Unaucho-Castro v. Unknown Party et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JOSE F. UNAUCHO-CASTRO,
Petitioner,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1318
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on October 28, 2025, by filing a counseled combined petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and request for emergency injunctive relief.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County,
Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: to accept jurisdiction over this action, to declare that Petitioner’s detention
without an individualized determination violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; to
declare that Petitioner’s detention was made in violation of statute and regulation; to declare the
continued detention of Petitioner to lack statutory authorization; to issue a writ of habeas corpus
ordering Respondents to release Petitioner immediately; to issue an order prohibiting the
Respondents from transferring Petitioner from the district without the Court’s approval; and to
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award attorney’s fees and costs. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.11.) 1 For the following reasons, the
Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a citizen and national of Ecuador. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) He entered the
United States in 2022 (id.) “without being inspected and admitted or paroled by immigration
officials.” (De Leon Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.42.) Petitioner has remained in the United
States since that time. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) He is the father of four children and, at the
time of his detention, was gainfully employed. (Id.)
On March 22, 2022, a United States Border Patrol (USBP) agent encountered Petitioner
near El Paso, Texas, and “issued and served” him with a Form I-862, Notice to Appear, charging
him with inadmissibility under §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i)(I) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) “because he is present in the United States without being inspected and
admitted or paroled, and . . . because he does not have a valid immigration documents [sic].” (De
Leon Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.42.) Petitioner was initially detained but, on May 6, 2022,
was released on a bond of $10,000. (Id. ¶ 8, PageID.43.) During his removal proceedings,
1 In his petition, Petitioner sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the transfer of Petitioner
out of this district during the pendency of the action and to protect him from “ongoing and
imminent harm caused by Respondents.” (ECF 1-1, PageID.14.) In an order entered on October
30, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ
of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No.
3.) Respondents filed their response on November 5, 2025, (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his
reply on November 9, 2025, (ECF No. 5). As to Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining
order, because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, the Court does not,
and need not, separately address Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order.
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Petitioner conceded removability but filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum, which remains
pending. (Id. ¶¶ 10–12, PageID.43–44.)
On October 12, 2025, a USBP agent encountered and arrested Petitioner in Chicago,
Illinois. (Id. ¶ 13, PageID.44.) ICE later issued Petitioner a Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest of
Alien. (Id.)
On October 14, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion for the immigration court to enforce the
previously issued bond; however, the immigration judge denied the motion because Petitioner filed
the motion in removal proceedings, not bond proceedings. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17, PageID.45.)
II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
III. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before the immigration court and, therefore,
has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.22.) Respondents
further argue that Petitioner should request a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any
unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Id.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
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Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479, 484 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95 (1969)),” to determine
whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. (cleaned up). Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
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Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024)
(discussing that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not
defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner, which
are not premised on “correctable procedural errors,” generally do not require exhaustion because
the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require
exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable procedural errors,” such as a claim
“that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an ‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to
review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody
would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact
that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all noncitizens
who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest and detention. Notably, the BIA
recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was
later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is thus
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unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA of that denial would lead the Government to
change its position, and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies and request a bond hearing would likely
be futile. Moreover, it is clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. First, as noted
above, Petitioner would need to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge. There is no
evidence in the record as to how long Petitioner would have to wait until such a hearing, if any,
were scheduled. Petitioner’s request would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in
Yajure Hurtado. Then, Petitioner would have the opportunity to appeal any unfavorable decision
to the BIA. Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.”
Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citation omitted). It is
“unmistakable that . . . depriving [Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision
certainly equates to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to
avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
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In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(See Pet., ECF No. 1.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every element for
detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were ambiguous, its
structure and history support the agency’s interpretation of the statute.” (Resp., ECF No. 4,
PageID.24.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “. . . in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And, § 1226(a) states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c)[ 2 ] and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
2 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The parties do not contend that Petitioner has been convicted of any crime
listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).
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(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
Id. § 1226(a). The plain language of these provisions indicates that both § 1225 and § 1226 govern
the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. The difference is that § 1225 provides
for mandatory detention and § 1226 allows for the release of the noncitizen on conditional parole
or bond. As explained below, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs
Petitioner’s detention.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted); see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009);
see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “must give effect
to the clear meaning of statutes as written” (citation omitted)). “When interpreting a statute, the
inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In
re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). But, “the ‘meaning—
or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.’”
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (citation omitted). And, “the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-
Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (citation omitted). The Court must also “use every tool
at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024).
As set forth above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention “of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the
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United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” See id.
§ 1225(a)(1). The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien
into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See id.
§ 1101(a)(13). The word “entry” is not defined in the INA, see generally id. § 1101, but the
dictionary definition of “entry” is “the right or privilege of entering” or “the act of entering.”
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entry (last visited
Nov. 18, 2025). “Entry” has long been understood to mean “a crossing into the territorial limits of
the United States.” Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Matter
of Pierre, 14 I&N Dec. 467, 468 (BIA 1973)). Further, the phrase “seeking admission” also is
undefined in the statute. See generally id. Looking to the plain, ordinary meaning of “seeking,”
this word is defined as “ask[ing] for,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/seeking (last visited Nov. 18, 2025), and the word “seeking” “necessarily
implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 218 (D. Mass.
July 24, 2025) (citations omitted).
Respondents contend that any noncitizen who has not been lawfully admitted, regardless
of whether they are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking
admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. However, that reading of § 1225 would
render the qualifier “seeking admission” in the statute entirely unnecessary. “It is ‘a cardinal
principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that,
if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citations omitted). Given Congress’s decision to
use different terms in § 1225—i.e., “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission”—the
Court will presume that Congress intended these phrases to mean different things. See Pulsifer v.
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United States, 144 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2024) (“In a given statute, . . . different terms usually have
different meanings.” (citation omitted)).
Here, Petitioner is not actively seeking to lawfully cross into the territorial limits of the
United States because he already entered the United States in 2022. (See Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.4.) As the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York explained
when addressing this issue:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then
proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be
described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be
described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered
to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
(or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered
unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the
United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [the petitioner],
because he has already been residing in the United States for several years.
Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2025); see Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 29, 2025) (“‘[S]eeking admission’ . . . implies action – something that is currently occurring,
and in this instance, would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.”).
In comparison to § 1225, “[s]ection 1226(a) is less specific,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025), and states that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision
on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Looking at
both § 1225 and § 1226, even if the statutory text appears unambiguous when viewed in isolation,
“courts are to interpret the words of a statute in context.” Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted);
see Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (“Whether a statutory term is unambiguous,
however, does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its component words. Rather, ‘[t]he
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plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language
itself, [but as well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context
of the statute as a whole.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
Section 1225 is titled, “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A title, such as this “is
especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.”
Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring). Additionally, Congress’s decision to include the
word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such
as “stowaways” and “crewmen,” in § 1225 evidences an intent to address noncitizens arriving “at
a border or port of entry.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2)(3). In
contrast, § 1226 is titled, “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. “That Congress
separated removal of arriving aliens[, as set forth in § 1225,] from its more general section for
‘Apprehension and detention of aliens,’ [as set forth in] § 1226, implies that Congress enacted
§ 1225 for a specific, limited purpose.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing Dubin v.
United States, 143 S. Ct. 1557, 1567–68 (2023)).
Further, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court
discussed that § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s
borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to
enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. The United States Supreme Court
stated 	that, 	in 	contrast, 	“[s]ection 	1226 	generally 	governs 	the 	process 	of 	arresting 	and
detaining . . . aliens [already living within the United States] pending their removal.” Id. at 288.
Thus, in Jennings, the United States Supreme Court differentiated between noncitizens initially
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arriving to the United States who are governed by § 1225, and noncitizens already present in the
country who are governed by § 1226. See id. at 288–89.
Additionally, Respondents’ interpretation urges this Court to turn a blind eye to the
remainder of the statutory scheme as recently amended. Courts are instructed to “construe statutes,
not isolated provisions.” King, 576 U.S. at 486. Just this year, Congress passed the Laken Riley
Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe a subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the
discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act added a subsection that explicitly mandates
detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and
1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). 	If all individuals like Petitioner, “present in the United States without
being admitted or paroled,” were already subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, then there
would have been no need for Congress to amend the INA to provide for mandatory detention of
individuals who were “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled” and who
were arrested, charged with, or committed certain crimes. See id. If the Court accepted
Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered entirely
superfluous. See Corey, 556 U.S. at 314 (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to
all its provisions.”)
Finally, 	it 	is 	Respondents’ 	position 	that 	applicants 	for 	admission 	detained 	under
§ 1225(b)(2) are subject to mandatory detention and are “ineligible for any subsequent release on
bond.” (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.33 (citation omitted).) However, in this case, Petitioner was not
detained at the time of his initial encounter with USBP; instead, Petitioner was released on a bond
of $10,000, which according to Respondents’ position would have been unavailable to him if he
was detained under § 1225(b)(2). (See De Leon Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.43). Therefore,
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following Respondents’ reasoning, the very actions taken by Respondents suggest that Petitioner
was, and is, subject to § 1226, not § 1225. Cf. Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *7 (“It was
not until Lopez-Campos requested a custody redetermination hearing (bond hearing) that
Respondents claimed his detention was under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). The Court cannot credit this
new position that was adopted post-hac, despite clear indication that Lopez-Campos was not
detained under this provision.”).
Accordingly, for the above-discussed reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States
and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested. 3
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (See
Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10–11.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that
Petitioner has received due process because “Petitioner received notice of the charges against him,
has access to counsel, may appear before an immigration judge, can request bond at that time, has
the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for less than
five weeks.” (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.36–37.)
3 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in a number of other habeas corpus actions
filed by immigration detainees. See, e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL
3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL
3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025
WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232,
2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271,
2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v.
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez
v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025). And, this Court
is far from the first federal District Court to reach this conclusion as noted by Petitioner.
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“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Respondents contend that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time. (See Resp.
ECF No. 4, PageID.37.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own supporting
evidence—there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing has been
scheduled. 	Respondents 	claim 	further 	“that 	statutory 	provisions 	denying 	bond 	during
administrative removal proceedings do not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (Id., PageID.35
(citation omitted).)
Granted, if this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the Government’s due process argument might hold true. However, as set forth
above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) clearly
sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision.
The statute allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien or release the alien
on “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by,
the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). This discretionary
framework “requires a bond hearing to make an individualized custody determination.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
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The Sixth Circuit has discussed that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration
detention. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If
this court has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the
claim is an issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme
Court set out in Mathews v. Eldridge. . . .”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following
three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos,
2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)
(citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e.,
“whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See
Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here,
Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he is the father or four children and, prior to his
detention, was gainfully employed. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) There can be no doubt that he is
“experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends
and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of
freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
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Likewise, the second Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. There is a high risk of
erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom should he not receive an individualized bond
hearing at which the immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk and/or a
danger to the community. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). But Respondents have not established
a significant interest in potentially “detaining someone who [could convince] a neutral adjudicator,
following a hearing and assessment of the evidence, that his ongoing detention is not warranted.”
See id. Furthermore, Respondents have not established that an individualized hearing would pose
“administrative or financial costs” in this case—“[t]o the contrary,” Respondents’ position
“requires the government to continue funding and overseeing [Petitioner’s] detention[.]” See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. 4
4 In his § 2241 petition, Petitioner also claims that his detention violates the APA. (See Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.9–10.) However, the APA only provides for review of agency action “for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also Trump v. J. G. G., 145
S. Ct. 1003, 1006–07 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Here, the Court has concluded that the
writ of habeas corpus provides an adequate remedy for Petitioner’s claims that his detention
violates both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the INA. Accordingly, “habeas
corpus, not the APA, is the proper vehicle here,” see J. G. G., 145 S. Ct. at 1007 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring), and the Court declines to consider Petitioner’s APA claims.
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V. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. (Resp., ECF
No. 4, PageID.38.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction”
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was the agency’s
prior name,] District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the respondent to his
habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner
has named the Warden of North Lake, the Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE, the United
States Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General as Respondents. 5 (Pet.,
ECF No.1, PageID.1.)
5 Petitioner lists additional respondents in his list of parties to the action (see Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.3–4); however, because these additional respondents are not listed in the case caption of
the petition, the Court does not consider them to be named respondents in the action. (See id.,
PageID.1.)
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In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the
immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the
possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas[ v. Olsen], 194 F. Supp. 2d [368,] 374
[(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often
transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp.
2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-
to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS
facilities, all of which are under the control of the Attorney General.”); . . . . In light
of these transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent
other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official,
such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event
of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL
1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only
one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to
another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s conditional grant of habeas relief—i.e., the Court’s directive that Petitioner receive a bond
hearing or, alternatively, be released—in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these
proceedings. The Court will, however, dismiss the Warden of North Lake and the United States
Attorney General as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will Order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
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within five business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also Order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify
compliance with this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will dismiss the Warden of North Lake and the United
States Attorney General as Respondents.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
November 24, 2025 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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