Ford v. Getting et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
ELIJAH MONROE FORD, 	Case No. 	1:25-cv-1150
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Jane M. Beckering
U.S. District Judge
v.
JEFFERY GETTING, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses the following motions:
 	a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Prosecutor Jeffrey Getting, ECF
No. 5, and
 	a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Kalamazoo Department of
Public Safety (KDPS), KDPS Chief Dave Boysen, KDPS Deputy Chief
Matthew Huber, KDPS Assistant Chief David Juday, KDPS Assistant
Chief Victor Green, and Chief of Staff Ryan Tibbets, ECF No. 11.
Plaintiff has not responded to any of Defendants’ motions.
Ford originally filed this lawsuit in the Kalamazoo County Circuit Court. 	On
September 25, 2025, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan. 	ECF No. 1. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that the KDPS Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment
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rights when they conducted a traffic stop and vehicle search on June 6, 2023. 	Id.,
PageID.17. Plaintiff further asserts that the search led to a false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution by Kalamazoo County Prosecutor Jeffrey
Getting. 	Id., PageID.18.
In ECF No. 5, Prosecutor Getting argues that the claims against him should
be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plead a malicious prosecution claim and that
any such claim is barred by immunity. 	ECF No. 5-1. 	In ECF No. 11, the KDPS
Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed for failure to
comply with Rule 8; (2) Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety should be dismissed
because a police department is not a legal entity capable of being sued under §1983;
(3) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Boysen, Huber, Juday, Green, and Tibbets
should be dismissed because they were not involved in the traffic stop; and (4)
Defendants Boysen, Huber, Juday, Green, and Tibbets are entitled to qualified
immunity. 	ECF No. 11, PageID.73.
II. 	Factual Allegations
Ford asserts that an unknown KDPS officer pulled him over on June 6, 2023,
because he “failed or didn’t use his blinker coming off of the curb.” 	ECF No. 1,
PageID. 13. 	Ford states that the traffic stop extended to an “investigative pretextual
stop.” 	Id. 	Ford alleges that the officer had prior knowledge of Ford’s passenger,
Earnest 	Spencer, 	who 	had 	three 	outstanding 	warrants 	for 	his 	arrest. 	Id.,
PageID.14. 	Ford says that the KDPS officer patted him down and did not find drugs
or paraphilia. 	However, Ford asserts that another KDPS officer patted down
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Spencer and found crack cocaine on his person. 	Id., PageID. 15. 	Next, Ford asserts
that “a pistol was Said to have been laying on the Front passenger Seat with a
Separate Fully load extended 22 round clip to a Glock-23 or (Glock 40. cal) Where
Earnest Spencer was presently Sitting Prior to being Order out of the Vehicle.” 	Id.,
PageID.15 [sic]. 	Ford says the officers then searched the vehicle and found other
drugs and a single bullet. 	Id. 	Ford asserts that the drugs did not belong to him.
Id., PageID. 15-16.
Next, Plaintiff asserts that he was charged for the drugs found in his vehicle.
Ford says that on June 8, 2023, he was “bonded out” for $1500. 	Id., PageID. 16.
Ford asserts that, on or about September 6, 2023, Kalamazoo County Prosecutor Jeff
Getting “maliciously prosecuted” him. 	Ford claims that he was charged with
controlled 	substance 	delivery/manufacturing 	of 	methamphetamine, 	felon 	in
possession of weapons/ammunition, and controlled substance delivery/manufacturing
of marijuana. 	Id., PageID. 13. 	Ford says that the charges were later dropped and
dismissed by the Eighth District Court. 	Id.
III. 	Motion to Dismiss Standard
The Federal Rules provide that a claim may be dismissed for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Put differently, if plaintiffs
do “not nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their
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complaint must be dismissed.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a claim has facial plausibility, a court must construe
the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff, 	accept 	the 	factual
allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Those
factual allegations “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 	League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted). “When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may
consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items
appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion so
long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained
therein.” 	Id.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. 	As such, his pleadings are subject to less
stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys. 	Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
IV. 	Analysis
A. Prosecutor Getting
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In his Complaint, Ford asserts that he sues Prosecutor Jeff E. Getting in his
official capacity only. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.11.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims as barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. 	The Supreme Court has held “that neither a State nor its
officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” 	Will v.
Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity for damages
cannot be maintained pursuant to § 1983 because that official has
Eleventh Amendment immunity. This is true because “a suit against a
state official in her or her official capacity is not a suit against the official
but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” As such, a suit against a
state official in his or her official capacity is no different than a suit
against the state.
Clark v. Chillicothe Corr. Inst., No. 2:19-CV-954, 2020 WL 1227224, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 13, 2020) (citations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit, in interpreting Will, has held “that plaintiffs seeking
damages under § 1983 [must] set forth clearly in their pleading that they are suing
the state defendants in their individual capacity for damages, not simply in their
capacity as state officials. 	Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir. 1989).
Here, Plaintiff indicates that he sues Prosecutor Getting in only his official
capacity. 	Plaintiff’s 	claim 	against 	Prosecutor 	Getting 	is 	barred 	by 	sovereign
immunity. 1 	Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court
1 	“There are three exceptions to a State’s sovereign immunity: (a) when the State
has consented to suit; (b) when the exception first set forth in Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), applies; and (c) when Congress has
properly abrogated a State’s immunity.” 	S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d
500, 507 (6th Cir. 2008). 	Only the second exception is potentially at issue here.
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grant Defendant Getting’s motion to dismiss.
B. KDPS Defendants
First, Defendants argue that KDPS is a department of public safety and cannot
be a proper defendant in a §1983 lawsuit. 	ECF No. 11, PageID.80.
The undersigned agrees that KDPS is not a separate legal entity capable of
being sued under § 1983. 	Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“[T]he Police Department is not an entity which may be sued . . . .”); May-Shaw v.
City of Grand Rapids, No. 1:19-CV-117, 2019 WL 2265076, at *3 (W.D. Mich. May 28,
2019) (“It is well settled in Michigan that a police department is not a legal entity
capable of being sued in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.” (citation omitted)). 	However,
the City of Kalamazoo, which governs KDPS, is a legal entity capable of being sued.
And unlike the State of Michigan, the City of Kalamazoo is a “person” under § 1983.
Monnell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. Of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 	The
undersigned therefore construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims against the
City of Kalamazoo. 	See LaPlante v. Lovelace, No. 2:13-CV-32, 2013 WL 5572908, at
*2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 2013) (construing the plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims
against Marquette County as the governing body of the Marquette County Sheriff’s
Department).
“Under the Ex parte Young exception, a federal court can issue prospective injunctive
and declaratory relief compelling a state official to comply with federal law.” 	Id.
Ford is not seeking prospective injunctive relief for an ongoing violation of federal
law. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.22-23. 	Thus, the Ex parte Young exception does not apply
in this case.
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Although the City of Kalamazoo is a “person” under § 1983, it “cannot be held
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” 	Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. “[I]n
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor . . . .” 	Id. (emphasis in original). 	Instead, Plaintiff must show that a
policy or custom of the City of Kalamazoo acted as the “moving force” behind a
violation of her constitutional rights. 	Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639
(6th Cir. 2005); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe v. Claiborne
Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 508-09 (6th Cir. 1996). 	The first inquiry in evaluating such a
claim is whether the municipality had a policy or custom. 	Doe, 103 F.3d at 509. 	“To
show the existence of a municipal policy or custom leading to the alleged violation, a
plaintiff can identify: (1) the municipality’s legislative enactments or official policies;
(2) actions taken by officials with final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of
inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of
federal violations.” 	Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 621 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing
Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)).
In Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth
Circuit held that if “no constitutional violation by the individual defendants is
established, 	the 	municipal 	defendants 	cannot 	be 	held 	liable 	under 	§
1983.” 	Generally, if no constitutional violation can be attributed to an individual
municipal actor, it is unlikely that the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right
at all. North v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 754 F. App’x 380, 390 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2018). 	More
recently, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that “in certain unusual circumstances, a
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municipality might be liable for a constitutional violation even in the absence of a
liable individual.” 	Hart v. Hillsdale Cnty., Michigan, 973 F.3d 627, 645 (6th Cir.
2020); Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 900 (6th Cir. 2018). 	A Monell claim
against a municipality may proceed without a claim against an offending officer, so
long as it remains consistent with a finding of a constitutional violation. 	Stucker v.
Louisville Metro Gov’t, No. 23-5214, 2024 WL 2135407, at *6 (6th Cir. May 13,
2024). 	There exists “scenarios when no officer may have acted unconstitutionally,
but the municipality has nonetheless inflicted constitutional harm of a victim – such
as a lack of action due to the failure to train, or where there are systematic problems
with the health care system in the County jail.” 	Grote v. Kenton Cnty., 85 F. 4th 397,
414 (6th Cir. 2023).
Here, Ford makes broad allegations that KDPS failed to properly train their
staff and officers. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.17.
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly summarized the minimum required to
constitute active conduct by a supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the
offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either
encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way
directly participated in it.” Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard
to 	mean 	that 	“at 	a 	minimum,” 	the 	plaintiff 	must 	show 	that 	the
defendant 	“at 	least 	implicitly 	authorized, 	approved, 	or 	knowingly
acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199
F.3d at 300); see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995); Walton
v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993).
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In the opinion of the undersigned, Ford’s failure to train claim against KDPS
fails for multiple reasons. 	First, Ford does not allege that KDPS “implicitly
authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced” the arresting officers’ behavior.
Furthermore, Ford’s allegations are conclusory and do not identify a policy or custom.
Accordingly, in the opinion of the undersigned, Ford’s Complaint fails to assert a
Monell claim against KDPS.
Next, Plaintiff asserts failure to train claims against Defendants KDPS Chief
Boysen, Deputy Chief Huber, Assistant Chief Juday, Assistant Chief Green, and
Chief of Staff Ryan Tibbits. 	Again, Ford does not allege that these individuals
“implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced” the officers’ actions.
Additionally, Ford’s claims against these Defendants are in their official
capacities only. 2 	Thus, Defendants argue that the claims are municipal liability
claims that fail as a matter of law. 	ECF No. 11, PageID.82.
“Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government
official for actions he takes under color of state law.” 	Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165 (1985). 	“Official-capacity suits, in contrast, ‘generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”
2 	It is also worthwhile to note that “[a]n individual capacity claim based on
supervisory liability, like all individual capacity claims, requires an allegation of
personal liability.” 	Venema v. West, 133 F.4th 625, 633 (6th Cir. 2025). 	“An official
cannot be held liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates under a theory
of respondeat superior, meaning that she ‘cannot be held liable simply because ... she
was 	charged 	with 	overseeing’ 	subordinate 	officers 	who 	violated 	the 	plaintiff's
constitutional rights.” 	Id. (quoting Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241
(6th Cir. 2016)). 	Finally, “[t]he complaint must plead that the official violated the
Constitution through her own actions.” 	Id.
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Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55
(1978). 	Thus, an official capacity claim against an individual defendant is treated
like a Monell claim against the entity of which the individual is an agent. 	See, e.g.,
Nelson v. Kentucky, No. CV 5:23-014-KKC, 2023 WL 1863162, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 9,
2023) (reasoning that “Nelson’s ‘official capacity’ claims against Engle and Jessica
are construed as claims against the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office”). 	“As long
as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-
capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity.” 	Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 270 n.8 (6th Cir. 1997) (italics in
original) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66)).
The first inquiry in evaluating a Monell claim is whether the entity had a policy
or custom. 	Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996). 	Then the
policy or custom must be the moving force behind the constitutional injury. Turner v.
City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815
(6th Cir. 2003); Doe, 103 F.3d at 508–09.
Here, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Chief Boysen, Deputy Chief
Huber, Assistant Chief Juday, Assistant Chief Green, and Chief of Staff Tibbits are
treated like a Monell claim against the entity of which they are agents. 	That entity
is the KDPS. 	But, as explained above, the undersigned construes Plaintiff’s
complaint against KDPS as asserting claims against the City of Kalamazoo. 	Thus,
it follows that notice to KDPS is also notice to the City of Kalamazoo sufficient for a
Monell claim under Mumford.
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Like Plaintiff’s claims against KDPS, Plaintiff’s claims against Chief Boysen,
Deputy Chief Huber, Assistant Chief Juday, Assistant Chief Green, and Chief of Staff
Tibbits for their failure to supervise and train are conclusory allegations. 	These
allegations do not rise to pleading a policy or custom. 	Accordingly, in the opinion of
the undersigned, Ford fails to state a Monell claim for failure to supervise against the
KDPS Defendants.
C. Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, the KDPS Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s constitutional
claims by asserting qualified immunity from liability. 	“Under the doctrine of
qualified 	immunity, 	‘government 	officials 	performing 	discretionary 	functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” 	Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a defendant raises
the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable
official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987)). 	The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. 	Martin v. City of
Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First, the court must
“determine if the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 	Id.
(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the court asks if the
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right at issue was “‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such that a
reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. (citing
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A court may address these steps in any order. 	Id. (citing
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). 	A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if
either step of the analysis is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted,
810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2016).
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
136 S. Ct. 	305, 308 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear
foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be “settled law,”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589
(1991) (per curiam), which means it is dictated by “controlling authority”
or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’ ” al–Kidd,
supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It is not enough that
the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be
clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish
the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply. See Reichle, 566 U.S., at
666, 	132 	S.Ct. 	2088. 	Otherwise, 	the 	rule 	is 	not 	one 	that 	“every
reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer's conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule's contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018).
As explained above, in the opinion of the undersigned, Ford fails to state a
constitutional claim against Chief Boysen, Deputy Chief Huber, Assistant Chief
Juday, Assistant Chief Green, or Chief of Staff Tibbits. 	Accordingly, it is also the
undersigned’s opinion that these Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
V. 	Unserved Defendants
If the Court adopts the undersigned’s recommendation with respect to the
named Defendants, then only un-named and un-served Defendants will remain in the
case. 	A review of the docket indicates that Defendants Unknown Arresting Officer,
Unknown Sergeant, Unknown Lieutenant, and Unknown Captain have never been
served with a summons and complaint. 	Service has not been completed because
Plaintiff has not identified these parties. 	The docket also indicates that Plaintiff has
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not requested additional time to identify and serve these Defendants. 	In fact, as
noted above, Plaintiff has not responded to the motions to dismiss at issue in this R.
& R.
Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court must,
after providing plaintiff with notice, either dismiss or order service within a specified
time frame against a Defendant who has not been served within 90 days after the
complaint was filed. 	The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court
dismiss the unnamed Defendants in this case if Plaintiff has not identified them
within the 14-day period for objections to this R. & R.
VI. 	Recommendation
For the reasons stated above, in the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff’s
claim against Prosecutor Getting is barred by sovereign immunity. 	Additionally,
Plaintiff fails to properly plead a Monell claim against Defendants KDPS, Chief
Boysen, Deputy Chief Huber, Assistant Chief Juday, Assistant Chief Green, and
Chief of Staff Ryan Tibbits.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant
Defendants’ motions to dismiss. 	ECF No. 5 &11.
Additionally, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court dismiss
the unnamed Defendants in this case if Plaintiff has not identified them within the
14-day period for objections to this R. & R.
Dated: 	June 2, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served on opposing parties
and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of any further
right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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