “as an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid
unexpired immigration visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document.”
(Ellis Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.473–474.)
Respondents 	contend 	that 	Petitioner 	is 	detained 	without 	bond 	“under 	INA
§ 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) because [Petitioner] is an applicant for admission who is seeking admission,
2 When Petitioner initiated this action, he also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF Nos. 2 and 3)
seeking largely the same relief that Petitioner seeks in his § 2241 petition (see ECF No. 1.) In an order entered on
October 30, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas
corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 5.) Respondents filed their
response on November 4, 2025 (ECF No. 6), and Petitioner filed his reply on November 7, 2025 (ECF No. 7). Because
the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, the Court does not, and need not, separately address
Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order.
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and he is not clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission.” (Id. ¶ 6, PageID.474.) “On
September 16, 2025, [Petitioner] submitted a bond redetermination request to the immigration
judge.” (Id. ¶ 8.) On September 25, 2024, the immigration judge denied bond, concluding that “he
lacked jurisdiction to set a bond.” (Id.)
On October 24, 2025, Petitioner “filed a Form EOIR-42B, Application for Cancellation of
Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents,” in the Detroit
Immigration Court. (Id. ¶ 10, PageID.475.) Petitioner “appeared in the Detroit Immigration Court
with his attorney for a master calendar hearing” on October 28, 2025. (Id. ¶ 11, PageID.476.)
“[T]he immigration judge has not set a date” for the hearing regarding Petitioner’s “EOIR-42B
application.” (Id.)
II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 145
S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
III. 	Merits Discussion
Respondents argue that Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and
that Petitioner is not entitled to further process at this time. (See Resp., ECF No. 6, PageID.452,
466.) The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.3
3 Respondents also argue that Petitioner has improperly raised APA-related claims in his petition. (See Resp., ECF
No. 6, PageID.451.) Specifically, in his § 2241 petition, Petitioner claims that his detention violates the APA. (See
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A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (See
Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10–12.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every
element for detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were
ambiguous, its structure and history support the agency’s interpretation of the statute.” (Resp.,
ECF No. 6, PageID.452.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” And § 1226(a) states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c)[4] and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.13.) However, the APA only provides for review of agency action “for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also Trump v. J.G.G., 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1006–07 (2025)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Here, the Court has concluded that the writ of habeas corpus provides an adequate remedy
for Petitioner’s claims that his detention violates both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the INA.
Accordingly, “habeas corpus, not the APA, is the proper vehicle here,” see J.G.G., 145 S. Ct. at 1007 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring), and the Court declines to consider Petitioner’s APA claims. Petitioner also raises several other claims in
his petition, including arguing that his present detention violates “[b]ond [r]egulations” and the Suspension Clause of
the United States Constitution. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.12, 15.) Respondents do not separately address these
arguments. As set forth herein, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, concluding that
Petitioner’s detention violates both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the INA. Therefore, the Court
does not, and need not, address the additional arguments in Petitioner’s petition, which Respondents did not address
in their response to the Court’s show cause order.
4 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The
parties do not contend that Petitioner has been convicted of any crime listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).
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(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
Id. § 1226(a). The plain language of these provisions indicates that both § 1225 and § 1226 govern
the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. The difference is that § 1225 provides
for mandatory detention and § 1226 allows for the release of the noncitizen on conditional parole
or bond. As explained below, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs
Petitioner’s detention.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted); see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009);
see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “must give effect
to the clear meaning of statutes as written”). “When interpreting a statute, the inquiry begins with
the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” See In re Vill. Apothecary,
Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). But “the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain
words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S.
473, 486 (2015) (cleaned up). And “the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93,
101 (2012) (cleaned up). The Court must also “use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the best
reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024).
As set forth above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention “of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” See id. § 1225(a)(1).
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The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See id. § 1101(a)(13).
The word “entry” is not defined in the INA, see generally id. § 1101, but the dictionary definition
of “entry” is “the right or privilege of entering” or “the act of entering.” Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entry (last visited Nov. 18, 2025).
“Entry” has long been understood to mean “a crossing into the territorial limits of the United
States.” Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pierre, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 467, 468 (B.I.A. 1973)). Further, while the phrase “seeking admission” is also undefined in
the statute, the ordinary meaning of “seeking” is “ask[ing] for,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seeking (last visited Nov. 18, 2025), and the word
“seeking” “necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp.
3d 211, 218 (D. Mass. 2025).
Respondents contend that any noncitizen who has not been lawfully admitted, regardless
of whether they are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking
admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. However, that reading of § 1225 would
render the qualifier “seeking admission” in the statute entirely unnecessary. “It is a cardinal
principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if
it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” TRW
Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (cleaned up). Given Congress’s decision to use different
terms in § 1225—i.e., “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission”—the Court will
presume that Congress intended these phrases to mean different things. See Pulsifer v. United
States, 144 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2024) (“In a given statute, . . . different terms usually have different
meanings.”).
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Here, Petitioner is not actively seeking to lawfully cross the territorial limits of the United
States because he already entered the United States over 20 years ago in 2004. (See Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.9.) As the Southern District of New York explained when addressing this issue:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then
proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be
described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be
described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered
to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
(or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered
unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the
United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [the petitioner],
because he has already been residing in the United States for several years.
Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937, 2025 WL 2371588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025);
see Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
29, 2025) (“[S]eeking admission’ . . . implies action—something that is currently occurring, and
in this instance, would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.”).
In comparison to § 1225, “[s]ection 1226(a) is less specific,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025). The statute provides that
“[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Looking at both § 1225 and § 1226, even if the statutory text appears unambiguous when viewed
in isolation, “courts are to interpret the words of a statute in context.” Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101; see
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language
is determined not only by reference to the language itself, but as well by the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” (cleaned up)).
Section 1225 is titled, “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A title such as this “is
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especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.”
Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring). Additionally, Congress’s decision to include the
word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such
as “stowaways” and “crewmen,” in § 1225 evidences an intent to address noncitizens arriving “at
a border or port of entry.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2)(3). In
contrast, § 1226 is titled, “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. “That Congress
separated removal of arriving aliens [as set forth in § 1225] from its more general section for
‘Apprehension and detention of aliens’ implies that Congress enacted § 1225 for a specific, limited
purpose.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citation omitted) (citing Dubin v. United
States, 143 S. Ct. 1557, 1567–68 (2023)).
Further, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court explained that
§ 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports
of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is
admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. By contrast, the Supreme Court stated that “[s]ection 1226
generally governs the process of arresting and detaining . . . aliens [already living within the United
States] pending their removal.” Id. at 288. Thus, in Jennings, the Supreme Court differentiated
between noncitizens initially arriving to the United States who are governed by § 1225 and
noncitizens already present in the country who are governed by § 1226. See id. at 288–89.
Moreover, the Court cannot ignore congressional intent when conducting statutory
analysis. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe a
subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act
added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible
under subsections (6)(A), (6)(C), and (7) of section 212(a) of the INA, and who have been arrested
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for, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Quite simply, were
the Court to agree with Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would
be rendered entirely superfluous.
Accordingly, for the above-discussed reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States
and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested.5
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.18–22.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by
stating that Petitioner has received due process because “Petitioner received notice of the charges
against him, has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration judge, had the
opportunity to request bond and appeal the denial of bond, and has been detained by ICE for just
over two months.” (Resp., ECF No. 6, PageID.466.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364,
5 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in a number of other habeas corpus actions filed by immigration
detainees. See, e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL 3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4,
2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus
Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft,
No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271,
2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196, 2025 WL
3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich.
Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025).
And this Court is far from the first federal district court to reach this conclusion.
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1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see also
Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Respondents contend that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time. (See Resp.
ECF No. 6, PageID.466.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own
supporting evidence—there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing
has been scheduled. Respondents claim further “that statutory provisions denying bond during
administrative removal proceedings do not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (Id., PageID.464
(citation omitted).)
Granted, if this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the Government’s due process argument might hold true. However, as set forth
above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) clearly
sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision.
The statute allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien, or release the alien
on “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by,
the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). This discretionary
framework “requires a bond hearing to make an individualized custody determination.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If this court
has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the claim is an
issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme Court set out
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in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following three factors:
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). The
Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, that is, “whether a detainee is held
in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, 784
F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st
Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here, Petitioner, through
counsel, represents that he has three minor children, all of whom are United States citizens and
reside in Washington, DC. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9.) There can be no doubt that he is
“experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends
and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of
freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
Likewise, the second Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Clearly, there is a high
risk of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom should he not receive an individualized
bond hearing at which the immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk or a
danger to the community.
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
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preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025). However, Respondents have not shown that they have a
significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably, continuing to enforce Petitioner’s
detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government, as it would be required to
continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
IV. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. (Resp., ECF
No. 6, PageID.469.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction”
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service, ICE’s predecessor agency]
District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus
petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has named the
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Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE, the United States Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Attorney General of the United States, and the North Lake Processing Center Warden as
Respondents.6 (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.)
In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the
immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the
possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods
are often transferred several times during their detention. In light of these transfers,
one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent other than his
immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official, such as the
Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event of a
transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL
1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only
one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to
another local district).
Id. at 325–26 (citations omitted). Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be
appropriate if the INS were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas
petitions.” Id. at 326.
In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s conditional grant of habeas relief—i.e., the Court’s directive that Petitioner receive a bond
hearing or, alternatively, be released—in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these
6 Petitioner lists additional respondents in his list of parties to the action (see Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4–5); however,
because these additional respondents are not listed in the case caption of the petition, the Court does not consider them
to be named respondents in the action. (See id., PageID.1.)
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proceedings. The Court will, however, dismiss the Attorney General of the United States and the
North Lake Processing Center Warden as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will dismiss Attorney General of the United States Pamela
Bondi and North Lake Processing Center Warden Angela Dunbar as Respondents.
Dated: November 18, 2025 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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